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ABSTRACT 
In various formulations, the idea of a developmental state has appeared in official discourse 
in South Africa since the advent of democratic government in 1994,  albeit that its adoption 
as state policy has been slow, uneven and inconsistent with the original East Asian model.  
What has been a feature of developmental state thinking in South Africa is the fact that the 
concept has been so poorly articulated in policy that it has come to mean different things to 
different state actors and to the public. This has been aggravated by the fact that the idea of a 
strongly interventionist developmental state has run counter to the idea of a diminished state 
enunciated in various neo-liberal policies.  Moreover, unlike the authoritarian and top-down 
East Asian model, the government envisages a South African developmental state which is 
infused with democratic content where citizens assist in the formulation of policy from 
below. In its emphasis on a bottom-up approach to policy formulation the South African 
model differs markedly from the conventional idea of a developmental state which is heavily 
reliant on a strong central bureaucracy to drive economic growth. In the South African model 
local government has been assigned a pivotal role in addressing persistent economic 
exclusion and uneven development. A central tenet of this approach is the need for local 
authorities to institutionalise participatory processes at grassroots level and devise effective 
structures and processes to facilitate citizen participation in local affairs.  
 
In the light of the above, this thesis sets out to examine the manner in which a system of 
developmental local government is being implemented in the City of Cape Town. Taking as a 
case study the township of Delft, the study looks at the systems and processes (and 
particularly the process of integrated development planning) set in place to advance citizen 
participation. It examines the extent to which the model is perceived to be achieving its goals 
from the perspective of political office bearers, officials from different spheres of government 
and residents. The research found that notwithstanding an enabling legislative and policy 
framework, there is little comprehension of, or interest, in the idea of developmental local 
government and municipal officials largely pay lip service to participatory processes which 
are carried out in a top-down fashion and which neither empower local residents nor enhance 
their welfare. It also concluded that developmental government, in its present form, is 
contributing little to the establishment of a national developmental state. 
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CHAPTER ONE:  SETTING THE SCENE 
__________________________________________________ 
 
The economic achievements of the newly industrialised countries of East Asia in the latter half 
of the 20th century sparked considerable theoretical debate on the role of the state and the 
appropriate trajectories of development policy for emerging economies (Amsden, 1989; Wade, 
1990; Beeson, 2009). In this context, the term ‘developmental state’ was used to describe the 
state-led model of economic growth adopted in the 1970s and 1980s by such countries as Japan, 
South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Vietnam amongst others (Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990; 
Woo-Cummings, 1999). Although the idea of ‘developmentalism’ lost some of its lustre 
following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, which prompted debate over the merits of state-led 
growth versus neo-liberal notions of a minimalist state (Burkett & Martin Hart-Landsberg, 2002; 
Onis, 1991), belief in the model has spread and it continues to hold appeal in many parts of the 
developing world and no less in post-Apartheid South Africa. 
 
In various formulations, the idea of a developmental state has appeared in official discourse in 
South Africa since the advent of democratic government in 1994 albeit that its adoption as state 
policy has been slow, uneven and inconsistent with the original East Asian model  (ANC, 2007b, 
Manuel, 2013; Evans, 2010, Fine, 2008). However, following the onset of the global financial 
crisis in 2008, which highlighted the weaknesses of laissez faire capitalism and emphasised the 
need for state regulation of the economy, there has been renewed interest in the idea of an 
interventionist developmental state and a growing conviction in many quarters (amongst 
academics, the media, policy formulators, social commentators and others) that it is the model 
most likely to succeed in overcoming South Africa’s multiple developmental challenges 
(Edigheji, 2010).  However, what has been a feature of developmental state thinking in South 
Africa is that the concept has been so poorly articulated in policy that it has come to mean 
different things to different state actors and to the public. This has been aggravated by the fact 
that the idea of a strongly interventionist developmental state has run counter to the idea of a 
diminished state enunciated in the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) macro-
economic framework which was launched in 1996 (Department of Finance, 1996) and the 
adoption of the principles of New Public Management which envisaged a public sector run on 
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more business-oriented principles (Cameron, 2009). This implicit contradiction aside, the 
conceptualisation of the developmental state in South Africa (to the extent that there is 
agreement on its core tenets) differs from that of the East Asian model, as shall be discussed, in a 
number of significant ways. 
 
1.1 Contextualization  
 
Chalmers Johnson (1982) is accredited with having coined the term ‘developmental state’ in the 
course of an investigation into Japan’s phenomenal post-war industrial expansion. Following 
Japan’s success, Beeson (2009:6) maintains, t h e  d ev e lo p men t a l  s t a t e  mod e l  w h i ch  
‘ was emulated with varying degrees of faithfulness and efficacy elsewhere in the region, became 
synonymous with East Asia’s rapid economic expansion and emblematic of the region’s 
distinctive approach to economic management’. Developmental states in this context are 
typically characterised by a strong centralised administrative authority which plays a central role 
in determining macro-economic policy and planning and which has no hesitation in intervening 
in the market in order to guide the path of economic development (Evans, 1995; Bagchi, 2000).  
This interventionist state role is frequently contrasted in the literature with the neo-liberal ‘free 
market’ approach which envisages an arms-length approach by the state and reliance on market 
forces to determine economic outcomes (Chang, 1999). 
 
While there continues to be debate on the essence of developmental states in the 21st century 
(Routley, 2012), there is broad consensus on the core features of the East Asian developmental 
model which the World Bank (1993) has referred to as the ‘Asian Miracle’. These features 
include a committed and determined political elite focused on achieving economic growth, a 
powerful, capable and insulated professional bureaucracy, successful policy interventions that 
promote growth, a strong symbiotic relationship between the state and private sector, relative 
autonomy of the bureaucracy and a weak and subordinated civil society (Meyns & Musamba, 
2010; Evans, 1995; Wade, 1990; Johnson, 1982; Edigheji, 2010; Routley, 2012).  
 
Notwithstanding the well-documented economic success of the so-called ‘Asian Tigers’, a 
number of authors have questioned the transferability of the East Asian developmental model 
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asserting that many of the preconditions for its success were historically and geo-politically 
contextual (Onis, 1991), emerging as it did in the aftermath of the devastating destruction of the 
Second World War and the threat of communist expansion in the region during the Cold War era 
(Mathews, 2006; Pempel, 1999). Others have pointed to the significance of cultural norms and 
political culture (Compton, 2000; Pye, 1985; Kuotsai, 2002; Kihl, 2004), in shaping the broad 
national consensus necessary to sustain a state-determined economic development path over a 
period of time (Gemandze, 2006). However, the approach has also not been without its critics 
who have pointed to the fact that East Asian development states were highly authoritarian in 
nature, that they permitted little dissent, imposed restrictive labour legislation and, in their early 
years at least, generally thought little of exploiting the working class who received low wages 
and often laboured under very poor conditions (Burkett & Hart-Landsberg, 2003). 
 
This has prompted some authors to assert that, while some elements of the Asian developmental 
state remain relevant for emerging economies elsewhere in the world, it is not possible, nor 
indeed desirable, to replicate the model as a whole. In a context where economic development is 
increasingly linked with notions of basic rights and entitlements, there has also been an 
increasing emphasis on the need for developmental states to embrace democratic principles and 
practices (Leftwich, 2002; White, 2006), which include the promotion of citizen participation 
(Welch & Nuru; 2006) as well as notions of good governance (Fritz and Rocha Menocal, 2007). 
 
1.2 Towards a Developmental State in South Africa 
 
An interest in the establishment of a developmental state was evident in the policy thinking of 
the ruling African National Congress (ANC) both in the lead-up to the first democratic elections 
in 1994 and on its assumption of office thereafter. Thus, the 1994 White Paper on Reconstruction 
and Development, which was based on the ANC’s Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP) 
(ANC, 1994), although not explicitly referring to a developmental state, nevertheless asserted the 
need for an interventionist state which would play a leading role in steering the economy and in 
reconstructing South African society: 
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Reconstruction and development will be achieved through the leading and enabling role 
of the State, a thriving private sector and active involvement by all sectors of civil 
society. The role of the Government and the public sector within the broader economy 
has to be redefined so that reconstruction and development are facilitated. In a wide range 
of areas the GNU will take the lead in reforming and addressing structural conditions. In 
doing so its guidelines will remain the basic people-driven principles of the RDP (RSA, 
1994, Sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3). 
 
While interest in advancing a strongly interventionist developmental state waned, as intimated, 
following the adoption of a neo-liberal macro-economic framework, the idea never entirely lost 
currency and in the course of the past decade it has resurfaced both in ANC policy documents 
(ANC, 2005, 2007b) as well in official discourse (PSC, 2008; The Presidency, 2009, 2010; Poon, 
2009). In that respect, the concept received new impetus following the global financial meltdown 
in 2008 and as it became increasingly apparent that GEAR had failed to deliver the economic 
growth it had promised. For the ruling ANC government a developmental state is now portrayed 
as the most viable vehicle to overcome the legacy of apartheid, to address poverty, social 
inequality and unemployment, to improve service delivery and to promote people-centred  
development (Manuel, 2009; ANC, 2009; Edigheji, 2010). Significantly, official South African 
understanding of a developmental state (in as much as it has been formally articulated) is one 
that is both developmental and democratic (Olayode, 2005; Van Dijk & Croucamp, 2007). In 
that regard, the ANC’s 2007 ‘Draft Strategy and Tactics Document’ stresses that a South African 
developmental state should, besides the advancement of sustainable economic development, 
‘mobilise the people as a whole, especially the poor, to act as their own liberators through 
participatory and representative democracy’ (ANC, 2007b: paragraph 59). Unlike the 
authoritarian and top-down East Asian model, government leaders envisage a South African 
developmental state to be infused with democratic content, where state/society synergies are 
created by a mobilised civil society working side by side with a committed and development-
oriented government, in order to inform policy from below. In its emphasis on the need for a 
bottom-up approach to policy formulation the South African government model differs markedly 
from the conventional idea of a developmental state, and yet the first, and hitherto only, official 
policy document which proposes a developmental approach was the White Paper on 
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Developmental Local Government launched by the Ministry of Provincial Affairs and 
Constitutional Development in 1998 (RSA, 1998b)1. According to the White Paper, the four 
characteristics of developmental local government are: 
 
(E)xercising municipal powers and functions in a manner which maximises their impact 
on social development and economic growth; playing an integrating and coordinating 
role to ensure alignment between public (including all spheres of government) and 
private investment within the municipal area; democratising development; and building 
social capital through providing community leadership and vision, and seeking to 
empower marginalised and excluded groups within the community (RSA, 1998b:8). 
 
The initial focus on establishing a system of developmental local government was based on a 
conventional belief that municipalities, as the sphere of government closest to the people, are 
best positioned to be the key drivers in addressing persistent economic exclusion and uneven 
development (Pieterse, 2007). A central tenet of this bottom-up approach was the need for local 
authorities to institutionalise participatory processes at grassroots level and devise effective 
structures and processes to facilitate citizen participation in local affairs. In support of this 
objective, a comprehensive legislative framework was set in place directing municipalities to 
implement systems of participatory governance (Moodley, 2006). This includes the Municipal 
Structures Act (Act 117 of 1998) and the Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000) which 
stipulate the participatory processes that municipalities must follow in their engagement with 
local communities. 
 
Amongst a number of measures introduced to promote citizen participation at the local level 
(including ward committees and sub-council structures) the most important mechanism for the 
advancement of developmental local government is the Integrated Development Planning (IDP) 
process (Achmat, 2002). In terms of the Municipal Systems Act of 2000, an IDP must be drawn 
up following municipal elections and the assumption of office of a new local government council 
(RSA, 2000). In that regard it is intended as a tool through which all development initiatives will 
                                                 
1 The ‘National Development Plan 2030’ (National Planning Commission, 2011), launched in 2012, speaks of the 
need for a ‘capable and developmental state’ but it is notably short of detail on the constituent elements of a 
developmental state. 
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be planned at local level and the means through which the views of ordinary citizens can be 
heard and their needs prioritised (Harrison, 2002, 2006). The Act further obliges municipalities 
to establish appropriate structures to ensure that effective citizen participation takes place (FCR, 
2002; Goldman, 2005). As part of this process, the Municipal Structures Act of 1998 (RSA, 
1998a) makes provision for a ward committee system which is intended to serve as the interface 
between citizens and local authorities on a day-to-day basis (Smith, 2008).  
 
From the above it is evident that, formalistically at least, there is in place both a legislative and 
policy framework necessary to support the establishment of development local government and 
that this could form part of a broader programme to establish a developmental state in South 
Africa. However, aside from the somewhat anomalous approach to establishing a developmental 
state from the bottom up, there is mounting evidence that the notion of developmental local 
government is failing both in its attempts to improve the welfare of the poor and in its efforts to 
promote effective citizen participation. A review of the literature reveals that local authorities are 
unable to actualise their developmental mandate and that a substantial proportion of South 
Africans are forced to live in poorly resourced settlements with limited opportunities for 
meaningful participation in development initiatives and with equally limited prospects of 
economic advancement (Chagunda, 2007; Fakir, 2007; Van Dijk & Croucamp, 2007; Tapscott, 
2008; Thompson, Nleya & Africa, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c; Van Donk, 2012; Andani & Naidu, 
2012). To that extent, mounting service delivery protests across the country are reflective of 
citizen frustration and anger both at unfilled expectations and the failure of formal participatory 
structures (Atkinson, 2007; Kimemia, 2011, Cape Times, 2013, Plessing, 2011; Sowetan, 2012). 
These protests can be viewed as the final resort of citizens attempting to make their voices heard 
through non-institutionalised popular means. Piper and Nadvi (2010:212) refer to this dynamic 
as a ‘disengaged–enraged’ dichotomy brought about by ‘the failure of the formal invited spaces 
for public participation in local governance’. 
 
In the light of the above, this thesis sets out to examine the manner in which a system of 
developmental local government is being implemented in the City of Cape Town. Taking as a 
case study the township of Delft, the study looks at the systems and processes in place to 
advance citizen participation (and particularly the process of Integrated Development Planning) 
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and examines the extent to which it is perceived to be achieving its goals from the perspective of 
political office bearers, officials from different spheres of government and residents. 
 
1.3 Statement of the problem  
 
The problem that this thesis seeks to investigate is the general inability of municipalities to give 
effect to the idea of a developmental local state and, in particular, their incapacity to bring about 
socio-economic transformation and the deepening of democracy. The establishment of a system 
of developmental local government is seen to form part of a broader programme to build a 
democratic developmental state. However, both government and independent commentators are 
in agreement that the creation of a developmental state in South Africa remains in its infancy, if 
it can be said to exist at all (Fine, 2008; Netshitenzhe, 2011; Kenny, 2010; Maphunye, 2009; 
Mokaba, 2001; Van Dijk & Croucamp, 2007; Chagunda, 2007), and there is also little evidence 
that developmental local government is contributing to this broader national project (Putu, 2006; 
Nzwei & Kuye, 2007; Frodin, 2009; Gumede, 2010). There is, nevertheless, substantial evidence 
to suggest that local governments are failing to fulfil their mandate with respect to the promotion 
of citizen engagement and that public participation is frequently reduced to administrative 
manipulation, coercion and top-down decision making (Williams, 2007a, 2007b; Piper, 2008; 
Andani, 2013). In this context it is evident that there is a variety of factors, including those 
relating to the systems, processes and practices of citizen participation, to the availability of 
human and financial resources, and to the relationships between political office bearers, 
administrators and ordinary people which individually and collectively inhibit the establishment 
of effective developmental government in South Africa and that their differential impact is not 
well understood. 
 
1.4 Significance of the research   
 
In recent years a significant body of literature has reflected on South Africa’s attempts to create a 
developmental state and has highlighted the lack of conceptual clarity and common 
understanding of the essential features of such a state (Putu, 2006; Nzwei & Kuye, 2007; Frodin, 
2009; Gumede, 2010). Other research has discussed the notion of developmental local 
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government but this has largely been descriptive in nature, focusing on the need for 
municipalities to promote service delivery, local economic development and citizen participation 
(Koma, 2012; De Visser, 2006; Powell, 2012). These contributions also fail to make any linkage 
between the idea of developmental local government and that of a developmental state. It is 
nevertheless certain that the idea of developmental local government is seen to be integral to the 
idea of establishing a democratic developmental state. Thus, amongst the eight areas identified 
by the National Development Plan (NPC, 2011:410) as being crucial to the building of a capable 
and developmental state is the need to strengthen local government. 
 
This research, as a consequence, is of significance in the extent to which it examines the role of 
developmental local government in building a democratic developmental state at national level. 
It is of further significance in the extent to which it aims to provide an empirical examination of 
the extent to which municipalities are able to give effect to one of the core elements of 
developmental local government prescribed in both policy and legislation, namely the 
establishment of mechanisms for effective citizen participation. Hitherto, research of this nature 
has tended to focus on the shortcomings of participatory processes from the perspective of 
citizens (Williams, 2007a; Thompson, Nleya & Africa, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c), while 
considerably less attention has been paid to the views of local state officials and political office 
bearers on the reasons why systems might be failing. Through the case study of Delft, this 
investigation aims to develop a more holistic view of the factors which are constraining 
participatory development at the local level. 
 
1.4.1 Aims of the study 
 
Against this background, the broad research aims of this investigation will be as follows:  
 To review international discourse on the developmental state and, within that framework, 
to critically analyse the South African government’s attempts to construct a democratic 
and participatory developmental state;  
 To investigate the theory and praxis of public participation and its contribution to 
participatory democracy and to review current participatory systems and practices in 
South Africa;  
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 To examine the legislative and policy frameworks in place to support developmental 
local government in South Africa and to assess the extent to which the Integrated 
Development Planning process is succeeding in advancing a developmental mandate at 
the local level; 
 To evaluate the implementation of the Integrated Development Planning process in a 
selected case study area in Cape Town;  
 To assess the extent to which participatory mechanisms enable citizen agency and 
influence development activities at the local level; and 
 To consider the degree to which developmental local government is contributing to the 
broader objective of establishing a developmental state in South Africa. 
 
1.4.2 Research propositions 
 
This research is premised on three key propositions. The first is that South Africa’s seeming 
inability to construct a democratic developmental state is a direct consequence of the fact that the 
concept has been poorly defined and has yet to be fully articulated in policy or legislation. As a 
corollary of this, there is an inherent contradiction between the neo-liberal model of the state 
currently in operation and ambitions to create a strong interventionist developmental state. The 
second proposition is that the notion of developmental local government suggests a bottom-up 
approach to the construction of a developmental state which, once again, appears to limit 
prospects for the emergence of a central state with a strongly interventionist agenda. The third, 
and final, proposition is that developmental local government is intended to entail a strong 
commitment to citizen engagement, and yet, in practice, the Integrated Development Planning 
process (a key instrument for participation), is carried out in a top-down, pre-determined fashion 
which inhibits effective community participation. 
 
1.5 Delineation of case study area   
 
The City of Cape Town is the oldest urban area in South Africa and is currently one of the most 
rapidly growing metropolitan complexes in the country. The City comprises 24 sub-council areas 
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each of which is further divided into wards which, as indicated, were established to foster 
participatory governance and deepen democracy (City of Cape Town, 2010; Naidu, 2011). The 
selected case study area of Delft is located on the Cape Flats, which is an elongated corridor of 
land extending in a south-easterly direction from the City centre. The Cape Flats has been 
described as the ‘dumping ground of apartheid’ as its growth is attributed to the infamous Group 
Areas Act and Bantustan policy of the Apartheid government. As a result of this discriminatory 
legislation and policy, African, Indian and Coloured people from diverse backgrounds and 
traditions were uprooted and forcibly resettled in segregated racially based residential areas on 
the Cape Flats2 in a process which radically altered the social and physical fabric of Cape Town 
(Cook, 1991; Western, 1981). 
 
While the Cape Flats accommodates the majority of the metropolitan population, economic and 
employment opportunities are predominantly located in the City’s central business district and in 
a few other industrial and commercial nodes. The majority of these employment centres are 
located some distance away from poor residential areas and people from the Cape Flats incur 
high transport costs in reaching them. Previous research reveals that low levels of physical and 
social well-being characterise most communities on the Cape Flats and residents face widespread 
poverty, unemployment, lack of education opportunities, health problems, high infant mortality, 
poor nutrition, drug addiction, crime, limited facilities and limited service provision (Penderis, 
2003). 
 
Many of these socio-economic conditions prevail in Delft which is located approximately 25km 
from the centre of Cape Town. The township was established in 1989 as what was termed an 
Integrated Service Land project, earmarked for the coloured population, but today comprises a 
mix of coloured and African people (Cook, 1991; Millstein, 2010). The rationale for the 
selection of Delft as a case study area for this research was twofold: in the first instance, 
empirical research conducted in 2009 by the African Centre for Citizenship and Democracy 
(ACCEDE) at the University of the Western Cape, and to which the researcher had access, 
                                                 
2 Although it continues to be a contentious issue, the racial categories African, coloured, Indian/Asian and white are 
still deployed in post-apartheid South Africa for such official government purposes as affirmative action and 
historical redress. This categorisation will be used throughout this thesis when required for purposes of clarification 
and comparison.       
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revealed that, contrary to official claims on the inclusiveness of the process, the residents of 
Delft believe that they have limited opportunity to participate meaningfully in the formulation of 
IDPs or to influence decisions which might affect their welfare. Furthermore, protests 
surrounding poor service delivery are common in the area and are indicative of popular 
frustration at the lack of development and transformation taking place. In this context, the ability 
to access quantitative data and to conduct corroborating qualitative research with officials and 
residents in Delft presented an opportunity to examine, first hand, the manner in which 
participatory development processes are being implemented and the extent to which the idea of 
developmental local government is being given effect in the City of Cape Town, albeit in one 
locality. 
 
In the second instance, the area was selected due to its geographical location on the Cape Flats 
and close proximity to the University of the Western Cape where the researcher is employed at 
the Institute for Social Development. This permitted relative ease of access to the case study area 
but it also enabled the researcher to build on the experience gained through research conducted 
in the surrounding region during 2003; this related in particular to an understanding of the socio-
economic conditions, community dynamics and survival strategies of the residents of the Cape 
Flats. 
 
1.6 Research design and methodology 
  
The epistemological position undergirding this investigation includes elements of the positivist 
and interpretivist paradigms as both perspectives are deemed relevant in answering the research 
question. Furthermore, a mixed method approach, using a blend of qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies, was used in order to broaden the data base and enhance the depth of the 
investigation.  While qualitative methodologies were used to access more in-depth information 
and gain a more holistic understanding of the experiences and attitudes of respondents with 
respect to the dynamics of participatory decision-making processes, the generation of 
quantitative data enabled broader targeting and hence more representative findings on the 
perspectives of respondents in the area. 
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While an extensive literature review assisted in developing a conceptual framework for the 
study, this was augmented by a range of secondary material. The secondary information analysed 
included state policy documents, legislation, research reports, draft discussion papers and 
internal departmental memos, communiqués and technical reports. In that regard, particular 
attention was paid to an examination of the City of Cape Town’s Integrated Development Plan 
and public participation policy. Additional information was derived from minutes of sub-council, 
ward committee and sector meetings and chairperson reports. 
 
A case study approach was deemed an appropriate method of empirical inquiry for research of 
this nature in that it facilitated the exclusive focus on a selected phenomenon (citizen 
participation in development process) in a specific locality (Delft) using multiple sources of 
evidence and methods to gather data (Yin, 2009). These methods will be discussed in greater 
detail below. While it is not possible to directly infer the extent to which the experiences of the 
residents of Delft are typical of other poor areas of Cape Town, the results of the Accede survey 
in Langa and Khayelitsha suggest that they are far from a-typical and disapproval of 
participatory structures is widespread in both these localities. Furthermore, it is evident that the 
same model of citizen participation is implemented throughout the metropolitan area, suggesting 
that its shortcomings are likely to be replicated elsewhere in the City. Finally, the City of Cape 
Town is acknowledged to be one of the best run municipalities in the country3 and it may be 
inferred that if it is struggling to give effect to the idea of developmental local government then 
progress in most other local authorities is likely to be similar or worse. 
 
1.6.1 The research procedure  
 
Data gathering commenced in January 2011 and extended until October 2013. The collection of 
information initially focused on procuring background information and data relating to the case 
                                                 
3 See Fin 24 (2013) ‘Cape Town best city in the world – poll’, 15 November 2012, accessed at 
http://www.fin24.com/Economy/Cape-Town-best-city-in-the-world-poll-20121115; Municipal IQ (nd), ‘Cape Town: best-
run metro in SA or a tale of two cities?’ Accessed at  
http://www.municipaliq.co.za/index.php?site_page=article.php&id=33 
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study area and this included the analysis of a range of documents, census data and research 
reports. Qualitative fieldwork took place between April 2011 and October 2013, whereas the 
quantitative survey was conducted over a three-week period during June 2011. 
 
1.6.2 Quantitative methods  
 
Formally defined, quantitative research involves the use of numerical measurement tools to 
gather information in order to uncover laws of relationships or causality (Mouton, 1996; Howell, 
2004). The quantitative method employed in this research was based on a structured 
questionnaire which used both closed and open-ended questions. The data used in this 
investigation, as indicated, was derived from a larger study conducted by the African Centre for 
Citizenship and Democracy (ACCEDE) in three localities in the Cape Flats, namely Khayelitsha, 
Langa and Delft. A group of researchers (including the author of this study) with differing 
research interests in the case study areas, provided input to the design of the questionnaire. The 
design of the questionnaire took place during a number of workshop sessions attended by all 
contributors (see Annexure 1). Following the finalisation of the questionnaire design, 
fieldworkers were recruited and training sessions were held at the University of the Western 
Cape’s School of Government. The training sessions focused on the sampling strategy and 
sample universe, and on ensuring that fieldworkers fully understood the meaning and intention of 
each question in the questionnaire. Considerable emphasis was also placed on the need to 
observe protocols of ethical conduct including the need to ensure the confidentiality of responses 
given and the fact that respondents were under no obligation to participate in the survey and did 
so entirely of their own volition. 
 
In all, 470 households in Delft were interviewed using a stratified random sampling method to 
select respondents. Fieldwork was conducted between 7 June and 29 June 2011 and each 
individual interview took about two hours to complete. Gender equality was ensured by using a 
gender split for individual interviews while individual households were stratified to include 
different housing types. The questionnaire focused first on gathering background demographic 
information about the respondents. Thereafter, questions focused on respondents’ perceptions of 
the performance of the City of Cape Town with respect to service delivery, the IDP process and 
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the institutionalised public participation systems established to enable community participation 
in decision making. 
 
1.6.3 Qualitative methods 
 
The use of qualitative research methods was particularly pertinent to a study of this nature as it 
enabled the researcher to gain ‘an insider perspective on social action’ and, at the same time, to 
gather information of a more sensitive nature (Babbie & Mouton, 2004:270). This methodology 
is concerned with understanding rather than measuring social phenomena, where people are 
conceived as self-directing, thinking beings that are continually constructing and changing their 
interpretations of the world (Mouton, 1996; Marshall & Rossman, 1989). The different methods 
were selected in terms of their relevance in answering the research question. Qualitative 
information was gathered using the following tools:  
  
 Immersion in the study area enabled the researcher to spend time with councillors and 
community members and gain first-hand knowledge and insight into the lifestyles of 
residents and the conditions that they confront on a day-to-day basis. Such immersion 
also enabled the researcher to observe and reflect on the dynamics of social interaction 
between officials, councillors and residents. This method formed an important part of the 
fieldwork strategy and enabled the researcher to view community dynamics in a real-life 
context and from the viewpoint of the different groups of people.  
 
 Observation has been referred to as the ‘fundamental base of all research methods in the 
social sciences’ (Adler & Adler, 1994:389). As a methodological tool, observation is 
extremely useful in terms of enabling the researcher to describe events, behaviours and 
day to day activities within a selected social setting (Marshall & Rossman, 1989). As 
such, and for the purpose of this research, observation within the case study area was an 
extremely valuable source of data collection and took the form of attendance at a number 
of meetings in the broader sub-council area. This included attendance at sub-council 
meetings on a monthly basis over a period of more than twelve months, as well as 
attendance at sub-council activity days, public meetings and ward committee meetings in 
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order to assess the socio-political dynamics of the participation process. Attendance at 
such meetings enabled the gathering of information on the form and effectiveness of the 
public participation process together with an assessment of the extent, level and nature of 
input from community members in the process. This proved to be an indispensable 
method of inquiry as it revealed important information relevant to the research such as 
human behaviour and relationship dynamics between officials and councillors on the one 
hand and between councillors and ward committee members on the other. One of the 
advantages of attending meetings as an observer was that it enabled the researcher to gain 
‘insider’ knowledge of the functioning of sub-councils and ward committees and 
provided the opportunity to observe interactions between members which was essential to 
the focus of the research. Attendance at sub-council meetings further enabled the 
researcher to access meeting agendas and minutes, chairperson’s reports, line department 
progress reports and other official documentation relating to development and service 
delivery in the sub-council.    
 
 Semi-structured interviewing, as a qualitative method of inquiry, is a particularly useful 
tool in terms of gathering information through direct personal contact with selected 
respondents according to pre-determined themes relating to the research question (Bless, 
Higson-Smith & Kagee, 2006). The use of semi-structured interviews and an open-ended 
questioning format in this research enabled respondents to elaborate on certain themes, 
highlight new issues impacting on selected topics and relate personal experiences, 
attitudes and opinions. Semi-structured interviews were used to gather information from 
three groups of office bearers, namely officials from the City of Cape Town and the 
Western Cape Provincial Government, councillors from Sub-council 5 and ward 
committee members who represent sector organisations and the community in Delft. 
Interviews were conducted with local government officials to ascertain their perceptions 
of the responsibilities which they have with respect to service delivery and the 
implementation of the developmental local state. Officials from the Integrated 
Development Planning Unit and Public Participation Office were interviewed to gather 
information on the implementation of the integrated planning process and the 
participatory mechanisms which were used to gather public input. Officials from the 
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Departments of Social and Early Childhood Development, Health, Parks, Safety and 
Security and Sport and Recreation were further interviewed in order to shed light on 
service delivery matters and challenges that impinged on development efforts in the 
wider urban area. At provincial level, interviews were conducted with officials from the 
Department of Social Development, while telephonic interviews were conducted with 
officials from the Provincial Department of Human Settlements and a representative from 
the Housing Development Agency. At sub-council level, a number of interviews were 
conducted with sub-council chairpersons and managers, councillors, ward committee 
members and community representatives. These interviews focused on issues relating to 
the conceptualization of the IDP process, its implementation procedures, the nature and 
extent of stakeholder participation and matters relating to administrative and institutional 
capacity. Questions further concentrated on eliciting responses relating to problems and 
challenges faced by councillors and ward committee members in the performance of their 
duties within the sub-council area.  
 
The sub-council chairperson and sub-council manager were essential sources of 
information throughout the empirical research. They provided a sound background to the 
dynamics that operate within the sub-council and invaluable insight into the issues that 
impact on the delivery of development in the different wards. These insights are explored 
and elaborated on in Chapters 7 and 8. It became apparent during both interview sessions 
and during observation at sub-council and ward committee meetings that the sub-council 
chairperson and manager have extensive experience in their respective roles and play a 
critical role in ensuring that Sub-council 5 functions according to the mandate set out by 
the City.  
 
The procedure followed during the qualitative interview sessions was firstly to meet with 
the subcouncil leadership to gain a broad understanding of the functioning and roles of 
subcouncils and ward committees as mechanisms established by local government to 
foster participation within the metropolitan area. Thereafter, interviews with government 
officials were set up in order to gather deeper insight into the responsibilities and 
activities of different officials and government departments. Whilst some officials were 
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forthcoming in providing information, others were hesitant and meetings frequently had 
to be rescheduled.   Some officials refused to meet with the researcher and on two 
occasions an official failed to attend a scheduled meeting. On these occasions, meetings 
were set up with alternate departmental officials. On the other hand, councillors were 
very informative during interviews and the workshop session and provided a range of 
insight into their role as councillor in the wards and the problems which they faced in 
liaising with officials from line departments, ward committee members and community 
residents.  Information from ward committee members were gathered during a focus 
group discussion, ward committee meetings and during individual interviews. Ward 
committee members were eager to provide insight into the functioning of the ward 
committees and the problems that they experienced in performing their role in accordance 
with their mandate. 
 
 A focus group discussion was conducted with five representatives from the different 
wards in the sub-council area in October 2012.  The function of focus groups, as a 
method of inquiry, ‘involves collective engagement designed to promote dialogue and to 
achieve higher levels of understanding of issues critical to the development of a group’s 
interests and/or the transformation of conditions of its existence’ (Kamberelis & 
Dimitriadis, 2011:546). There is an abundance of literature that highlights the potential of 
focus groups to focus specifically on a predetermined set of research issues that relate 
particularly to a selected research question, the provision of an unthreatening 
environment to participants which enables them to respond spontaneously to issues and 
the fostering of open-ended group interaction which can lead to the generation of new 
ideas and which enables participants to express common or diverse experiences, 
thoughts, perceptions and opinions about certain topics (Krueger & Casey, 2000; Babbie & 
Mouton, 2004). In setting up the focus group discussion, the sub-council chairperson and 
manager assisted the researcher in selecting members serving on the ward committees 
within the sub-council area and in inviting the participants. They further assisted in 
providing the venue at The Hague community centre in Delft.  
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The question schedule was formulated with the intent of gathering information required 
to answer the research questions of the broader investigation (see Annexure 2) and to 
collaborate findings gleaned from the questionnaire survey. Questions were formulated 
around their understanding of public participation and their opinions on the effectiveness 
of such mechanisms as the sub-councils, ward committees and the system of sector 
representation in fostering inclusivity and in promoting participatory decision-making. 
Other questions focused on assessing the extent of community input into the IDP process, 
the levels of participation, the obstacles to public participation and recommendations for 
improvement of the system of citizen engagement.  
 
The focus group discussion took just over an hour to complete and was conducted in an 
informal atmosphere in order to enable participants to feel comfortable in expressing their 
views on the often contentious issues under discussion. The ward committee members 
participated actively and spontaneously in discussing the themes raised and provided 
important insights into the functioning of the institutionalised participatory mechanisms 
in the sub-council area as well the dynamics of citizen participation in the different 
wards. Furthermore, the nature of the method of inquiry stimulated different participants 
to elaborate on the comments of others and this is in turn led to the generation of more in-
depth information and insight on the problems faced by community members in 
attempting to influence policy decisions.  
 
 A workshop was conducted with the sub-council chairperson, sub-council manager and 
eight councillors in order to explain the focus and objective of the research as well as to 
gain an understanding of their views of different aspects of the topic under review. 
Discussions thus related to their understanding of the concept of a developmental state, of 
inter-governmental coordination and of the implementation of the IDP as the mechanism 
for delivering development at the local level. Attention also focused on the role of 
councillors in the development process and the obligation imposed upon them to foster 
participatory governance and community participation throughout the sub-council, ward 
committee and sector representation systems; it also focused on their role in building a 
developmental state by way of developmental local government. 
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1.6.4 Processing, analysis and presentation of data 
 
Untabulated quantitative data generated by Accede was edited and numerically coded for 
analysis using the SPSS Statistical Package. This enabled the presentation of information using 
statistical tables and graphs.  The processing of qualitative data involved the organisation and 
categorisation of field notes taken during the observation phase of the research. This included the 
classification of information recorded at sub-council and ward committee meetings into themes 
and sub-themes and the identification of patterns and relationships in the data. Information 
gathered during the focus group discussion with ward committee members and the workshop 
with councillors was organised accordingly to the schedule themes and points of discussion. 
Analysis of the data required reflection on the responses of residents and this frequently led to a 
new set of questions being posed as a result of new understandings of the context. Interviews 
conducted with office bearers were similarly transcribed and ordered into themes and categories. 
In many instances the qualitative research findings confirmed the quantitative data and vice 
versa. Qualitative data is presented in succeeding chapters using diagrams, verbal descriptions 
and quotations. 
 
1.7 Structure of the thesis 
 
This thesis is divided into nine chapters. Chapter 1 has provided a theoretical overview of the 
concept of a developmental state and the context in which it has risen to prominence in South 
Africa. It has also set out the research problematic, the key research propositions and the 
methodology adopted in carrying out the research. 
 
Chapter 2 discusses understandings of the origins and characteristics of developmental states in 
the literature and provides an interpretive and theoretical framework for the study as a whole. 
 
Chapter 3 examines the emergence of developmental state discourse in South Africa and 
identifies what its advocates believe to be the defining features necessary to establish a 
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democratic developmental state, including the focus on a participatory and citizen-centred 
approach. 
  
Chapter 4 provides a critical theoretical overview of the concept of participatory development 
and, inter alia, discusses the challenges which confront attempts to effectively engage ordinary 
citizens in officially created participatory spaces. 
 
Chapter 5 investigates the idea of Developmental Local Government in South Africa and the role 
assigned to Integrated Development Planning as a key instrument in the rollout of a 
developmental state at the local level. 
 
Chapter 6 provides an overview of the history, demography and settlement dynamics of the City 
of Cape Town and the township of Delft, together with a discussion of the extant system of 
municipal governance. 
 
Chapter 7 focuses on the political perspectives of Delft residents and their perceptions of the 
effectiveness of the Integrated Development Planning process and participatory mechanisms set 
up by local government to foster inclusive governance and give meaning to the notion of a 
developmental state. 
 
Chapter 8 presents the views and perceptions of officials, councillors and ward committee 
members with regard to the delivery of the developmental state mandate and the effectiveness of 
Integrated Development Planning and public participation processes in the case study area. 
 
Chapter 9 summarises the general findings of the research and discusses the extent to which 
developmental local government in South Africa is fulfilling its brief to enhance citizen 
participation and promote socio-economic development, as well as the extent to which it is 
facilitating the building of a developmental state at national level. 
 
The chapter which follows discusses the origins of the concept of a developmental state and the 
theoretical debates on its constituent elements. It also examines the extent to which the East 
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Asian model of a developmental state might be replicable elsewhere in the world. It further 
considers contemporary theorising on the essence of what has come to be called the democratic 
developmental state and its appeal to policy makers in South Africa. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
DEVELOPMENTAL STATES – A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW 
____________________________________________________ 
 
The unprecedented economic successes of the East Asian developmental states, as intimated, 
have encouraged many other nations to consider adopting a state-led model of economic 
development. This applies no less to South Africa where the government has repeatedly 
asserted its commitment to constructing a developmental state which will pursue economic 
growth and yet which is people-centred, participatory and democratic. As a background to an 
analysis of the way in which the government has set about this task and with what effect, this 
chapter will examine the origins and characteristics of what are now understood to be the 
classical East Asian developmental states, as well as the way in which they have been framed 
in theory. It will also consider the ways in which theorists have distinguished the East Asian 
model from the democratic developmental state model which is being pursued elsewhere in 
the world, since it is believed this hybrid model will be of particular relevance to the South 
African case. 
 
2.1 East Asian Developmental States 
 
Despite the more recent labelling of countries such as Brazil, India, Botswana and Mauritius 
as developmental, the conventional definition of a developmental state refers to the high-
performing economies of Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore which 
emerged in the late 1950s and 1960s and which owed their success to interventionist policies 
driven by the central state. As a consequence of the success of this model, Eastern Asia has 
been referred to as ‘the world’s most dynamic region of economic growth and social 
transformation’ (Zhang, 2003:1) and the economic achievements of these developmental 
states have been heralded by the World Bank (1993) as the ‘Asian Miracle’. While China 
only joined this celebrated group of first generation developmental states more recently, its 
rapid economic growth since the turn of the century is attributed to the lifting of 170 million 
people out of absolute poverty (Nee, Opper & Wong 2007). 
 
Although all states intervene in their economies to some extent, Johnson (1982) emphasises 
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that it is the degree of state intervention that is determinant of their success. For Bagchi 
(2000:398), a developmental state is ‘a state that puts economic development as the top 
priority of government policy, and (it) is able to design effective instruments to promote such 
a goal. The instruments should include the forging of new formal institutions, the weaving of 
formal and informal networks of collaboration amongst citizens and officials and the 
utilization of new opportunities for trade and profitable production’ (Bagchi, 2000:398). The 
state-led macro-economic model adopted by the so-called Asian Tigers, unlike the neo-liberal 
model which relies on the fluctuation of market forces, the depoliticisation of the economy 
and the contraction of the state, purposefully guides and structures the market in order to 
control and influence the pace and direction of development (Chang, 1999). 
 
The term ‘developmental state’ was coined by Chalmers Johnson who analysed the economic 
successes of the Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) in East Asia and reached the 
conclusion that their successes were attributable to the pursuit of a different capitalist 
development trajectory to that of developed core economies in the West (Johnson, 1982). 
This trajectory was based on a different institutional ideology and management style (Bae & 
Sellers, 2007). Johnson stressed that, while the developmental state aimed to use market 
forces to grow the economy, economic policy was to be the key driver of development and a 
‘strong state’ was critical in providing the means to accelerate growth including, where 
necessary, new capital, the approval of investment loans, the channeling of investment 
funding and the provision of tax breaks, amongst other measures (Evans, 1995). 
 
Johnson, in his analysis of the industrial renaissance and phenomenal economic growth of 
Japan, provides an illustration of the economic initiatives embarked upon by the government 
following the recessions of 1954 and 1965 and the important inter-sectoral shift from primary 
activities to manufacturing to which they gave rise during this era. Such shifts, he 
emphasised, were not haphazard, but rather the result of the actions of a ‘plan rational’ state 
(Pempel, 1999) which focused on consciously intervening and shaping the development 
process, ‘rather than relying on the uncoordinated influence of market forces to allocate 
economic resources’ (Beeson, 2003:2). This ‘plan rational’ state referred to Japan’s deliberate 
reconstruction of its industrial capacity and adoption of interventionist policies which 
differed markedly from the market-rational regulatory states of Western countries, such as the 
United States, and the plan-ideological states of socialist countries, such as the then Soviet 
Union (Kim, 2007; Bello, 2009). 
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According to Bagchi, however, politics, not economics, was at the core of the ‘plan rational’ 
system of the development state, and government policy purposefully devised instruments to 
prioritise economic development as its primary objective (Bagchi, 2000). Leftwich 
(2008:154) concurs with this premise and attributes the successes of the Asian developmental 
states to ‘fundamentally political factors that have shaped the urgency, thrust and pace of 
their developmental strategies through the structure of the state’. The political motives behind 
the economic imperatives were concerns about power and control, and the desire to be treated 
as equals in the international arena (Johnson, 1999). The ‘plan rational’ developmental state 
was thus focused on national interests and the political power and astuteness of state 
bureaucrats were instrumental in achieving ‘national economic competitiveness’; in this 
context ‘political representatives, rather than individual, utility maximising consumers’, 
shaped the economic agenda (Pempel, 1999:140–145). In consonance with Weber’s 
normative bureaucratic state, the competent and coherent bureaucratic structures of the 
developmental state were indispensable in determining economic outcomes and industrial 
transformation (Evans, 1995). 
 
2.2 Ideology and structure 
 
A number of authors have pointed to the significance of what has been termed a 
‘developmentalist ideology’ which has underpinned the operations of developmental states 
and distinguished them from ‘non-developmental states’ (Edigheji, 2007; Mkandawire, 2001; 
UNCTAD, 2007; Castells, 1992). Such a state, according to Mkandawire, is ‘one whose 
ideological underpinnings are developmental and one that seriously attempts to deploy its 
administrative and political resources to the task of economic development’ (Mkandawire, 
2001:291). Elaborating on this view, Castells asserts that ‘a state is developmental when it 
establishes as its principle of legitimacy, its ability to promote and sustain development; 
understood as the combination of steady and high rates of economic growth and structural 
change in the productive system, both domestically and in its relationship with the 
international economy’ (Castells 1992:55). ‘Developmentalism’ in this context thus refers to 
the aggressive pursuit of clearly defined growth strategies and socio-economic development 
goals, aligned to attainable performance targets that enable it to meet its specified objectives 
(Gelb, 2006; UNCTAD, 2007). 
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The structural components of the developmental state, as described, refer to its institutional, 
technical, administrative and political capacity to devise and implement long-term economic 
policies. In order to do this it must be a ‘strong state’, willing to exert its political power and 
administrative capacity; but it must also be one which enjoys ‘relative autonomy’ from social 
forces ‘that might dissuade it from the use of its capacity to design and implement policies 
that are in its long-term interest’ (Mkandawire, 2001:2). However, there must also be a 
certain amount of ‘social anchoring that prevents it from using its autonomy in a predatory 
manner’ (Mkandawire, 2001:2). For Evans (1995:12) this autonomy does not entirely insulate 
such states in that they are embedded in a concrete set of social ties which binds them ‘to 
society and provides institutionalized channels for the continual negotiation and renegotiation 
of goals and policies’ (Evans, 1995:12). Such embeddedness implies the immersion of the 
state ‘in a network of ties that bind it to groups or classes that can become allies in the pursuit 
of societal goals’ (UNCTAD, 2007:60). For Johnson (1999:33), the institutional 
characteristics of Japan and its ‘emulators elsewhere in East Asia’ differed from the capitalist 
economies of the United States and Britain in that they possessed the capacity to formulate 
and implement policies necessary to achieve their stated development goals, even at times 
‘flagrantly flouting all received principles of capitalist rationality’. 
 
2.3 Contextual determinants of the East Asian Developmental State 
 
The East Asian developmental state was the product of a specific historical, societal and 
geopolitical context. Numerous developmental state theorists have studied the origins of the 
East Asian model and highlighted a number of factors which played a critical role in their 
development path and attainment of exceptional economic growth. These insights will be 
presented in the sections below. 
 
2.3.1 Historical and geo-political factors 
 
The historical setting and geo-political factors clearly played a critical role in the 
development path of East Asian countries and their attainment of high economic growth 
rates. Thus, for example, the foundations of the modern Japanese state may be traced to the 
reforms of the early 20th century. These emanated from the reforms of the Meiji Restoration 
and an emphasis on national autonomy, which implied both political and technological 
independence. Mass education and the adaptation (rather than adoption) of foreign 
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technology were the hallmarks of this era (Bagchi, 2000). Japan also made a concerted effort 
to adopt Western models and this quest for modernisation led to the establishment of a 
number of new institutions ‘including a British-style navy and postal system, a French-style 
police and judicial system, American-style banking and primary school systems, and a 
German-style army’ (McCargo, 2000:19). 
 
The onset of the Cold War had a profound impact on the political development of the East 
Asian developmental states. Onis (1991) asserts that the fear of external threats and foreign 
control gave rise to a deeply ingrained nationalism and a single-minded quest for 
independence, long-term economic transformation and national prosperity. Amongst these 
states the ever-present communist threat boosted sentiments of patriotism and served as a 
strong motivation for economic growth and independence (ibid). Johnson (1999) notes 
further that military confrontation (in Korea and Vietnam) and concerns about communist 
expansion in Asia prompted intervention by the United States to protect its interests in the 
region. Japan, in particular, benefited from the Korean War and the support which it received 
from the United States is viewed as ‘the virtual equivalent of the Marshall Plan’ in the extent 
to which it created a platform for rapid economic growth (Johnson, 1999:55). Thus, the Cold 
War era and the communist threat not only fostered national cohesion around the goal of 
economic growth but financial aid received from the United States and its allies served to 
leverage this growth (Mathews, 2006; Pempel, 1999). 
 
2.3.2 Cultural factors 
 
A number of analysts have pointed to the significance of cultural norms and the political 
culture in which national leaders (both administrative and political) were socialised as 
decisive factors in the economic advancement of East Asian developmental states (Compton, 
2000; Pye, 1985; Kuotsai, 2002; Kihl, 2004). According to Harrison and Huntington (2000), 
‘culture matters’, and in support of this viewpoint Pye (1985:27) asserts that ‘Asian 
orientation to the group, rather than stressing the individual, affects not only basic political 
values but a wide range of ordinary political behaviour’. Cultural factors are also seen to have 
supported ideas about the importance of ‘indigenisation and isolation from external 
influence’ which, in turn, gave licence to the state to pursue a determined course of action 
that shielded it from ‘other cultural and political impulses on the processes of decision-
making’ (Schmidt, 1998:9). 
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Culture in this context is seen to have played a significant role in setting the ‘paradigm under 
which political power could be exercised legitimately’ (Compton, 2000:2). Confucian 
doctrine, in particular, is regarded as having been central to the national cooperation of 
politicians, bureaucrats and workers and their commitment to the broader goals of economic 
advancement (Gereffi, 1989; Compton, 2000; Liou, 2002). Confucian beliefs such as those of 
industriousness, dedication, loyalty, harmony, respect for elders, conformity, punctuality and 
deference to all forms of authority are considered to have set the context for the national 
cooperation that led to the rapid economic growth of Japan and other East Asia states 
(Pempel, 1999; Gereffi, 1989; Leon, 1998). 
 
Some writers, however, believe that the influence of culture has been overstated and that it 
was only important in the context of the ‘late development’ of these nations, more of which 
will be said below (Dore, 1990; Johnson, 1982). Furthermore, even some proponents of the 
cultural perspective have drawn attention to the variations in the economic structure and 
political-institutional forms which exist within Confucian Asia, and suggest that it would be 
misguided to present a universal cultural framework applicable to all (Kihl, 2004; Zhang, 
2003). In similar vein, Leon (1998) notes that culture cannot be equated with religion and, 
moreover, Asia should not be viewed as a homogeneous cultural or religious region as it 
incorporates a diversity of religious and cultural collectives which, besides Confucianism, 
include Muslim, Shintoist, Buddhist, Taoist, Hindu and Christian followers. Notwithstanding 
these reservations and the specificities of individual East Asian countries, a combination of 
historical and socio-cultural factors do appear to have been influential in setting the context 
for a state-led approach to economic growth. 
 
2.3.3 Socio-economic influences 
 
Further factors which have been seen to contribute to the success of the Asian developmental 
state are low levels of conflict between capital and labour, ‘deferred gratification for 
consumers’ and ‘relatively flat pay scales’ (Crotty & Dymski, 1989:8–9). In that regard the 
literature reveals that economic growth was achieved despite the relatively equal spread of 
income amongst the countries of Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong and South Korea (Onis, 
1991; Gereffi, 1989). The devastation of the Second World War, in the case of Japan, and 
colonial land dispossession in Korea and Taiwan, had resulted in general poverty throughout 
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the population and an egalitarian distribution of income prior to the onset of industrialisation 
(Onis, 1991). According to Brohman (1996) this low socio-economic base enabled East 
Asian states to focus on labour-intensive export industries which provided them both a 
competitive and comparative advantage. This was also made possible through low wages and 
a relatively passive workforce held in check by restrictive labour laws. 
 
2.3.4 Integration into the world economy  
 
A further contributory factor relates to the manner in which developmental states had 
historically been integrated into the world economy. As Cumings (1999:92) points out, the 
experience of East Asian states in the early 20th century ‘had not been a realm of 
independence where autonomy and equality reigned, but wide enmeshment in another web: 
the hegemonic web’ of Western capitalism. While favourable international conditions in the 
post-second world war era undoubtedly played a significant role in the growth of the Asian 
economies, Japanese colonialism in Korea and Taiwan, during the early 20th century, was the 
machinery that set the stage for economic growth and industrial transformation in the wider 
region through foreign investment, technological support and agrarian reforms (Hart-
Landsberg, Jeong & Westra, 2007). Hong Kong and Singapore had also benefited from 
British colonial rule in the form of modern state institutions, the provision of modern 
infrastructure and the creation of advanced industrial, financial, administrative and 
managerial structures which helped to attract investment capital (Brohman, 1996). 
 
As previously indicated, the onset of the Cold War clearly served the interest of East Asian 
states, and Japan, Taiwan and South Korea as, frontline states, benefited in particular from 
aid supplied by the United States. The assistance these and other states received was in the 
form of development and military aid, access to foreign markets and direct foreign 
investment (Gereffi, 1989). In that respect, the role played by the United States (and to a 
lesser extent other Western powers) was of considerable importance in the extent to which it 
stimulated growth and provided an outlet for Asian merchandise in developed northern 
markets. 
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2.3.5 Geographical location and regionalism 
 
The advantageous geographical location of the emerging developmental states and their 
position within the ‘new international division of labour’ has been seen as a further 
contributor to their success (Gereffi, 1989; Gereffi & Wyman, 1990; Zhang, 2003). Linked to 
this favourable location (at the cross-route between East and West), which afforded unique 
opportunities for intra-regional economic cooperation (Broham, 1996), scholars have 
ascribed the success of East Asian states to what has been described as the ‘flying geese’ 
pattern of development. 
 
The ‘flying geese’ model of economic development was first advanced by Kaname Akamatsu 
in the 1930s as a means of analysing the process in which less-developed economies had 
been able to ‘catch up’ to those of the industrialised countries in the West (Kumagai, 2008; 
Zhang, 2003). The model described the regional transmission of manufactured goods, 
technology and foreign direct investment to less-developed countries and the sequential 
advancement of such countries as they benefitted from the transfers and began to ‘catch up’ 
(to be discussed further below) with the more advanced nations and progressively moved up 
the industrial ladder (Dowling & Cheang, 2000; Ozawa, 2008). Japan, favourably positioned 
as ‘lead goose’ and benefitting from its close relationship with the United States, initiated a 
rigorous ‘expansionist policy’ of regional integration in the 1950s and early 1960s and was 
followed by the newly industrialised economies of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Singapore as ‘second tier geese’ (Furuoka, 2005). The third ranked tier comprised the main 
ASEAN countries of Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. China and Vietnam, as 
least developed countries during that period, comprised the fourth and final tier at the tail of 
the flying formation (Kasahara, 2004). 
 
Although the flying geese metaphor was originally used to describe the trajectory of 
economic development in the Asian region, it later ‘acquired social and political dimensions’ 
due to what were believed to be the cultural similarities and shared values of the nations in 
the formation (Zhang, 2003:19). The ‘flying geese’ model was consequently accepted as a 
distinctively ‘Asian’ mode of development which other nations in the region were 
encouraged to emulate in their quest towards economic growth rather than conventional 
Western approaches. 
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2.3.6 The advantages of ‘late developers’ and ‘catch up’  
 
A number of authors have attributed the rise of the East Asian developmental states to their 
status as ‘late developers’ and the fact that they were able to capitalise on technological, 
administrative and managerial advances elsewhere in the world (Onis, 1991; Woo-Cumings, 
1999; Cumings, 1999; Mathews, 2006; Paul, 1987). In the immediate post-war period, East 
Asian states lagged far behind the advanced Western nations economically and there was a 
perceived need for these so-called ‘backward’ countries to ‘catch up’ and take advantage of 
the development trajectories of advanced economies. ‘Catch up’ theories of development 
were based on the work of Gershenkron (1962) and Abramovitz (1986, 1994), amongst 
others, and they differed from the relatively uniform linear stages-of-growth model advanced 
by W.W. Rostow. Rostow had proposed that for economic development to occur, traditional 
societies would need to follow the experiences of industrialised Western nations and pass 
through five stages of growth. If accompanied by substantial investment capital, he had 
maintained, development would occur and wealth would trickle down to all segments of 
society (Rostow, 1960). 
 
Gershenkron (1962), in contrast, argued that evidence had shown that the catch-up process 
need not follow the same development paths as advanced economies and would, instead, be 
attendant on the ‘relative backwardness’ of different developing countries and the unique 
historical context of each. In that regard, ‘the more backward a country’s economy, the more 
likely was its industrialization to start discontinuously as a sudden great spurt proceeding at a 
relatively high rate of growth of manufacturing output’ (Gershenkron, 1962:353–4). An 
advantage for such countries was the opportunity to import existing technology from 
developed nations, while the instruments for ‘catching up’ were in the form of strong, 
growth-oriented state policies (Burkett & Hart-Landsberg, 2003). 
 
In catching up, moreover, late developers tended to operate at greater speed than developed 
nations, mainly by tapping into existing foreign technologies, learning from advanced 
capitalist nations and thereby saving costs by replicating innovations (Bagchi, 2000; Burkett 
& Hart-Landsberg, 2003). The Gershenkronian ‘late-comer effect’ was thus deemed a 
deciding factor in the success of the East Asian developmental state and disproved the 
predominant Rostowian theory of the 1960s and other simplistic neoclassical economic 
models of the time (Mathews, 2006). 
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2.4 Defining features of the Developmental State 
 
Over and above historical and contextual factors, there is a broad consensus in the literature 
on the essential criteria which contributed to the success of the classic developmental states 
of East Asia and a number of these are discussed in the section which follows. 
 
2.4.1 The national structure of finance 
 
One of the defining characteristics of the development state was its control of finance and ‘its 
centrality to the provision of new capital’ (Evans, 1995:48) which ‘binds the state to the 
industrialists’ (Woo-Cumings, 1999:10). In Japan this was achieved through interest rate 
controls, a rationalised currency system, enhancement of the quality of the financial sector, 
banking supervision for commercial and developmental banks, the creation of special credit 
institutions and the ability to provide loans through the banking sector and postal saving 
systems (Kohli, 1999). This scenario was also evident in South Korea where the leverage of 
finances enabled the state to ‘create or strengthen state organizations, to employ personnel, to 
co-opt political support, to subsidize economic enterprises, and to fund social programs’ 
(Skocpol, 1985:6). 
 
2.4.2 Centrality of the role of the state 
 
While all states (to a lesser or greater extent) play an enabling role in determining the course 
of national economic development, the Asian developmental state was focused on 
deliberately driving the development process by intervening in the economy rather than 
leaving it to the vagaries of the free market (Makgetla, 2007). One of the distinguishing 
attributes of the Asian developmental state has thus been the dominant role of the state in 
directing long-term development and in actively prioritising industrial policy as part of its 
‘plan rational’ and intentional pursuit of developmental goals (UNCTAD, 2007). 
 
According to Leftwich (1995:401), a state can only be termed developmental when ‘politics 
have concentrated sufficient power, autonomy and capacity at the centre to shape, pursue and 
encourage the achievement of explicitly developmental objectives, whether by establishing 
and promoting the conditions and direction of economic growth, or by organizing it directly, 
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or a varying combination of both.’ A strong state-led form of economic development was 
thus an essential component of the successes of the Asian developmental states (Chang, 
2002). In that respect its programmes were focused, centering firstly on advancing the 
agricultural sector and thereafter on ‘rapid industrial growth; and (the) production of a 
disciplined, obedient, and educated workforce’ (Kohli, 1999:101). 
 
2.4.3 Authoritarianism 
 
A number of authors have identified authoritarianism as key a characteristic of the East Asian 
developmental state, whether this took the form of military dictatorship, authoritarian control, 
restrictive labour laws or working class exploitation, factors which are evident in the various 
histories of Taiwan, Singapore, Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia and China (Burkett & Hart-
Landsberg, 2003). This authoritarianism was, to a significant extent, underwritten by the 
legitimacy which state officials had attained through their efficiency and effectiveness (Kim, 
2010; Deen, 2011) and this, in turn, permitted them to be ‘more experimental and 
undoctrinaire than in the typical authoritarian regime’ (Johnson, 1995:52). For some scholars, 
the state’s ‘soft authoritarianism,’ ‘repressive nature’ and autonomy not only enhanced its 
overall development performance but also enabled it ‘to consult, negotiate and elicit 
consensus and cooperation’ (Edigheji, 2005:12). 
 
Although several studies have found that authoritarian regimes in developing countries are 
economically more successful than democratic states, other analysts point to the difficulty of 
establishing a causal relationship between authoritarianism and economic development 
(Leon, 1998). For some, authoritarianism can only ever be a temporary measure to mobilise 
the population towards sacrificing for the purpose of developmental growth and it is more the 
legitimacy of the leadership of such states rather than true authoritarian control that enables 
this sacrifice (Johnson, 1999). In the case of South Korea, List-Jensen (2008:21) maintains 
that it is difficult to assess the impact which authoritarianism has had on the country’s 
economic success as other ‘exogenous factors such as history, geopolitics, and culture’ 
played a significant role in shaping the developmental state. However, she concedes that an 
authoritarian regime is better positioned to ‘regiment a population’ to sacrifice for early 
industrialisation and its insulation from societal interests and policy consistency improves 
economic outcomes (ibid:5). 
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2.4.4 Structure of the bureaucracy 
 
The influence of a professional, meritocratic bureaucracy, as previously intimated, has been 
seen as a key factor distinguishing East Asian development states from other types of state. 
Small, elite bureaucracies were chosen purely on merit and those recruited into their ranks 
were highly educated lawyers and economists ‘from the top ranks of the best law schools in 
the country … on the basis of legally binding national examinations’ (Woo-Cumings, 
1995:14). The functions of these bureaucrats were to draft all legislation, manage the national 
budget and coordinate and supervise the path towards the achievement of economic 
development goals (Johnson, 1982). According to Maung Maung Than (2004:212) the 
expertise of highly educated lawyers and economists in the bureaucracy played a decisive 
role in the success of the developmental state. Emphasising the importance of expertise and 
capacity, he remarked that ‘(s)tate-led development is a non-starter if there is no competent 
and impartial economic bureaucracy or civil service to implement development policies. 
Successful developmental states possess capable economic bureaucracies that enjoy the 
confidence and trust of their political masters and are insulated from societal pressures’. 
 
Furthermore, capable economic bureaucrats possessed the competency to manage ‘local and 
foreign economic interests’ effectively (Leftwich 1995:405), and their accomplishments and 
the prestige which ensued from these achievements strengthened their insulation from 
political pressure (Wade, 1990). 
 
2.4.5 National consensus and patriotism 
 
A highly nationalistic public service and a single-minded determination to achieve economic 
goals are viewed as further important features of the developmental state (Gemandze, 2006). 
This took the form of public patriotism and commitment towards national goals and it was 
also evident in the high esteem in which the public service was held (Johnson, 1999). 
Thompson (2007:9) underscores the importance of a consensus and observes that ‘the 
creation of a genuine developmental consensus, where society backed the direction of 
development and the role of the state was not questioned’ enabled ‘long term thinking and, to 
some degree allowed the bureaucracy to experiment and learn from experience’. 
 
The bureaucracy in this context was seen to be motivated by national rather than individual 
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interest and was believed to have the interests of the general public at heart (Bagchi, 2000). 
At the same time, although employee demands were strictly controlled, skilled workers and 
managers were ensured of life-time employment. Managers were further promoted on the 
basis of seniority and a profit-sharing system was introduced, linking workers and employers 
and instilling a sense of pride in their work in the latter (Bagchi, 2000; Kohli, 1999). 
 
2.4.6 Coordination and co-operation between big business and the state 
 
The symbiotic relationship between the state and big business in industrial transformation has 
been seen as a further defining characteristic of the developmental state (Weiss, 1988). The 
partnership between business and the state, which took the form of industrial financing, was 
mutually beneficial in achieving development goals and in ensuring enterprise viability 
(Cumings, 1999). Within this system, the state acted as a catalyst, partnering the private 
sector in industrial transformation and, through a range of incentives and disincentives, 
providing a platform for business to pursue profits and, thereby, national economic 
development (ibid). 
 
2.5 Developmental States beyond East Asia  
 
The defining characteristics of the East Asian developmental state which have been outlined 
in the discussion above point to the fact that the successes of the model were contextually 
specific and were shaped by a particular sequence of historical, geo-political, cultural and 
socio-economic factors (Mathews, 2006; Pempel, 1999; Woo-Cumings, 1999) and hence 
their exact replication elsewhere in the developing world is neither possible nor probably 
desirable. In that respect, a particular source of concern has been the hegemonic character of 
these states, manifest in their authoritarianism, managerialism and social exclusion which 
have been seen to conflict with contemporary concerns about democracy and citizen rights. 
Notwithstanding these concerns, a number of writers have argued that the sequence in which 
economic development occurs and democracy is introduced is critical to the success of both 
and a degree of authoritarianism is necessary to set things on the right track. 
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2.5.1 The relationship between democracy and development 
 
The complex interrelationship between development and democracy was the subject of 
extensive theoretical debate from the 1960s onward and was characterised by two divergent 
positions, the first of which held that development is always a precursor to democracy, while 
the second asserted that democracy must precede or at least parallel development. In the first 
position it was argued that democracy could only be established in the context of economic 
growth, which would permit the development of the institutions necessary to support and 
sustain a system of democracy (Lipset, 1959; Huntington, 1991). In East Asian 
developmental states, it was maintained, democratic ideals had been discouraged as it was 
believed that they could constrain the beginning stages of socio-economic development. 
Democracy, in this era, was viewed as ‘a luxury which poor countries can ill afford’ (White, 
2006:61) and a slogan of the time was ‘development first democracy later’ (Kim, 2010:98). 
 
Despite arguments that sustained economic growth is just about impossible in developing 
democracies, a second strand of scholarship supports the view that democracy should either 
precede or parallel development initiatives. Thus Przeworski and Limongi (1993) strongly 
dispute the idea that increased economic growth, in and of itself, leads to democracy, 
although they concede that it impacts positively on the survival and sustainability of 
democracy and that the nature of political regimes influences economic performance. 
Expanding on this theme, Robinson and White (2002:2) draw on lessons from Latin America 
(Brazil), Africa (Botswana and Mauritius) and Asia (Malaysia and India) to demonstrate that 
development and democracy are not only possible under certain political and institutional 
conditions, but they can be ‘mutually reinforcing’. Edigheji (2010:8) echoes these sentiments 
noting that ‘because development is multidimensional, political freedom – and hence 
democracy – is central to development’. He further refutes the supposed direct correlation 
between authoritarian regimes and development, arguing that ‘history is replete with 
examples of autocratic regimes characterised by development failures’ (ibid). Relatedly, after 
reviewing a substantial number of case studies on the interrelationship between democracy 
and economic growth, Przeworski and Limongi (1993), reached the conclusion that there was 
very little empirical evidence to support either argument due to the complex and multifaceted 
nature of the relationship. 
 
White (2002:21–23) suggests that positions held by adherents of the different schools of 
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thought are as much a reflection of their ideological convictions as they are based on 
empirical evidence. In that respect he distinguishes between the optimistic view, which 
believes that liberal democracy is a strong stimulus to socio-economic development and calls 
for participation in the development process of a broad range of actors, and the pessimistic 
view, which considers democracy to be an impediment to development in that it leads to 
indiscipline, disorderly conduct, institutional uncertainty, rising demands and excessive 
expectations which will hamper economic growth. 
 
Notwithstanding these theoretical debates on the relative merits of authoritarian or 
democratic models, changes in the global geo-political order played a major role in shifting 
the discourse towards a more inclusive and citizen-focused form of the developmental state. 
This was prompted, in the first instance, by what has been described as the ‘third wave’1 
(Huntington, 1991) of democratisation which began in the 1970s and was carried forward 
into the 1980s and beyond. This era witnessed the transition to democracy of a number of 
countries in Asia and Latin America and a discernible move away from autocratic rule. In this 
context, there was both domestic and international pressure on democratising states to 
embark on public sector reforms and to adopt a more inclusive system of government 
(Robinson & White, 2002; Randall, 2007). This process was given new impetus by the 
ending of the Cold War in the early 1990s and the fact that states in the Western bloc, and the 
United States in particular, which had hitherto been more tolerant of authoritarian regimes 
provided they were anti-communist, began to actively support democratisation processes and 
frequently set democratic reform as a pre-condition for continued aid. 
 
Thus, while considerable interest remains in the manner in which Asian states were able to 
steer their economies towards sustainable growth, and hence to eliminate poverty, theorists 
and policy makers have broadened the scope of what might constitute a developmental state 
and this has taken into account more recent understandings of the meaning of development 
and democracy in a globalising world. It is, however, necessary to note a key distinction 
between theorising on the East Asian model and writings on developmental states elsewhere 
in the world. This relates to the fact that theory on the former is based on ex-post-facto 
                                                 
1 Samuel P. Huntington used the term ‘third wave’ in his book titled The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 
Twentieth Century, published in 1991, to refer the global wave of democratisation in countries throughout 
Europe, Latin America, Asia and Africa since the 1970s. 
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analysis while the latter discuss what are believed to be the necessary preconditions for a 
democratic developmental state. It also evident that, where the East Asian developmental 
states were seen to embrace a relatively narrow range of measures to promote economic 
growth, those advocating for democratic developmental states envisage a much broader ambit 
of activities and approaches which, amongst others, will include notions of citizen 
participation, redistribution, capability enhancement, decentralisation and the essence of 
development, all of which are seen to be mutually reinforcing. 
 
2.5.2 Conceptualising Democratic Developmental States 
 
Edigheji (2005:22) defines a democratic developmental state as one which has the 
‘institutional attributes of the classical developmental state, that is, being autonomous and 
coherent, but (which) also takes on board the attributes of procedural democracy. In addition, 
the democratic developmental state is one that forges broad-based alliances with society and 
ensures popular participation in the governance and transformation processes’. To that extent, 
there is some consensus in the literature that a democratic developmental state should have a 
transformative agenda which extends beyond economic growth to a focus on broader social 
and political goals (Maphunye, 2009; Gumede, 2009). In support of this perspective White 
(2006:60) asserts that ‘the process of development involves more than just economic growth 
but includes life-and-death issues such as poverty, personal security, distributive equity, 
social justice and environmental sustainability’. It must also embody the principles of 
democracy, which Leftwich (2002) refers to as a developmental orientation and democratic 
political system. To that extent Edigheji (2005) maintains that a key determinant of a 
democratic development state is its competence in promoting development and growth and, 
at the same time, its capacity to engender consensus and popular participation. The ability to 
provide mechanisms for effective citizen participation, in particular, has been seen as a key 
characteristic of the democratic developmental state. The extent to which citizens accept the 
legitimacy of the state, moreover, is believed to be contingent on the effectiveness of these 
participatory processes as well on the extent to which the gains of economic growth are 
redistributed (Leftwich; 2002; Welch & Nuru; 2006). 
 
Unlike the East Asian model which required collective sacrifice in pursuit of long-range 
economic goals, redistributive capacity is seen to be one of the core features of the 
democratic developmental state as it builds public confidence in the system and confers 
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legitimacy on its political leaders. For Sindzingre (2004:14), redistributive capacity is 
essential ‘as it regulates inequalities and social conflict, and consolidates the middle class’, 
while weak redistributive capacity erodes credibility. Furthermore, in order to consolidate 
and deepen democracy, an effective democratic developmental state must promote social and 
physical investment and ensure the redistribution of the gains of economic growth to all 
sectors of society (White, 2006). In effect, Fritz and Rocha Menocal (2007) maintain that the 
legitimacy of a democratic developmental state is directly linked to good governance and its 
capacity to deliver public goods. 
 
2.5.3 Decentralisation 
 
A further component of a democratic developmental state is seen to be its capacity to 
decentralise administrative and political responsibilities to lower echelons of government. 
Although decentralisation had been ‘fashionable’ in development circles for some decades 
(Conyers, 1984), interest in the concept gained momentum in the 1980s and 1990s (Turner, 
1999). Programmes aimed at devolving power away from central government have since 
been extensively supported by international donor organisations, by United Nations structures 
and international funding organisations such as the World Bank and the IMF (Blair, 1998). In 
that context, state reforms that focus on decentralised governance have been seen as not only 
desirable but, according to Blondel (1990), inescapable. This is because the process is 
associated with good governance, greater efficiency and the deepening of democratisation 
through participatory processes which give voice to the poor at the local level (Klugman, 
1994). This element of the developmental state will be seen to be of importance in the 
analysis of the South African case to be discussed in subsequent chapters. 
 
2.5.4 Conventional criteria needed to build a Democratic Development State 
 
Over and above the emphasis placed by most advocates of the democratic developmental 
state on the need for citizen participation, good governance and legitimacy, a number of 
writers have reasserted the view that many of the characteristics of the East Asian model 
remain essential preconditions for any state hoping to assume a developmental label. 
 
The need for economic growth: Contrary to the dominant citizen-centred view, Huff, Dewitt 
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and Oughton (2001:713) maintain that that economic growth alone will establish the 
reputation of a state as being developmental as this will confer credibility on its performance. 
They further maintain that only demonstrated economic achievements will convince the 
private sector of the genuineness of their intentions and will encourage the increased private 
sector investment necessary to stimulate still higher economic growth. They caution, 
however, that the private sector is an ‘always skeptical audience’ and to establish its 
reputation as democratic and developmental a state will need to convince society of its 
commitment and consistence (ibid). 
 
Building national institutions: In rejecting the narrow economistic focus of the East Asian 
development states, a number of writers, adopting what has become known as the 
‘institutional perspective’, have called for significant refurbishment of 21st century public 
institutions in order to address what are major shifts in the historic character of development 
(Hoff & Stiglitz, 2001; Rodrik, 2002; Olate, 2003; Evans, 2010). The premise of the 
institutionalist perspective is that while the state must take centre stage it must focus 
particularly on effective, quality service delivery with the aim of increasing the well-being of 
the broader society through transformation and redistribution of the fruits of development. 
The institutional perspective which is supported by a number of development economists 
(Rodrik, 1999; Hoff & Stiglitz, 2001; Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2002), contest the 
view that development is primarily a process of capital accumulation. Instead, they view 
development as process of organisational change and stress the need to promote high-quality 
institutions that provide broad-based growth. For Evans (2010), the construction of such 
high-quality institutions can only take place if the foundation of a skilled and creative 
populace is set in place and a state invests in the development of human capabilities. 
 
Building a national consensus: In similar fashion, a number of authors have pointed to the 
need for a common understanding of the strategies and policies which are adopted by a 
democratic developmental state. Just as the successes of the East Asian states have, in part, 
been attributed to a broad national consensus and a shared understanding of the objectives of 
the growth path which is being followed, so too have proponents of the democratic 
developmental states stressed the need for a collective vision. Thus Pant (2002:iii), writing in 
the context of India, asserts that ‘(e)very country needs a vision statement which stirs the 
imagination and motivates all segments of society to greater effort. It is an essential step in 
building a political consensus on a broad national development strategy, which encompasses 
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the roles and responsibilities of different agents of the economy.’ A similar view is advanced 
by Gupta (2004:1) who proclaims that a country’s vision must be comprehensive, 
harmonious and a synthesis of competing views and forces. It must be supported, he 
maintains, by objective and realistic appraisals of ‘emerging opportunities’ and ‘concealed 
potentials’ and must rise beyond past limitations and challenges. Such a vision, he declares, 
‘should awaken in us an unswerving confidence in ourselves, a complete reliance on our own 
capacity as a nation and an unshakeable determination to realize our full potential.’ 
 
2.6 21st Century developmental thinking 
 
The remarkable economic successes of the newly industrialising countries (NICs) of East 
Asia ignited considerable theoretical debate and a re-examination of the nature and character 
of development thinking and its status in the 21st century. The 1997 Asian crisis further 
revived these debates and post-crisis theorising has revolved around the merits of 
neoliberalism and development statism and controversy surrounding market-oriented and 
state-led development (Rapley, 2007; Radice, 2008; Pempel, 1999).  
 
20th century development thinking, as indicated, was framed in terms of economic growth 
with development models focusing narrowly on economic expansion and industrial 
modernization (Kohli, 1999). Little emphasis was placed on issues such as participatory 
democracy, quality livelihoods, equity and redistribution (Edigheji, 2008, 2009). For Peter 
Evans (2010), however, developmental state thinking in the 21st century must shift its focus 
to the promotion of high-quality institutions and the expansion of human capacities as 
articulated in the ‘capability approach’ pioneered by Amartya Sen (1999). Others, such as 
Leftwich (2000) and Grindle (2007), underline the importance of sound governance and the 
preconditions necessary to bring about development and reduce poverty. As these three foci 
are interrelated and have significant relevance for research focusing on democratic 
developmental states in the 21st century, they will be discussed in more detail below.  
 
2.6.1  Good  governance  
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Since the 1990s, and the failure of the neoliberal ‘Washington Consensus’ policy reforms2 to 
reduce poverty or stimulate growth, the concept of good governance has emerged as an 
alternate focus of development (Marangos, 2008). In this way, the original ‘Washington 
Consensus’ policy reforms were ‘augmented’ (Rodrik, 2002) to include ideas of good 
governance, social capital, civil society participation, capacity building, institutional reform, 
poverty-reduction strategies and the creation of safety nets (Beeson & Islam, 2005). Features 
of good governance include sound financial regulation, transparency and an active role of the 
state in fostering the expansion of human capital. Moreover, good governance is seen to 
incorporate such core factors as participation, consensus orientation, equity, efficiency and 
accountability (Stiglitz, 1998). 
 
Grindle (2007:554), however, in questioning the term ‘good governance’ coined the concept 
of ‘good enough governance’. This implies that the development interventions of individual 
countries must be assessed in accordance with their particular historical contexts, sequencing 
and timing, and must be carefully selected in accordance with their ‘contributions to 
particular ends such as poverty reduction and democracy’. She used this concept to refer to 
the ‘minimal conditions of governance necessary to allow political and economic 
development to occur’ (ibid). Linking the notion of good governance to developmental states 
in the Third World, Leftwich (2000:126) preferred the term ‘democratic good governance’ 
where democracy would act as ‘the glue that holds good governance together’ and this would 
include such aspects as political legitimacy, adherence to the rules of the democratic process 
and the exercise of policy constraint in new democracies. Fritz and Rocha Menocal (2007), 
expanding on this line of thought, draw attention to the overlap of the developmental state 
and good governance agendas. These authors stress the need for such aspects as state 
capacity, accountability and respect for human rights, while supporting Grindle’s (2007) 
concept of ‘good enough governance’ as ‘less normative and more situational and pragmatic’ 
(Fritz & Rocha Menocal, 2007:538). Drawing on the work of Khan (2006), Fritz and Rocha 
Menocal (2007) further emphasise the key importance of political stability and state capacity 
in low-income countries, which they view as ‘key “growth-enhancing” components of 
governance’.  
                                                 
2 A term coined by John Hamilton in 1989. The Washington Consensus comprised a set of ten policy reforms including trade liberalisation, 
privatisation, deregulation, fiscal policy discipline, tax reforms, redirection of public spending, competitive exchange rates, legal security for 
property rights and liberalisation of  inward foreign direct investment (Williamson, 2004). These reforms were supported by the US 
leadership and Washington-based economic organisations such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the US Treasury. 
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2.6.2  The Institutional Perspective 
 
For many development theorists, unlike 20th century developmental states, the building of 
successful developmental states in the 21st century requires the establishment of participatory 
institutions that are democratic and capability enhancing. A significant body of literature 
(Hoff & Stiglitz, 2001; Rodrik, 2002; Olate, 2003; Evans, 2010) proposes that 21st century 
institutions will require substantial refurbishing to address the shift in the historic character of 
development. For Evans (2010:37), ‘the idea of a developmental state puts robust, competent 
institutions at the centre of the development matrix’. However, he emphasises that, besides 
having to incorporate some of the institutional features of 20th century states, 21st century 
developmental states will need to strengthen state-society ties and engage with societal actors 
as access to ‘accurate information on collective priorities at the community level is a sine qua 
non for a successful 21st century developmental state’ (ibid:38). Moreover, Evans (2010) 
believes that the construction of high-quality institutions can only take place if the foundation 
of a skilled and creative population is set in place and a nation invests in enhancing human 
capabilities. 
 
The premise of the institutionalist perspective is that the state must take centre stage and 
focus particularly on effective, quality service delivery with the aim of increasing the well-
being of broader society through transformation and redistribution of the fruits of 
development. Building strong institutions is increasingly supported by a wide range of 
development economists who contest the view of development as primarily a process of 
capital accumulation (Rodrik, 1999; Hoff & Stiglitz, 2001; Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 
2002). Advocates of the institutional perspective view development as a process of 
organisational change and are increasingly focusing on promoting high-quality institutions 
that provide broad-based growth. In this regard, Rodrik (1999:19) proposes that participatory 
political institutions should be viewed ‘as meta-institutions that elicit and aggregate local 
knowledge and thereby help build better institutions. Improved performance of institutions 
depends on their own internal coherence credibility, their competence and their external 
accountability to civil society’. 
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2.6.3  Expanding capabilities 
 
While the East Asian developmental states were seen to be synonymous with managerialism 
and authoritarianism (Fakir, 2007), democratic development states are seen as being more 
inclusive, focusing on effective state–society linkages, democracy-building (Randal, 2007; 
Edigheji, 2010) and the expansion of human capabilities (Ostrom, 1996). For Evans 
(2010:38) ‘a 21st century developmental state must be a “capability-enhancing state”’. 
Expanding capabilities, he asserts, ‘is not just a welfare goal. It is the inescapable foundation 
of sustained growth in overall GDP’. Evans provides a list of the provision of collective 
goods that will enable capability expansion, including health, education, infrastructure – 
particularly transportation that enables access to employment – and investment in the 
development of skills and capacity. 
 
Capability expansion, which refers to a general enhancement of human capacity and well-
being, has emerged as a new way of conceptualising development. The capability approach, 
pioneered by Amartya Sen (1981; 1995; 1999) and operationalised on a more practical level 
by authors such as Mahbub Ul Haqhas (1995) and Alkire (2002), has been advanced as an 
alternative to economic frameworks in addressing poverty, inequality and human 
development. In that regard, Sen’s (1999) notion of freedom seen to be a central feature of 
development in that it provides the poor with the autonomy and the means to become agents 
of change in exercising control over the course of their own lives. He sees instruments of 
freedom as including political freedom, economic facilities and social opportunities. Both 
Sen (1999) and Nussbaum (2000) emphasise the importance of public discussion, political 
empowerment and democratic decision making as ethical processes for collective choice and 
social cooperation. 
 
2.7 The prospects for Democratic Developmental States in Africa 
 
While White (1988:44) acknowledges that the democratic developmental state is ‘a rare bird 
on the developmental scene’, experiences throughout the world reveal that it is clearly 
possible to construct such a state. Research commissioned by the World Bank in emerging 
economies in Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America, Africa and Asia (Babajanian, 2005; 
Folscher, 2007a, 2007b; Goldfrank, 2007; Shall; 2007) revealed that participatory democracy 
and sound local government had been instrumental in building inclusive and accountable 
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systems of governance capable of supporting economic growth and redistribution. Further 
studies in countries which included Brazil, Mexico, India, Mauritius, Turkey and Armenia 
indicate that the adoption of a democratic developmental state model strengthens citizen–
state engagement and enables the marginalised and disempowered to participate and 
influence decision making on issues which affect their welfare (Shah, 2007; Moynihan, 
2007). 
 
In the context of Africa, despite numerous references in the literature to the existence of 
developmental states on the continent (Mkandawire, 2001; Edigheji, 2005, 2006, 2009; 
Meyns & Musamba, 2010) or, alternatively, to their inevitability (Nzwei & Kuye, 2007:207), 
a number of scholars have questioned whether any African state can accurately be labelled as 
developmental or whether this is merely an aspirational goal (Fine, 2008; Southall, 2006; 
Turok, 2008). Referring to this ambivalence in the literature, Mkandawire (2001:289), 
observes that ‘one remarkable feature of the discourse on the state and development in Africa 
is the disjuncture between an analytical tradition that insists on the impossibility of 
developmental states in Africa and a prescriptive literature that presupposes their existence’. 
Referring to this ‘impossibility’ thesis, Mkandawire (2001:310) remarks that ‘Africa has had 
examples of countries whose ideological inclination was clearly “developmentalist” and that 
pursued policies that produced fairly high rates of growth and significant social gains and 
accumulation of human capital in the post-colonial era’. 
 
Notwithstanding the scepticism, there is some agreement that Botswana and Mauritius exhibit 
many of the features of a democratic developmental state including rapid economic growth, 
state intervention in the economy, a determined commitment to pursue development, a 
competent bureaucracy and disciplined leadership (Leftwich, 2000; Mbabazi & Taylor, 2005; 
Gumede, 2009; Acemoglu et al. 2002; Mapunye, 2009; Taylor, 2003; Hwedi, 2001). Their 
status as democratic developmental states, moreover, stems from the fact that since 
independence both Botswana and Mauritius have supported a ‘political culture of pluralism 
and political tolerance anchored on a relatively stable multiparty political landscape, 
predicated upon liberal democracy’ (Matlosa, 2005:15). 
 
In the case of Botswana, the country not only achieved the fastest economic growth rate in 
the world during the 1980s (Hwedi, 2001), but it also possesses a dedicated and efficient 
bureaucratic elite that enjoys legitimacy from its constituents (Taylor, 2003). Samatar (1999) 
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shares a similar view of the professionalism of Botswana’s bureaucracy and underscores the 
central role played by the state in acting as a facilitator or ‘entrepreneurial agent’. Relatedly, 
Acemoglu et al. (2002) ascribe the success of the country to the building of quality 
institutions by post-independence leaders, such as former presidents Khama and Masire, 
together with a disciplined public sector leadership. 
 
The successes of Mauritius as a democratic developmental state are similarly attributed to 
far-sighted government policies, to state-led macro-economic planning, to the character and 
quality of its public service, to pro-poor interventionist policies and to a consistent track 
record of service delivery (Mapunye, 2009). The Overseas Development Institute lists the 
drivers of progress in Mauritius as being ‘smart leadership’ (introducing reforms, promoting 
national cohesion and facilitating local initiatives), ‘smart policies’ (promoting sound macro-
economic management and meaningful citizen engagement), ‘smart institutions’ (advancing 
more responsive governance and offering a participatory role for citizens) and ‘smart friends’ 
(the nurturing of good relations with the international community and facilitating 
international donor support) (ODI, 2011:7). In economic terms Mauritius has managed to 
achieve significant growth and in 2011, after Botswana, it was the fifth best performing 
country in Africa in terms of GDP per capita (African Economic Outlook, 2012).3 In that 
respect, the state is seen to have played a central role in stimulating high growth rates and 
boosting trade (Gumede, 2009) but, equally important, since the 1980s this growth was 
successfully translated into improving human development and in substantially reducing 
poverty (Vandemoortele & Bird, 2010). 
 
Notwithstanding the successes of Botswana and Mauritius and evidence that economic 
growth in Africa, in excess of five per cent, has been amongst the fastest in the world in the 
past decade (African Economic Outlook, 2012), a range of problems continues to inhibit the 
emergence of democratic developmental states (Edigheji, 2005; White, 1998). These relate, 
amongst others, to low savings, poor investment in technology and research, flawed industrial 
strategies, weak governance systems and corruption (UNECA, 2011). Furthermore, in 
analysing the achievements of Botswana and Mauritius, it must be borne in mind that both 
have small and relatively homogeneous populations which has made forging a national 
                                                 
3 It must be noted that growth in the top three economies, those of Equatorial Guinea, Seychelles and Gabon was 
from a very low base (African Economic Outlook, 2012). 
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consensus necessary to pursue a democratic developmental agenda an easier proposition. The 
size of the population has also meant that it has been comparatively easier to redistribute 
some of the gains of economic growth. Forging a consensus in more socio-culturally diverse 
societies and alleviating wide-spread poverty is clearly a more challenging prospect in larger 
states. 
 
Despite the aspirational nature of much of the writing on democratic developmental states in 
Africa and elsewhere, there is some agreement in the literature on what are, or should be, key 
components of the democratic model. Summarised, these include selected characteristics of 
the classical East Asian model such as the need for state-led intervention in macro-economic 
planning, the building of a competent bureaucracy and the establishment of some form of 
national consensus on the development path to be followed. There is also broad agreement 
that democratic developmental states should reject authoritarianism and, in addition to 
strengthening governance systems, should focus, inter alia, on promoting meaningful citizen 
participation, establishing a culture of human rights, decentralising administrative 
responsibility, adopting pro-poor policies and ensuring that the benefits of economic growth 
are redistributed across society. 
 
It is nevertheless recognised that democratic developmental states may not necessarily 
manifest all of these features at one time. In addition, while many scholars are in agreement 
that developmental states, in general, share similar defining features, it is acknowledged that 
they are differentiated by a range of capacities, visions and ideologies (Evans, 2010; Fritz & 
Rochas Menocal, 2007) and emerge under very different circumstances and contexts (Pye, 
1985; Compton, 2000; Hart-Landsberg, Jeong & Westra, 2007). It is therefore not possible to 
replicate developmental successes from elsewhere by merely superimposing a ‘ready to 
order’ template on another setting, and this would apply no less to democratic development 
states. Fritz and Menocal (2007:536) further caution that building a democratic 
developmental state is accompanied by certain challenges not faced by non-democratic 
regimes. Although democratic processes promote power sharing, decision-making processes 
are slowed down and the state also becomes ‘less autonomous and less insulated from 
societal demands’. If a democratic regime lacks the requisite skills to deliver development 
promises, this will result in increasing citizen dissatisfaction which could threaten the 
integrity of the state as a whole. 
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2.7 Concluding comments 
 
This chapter has reviewed the factors (historical, geo-political, socio-cultural etc.) which gave 
rise to the East Asian developmental states and has examined what, in the literature, are seen 
to be their defining characteristics. Their successes were found to be attributable to a strong 
state capable of directly steering the economy towards clearly defined strategic goals over a 
sustained period of time. The East Asian developmental state was also found to be 
authoritarian and intolerant of democratic processes which might challenge or sway a 
government from its chosen path. It is evident that, while many developing nations have been 
prompted to emulate the East Asian model in their quest for accelerated economic growth, 
changing global attitudes towards state–civil society relations (a consequence of the ending of 
the Cold War and the onset of the Third Wave of democracy) have led to attempts to 
establish developmental states which are citizen focused and democratic in nature and which 
have a transformatory agenda. It is to this democratic developmental state model which the 
South African government appears currently to aspire. In the chapter which follows 
discussion will focus on understandings of developmentalism in South Africa and will 
examine the impact of seemingly contradictory policies on the attempts to construct a 
democratic developmental state in the country. 
 
 
 
 
  
47 
CHAPTER THREE 
 THE EMERGING SOUTH AFRICAN DEVELOPMENTAL STATE 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The preceding chapter discussed understandings in the literature of the factors which gave rise to 
the East Asian model of the developmental state as well as understandings of the components of 
a democratic developmental model which might be adopted elsewhere in the developing world 
as well as in South Africa. However, a challenge confronting the South Africa government in its 
quest to build a developmental state relates to the fact that the parameters of the model to be 
implemented have never been clearly articulated either in policy or legislation. Although there 
has been repeated mention of the need for a developmental approach in ANC policy documents, 
commencing with the 1992 ‘Waiting to Govern’ and followed by the 1994 Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (ANC, 1994), this has always been at the level of broad generalisation 
and it has been left to independent commentators (academics, individual politicians, trade 
unionists and members of civil society amongst others) to advance what they believe to be the 
core elements of a developmental state. Much of this, as will be seen in the chapter which 
follows, is aspirational in nature and serves to highlight the challenges facing the construction of 
a developmental state rather than suggest a developmental path which might be followed. It also 
points to the fact that some of the key conditions necessary for the establishment of a 
developmental state in South Africa, including a consistent economic growth policy (strongly 
guided by the state) and a national consensus on the path to be followed, are simply not in place. 
 
Over and above the multiple challenges faced by the incoming ANC in its attempts to overcome 
the legacies of apartheid, which included the establishment of an integrated non-racial state and 
the alleviation of wide-spread poverty, a number of additional factors have served to constrain 
attempts to forge an integrated and concerted development strategy and no less to reach a 
common understanding on the essence of a developmental state. The first of these relates to the 
fact that the transition to democracy in 1994 occurred far more quickly than most in the ANC 
had anticipated1 and in the process of conducting multi-party negotiations2, of forging new 
                                                 
1 It must be borne in mind that the ANC and other anti-Apartheid organisations were only unbanned in early 1990. 
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political alliances and, ultimately, of electioneering, the party had had insufficient time to develop a 
coherent development strategy to guide its policies once in office. As Jeremy Cronin, the Secretary 
General of the South African Communist Party (SACP) was to concede, ‘As a liberation movement, we 
were not well positioned, intellectually, theoretically in terms of policy formulation, in terms of socio-
economic transformation. It was understandable. We had been very focused on the political tasks, 
democratisation, mobilisation, fighting a guerrilla struggle.’ (Cronin, quoted in Gumede; 2005:71). 
 
This problem was aggravated by the collapse of the Soviet Union, until then a major source of 
support to the ANC and for some (in the South African Communist Party) a socialist model 
worth emulating. As Mac Maharaj, a former Minister of Transport in the Mandela cabinet, has 
stated, ‘there were no examples to learn from or use as a guide. We could not go it alone. 
Countries that did, such as Sweden, had the space to do so with the Cold War still raging and the 
world being bipolar. The ANC came to power at the end of the Cold War. We had no room to 
manoeuvre’ (Maharaj, quoted in Gumede; 2005:76). The process was further complicated by the 
diverse nature of the ruling tripartite alliance, which encompasses partners from organised labour 
and the Communist Party, as well as more conventional nationalists, seeking to advance the 
interests of hitherto disadvantaged black elites. The different ideological persuasions of these 
partners, as will be discussed below, meant that there was seldom a consensus on the 
development path to be followed, and policies formulated were in consequence, frequently 
inconsistent and sometimes contradictory. It is therefore not surprising that as recently as 2012 a 
draft Green Paper emanating from the Presidency should state, somewhat, disconcertedly: 
 
It is important to note that there seems to be no common understanding of the 
developmental state in the country as a key philosophy in driving economic growth 
and development. While there has been extensive deliberations on the subject, it 
would seem that the concept has not been adequately defined and communicated by 
government… It follows then that a common understanding of such an important tool 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 For a discussion of this process see South Africa History Online, n.d. ‘The CODESA negotiations Convention for a 
Democratic South Africa (CODESA)’, accessed at http://www.sahistory.org.za/codesa-negotiations.  
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of government whose success is attributable to a vision commonly shared by all, 
should be fostered (The Presidency, 2013). 
 
This lack of conceptual clarity, together with the lack of a broad political consensus, as shall be 
discussed below, has meant that the establishment of a democratic developmental state in South 
Africa has struggled to move beyond rhetoric. The project has also been hampered by the fact 
that many of the preconditions necessary to establish a developmental state, such as a strong 
bureaucracy and a skilled workforce, are not yet in place and headway in addressing these 
challenges is slow. 
 
3.1 The rationale for a South African Developmental State  
 
As previously indicated, the ANC, both as a government in waiting and on assumption of 
political office, had displayed an interest in the idea of a developmental state although it is 
evident that different ideological positions within the ruling alliance had different understandings 
of what this might mean. For those to the left, including the SACP, a strong state was necessary 
to drive through a process of social and economic transformation necessary to overcome the 
legacies of apartheid. Thus, according to Alec Erwin (2008:129), former Minister of Public 
Enterprises, ‘a developmental state comes into being when a political movement can translate its 
political power into a set of institutions that support developmental processes which can be 
sustained over decades’. This, he maintained, would require a ‘strong state’ where the ruling 
party has the political power, capacity and visionary leadership to bring about meaningful 
transformation that is sustainable (ibid). For others of a more nationalistic bent, a developmental 
state would be the vehicle for driving rapid economic growth, and this has subsequently been 
stated to have been the objective of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution programme to 
be discussed below. To that extent, at the outset the vagueness in the delineation of the 
parameters of a development state served different interests within the ruling party. With the 
passage of time, however, it has become increasingly apparent that the ANC’s partners, 
COSATU and the ANC, do not share the same ideological and conceptual understandings of a 
developmental state and this has given rise to tensions within the ruling alliance (Chagunda, 
2007:2). 
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Although, as shall be discussed below, interest in the establishment of a development state in 
South Africa has waxed and waned since the advent of democracy in 1994, the idea has re-
emerged as an important component of the ANC’s policy discourse, prompted both by the 
shortcomings of economic development policies in place and the lessons of the global financial 
crisis of 2008 (which demonstrated the dangers of unregulated capitalism).3 Reflective of this 
perspective, the National Planning Commission (2011) asserts that ‘(t)he call to build a 
developmental state resonates because the policies pursued since 1994 have not gone far enough 
in addressing the inequalities of the past and, as a result, the proceeds of growth have been 
unevenly shared.’ In this context, the construction of a developmental state is now viewed by the 
ruling party as the most viable option to address socio-economic inequalities and improve 
service delivery (ANC, 2007a; Levin, 2008). A commitment to the establishment of a 
development state was pledged in the ANC’s 2009 Election Manifesto which states that: 
 
The developmental state will play a central and strategic role in the economy. We 
will ensure a more effective government; improve the coordination and planning 
efforts of the developmental state by means of a planning entity to ensure faster 
change. A review of the structure of government will be undertaken, to ensure 
effective service delivery. 
 
In calling for a developmental state there is a recognition that it will need to follow a trajectory 
which differs from that of the East Asian model due to the contextual realities of South Africa 
(Thomas, 2008; Makgetla, 2008). Thus the National Planning Commission (2011:409) asserts 
that: 
 
Developmental states have been created in both authoritarian and democratic 
countries. In many cases, democracy has been crucial in ensuring the state has 
                                                 
3 A precursor to this line of thought is evident in the ANC Economic Transformation Policy Discussion Document 
22 March 2007:  ‘Our approach to economic transformation proceeds from the understanding that the changes we 
seek cannot emerge spontaneously from the `invisible hand` of the market. The state must play a strategic role in 
shaping the contours of economic development.’ Accessed at http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=5246 
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sufficient legitimacy to bring about transformation. This is particularly important in 
South Africa where, as the plan identifies, one of the most critical roles of the state is 
to enable people to develop their capabilities. A robust democracy is therefore not 
just compatible with building a capable and developmental state, it is an essential 
prerequisite for the sort of developmental state needed to tackle poverty and 
inequality.  
 
To that extent the ruling party has called for the construction of a state that is people-centred, 
participatory and democratic. This commitment has been repeated on various platforms including 
the ANC General National Council meeting in 2005 (ANC, 2005), the 52nd National Conference 
in Polokwane (ANC 2007b) and in its manifesto for the 2009 General Election (Poon, 2009). 
Further, the ANC’s 2007 Draft Strategy and Tactics Document (ANC, 2007b) states explicitly 
that a developmental state must mobilise society, and particularly the poor, to participate in their 
own development. However, as shall be discussed, despite these public declarations on the 
government’s commitment to building a developmental state, there are very few documents 
which provide any real detail on the constituent elements of such a state. Even the National 
Planning Commission (2011), which up to the present has advanced the most explicit 
explanation of the intended role of a democratic developmental state, provides a remarkably 
generalised description of what this would consist of or the policy directions it might follow:  
 
Broadly defined, a developmental state brings about rapid and sustainable 
transformation in a country’s economic and/or social conditions through active, 
intensive and effective intervention in the structural causes of economic or social 
underdevelopment. This model has been applied to the success of East Asian 
countries from the 1960s in achieving rapid economic growth alongside 
improvements in human wellbeing; in the Indian state of Kerala to bring about 
improvements in human wellbeing (without comparable economic improvements); 
and in Scandinavia to realise full employment and establish welfare states. There is 
no prototype of a developmental state: each country has pursued a unique set of 
policies in response to its own set of challenges. 
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Beyond this generic definition, as will be discussed in greater detail below, there is little in 
policy or legislation which appears to distinguish the South African developmental state from 
states elsewhere in the developing world. 
 
3.2 Defining features of a South African Developmental State 
 
In as much as there is a coherent understanding of what might be the key features of a 
democratic developmental state in South Africa, there is agreement in the ruling alliance on the 
need for strong direction from the government (as the polity) and a strong central state.  
 
3.2.1 The central role of a political centre and a strong state 
 
Numerous sources point to the importance of developing a strategic political centre in South 
Africa, with effective central planning and the coordination of government activities to 
streamline its efforts. Jeremy Cronin, Deputy General-Secretary of the South African Communist 
Party (SACP) and member of the ANC’s National Executive Party, questions how the state 
might become the strategic centre for transformation:  
 
How exactly do we understand this notion of a strategic political centre? Is it 
something we strive to build, a role that has to be earned daily in struggle through 
moral example, policy capacity, presence on the ground and an ability to provide 
inspiring strategic leadership to cadres in the ANC, in the state, to Alliance partners, 
to social movements and to grass-roots communities alike? (Cronin, 2008:237). 
 
Despite the desire for a strong political centre, it is evident that the diverse interests of the ruling 
alliance, together with the rent-seeking ambitions of political leaders seeking to use the state for 
personal accumulation, have presented serious difficulties to the establishment of a strong 
political centre. In that regard Kenny (2010:1–2) points to the infighting and ‘factional battles for 
position’ within the governing alliance and the purpose of certain elements intent ‘on state 
capture to serve their narrow political and economic interests which further negates the state's 
ability to deliver’. This reality prompted Erwin (2008) to call for a strengthening of the tripartite 
 
 
 
 
  
53 
alliance in order to dissuade attempts to ‘capture’ the leadership of the ANC’, either by unions or 
the idealistic views of individuals. 
 
In addition to the need for a strong political centre is the need for a strong and unified state 
structure which is capable of implementing development programmes in a coherent way across, 
both within and between, the different strata of the governing hierarchy. Despite the fact that the 
Presidential Review Commission (1998) identified the need to strengthen the centre of 
government and improve intergovernmental relations more than 15 years ago, this still remains a 
key challenge. In that respect Mokaba (2001) contends that the coordination of planning and 
budgeting has remained an elusive reality in South Africa for a number of years. He firmly 
advocates the building of a strong coordinating centre, accompanied by competent bureaucrats 
and a capable administration that works jointly with non-state actors towards achieving common 
developmental goals. Such a centre must drive economic transformation, direct macro-economic 
policy towards developmental goals, synchronise economic reforms, monitor policy 
implementation and become more competitive by diversifying and identifying new niche areas. 
Both the Public Service Commission (PSC, 2013) and Kondlo and Maserumule (2010) draw 
attention to the importance of coordinating activities and integrating development programmes to 
prevent duplication of efforts, which have frequently plagued development activities in the past 
and led to the unnecessary squandering of scarce resources. 
 
3.2.2 Intergovernmental relations 
 
A key dimension in ensuring that a developmental state is capable of implementing its policies in 
a comprehensive fashion across all tiers of government is the extent to which it is able to 
establish effective intergovernmental relations. In the case of South Africa, the constitutionally 
determined notion of cooperative government has presented its own challenges to integrated 
development planning. Chapter 3 of the Constitution (RSA, 1996: Sections 40 and 41) describes 
the three tiers of government, national, provincial and local, as distinctive, interdependent and 
interrelated spheres which are obliged to cooperate with one another ‘in mutual trust and good 
faith’, to assist and support one another and to coordinate their actions and legislation. However, 
beyond presenting an enabling framework, the Constitution provides little detail on how this 
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harmonious relationship might be built. This challenge is further compounded by the fact that 
constitutionally the public sector is not a unified entity and the legislation and administrative 
practices governing national and provincial government differ from those of local government 
(RSA 1996: Chapters 7 and 10)4. Furthermore, national government may only intervene to direct 
the affairs of provincial and local government under very specific conditions prescribed by the 
Constitution. Weaknesses in the coordination of government activities were identified by the 
Presidential Review Commission as far back as 1998 (PSC, 2008) and this continues to present 
challenges to the effective delivery of state programmes, prompting calls for the establishment of 
a common set of norms and standards for all spheres of government (Abrahams, Fitzgerald & 
Cameron, 2009). This, indeed is the intent of the 2013 Public Administration Management Bill 
which asserts that the challenge of redressing poverty, the marginalisation of people and 
communities and other legacies of apartheid and discrimination is ‘best addressed by providing 
for administrations in the three spheres of government to be organised and to function in ways 
that ensure efficient, quality, collaborative and accountable service delivery to alleviate poverty 
and promote social and economic development for the people of the Republic.’5 
 
The 2005 Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act was promulgated to facilitate cooperation 
between different spheres in order to enable each level to discharge its responsibilities effectively 
and efficiently (RSA, 2005b), but it has not managed to resolve many of the inherent problems 
still confronting intergovernmental relations in South Africa. It is thus unsurprising that the 
National Development Plan (National Planning Commission, 2011:409) should assert that: 
 
                                                 
4 According to the 2013 Public Administration Management Bill, ‘’public administration’ means the public service, 
municipalities and their employees; ‘public service’  means all - (a) national departments; (b)national government 
components listed in Part A of Schedule 3 to the Public Service Act; (c) provincial departments which means (i) the 
Office of a Premier listed in Schedule 1 to the Public Service Act; and (ii) provincial departments listed in Schedule 
2 to the Public Service Act; and (d) provincial government components listed in Part B of Schedule 3 to the Public 
Service Act, and their employees.’  Republic of South Africa  (2013),  Public Administration Management Bill, 
(B55-2013). Accessed at 
http://www.dpsa.gov.za/dpsa2g/documents/acts&regulations/pam/Public%20Administration%20Management%20B
ill,%202013%20as%20introduced%20in%20the%20National%20Council%20of%20Provinces.pdf.  
5 Ibid. p. 2. 
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South Africa has struggled to achieve constructive relations between local, 
provincial and national government. A lack of clarity about the division of 
responsibilities together with a reluctance to manage the system has created tension 
and instability across the three spheres of government. There is no consensus on how 
this is going to be resolved and there is a lack of leadership in finding appropriate 
solutions. 
 
The on-going challenges of intergovernmental coordination present constraints to the roll-out of 
most government programmes and they present a serious impediment to the establishment of a 
developmental state which, virtually by definition, calls for a coordinated and integrated plan of 
action. Reflecting this concern, in its 15-year review of intergovernmental relations in South 
Africa, the Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG, 2008:16) asserted that ‘the 
underlying challenge for government currently is ensuring that IGR structures are able to bring 
certainty in how the three spheres transact on key developmental priorities of the country as a 
whole, and how to position government better for local and community focused development.’ It 
is thus not surprising that the National Development Plan (National Planning Commission, 
2011:410) should set as one of the key priorities for a developmental state the need to improve 
interdepartmental coordination and to adopt ‘a less hierarchical approach to interdepartmental 
coordination so that most issues can be resolved between officials through routine day-to-day 
interactions.’ 
 
3.2.3 Institution building  
 
The successes of the classic developmental states have been attributed to their coherent 
organisational structure, institutional arrangements that operated according to strict rules and 
norms and their institutional capacity to formulate and implement policies in order to achieve 
development goals (Johnson, 1999). For Edigheji (2010:4), ‘institutions matter’ and the quality 
and capacity of institutions in South Africa will determine its ability to bring about growth, 
transformation and developmental success. Evans (2010), together with analysts such as Butler 
(2010) and Kim (2010), draws attention to the critical importance of building strong, 
developmentally focused institutions, noting that effective developmental performance will only 
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emerge within a coherent institutional framework. 
 
At a formalistic level, significant headway has been made since 1994 in establishing the 
institutions necessary to support a developmental state. These include the reconfiguration of the 
organisational structure of the state (both the integration of the former ethnic homelands and the 
re-delimitation of provincial and municipal boundaries), the establishment of representative 
structures at all three levels of government, the establishment of a coherent legislative framework 
and the creation of oversight and regulatory structures, amongst others. However, although the 
calibre of political institutions and their internal design plays a vital role in influencing policy 
outcomes and mediating between political and civil society, ‘“good” institutions do not 
necessarily produce “good” developmental outcomes since this linkage depends on the quality of 
policies and other variables’ (White, 2002:36). Thus, despite the existence of a sound 
institutional structure, the South African state still manifests a number of the characteristics of 
what Myrdal (1970) has termed a ‘soft state’, with widespread disregard for regulations, a lack of 
accountability and corruption – more will be said of this below. 
 
3.2.4  Building a strong state bureaucracy  
 
The structure, power and caliber of the state bureaucracy were key factors in driving the 
successes of the East Asian developmental states and it is recognised that the establishment of a 
professionalised and dedicated public service will be of critical importance in building a 
democratic developmental state in South Africa. Thus Erwin (2008:139) stresses that the 
strengthening and transformation of the public sector will be one of the primary challenges faced 
in constructing a developmental state in South Africa and asserts that: 
 
the state has to be composed of efficient and stable institutions that are capable of 
monitoring, evaluating and effectively implementing complex policy programmes and 
ensuring that they impact positively across the economy and society. This requires 
high levels of skill and organisational capacity to be located within the public sector.  
 
Sangweni and Mxakato-Diseko (2008:37), respectively former chairperson and commissioner of 
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the Public Service Commission of South Africa, draw on experiences of developmental states in 
China, Japan, and India to highlight the vital importance of the organisational structure of 
institutions, strong leadership, the coherence of lead ministries and the need for ongoing training 
of public officials. In order for the South African public service to be ‘anywhere near a cutting-
edge juggernaut for the developmental state’ (ibid:41), Sangweni and Mxakato-Diseko maintain, 
the public sector will need to ‘cohere into a high performance machinery, bound by a common 
developmental grammar and idiom, astuteness, capacity, agility and single-mindedness, and 
driven by strong nationalism to do its best for the country’ (ibid:47–48). A similar view is held 
by Marwala (2009:2) who contends that ‘in order to build a robust developmental state it is vital 
that we produce a cadre of highly educated people who are able to conduct advanced research 
and development’. This bureaucratic layer must comprise competent and numerate graduates, 
who possess well-developed visualisation skills, but will require ongoing technical education in 
order to increase developmental capacity and reduce poverty (ibid). 
 
However, while the government recognises the need to develop a stronger skills base in order to 
establish a developmental state, its approach to the challenge is largely aspirational. Thus, as part 
of its 15-year review process the Presidency (2008:119) asserted that a developmental state: 
 
(W)ould need organisational capacity, to ensure that its structures and systems 
effectively facilitate implementation of programmes decided upon, insisting on the 
highest possible standards of public service. This would mean continuing attention to 
issues of the macro-organisation of the state which have received profile in the 
findings of this review. It would include definition of roles and responsibilities across 
the three spheres, effective relations between the spheres and stability of the 
management system. This would include strengthening monitoring and evaluation 
capacity, including at points of delivery (such as schools, hospitals, clinics and so 
on). It should have the technical capacity to translate broad goals and objectives into 
practical programmes and projects and to see that they are implemented. This would 
require effective training, appropriate orientation and leadership of the Public 
Service, and recruitment and retention of skills. It would need to master long-term 
planning. This is a prerequisite not only of technical capacity but also of the state’s 
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ability to give leadership to the rest of society by making long-term commitments that 
other actors can rely on. 
 
While it is acknowledged that the construction of a developmental state will require both a 
broadening and deepening of the national skills base, there is also general agreement, both within 
and outside the state, that the capacity of human resources in the public sector is inadequate for 
the task at hand. Thus, the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (The 
Presidency, 2006:7) policy document notes that ‘for both the public infrastructure and the private 
investment programmes, the single great impediment is shortage of skills’. The document further 
highlights the different types of skills required which include ‘professional skills, such as 
engineers and scientists; managers, such as financial, personnel and project managers; and 
skilled technical employees, such as artisans and computer technicians.’ Significantly, the severe 
skills shortages are also seen to be a constraint to economic development. Thus, according to 
Breier (2009:1), ‘South Africa’s skills shortages are widely regarded as key factors preventing 
the achievement of the country’s targeted six per cent growth rate. These shortages of 
professionals and artisans in particular, need to be seen in relation to a number of issues that arise 
from the country’s apartheid history as well as post-apartheid attempts to rectify historical 
imbalances.’ Furthermore, while a shortage of key personnel is a challenge at national level, the 
problem is particularly acute at local government level (COGTA, 2009). 
 
A further constraint to the effectiveness of the public sector has been the high level of corruption 
amongst civil servants (PSC, 2013). This has not only adversely affected the performance of the 
public sector but it has also led to considerable public distrust in state officials (Wielders, 2013). 
This, in turn, has made the task of forging some form of national consensus necessary for the 
construction of a developmental state an extremely difficult task. 
 
3.2.5 Embeddedness and state–society synergies  
 
As noted earlier, the political landscape of a nation plays a significant role in the construction of 
a developmental state. What distinguished East Asian developmental states from other states was 
their strength and autonomy in implementing long-term economic policies. Lessons from these 
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experiences inform us that a South African developmental state ought to be a ‘strong state’, 
willing to exert its political power and administrative capacity, while enjoying ‘relative 
autonomy’ from social forces ‘that might dissuade it from the use of its capacity to design and 
implement policies that are in its long-term interest’. It is state autonomy that prevents its capture 
from rent-seeking groups and particularist interests (UNCTAD, 2007:60). Only under conditions 
of such ‘embedded autonomy’ can states be termed developmental and provide the necessary 
structures for industrial transformation. It is the immersion of the state in a dense network of ties 
that binds all sectors to pursue common development goals and such alliances enable social 
actors to be the stimulus for socio-economic change (White, 2000). 
 
Turok (2008:17) extends this discussion to include the importance of building democracy with 
social content to enable meaningful synergistic relations, noting that the South African 
developmental state ‘should mobilize the people as a whole, especially the poor, to act as their 
own liberators through participatory and representative democracy’. In that respect, Chang 
(2010:88) maintains that South Africa is in a particularly fortunate position in this respect, due to 
its ‘uniquely strong mass party base’ which it could use to its advantage and ‘implement its 
policy much more thoroughly than most other countries, if it has the political will’. However, 
Fine (2010:172) points out that what is of key importance in this context is ‘the precise nature of 
the connections between state and society, and what renders them functional – as opposed to 
dysfunctional’. 
 
In South Africa the ruling party continues to enjoy significant popular support at the polls and 
this has been sustained through four successive elections. However, despite this support, as 
intimated above, numerous surveys (Afrobarometer, 2008) point to the exceedingly high levels 
of distrust which ordinary citizens have in all levels of government. In this context, the 
construction of a development state which is imbedded in civil society is likely to be a difficult 
undertaking. 
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3.3 Macro-economic policy and the Developmental State 
 
South Africa’s limited success in growing the economy and redistributing its gains to the broader 
populace since its transition to democracy has been well documented in the literature (Tregenna, 
2011; Bhorat & Van der Westhuizen, 2010; Misra-Dexter & February, 2010; Chagunda, 2006). 
While the pursuit of economic growth was a priority for Asian developmental states, there is 
widespread acceptance that a South African developmental state must, in addition, embrace a 
social development focus in order to address the inherited and deep-rooted poverty of the 
majority of its citizens and their unequal access to economic opportunities and services. For 
Heller (2001), developmental states must carefully balance the focus on economic growth with 
social development concerns. 
 
Currently, as Turok (2010:498) points out, South Africa’s economy rests on a narrow economic 
base dominated by mining and financial services and is characterised by large income 
inequalities, concentrated patterns of ownership and limited economic growth in low-value 
consumer services. Despite numerous economic policy reforms since 1994, none have made 
significant inroads into addressing the increasing inequalities and poverty of the majority of 
South Africans. As a consequence, the government’s macro-economic policy has been subject to 
criticism from an increasing number of quarters. The neoliberal orientation of its policy is held 
accountable for the deepening of poverty and inequality and is cited as one of the primary 
reasons for the country’s inability to construct a transformative developmental state. This 
criticism stems from what is seen as the paradox between the ANC leadership’s developmental 
state policy discourse that purportedly favours state intervention in the market, on the one hand, 
and its neoliberal ‘non-interventionist’ macro-economic strategy that favours financialisation, 
trade liberalisation, free markets, the privatisation of state-owned enterprises, the deregulation of 
markets and downsizing of the role of the state, on the other. Commenting on this Misra-Dexter 
and February (2010:xi) assert: 
 
It is ‘farcical’ for South Africa to preach the developmental state model when its 
macro-economic policies suggest the opposite. To move towards such a model, a 
radical departure from current macro-economic policy is required that would 
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prioritise the welfare needs of the majority of South Africans over the interests of 
capital. Although Zuma’s government has alluded to the need for change, it has so 
far seemed to be paying lip-service to economic reform, making no substantive 
changes that would point to the creation of a developmental state. 
  
Turok (2010:498), a senior ANC politician, likewise attributes the country’s inability to give 
substance to its idea of a developmental state to its neo-liberal policy stance. In Turok’s view this 
policy approach perpetuates social and spatial inequalities through its skewed economic 
structure, ‘concentrated pattern of ownership, its narrow base dominated by mining and financial 
services and the historic marginalisation of the black population from opportunities of all kinds’. 
While sluggish economic performance has been ‘skewed towards low-value consumer services’, 
worsening trade deficits and demand for basic commodities have resulted in job losses and the 
decline of industrial output (ibid).  
 
What is clearly apparent from the above discussion is that, notwithstanding South Africa’s 
repeated commitment to construct a developmental state and follow a pro-poor development 
path, its continued support of neo-liberal policies is incompatible with its developmental focus 
and is, in many respects, responsible for frustrating attempts to bring about meaningful social 
and economic transformation. The economic focus on GDP growth, it is argued, continues to 
serve the interests of big capital and the elite minority, rather than a broader developmental focus 
intent on redistributing wealth and economic gains to the impoverished majority. This is perhaps 
nowhere more explicit than in its management of the industrial and mining sectors, which 
constitute the backbone of the South African economy. 
 
3.3.2 The structure of South Africa’s economy  
 
Although industrial policy represents only one aspect of economic policy, industrialisation is 
considered a ‘prime mover’ of sustainable economic development (McCarthy, 2011) and a ‘key 
determinant of any country’s overall economic growth’ (Kohli, 2004:2). The advantages to be 
derived from prioritising industrialisation include increased production, the emergence of 
markets, skills development, the creation of employment and political stability (ibid). Where 
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countries thus have the necessary resource endowments, it is seen to be essential that a nation’s 
macro-economic policy should promote industrial strategies which drive growth and support 
developmental goals (Wade, 2010). 
 
Therefore, as part of the economic policy package, industrial policy in South Africa has a 
critically important role to play in fostering rapid economic development and in facilitating a 
more labour-absorbing and developmental growth path (Black, 2010). However, its success will 
require consistent long-term government intercession, rather than ‘once-off’ interventions, a 
focus on higher productivity areas (Laubscher, 2007) and gradual ‘cumulatively transformative 
change through identification of bottlenecks and self-correction’ (Hausmann, Rodrik & Sabel, 
2008:17). 
 
The complexities of South Africa’s industrial policy and problems stem from its heavy reliance 
on mining and mineral exports. In that respect, the country’s mineral riches have had a major 
impact on its current developmental path and system of capital accumulation. Prior to 1994, 
capital was shaped by its reliance on mining and was geared towards the production of consumer 
goods earmarked for high-income groups and the prioritisation of imports and capital equipment 
(COSATU, 2005). Post-apartheid industrial policy has not only continued but intensified this 
trajectory and the enduring dominance of mining is linked to the existing system of capital 
accumulation and the continuing influence of powerful corporate interests on state decisions and 
industrial policy resolutions (Fine, Ashman & Newman, 2010; Bezuidenhout, 2002). 
 
The Minerals-Energy Complex (MEC), a concept first described by Fine and Rustomjee 
(1996:5), is used to explain the system of capital accumulation in South Africa. The MEC, which 
is recognised by many as the fulcrum around which South Africa’s industrial policy revolves 
(Terreblanche, 2011; Fine, 2008), comprises ‘a core set of industrial sectors’ which exhibit very 
strong linkages with each other and relatively weak linkages with other sectors (Fine & 
Rustomjee, 1996:91). South Africa’s continued direct and indirect dependence on the MEC has 
been seen as a retarding factor ‘not only by virtue of its weight in economic activity but also 
through its determining role in the rest of the economy’ and its contribution to the ‘poor 
performance of the manufacturing sector’ (ibid:5–6). In that respect Fine (2008:3) maintains that 
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the MEC effectively constrains ‘the space that can be occupied by other activities’. 
  
Kaplan (2007:96) points out though that there are two systemic exogenous constraints that curb 
the impact of South Africa’s industrial policy. The first of these is the government’s macro-
economic framework which has resulted in high interest rates and stifled investment as a result 
of the volatile exchange rates, while the second relates to the terms of trade set by the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) which effectively governs global trade and constrains the freedom of 
developing nations. Although the industrial sector unquestionably has an important role to play 
in generating higher levels of employment, it has been argued that this can only be achieved if 
existing economic activities become more labour intensive and the composition of output is 
shifted to sectors that are less capital intensive (Black, 2010). Other recommendations relate to 
fostering economic diversification in sectors that will create mass employment opportunities and 
a more robust role for government in terms of providing infrastructure, favouring local 
producers, using tax incentives and providing finance assistance through the Industrial 
Development Corporation – all of which might be expected of a developmental state (Bodibe, 
2008). 
 
Fine, Ashman and Newman (2010) argue that South Africa’s continued dependence on the MEC, 
together with post-apartheid macro-economic policy measures, are preventing the government 
from achieving its developmental state ideals. This dependence, they argue, rather than favouring 
a pro-poor development path, is supporting the interests of conglomerate capital, encouraging the 
flight of capital and preventing domestic investment. In a similar vein, a research report issued 
by the Eastern Cape Socio-Economic Consultative Council (ECSECC) reveals that South 
Africa’s failure to diversify its industrial base and the continued dominance of the MEC is 
responsible for the poor performance of the economy (ECSECC, 2011). The ECSECC Report 
asserts that current debt-driven growth and investment in capital-intensive strategic industries 
counteracts developmental policy intentions, while the ‘lifting of barriers to financial outflows 
and the dominance of monetary policy, coupled with fiscal policies geared at reaching and 
maintaining a surplus, further attest to the non-developmental nature of government policies’ 
(ibid:23). 
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3.3.3 Redistributive capacity 
 
A significant feature of a democratic developmental state identified in the literature is its 
capacity to redistribute welfare gains to society as a whole. This is necessary both to establish the 
legitimacy of the state and to build a national consensus. However, most theorists concur that for 
a developmental state to be able to redistribute welfare gains it must be able to grow the 
economy. In the case of South Africa, the state’s ability to achieve rapid growth has been 
constrained both by the structure of the national economy, as discussed, and by global economic 
trends. According to Pravin Gordhan, Minister of Finance, South Africa must aim to achieve an 
annual growth rate of 6.5% in order to have a significant impact on poverty and unemployment 
(City Press, 2010). However, the real gross domestic product (GDP) of South Africa fell by 1.8% 
in 2009, which amounted to the highest decline since 1992, when it contracted by 2.1% (South 
African Survey, 2010). In terms of GDP per capita, South Africa’s average annual growth 
between 1970 and 2008 amounted to only 0.6%, an insignificant rate when compared to 
Botswana’s growth of 5.9% and China’s growth of 79% (UNDP, 2010) over a similar period. 
Recent figures released by Statistics South Africa (2013a) reveal that GDP increased by 2.5 per 
cent in 2012. Between 2006 and 2008, the expenditure on Research and Development (R&D), 
imperative for building skills and capacity so sorely needed in South Africa, amounted to 1% of 
GDP, but was no more than 0.95% in 2006/2007 and fell to 0.93 % of GDP in 2007/2008. This 
also impacts on South Africa’s goal to transform from a resource-based economy to a 
knowledge-based economy. In this regard, South Africa has fallen from 49th position in 1995 to 
65th position on the knowledge-based economy index which is a reflection of its decreased 
funding for R&D and low university throughput. South Africa also fares very poorly in terms of 
pass rates in mathematics, science and engineering (Development Indicators, 2010). 
 
Aside from the fact that it has been unable to achieve its economic growth targets, the 
government’s achievements in redistributing welfare gains to the poor and in reducing inequality 
have been a source of national concern. While progress has been made in the delivery of such 
basic services as housing, water and electricity, considerably less progress has been made in 
addressing poverty and social inequality. In 2010, the official unemployment rate was 25.2% and 
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35.9% according to a wider definition6. When disaggregated by race these figures become 
starker with 29.7% of Africans and 21.8% of Coloureds unemployed according to the official 
definition, and 38.2% and 24.9% respectively unemployed according to the wide definition 
(Development Indicators, 2010). Between 2009 and 2010, of the 3.4 million unemployed, a total 
of 86% were African. Excluded from these statistics is a further 51.4% of discouraged 
jobseekers. The decrease in the labour participation rate, from 61% in 2001 to 55% in 2010, is a 
further matter of concern (South African Survey, 2010). New unemployment figures released by 
Statistics South Africa (2013b) reveal that unemployment rose slightly in the last two quarters of 
2012, averaging at 25.4%. 
 
The Institute for Future Research (Kane-Berman, 2010) provides comparative annual per capita 
income figures by race and in 2008 African personal disposable income amounted to R9 700 
compared to a disposable income of R75 297 for the white population group. In terms of the 
proportion of people living in relative poverty (< R1 259 per month) in 2009, 49.5 % of Africans 
and 29.4% of coloureds fell in this category, as opposed to only 0.9% of whites. With a Gini co-
efficient of 0.65 in 2009, South Africa is one of the most unequal societies in the world. 
 
3.3.4 A consistent and focused economic growth path  
 
A hallmark of developmental states, both the East Asian and democratic variants, has been their 
adherence to a consistent economic growth path pursued over a sustained period of time. In the 
case of South Africa, however, the course chartered for economic growth has been anything but 
consistent and, as will be discussed below, the policies implemented appear often to have been at 
cross purposes. On its assumption of power the ANC’s vision of transformation was guided by 
its 1955 Freedom Charter, which advocated equality, inclusivity and improving the lives of the 
poor. The new government thus committed itself to redirecting resources to the poor with the aim 
of creating a more just and equitable society (ANC, 1994). However, as will be seen, over the 
course of the past two decades it has pursued a succession of economic policies, commencing 
with the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). 
                                                 
6 The narrow (official) unemployment rate refers to the number of people actively searching and available for work. 
The broad unemployment rate refers to the number of people available for work (Development Indicators, 2010:21). 
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3.3.4.1 The Reconstruction and Development Programme  
 
The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) released in 1994 by the ANC and its 
alliance partners was the culmination of a long process of consultation with civil society 
organisations, non-governmental organisations and research organisations and the business 
sector (Terreblanche, 1999). The RDP represented the first socio-economic policy framework of 
the post-apartheid government and it aimed to restructure and boost the economy and address the 
impoverishment, inequality and rampant unemployment facing the majority of its citizens (ANC, 
1994). The RDP was explicit in its intent to redress the imbalances of the past and to orient 
development strategy towards improving ‘the quality of life of all South Africans, and in 
particular the most poor and marginalised sections of our communities’ (ANC, 1994:15). 
 
In its broad orientation the RDP could be seen to be supportive of the principles of a 
developmental state in the extent to which it appeared to be aligned with Keynesian principles 
that advocated a significant role for state in the economy. The RDP asserted that ‘reconstruction 
and development will be achieved through the leading and enabling role of the state, a thriving 
private sector, and active involvement by all sectors of civil society which in combination will 
lead to sustainable growth’ (ANC, 1994: Paragraph 4.2.1). Its main policy goal was to link 
growth, development, reconstruction, redistribution and reconciliation into what was referred to 
as a ‘unified programme’ supported by an expansive infrastructural programme (Bond, 2001; 
ANC, 1994). The RDP proposed an interventionist role for government, while its transformative 
focus was on social welfare and the redress of inequalities stemming from the previous regime 
(Visser, 2004). 
 
Due to its reconstruction and transformation objectives, the RDP has been likened to the 
Marshall Plan (Naidoo, 2006). Its socio-economic transformative goals were to create productive 
employment opportunities at a living wage, alleviate poverty and inequality, meet basic needs 
and ensure a decent standard of living, democratise the economy, empower the historically 
oppressed and remove discrimination in the workplace (HDR, 2000:viii). To that extent the RDP 
was essentially a strategy for narrowing the gap between the rich and the poor, with a strong 
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emphasis on extending access to basic services to all (Lundahl & Petersson, 2004). 
 
However, the RDP was not without its critics. While some criticised the ‘extravagant promises’ 
of politicians, others noted that the programme never got off the ground due to a lack of capacity 
at the local level where most of the projects were to be implemented (COSATU 2005; Lundahl 
& Petersson, 2004). Although the RDP aimed to provide a coherent and integrated socio-
economic framework, it failed to specify the policies and strategies that would enable 
government to achieve its stated goals (Fine, Ashman & Newman, 2010). Additional problems 
included lack of funding and commitment by the public and private sector and lack of 
government capacity and coordination to implement the RDP (Terreblanche, 1999), while the 
low level of economic growth, needed to fund the various social development initiatives, was 
seen to seriously hamper the implementation of government’s plans (Naidoo, 2006). Other 
criticisms included the ambiguous nature of the RDP base document, which was exacerbated 
when it was formalised in the RDP White Paper which was released towards the end of 1994 
(HDR, 2000). At the time Adelzadeh and Padayachee (1994:25) concluded that the RDP White 
Paper was not only ‘incoherent and fragmented’ but that ‘the possibility of retrieving the earlier 
vision is eroded daily in the cut and thrust of ‘reconciliation’ and compromise-making politics 
within the GNU’. 
 
3.3.4.2  Growth Employment and Redistribution Programme  
 
Besides numerous domestic challenges, the new government struggled to position itself within a 
growing and unpredictable global economy. Moreover, the absence of sustained economic 
growth, increasingly high unemployment and instability of the rand resulted in the closure of the 
RDP office in March 1996 and the introduction of a new macro-economic policy framework in 
June 1996 (Visser, 2004). Despite having earlier criticised the ideas of the pro-market 
Washington Consensus (ANC, 1996), the ANC government adopted the Growth, Employment 
and Redistribution (GEAR) macro-economic policy in 1996, which epitomised the free market 
oriented neoliberal framework promoted by the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund. Tregenna (2011:627) characterises the GEAR as ‘broadly neo-liberal, including amongst 
its key tenets tight monetary and fiscal policies, elimination of exchange controls, labour market 
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flexibility and privatisation’. The core goal of GEAR was to attain macro-economic stability and 
stimulate investor confidence and this took precedence over the social welfare developmental 
focus of the RDP and its attempts to reduce poverty and inequality. 
  
GEAR’s point of departure was that sustained growth would require ‘transformation towards a 
competitive outward-oriented economy’ and higher levels of growth would be achieved through 
core elements such as budget reform, fiscal deficit reduction, consistent monetary policy, 
relaxation of exchange controls, tax incentives, trade liberalisation and an expansionary 
infrastructure programme (Department of Finance, 1996:1–2). It was estimated that such 
structural adjustments would enable South Africa to grow its economy by six per cent and create 
400 000 jobs per annum by 2000 which would enhance credibility and encourage investor 
confidence (ibid).  
 
For many scholars, GEAR’s narrower focus on fiscal stability and withdrawal from intervention 
in the market was at the cost of broader developmental goals. There was a clear shift in emphasis 
from ‘growth through redistribution’ which had been the dictum of the RDP, to the GEAR 
strategy of ‘redistribution through growth’, where redistribution was a secondary outcome which 
would presumably be achieved through a ‘trickle-down’ effect (Visser, 2004:9). To that extent, 
GEAR’s focus on macro-economic stability over shadowed the transformative agenda envisaged 
for a developmental state. While Jahed and Brey (2011) highlight some of the successes of 
GEAR, namely the reduction of fiscal deficit and lowering of inflation, they also point to its poor 
performance in attracting foreign and local investment and low levels of GDP growth, both of 
which they deem to be responsible for the failure to create jobs. 
  
3.3.4.3  The Accelerated Shared Growth Initiative  
 
The Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA), an extension of 
GEAR, was launched in July 2005 in an attempt to further stimulate slow economic growth. 
ASGISA represented an economic development strategy that, once again, supported neoliberal 
economic orthodoxy and a free market system (Mabhula, 2013). Its main objective was to 
steadily increase economic performance and job-creating capacity and to halve unemployment 
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and poverty by 2014 (The Presidency, 2006). In order to do so, a number of strategic government 
interventions would be put in place in specific socio-economic areas to address what had been 
identified as six major constraints to economic growth (ibid). These constraints included 
currency volatility, the shortage of skilled labour, infrastructure backlogs, barriers to entry and 
limited opportunities for new business, burdens placed on small and medium businesses as a 
result of the regulatory environment and deficiencies in state organisation, capacity and 
leadership (Van der Walt, 2010; The Presidency, 2006). Government interventions which were 
seen to be necessary to counter these constraints were identified as being infrastructure 
investment, sector-specific investment strategies, skills and education development, the 
elimination of what was termed the second economy, improved macro-economic management 
and enhancement of the quality of governance (Mlambo-Ngcuka, 2006). The Joint Initiative on 
Priority Skills Acquisition (JIPSA) was a sister programme, intended as a joint initiative between 
government, business, labour and educational research institutions with a focus on addressing the 
scarce skills shortage in the country (Lunsche, 2010, The Presidency, 2006). However, both 
policies have been criticised for failing to meet their targets, due in large part to poor state 
capacity and weak organisational leadership (Mabhula, 2012). 
 
Criticisms of ASGISA have also been raised by the government’s own allies including, amongst 
others, the Congress of South Africa Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Non-
Governmental Coalition (SANGOCO). Thus, COSATU’s General Secretary Zwelinzima Vavi, 
maintained that ASGISA would need fundamental restructuring to include a common 
commitment to shared ‘rather than inequitable’ growth throughout all its programmes. 
COSATU’s stance, he maintained, were that ‘elements of AsgiSA are inadequate to achieve the 
desired transformation of the economy’ and that proposals on sector and infrastructural growth 
should be redesigned around a coherent development vision (Louw, 2006). SANGOCO’s 
criticism related to the lack of consultation which preceded the preparation of the framework 
document and the fact that civil society had been excluded from the planning and design of 
ASGISA (Chagunda, 2006). 
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3.3.4.4  The New Growth Path 
 
The New Growth Path (NGP) which was introduced in November 2010 has as its main policy 
objective the stimulation of economic growth as means to accelerate employment creation and 
create a more equal and inclusive society and, to that extent, it was intended as a mechanism to 
advance a developmental state mandate. The NGP framework stipulates that massive 
infrastructure investment in the areas of energy, transport, communication, water and housing 
will be key drivers in stimulating ‘decent’ employment. Its target is to create five million new 
jobs by 2020. The NGP document proposes ‘smarter coordination’ between the different 
government tiers and the forging of closer ties with business and labour (The Presidency, 2010). 
 
The New Growth Path acknowledges as its core challenge the reality of mass joblessness, 
poverty and inequality and the need for a developmental state to leverage resources and align 
market outcomes to developmental needs (The Presidency, 2010). Key actions proposed by the 
NGP include the use of micro and macro policies to create a favourable environment and support 
labour-absorbing activities, the generation of consistent and focused state policies that facilitate 
dialogue with business, labour and civil society actors and the re-industrialisation and deepening 
of both domestic and regional markets for South African goods (ibid). However, in a study to 
investigate whether the NGP’s targets of increasing economic growth to between 6% and 7% per 
annum and reducing unemployment to 15% were feasible, Van Aardt, Ligthelm and Van Tonder 
(2011) found, firstly, that factors other than economic growth affected job creation in South 
Africa and secondly that higher economic growth would not automatically translate into higher 
job creation due to the current preference of capital over labour in production processes. These 
authors further questioned the focus of the NGP on specific sectors and pointed out that, since 
2000, nine out of the ten economic selected sectors in their survey showed a preference for 
capital over labour (ibid). The NGP has also been heavily criticised by COSATU who 
questioned its merit as a ‘comprehensive and overarching development strategy’ and called for 
its revision in that, in its present form, it would not achieve its goals of addressing 
unemployment, poverty and inequality (Mail & Guardian, 2011; COSATU, 2011). Amongst the 
revisions suggested by COSATU were the need for a greater focus on public healthcare and 
education and a more serious focus on the expansion of training opportunities (ILO, 2011).  
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3.3.4.5  The National Development Plan 
 
The National Development Plan, released in 2011 but officially launched in 2012, represents the 
government’s latest policy framework and is one of the few documents which has explicitly 
referred to the need to build a developmental state. Significantly, it also asserts the government’s 
commitment to establish a democratic developmental state: 
 
The National Development Plan highlights the need for a developmental state that is 
capable of driving the country’s development. Building state capacity is the most 
important step to achieve a developmental state. However, the plan also recognises 
that not all capable states are developmental and so emphasises the importance of 
building a capable and developmental state within a vibrant democratic system 
(National Planning Commission, 2011:474). 
 
However, notwithstanding its explicit intent to establish a democratic development state, the 
National Planning Commission (2011:474) is vague on the details of what might constitute such 
a state, other than that it will aim to rapidly transform the economy: 
 
A developmental state brings about rapid and sustainable transformation in a 
country’s economic and/or social conditions through active, intensive and effective 
intervention in the structural causes of economic or social underdevelopment. 
Developmental states are active. They do not simply produce regulations and 
legislation. They constantly strive to improve the quality of what they do by building 
their own capacity and learning from experience. They also recognise the 
importance of building constructive relations with all sectors of society, while 
insulating themselves from capture by sectional interests.  
 
It is noteworthy, furthermore, that the eight areas identified by the NDP (National Planning 
Commission, 2011:410) as being key to the establishment of a capable and developmental state 
are operational rather than strategic in their orientation. These are stated to be the need to 
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stabilise the political-administrative interface; to make the public service and local government 
administration careers of choice; to develop technical and specialist professional skills; to 
strengthen delegation, accountability and oversight; to improve interdepartmental coordination; 
to take a proactive approach to improving relations between national, provincial and local 
government; to strengthen local government; and to clarify the governance of SOEs (ibid).  
 
The NDP has also not been without its critics who have attacked both its ideological orientation 
and its format. Thus COSATU complained that ‘On Macroeconomic policy, instead of proposing 
a radical shift, the Resolution proposes 3 cautious changes to policy, in deliberately ambiguous 
language which rather than decisively confronting the Treasury’s conservative stranglehold on 
macroeconomic policy, will perpetuate massive contestation over the interpretation of ANC 
policy.’ (COSATU 2013:9) It also criticised the plan for its excessive length (over 484 pages), 
the number of ‘inconsistencies and errors’ in regard to ‘incorrect interpretations’ of related 
literature and incorrect ‘projections of poverty and employment’ (COSATU, 2013:18). Other 
criticisms relate to its overly ambitious ‘objectives, aims and coverage’ and that in order to be 
successful a number of ‘capabilities’ would be required by key players in terms of implementing 
and monitoring the NDP (Zarenda, 2013). Further areas of concern relate to the sequencing and 
structuring of the wide number of development efforts required at different levels and the 
coordination with other national plans such the Medium Term Spatial Development Framework 
(The Presidency, 2009a) and provincial and local level plans. 
 
State ideologues have attempted to portray the twists and turns in economic policy as being part 
of an evolutionary process. Thus, Trevor Manuel (Manuel, 2013b), the Minister in the 
Presidency responsible for the NDP, asserts that there has not been ‘a deviation from where we 
were headed but rather a refinement of the route’ and that ‘(v)ery simply put, the legislative and 
policy frameworks that have been adopted since the first democratic elections in 1994 are more 
than adequate, but requires proper implementation to be effective.’ However, critics such as Fine 
(2007:1) maintain that the government’s renewed interest in the developmental state is ‘a 
reinvention of the past decade’s economic and social policy, a way of excusing the Gear policy 
while departing from it.’ To that extent it serves to rationalise the government’s volte-face in key 
policy areas: 
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(T)he rise of the putative developmental state is a rhetorical shift in the government 
signalling its belief that a job has been half done and conditions are now favourable 
for more interventionist policies. Second, of course, the politics of the rise of the 
developmental state is a matter of appeasing critics of the government’s economic 
and social policies. In particular, there has been the failure to address high and 
worsening levels of unemployment and impoverishment while black economic 
empowerment has mainly flourished as a source of elite enrichment (ibid). 
 
In a somewhat contradictory fashion, given his assertions on the general continuity of policy 
directions cited above, in a speech presented a week earlier Trevor Manuel was remarkably 
candid in his admission of the inconsistency of state economic policy and its short-term focus, 
asserting that: 
It is important that we appreciate that sustainable growth and development require 
policy stability. Changing policy too often has the effect of destabilising the 
bureaucracy and therefore not allowing policies to take effect and show results. Our 
performance as a country on this measure has been uneven, at best. It is worth 
pausing for reflection on why we faltered on something so self-evident. After 1994, it 
was apparent through our policies that the government was aware that our people 
had high expectations. However, the performance of the public service did not reflect 
the improvements necessary to meet our policy objectives. Many of the failures had 
their root causes in the capacity of the state machinery inherited from apartheid – 
the corruption, the absence of a culture of public service, poor skills, among others. 
Instead of analysing the root causes of the performance failures and embarking on 
the painstaking process of institution-building, we resorted to changing policy each 
time we were dissatisfied with the results we were seeing… Too often … new policies 
are or were implemented in an unconsidered fashion, as new leaders seek to make 
their mark, or as a response to the latest international fad. Many of the problems 
with public sector performance have to do with deeply rooted systemic issues, and 
there is no ‘quick fix’ substitute for a long-term and strategic approach to enhancing 
institutional capacity. 
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From the above, it is evident that the ruling ANC government has not succeeded in maintaining a 
consistent economic course since it assumed power nearly twenty years ago. This has meant that 
the policies in place and the consequent state intervention have succeeded neither in accelerating 
economic growth nor in alleviating poverty. 
 
3.4 Building a people-centred state 
 
A key feature of South Africa’s attempts to build a democratic developmental state has been its 
stated commitment to a people-centred approach (National Planning Commission, 2011) which 
will engage ordinary people in decision making that affects their daily lives. While this approach 
applies to all three spheres of government, it applies specifically to the local state which is the 
vehicle for the delivery of basic services. This implies that local government has been assigned a 
particular role in the construction of a developmental state which is uncharacteristic of 
developmental states elsewhere in the world. In that respect it is also of significance that the first, 
and to date the only formal policy oriented to the creation of a developmental state was the 1998 
White Paper on Developmental Local Government. Although, as will be discussed in a 
subsequent chapter, the use of the term ‘developmental’ in this context was more descriptive 
than strategic, it is reflective of an approach which aims to build a developmental state both from 
the top down and the bottom up. 
 
3.5 Building consensus and setting a national development agenda  
 
The success of developmental states, whether authoritarian or democratic, has in part been 
attributed to their ability to forge some form of national consensus on the economic path to be 
followed. This, as indicated, is necessary both to ensure that economic policy is sustained over 
time and also to convince citizens that short-term sacrifices will yield longer term gains.  
 
The importance of a collective developmental vision and mobilising the nation around a 
commonly agreed upon national development agenda is critical to building a successful 
developmental state. However, the creation of such a collective vision and development agenda 
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will require a mutual understanding of South Africa’s developmental requirements, which 
Johnson (1995) refers to as a ‘common developmental grammar and idiom’. In that respect 
Erwin (2008:138) asserts that South Africa’s principal developmental objective must be 
nationalistically orientated and persistently focused on developing the economy and its entire 
people. A national development agenda for South Africa, he maintains, must be the outcome of 
broad national consensus, reflecting the commitment and clear vision of key stakeholders and 
must be devised according to the expressed needs of the majority of the population. Turok 
(2010:500) supports the need for a collective effort to define ‘a common purpose and sense of 
direction’ from all actors and stake holders, which, he stresses, must include collaboration 
between spheres and sectors of government and partnerships with business, labour and 
community organisations in order to build commitment and national support. For the ANC 
government the building of such a consensus was never going to be an easy task given the 
nation’s bitter history of racial separation and economic exploitation. However, given the fact 
that the ANC has attained nearly two thirds of the popular vote since the first election in 1994, it 
might have been expected to have made greater headway in this undertaking. Public distrust in 
state institutions and in the integrity of public officials has been alluded to above, but 
paradoxically, reflecting the different ideological persuasions within the ruling tripartite alliance, 
the strongest resistance to the ANC’s economic policies has come from with the ranks of its own 
allies, the trade union movement, predominantly represented by COSATU, and the South 
African Communist Party. 
 
Following the jettisoning of the RDP, both COSATU and the SACP have repeatedly criticised 
the ANC’s macro-economic policy approach and called for a more redistributive development 
trajectory that addresses the need for housing, basic services, healthcare, land reform and broad-
based employment (Pillay, 2008). COSATU, in particular, has repeatedly stressed the need for 
an interventionist role for the state as the vehicle of transformation in post-apartheid South 
Africa and dismissed the likelihood of a ‘trickle-down’ effect emanating from the ANC’s neo-
liberal policies. In a political discussion paper issued by its Central Executive Committee, 
COSATU stressed that ‘…the world hegemony of neo-liberalism in the last twenty years of the 
20th Century did not derive from success in addressing developmental needs. Global economic 
growth is still low; employment is stagnant; standards of living are worsening; and inequality is 
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growing both within and between states’ (2001: Section 2.2). Despite progress in the political 
sphere in South Africa, they maintain, ‘deeply contradictory government policies’ are in effect 
worsening poverty due to serious unemployment and underemployment which is forcing people 
to ‘rely on survivalist activities to make ends meet’ (COSATU, 2001: Section 2.1). The South 
African Communist Party (SACP) has also distanced itself from a macro-economic policy which 
supports privatisation, believing that it privileges the minority and leads to the exploitation of the 
majority (SACP, 2005, SACP, 2006). In that respect, both COSATU and the SACP are 
concerned that the interest of capital is being prioritised over the interests of the majority of the 
country’s inhabitants (Matshiqi, 2009). 
  
The National Development Plan (National Planning Commission, 2011:2) recognises the need 
for a national consensus and yet, in the face of severe criticism from the government’s own 
allies, there is a millennial ring to its call for national unity: 
  
The national plan has to attack the blight of poverty and exclusion, and nurture 
economic growth at the same time; creating a virtuous circle of expanding 
opportunities, building capabilities, reducing poverty, involving communities in their 
own development, all leading to rising living standards. Such a virtuous circle 
requires agreement across society about the contribution and sacrifices of all sectors 
and interests. This will translate into greater confidence and a greater field of 
opportunities for individuals and the country. Growth and development, and 
reducing poverty and inequality, are the core elements of this virtuous cycle. Strong 
leadership throughout society, national consensus, social cohesion and a capable 
state are its key enablers. 
 
From this it might be inferred that there is a tacit acknowledgment on the part of the government 
that while a national consensus is an important requirement for the construction of a 
developmental state, one has yet to be established in South Africa. 
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3.6 Developmental State challenges 
 
In the context of the discussion above, there is mounting scepticism in the literature and in public 
discourse over South Africa’s ability to construct a developmental state. A number of scholars 
cite inefficiency and the lack of skills as one of the major stumbling blocks to achieving this 
vision (Fine, 2008; Butler, 2010). Gelb (2006) concurs, noting that South Africa cannot yet lay 
claim to being a developmental state as, despite improved state capacities since the democratic 
transition, this has not translated to economic growth and distribution. He emphasises that such 
states are ‘made’ not ‘born’ and they constitute a deliberative process, with the fruits thereof 
shared across society. Mantzaris and Ngcobo (2007) cite poor leadership and the lack of long-
term vision, together with corruption in the public sector, as major impediments to the 
construction and delivery of a developmental state. Van Dijk and Croucamp (2007) and 
Chagunda (2007) allude to inefficient local government, poor service delivery and the resulting 
increasing public protest across the country as proof of the government’s inability to construct 
and deliver such a state. 
 
In similar vein, both Maphunye (2009) and Mokaba (2001) point to poor governance, poor 
bureaucratic capacity, corrupt practices, inefficient local government, the disjuncture between 
policy and implementation and conceptual eclecticism with regard to the type of developmental 
state required in South Africa. Furthermore, according to Makgetla (2008), substantial dualism, 
formal sector marginalisation, rising unemployment, massive inequalities in ownership and low 
living standards are some of the challenges that a South African developmental state must 
address. In summarising the multiple challenges which the nation confronts in constructing a 
developmental state Kenny (2010:1) asserts that: 
 
South Africa faces serious challenges which continue to constrain its ability to 
deliver on the minimum targets it has set itself. The overall state capacity needed to 
define and realise a national agenda seems to be unattainable at present. The quality 
of leadership which is required to successfully drive the process forward is sorely 
lacking, evidenced by the myriad scandals around corruption, party factionalism and 
a breakdown in the ability of government to deliver ... Clearly, if issues of 
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governance remain unresolved then the tools by which the Government would like to 
implement its developmental state remain severely blunted.  
 
3.7 Concluding comments  
 
This chapter has examined understandings of the developmental state in South African 
government discourse over the course of the past two decades. It has revealed that the concept of 
a developmental state has never been clearly articulated either in policy or legislation and that it 
continues to be used largely as a descriptive device to reflect the ways in which the government 
of the day might intervene to promote economic growth and enhance social welfare. The chapter 
also discussed the manner in which state policy has changed over time, veering from the more 
interventionist ambitions of the RDP, to the neoliberal free market nostrums of GEAR, and on to 
the attempts to synthesise these contending positions in the New Growth Path and National 
Development Plan. It further concluded that the pre-conditions for the establishment of a 
democratic developmental state in South Africa are not auspicious when measured against a 
number of the key determinants of developmental states elsewhere in the world. These include a 
well-defined economic development strategy pursued over a sustained period of time, the 
existence of a strong and independent bureaucracy and the forging of a national consensus on the 
path to be followed. 
 
In the chapter which follows, discussion will focus on the attempts to build developmental local 
government in South Africa as part of the broader programme to construct a national 
developmental state. It considers both the role of local government in the post-apartheid state and 
the responsibilities assigned to municipalities by the Constitution. It further reflects on the 
obligations of the local state to enhance the welfare of the population to service delivery and to 
promote systems of participatory governance. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DEVELOPMENTAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND INTEGRATED  
DEVELOPMENT PLANNING 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
The preceding chapter made reference to the fact that local government has been assigned a 
prominent role in South Africa’s endeavour to construct a democratic developmental state. In 
order to proceed to the case of Delft, which examines the manner in which developmental local 
government is unfolding in one specific urban locality, the chapter which follows provides an 
overview of the mandate which has been assigned to municipalities by national legislation and 
policy. It is in terms of this formal mandate, moreover, that the performance of the democratic 
developmental state in Cape Town will be assessed. 
 
From the outset, it is clear that the ANC government had always intended that local government 
should play a key role in the reconstruction of the post-apartheid state.  Thus, the resolutions of 
the 49th ANC National Conference held in Bloemfontein in December 1994 asserted that local 
government was to be the ‘arms and legs’ of local socio-economic transformation (ANC, 1994). 
In this context the local sphere has been defined as ‘the anchor of our reconstructive fibre in our 
developmental state’ and ‘the sphere of government that can be characterised as the pulse of 
interaction between nation and state, through which service delivery processes take place’ 
(Mmoiemang, 2010:1). Broadly understood, the local state is considered to be ‘the frontline of 
development’ and the ‘interface between government and citizens’ (Buhlungu & Atkinson 
2007:27). 
 
Since the advent of a democratic dispensation in 1994 local government in South Africa has 
undergone major transformation. Through this process an autocratic, racially discriminatory 
municipal system was reconstructed to promote democracy, participatory governance and 
accountability (Blair, 1998, 2000). This transformation, as indicated in a previous chapter, took 
place within the context of broader international debates on decentralisation, good governance 
and participatory democracy (McEwan, 2003), and has been described as ‘nothing short of 
remarkable’ (Atkinson, 2007:53). The formal system of participatory governance proposed has 
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also been referred to as ‘state of the art’ (Frodin, 2009:288). These plaudits aside, a growing 
number of authors concur that the system is not functioning as intended. As Friedman (2006) 
observes,  although ‘the plethora of formal mechanisms which enable citizens to participate in 
government should make South Africa a model of participatory governance, in which citizens 
have ample opportunity to shape decisions which affect their lives’ this is not the case.  
 
4.1 Developmental Local Government 
 
Prior to the democratic transition in South Africa, local government had been configured along 
strict racially defined and segregated lines, privileging the White minority and resulting in a 
highly unequal society characterised by poverty and social dislocation for the majority.  Local 
government’s status during the apartheid era was ‘subservient, racist and illegitimate’ and the 
establishment of separate local authorities, according to De Visser (2009:8), ‘provided a clever 
scheme of naked exploitation on the basis of race’. Furthermore, the race-based system of 
municipal authorities resulted in fragmentation, the duplication of functions and inefficiency 
(Nyalunga, 2006).   
 
The end of apartheid rule in 1994 heralded a new era of government in South Africa which was 
intended to elevate the majority of citizens from passive recipients of government largesse to 
active partners in matters of governance. In this context, local government was assigned 
considerably greater powers than in the past with a set of constitutionally enshrined powers and 
functions (Fakir, 2007:4). These prescribed a considerably more prominent role for 
municipalities in the broader affairs of the state and, in particular as shall be discussed below, in 
the construction of a developmental state.  
 
Chapter 10 of the Interim Constitution of 1993 of the Republic of South Africa sets out the 
guidelines for the establishment, status, powers and functions of the first non-racial system of 
local government in South Africa. Section 174 (3) of the Interim Constitution stipulated that 
‘local government shall be autonomous and, within the limits prescribed by or under law, shall 
be entitled to regulate its affairs’ while Section 174 (4) determined that ‘Parliament or a 
provincial legislature shall not encroach on the powers, functions and structure of a local 
 
 
 
 
81 
 
government to such an extent as to compromise the fundamental status, purpose and character of 
local government’. These principles were carried forward into the final Constitution. Chapter 3 
of the 1996 Constitution sets out the relationships between the three spheres of government, and 
the principles of co-operation that must be followed by the national, provincial and local 
government. Section 40 stipulates that ‘the three spheres of government are distinctive, 
interdependent and interrelated’.  For Cameron (2001:102) the ‘distinctive’ component denotes 
the autonomy of the separate spheres, while the ‘interdependent’ and ‘interrelated’ components 
signify their international nature.  
 
The Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act, as previously indicated (RSA, 2005b:2), 
provides a framework for the promotion and facilitation of intergovernmental relations, 
recognizing that ‘all spheres of government must provide effective, efficient, transparent, 
accountable and coherent government for the Republic to secure the well-being of the people and 
the progressive realisation of their constitutional rights’. Policy and legislation requires the local 
government sphere ‘to perform specific government functions within a specifically demarcated 
area, in consultation with the local community and other stakeholders, such as local businesses 
and the relevant provincial government authorities’ (Davids, 2006:1).   
 
The objectives of local government are set out in Section 152 of the Constitution which 
stipulates that, subject to their financial and administrative capacity, municipalities must provide 
democratic and accountable government for local communities; ensure the provision of services 
in a sustainable manner; promote social and economic development; promote a safe and healthy 
environment; and encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in 
the matters of local government.  
 
Section 155 of the Constitution (RSA, 1996) makes provision for the following categories of 
municipalities: Category A municipalities which have exclusive municipal executive and 
legislative authority in their area of jurisdiction; Category B municipalities which share 
municipal executive and legislative authority with a category C municipality which falls within 
their boundaries; and Category C municipalities which have municipal executive and legislative 
authority in an area that includes more than one municipality. The new configuration of the local 
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state thus comprises three categories of municipalities, namely metropolitan, local and district 
municipalities. In this configuration metropolitan municipalities exercise all local government 
powers and functions, whilst local and district municipalities share powers and functions.  
 
The Constitution further stipulates that national legislation must not only establish the criteria for 
determining different categories of municipalities and make provision for the division of powers 
and functions between them, but it must also take into account the need to provide municipal 
services in an equitable and sustainable manner (RSA, 1996). It further specifies that provincial 
government must determine the types of municipalities within each province. Provincial 
governments are mandated to support and monitor local governments within their province and 
to assist municipalities to build the necessary capacity to perform their functions and manage 
their own affairs. The Constitution assigns national and provincial government the legislative 
and executive authority to oversee the effective performance of municipalities (ibid).  
 
4.1.1 The developmental role of Local Government 
 
The South African government’s developmental vision for local government was introduced in 
the 1998 White Paper on Local Government (RSA, 1998b). The White Paper directs local 
government to play a development role and ‘work with citizens and groups within the 
community to find sustainable ways to meet their social, economic and material needs and 
improve the quality of their lives’ and to place their focus particularly on the poor and 
marginalised or historically excluded groups (RSA, 1998b). According to Davids and Maphunye 
(2005:59) the developmental role of local government is intended to include the integration and 
co-coordination of activities with other spheres of government, democratizing development, 
empowering the poor and redistributing income and opportunities in favour of the economically 
excluded and marginalized. They further maintain that the overall focus of local government is 
supposed to be on such developmental outcomes as the provision of infrastructure and services, 
the creation of liveable, integrated human settlements and the promotion of local economic 
development (Ibid). However, Samson (2007:37) points out that ‘whilst development is clearly 
understood as including improvements in material conditions of the impoverished majority, it is 
also explicitly seen as encompassing participation in general and participatory democracy in 
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particular as developmental objectives in and of themselves’. Linked to this idea, Parnell and 
Pieterse (2008) highlight the importance of the redistributive role which developmental local 
government is expected to play in safeguarding the interests of the poor,  
 
4.1.2 Legislative and policy framework for developmental local government 
 
The local sphere of government in South Africa, as indicated, ‘receives its mandate, powers and 
functions directly from the Constitution’ (DPLG, 2004:20). Its relative autonomy is protected by 
Section 151 (3) (RSA, 1996) which states that ‘a municipality has the right to govern, on its own 
initiative, the local government affairs of its community, subject to national and provincial 
legislation, as provided for in the Constitution’. Section 151 (4) emphasizes that ‘the national or 
provincial government may not compromise or impede a municipality’s ability or right to 
exercise its powers or perform its functions’ (RSA, 1996). According to Frodin (2009:292) ‘the 
Constitution thus raises local government from a subordinate level to a significant sphere in its 
own right, with considerable autonomy and the responsibility to promote social and economic 
development’. Similarly, Nel and Binns (2003:169) emphasise local government’s increasing 
responsibility in addressing the ‘daunting range of socio-economic challenges’ as ‘key agents for 
transforming South Africa’s society and economy in the post-apartheid era’.   
 
In addition to the Constitution, the developmental role of local government is further informed 
by an array of legislation and policy including the Local Government Transition Act (Act 209 of 
1993), the Local Government Municipal Demarcation Act (Act 27 of 1998), the Local 
Government White Paper (1998), the Local Government Municipal Structures Act (Act 117 of 
1998), the Local Government Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000), the Disaster 
Management Act (Act 57 of 2002), the Local Government Municipal Finance Management Act 
(Act 56 of 2003) and the Local Government Municipal Property Rates Act (Act 6 of 2004). 
 
4.1.2.1  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
 
Chapter 7 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (RSA, 1996) clearly defines the 
new transformative role and responsibilities of local government. In that respect, Section 152(1) 
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outlines local government’s developmental objectives as including the provision of services to 
communities in a sustainable manner, the promotion of social and economic development, and 
the facilitation of community involvement in matters of local government. Section 153 further 
stipulates that a municipality must ‘structure and manage its administration and budgeting and 
planning processes to give priority to the basic needs of the community and to promote the social 
and economic development of the community’.  
 
The developmental role outlined for municipalities in Sections 152(1) and 153 is aligned with 
Section 195 of the Constitution which states that public administration must be governed by the 
democratic values and ‘must be development-oriented’ (RSA, 1996). Section 23(1) indicates that 
a municipality ‘must undertake developmentally-orientated planning so as to ensure that it strives 
to achieve the objects of local government set out in Section 152 of the Constitution; gives effect 
to its developmental duties as required by Section 153 of the Constitution; and together with 
other organs of state contribute to the progressive realisation of the fundamental rights contained 
in Sections 24, 25, 26, 27 and 29 of the Constitution’. 
 
Although it is questionable whether the use of the term ‘developmental’ in this context was 
understood in the same context as that of a developmental state, it is clear that it implied a more 
decisive role for municipalities in the delivery of services and in the promotion of local 
economic development than had been previously been the case. It is also evident that, over time, 
what had been a rather descriptive use of the term (that is one pertaining to the delivery of 
services and local job creation) has been extended in official discourse to encapsulate a broader 
understanding of a developmental state. 
 
4.1.2.2 The Local Government Transition Act (Act 209 of 1993) 
 
Prior to 1994, as intimated, local government comprised a racially discriminatory system which 
incorporated a wide array of unequally resourced race based municipal authorities with differing 
functions established to favour the white population group (Nyalunga, 2006). In 1993, a total of 
1262 municipalities were compartmentalised into race-based white, coloured, Indian and black 
local authorities (DPLG, 2004; Steytler, 2005). In addition, in the ethnic homelands local 
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government was restricted to the urban centres whilst the rural areas fell under the control of 
traditional authorities which lacked a democratic base. The Local Government Transition Act 
(LGTA) of 1993 set out the legislative requirements for a transitional process which was 
specifically geared towards de-racialising and democratizing municipalities (De Visser, 2009) 
and the construction of a more inclusive and participatory system of local government (Millstein, 
2010). The LGTA mapped out a three-phase transition process, namely the pre-interim phase 
(1994-95), the interim phase (1995-99) and the final phase (2000).  
 
The first pre-interim phase (1994/95) commenced with the promulgation of the LGTA in 
February 1994 which took place prior to local government elections and  was characterised by 
the replacement of race based local authorities with interim non-racial transitional local councils. 
The LGTA prescribed the establishment of a negotiating forum for each municipal area and 
negotiations were conducted between statutory and non-statutory bodies in order to create pre-
interim councils which would be responsible for decision-making on issues of governance and 
service delivery (De Visser, 2005; DPLG, 2004).  Transitional councils comprised appointed 
councillors drawn from both existing statutory authorities and non-statutory community 
organisations located in black township areas (Cameron, 2001; Steytler, 2005).  
 
The second interim phase commenced with the first democratic local government elections that 
took place from November 1995 to early 1996. This phase was guided by the Interim 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (RSA, 1993) which provided local government with 
institutional recognition and legislative protection for its autonomy in prescribed areas of 
responsibility. In 1995, the country was demarcated into 843 municipal areas and elections were 
held for transitional metropolitan councils and transitional local municipalities (Steytler, 2005). 
The Interim Constitution of 1993 prescribed the establishment of a two-tiered system of 
Metropolitan Local Councils in metropolitan areas, the establishment of Transitional Local 
Councils to administer urban non metropolitan areas, with Transitional Rural Councils and 
Transitional Representative Councils governing the rural areas (Naude, 2001:1). Democratically 
elected District Councils with new powers and functions were established in non-metropolitan 
areas (DPLG, 2004). During the elections of 1995 and 1996, 40% of councillors were elected by 
proportional representation, whilst of the remaining 60%, half of the ward councillors 
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represented previously classified white, coloured and Indian areas and the other half represented 
traditional black communities. The 1996 Constitution institutionalised three categories of local 
authorities for the entire country, namely metropolitan, local and district municipalities, thereby 
establishing the so-called ‘wall-to-wall’ local government system (Steytler, 2005:187-188).  
 
A number of policy documents guided the interim phase. The Municipal Demarcation Act 
(MDA) of 1998 provided the legislative framework for the demarcation of municipal boundaries. 
Chapter 1 of the MDA set out the requirements for the establishment of a Municipal 
Demarcation Board and its operating procedure, powers and duties. Chapter 2 of the Act set out 
the demarcation criteria and procedures for municipal boundaries and ward boundaries within 
each municipality (MDA, 1998). Prior to the local government elections in 2000, the MDA 
provided for the demarcation of new municipalities and reduced the number of local authorities 
from 843 to 284. This was rationalized as a means to enable more functional and viable 
jurisdictions and to assist municipalities to achieve their developmental mandate. The 284 
municipalities comprised 6 Metropolitan Municipalities, 231 Local Municipalities and 46 
District Municipalities (Monare, 2011).  Considerations of economies of scale were the driving 
force behind this drastic reduction of municipal areas (Naude, 2001). Another important 
development during this interim phase was the finalisation of the 1998 White Paper on Local 
Government which represented the first national policy framework for local government 
(Department of Constitutional Development, 1998). For the first time in South African history, 
the White Paper set local government on a path away from ‘a non-developmental, subservient 
and illegitimate level of government to a developmental, autonomous and democratic sphere of 
government (De Visser, 2005:61). 
 
The final transformational phase commenced with the first non-racial local government elections 
on 5 December, 2000. This ended the transitional phase and the commencement of a new 
democratic form of local government (Sutcliffe, 2002; Nel & Binns, 2003). During the final 
phase, local government elections took place in accordance with the requirement of the 1996 
Constitution which provided a ‘new generation of municipalities’ with a ‘renewed’ mandate and 
enhanced status (De Visser, 2005:62).  
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4.1.2.3 The White Paper on Local Government  
 The 1998 White Paper on Local Government presented a new vision for governance at the local 
level. Its prescription that local government must play a ‘development role’ and work with 
communities includes the stipulation that it should especially target those members and groups 
within communities that are most often marginalised or excluded, such as women, disabled 
people and the very poor (RSA, 1998b). This stipulation is in compliance with the Constitutional 
prescript that government must take reasonable steps, within available resources, to ensure that 
all South Africans have access to adequate housing, health care, education, food, water and 
social security. Section B of the White Paper (RSA, 1998b) clearly encapsulates the 
developmental role of local government in the following four interrelated responsibilities:  
 
 Firstly, its developmental role in maximising social development and economic growth 
includes impacting positively on the social development of an area in terms of delivering 
basic services that meet the needs of the poor in a cost-effective and affordable manner. 
Furthermore, in order to stimulate economic growth, municipalities must work in 
partnership with local business to improve job creation and investment and must provide 
the environment for the creation of employment opportunities.  This role prescribes that 
municipalities must intensify efforts to promote local small businesses that will employ 
local people.  
 
 A second developmental role assigned to local government is an integrating and co-
ordinating function. Within this context, municipalities are expected to play a leading 
role bringing together the various national and provincial government departments, 
parastatals, trade unions, community groups and private sector organisations operating in 
their area of jurisdiction in the process of integrated development planning.  
 
 The third function assigned by the White Paper is that of democratising development, 
empowering and redistributing which is central to the developmental mandate of local 
government. Within this role, Municipal Councils must not only represent local interests 
but must support local citizens and groups to participate meaningfully in municipal 
programmes through the mechanisms of ward committees and community consultation.  
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 Finally, the fourth functions of leading and learning relates to local government finding 
innovative and sustainable methods of governing in order to promote development at the 
local level. This requires that the leadership of municipalities must keep abreast with 
change in order to achieve developmental goals in their area, and must actively empower 
marginalised community groups and encourage their participation, together with ward 
councillors, in building a shared vision at the local level. 
 
Section B of the White Paper further requires local government to pursue such developmental 
outcomes as the provision of household infrastructure and services; the creation of liveable, 
integrated cities, towns and rural areas, and the promotion of local economic development with 
aim of redistribution (RSA, 1998b). In this regard, three different approaches for the realisation 
of these developmental outcomes are proposed. The first approach is integrated development 
planning and budgeting which will enable the prioritisation of development needs and integration 
of planning. The second approach includes the development of a performance management 
system which will improve the accountability of municipal officials. The third approach relates 
to the role of municipalities in engaging local citizens as partners in government affairs, as 
voters, consumers and end-users of municipal services (ibid). 
  
4.1.2.4 The Municipal Structures Act  
 
The Municipal Structures Act (Act 117 of 1998) gives substance to the Constitution and White 
Paper on Local Government and sets out the structural foundation for developmental local 
government. The Municipal Structures Act provides for the establishment of municipalities and 
outlines the categories and types of municipalities as specified in the Constitution. It further 
defines the division of powers and functions between the different municipal categories, clarifies 
the roles and responsibilities of the municipal office-bearers and regulates the internal systems 
and structures of local government. Section 83(3) of the Act prescribes the developmental 
mandate of district municipalities in terms of their responsibility to ensure district-wide 
integrated development planning, the provision of district-wide bulk services, the building of 
local municipal capacity and promotion of the equitable distribution of resources between local 
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municipalities.  
 
In terms of the Municipal Structures Act, several different governance systems may be 
established by municipalities. These include the Collective Executive System, which allows for 
the exercise of executive authority through an executive committee, a  Mayoral Executive 
System which allows for the exercise of authority through an executive mayor (assisted by a 
mayoral committee) in whom the executive leadership of the municipality is vested, a Plenary 
Executive System which limits the exercise of executive authority to the municipal council itself, 
a Sub council Participatory System which allows for delegated powers to be exercised by sub- 
councils established for parts of the municipality, and a Ward Participatory System which allows 
for matters of local concern to wards to be dealt with by committees established for wards (RSA, 
1998a). Commenting on the impact of certain of these systems on decision making and 
development, Smith (2007:12) argues that mayoral committees tend ‘to be overly centralised 
bases of power, non-transparent and unaccountable to the broader council, and the community as 
a whole’ in that they have the power to exclude opposition party members. Furthermore, the 
tendency of mayoral committees to convene behind closed doors excludes ‘non-executive 
councillors, the public, the media from overseeing discussions and decisions on key municipal 
functions’.  
 
In order to enhance participatory democracy, Section 19(2) of the Municipal Structures Act 
provides guidelines for the annual review of the needs of communities; as well of municipal 
processes for involving their citizens, together with their organisational capacity to deliver 
required services. Section 19(3) compels municipal councils to develop mechanisms to consult 
the community and community organisations in performing its functions and exercising its 
powers. Furthermore, Section 44 obliges municipal executives to report annually on community 
involvement in the affairs of the municipality and ensure that due regard is given to the views of 
the public elicited through participatory processes.   
 
Part 4 of the Municipal Structures Act outlines the requirements for the establishment of ward 
committees, as a mechanism for enhancing participatory democracy, and sets out their powers 
and functions. Section 73 the Act specifies that the councillor representing a ward must be the 
 
 
 
 
90 
 
designated chairperson of the committee which must comprise not more than ten other persons. 
It also stipulates that municipal council must regulate such matters as the procedures for electing 
ward committees, which must take into account the equitable representation of women, the 
diversity of interests in the ward and the frequency of meetings. Ward councillors represent 
voters in specific geographical areas as opposed to party representative councillors elected 
according to proportional representation lists (Friedman, 2006). The Structures Act further 
stipulates that it is the responsibility of a municipality to make administrative arrangements to 
enable ward committees to perform their functions and exercise their powers effectively. With 
regard to the powers and functions of ward committees, Section 74 of the Act states that ward 
committees may make recommendations to the ward councillor on any matter affecting the ward, 
and, through the ward councillor, to the council. 
 
4.1.2.5 The Municipal Systems Act  
 
The Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000) provides the legislative framework within which 
developmental local government must operate and prescribes the rights and duties of 
municipalities in that regard. Chapter 4 of the Act provides clear guidelines to municipalities on 
their responsibilities in fostering a culture of participation and outlines the mechanisms, 
processes and procedures necessary to enable communities to participate in municipal decision 
making processes. Chapter 4 further outlines the obligations of municipalities in regard to the 
communication of information to local communities on the mechanism for participation which 
are available to them, and stipulates that language preferences and usage in different localities be 
taken into account when disseminating such information. However, it is the process of integrated 
development planning (outlined in Section 17 of the Act) that the need for citizen participation is 
made most explicit. 
 
4.2 Integrated Development Planning 
 
There is an extensive literature on the topic of integrated development planning which includes 
discussion on international planning discourse and its impact on South African planning theory 
and practice (Holland, 2006; Mabin, 2002; Harrison, 2006; Binns & Nel, 2002; Cameron, 2009).  
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Integrated planning has, for a number of decades, featured prominently in development discourse 
throughout the world (Maxwell & Conway, 2000) and it is conceived as a participatory planning 
process that addresses development problems by synthesising of sectorial strategies as a means 
to optimize the allocation of limited resources in a sustainable and effective manner (DEAT, 
2002).  
 
The emergence of integrated development planning in South Africa has been ascribed to the 
influence of international thinking in the 1990s which underscored the need to foster 
participation between government and beneficiary communities (Harrison, 2006; Theron, 2005). 
Pre-1994 planning had been detached from international developments in the field of public 
service reform, and had been narrowly focused on service delivery which was conducted in a 
top-down, paternalistic, non-democratic and non-consultative manner (Binn & Nel, 2002, 
Thornhill, 2008). In this context there was an urgent need for the incoming ANC government to 
transform the sectorally fragmented and racially segregated municipal planning of the apartheid 
system and introduce an integrated municipal planning approach that addressed the needs of all 
South Africans (Oranje et al, 2000). 
 
International policy discourse on governance and development and its support by major 
multilateral bodies, such as the World Bank and United Nations, in tandem with powerful 
international development agencies, impacted significantly on South African planning dialogue 
during the period of transition to democracy in the early 1990s (Harrison, 2006). In that regard, 
scholars such as Mabin (2002) and Holland (2006) highlight the influence of the international 
shift in focus from planning as a spatial exercise, to planning as a form of urban management to 
improve the performance of local authorities which emanated from the United Nation’s Habitat 
Conference in Vancouver in 1976. 
 
A further factor which played a central role in directing South African public policy direction 
and planning discourse in the immediate post-apartheid era was the impact of the New Public 
Management (NPM) reforms which had arisen in Western countries in the 1980s. The NPM 
reforms were driven by the quest for greater effectiveness and efficiency in the delivery of public 
services in order to construct a ‘market-friendly, liberalized, lean, decentralized, customer-
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oriented, managerial and democratic state’ (DMPD, 2003, vii). The new approach to public 
management, which derived much of its logic from public choice theory and new institutional 
economics, was results-oriented and relied on performance-related operating principles 
(Harrison, 2006). This shift in global thinking was particularly appealing to South African policy 
makers in their attempts to transform and democratize the post-apartheid state and reform the 
public sector (Chipkin & Lipietz, 2012).  In that regard Harrison (2006) argues that a second 
wave of NPM reforms in the 1990s and the ‘Third Way’1 governance approaches of that period 
significantly influenced the policy debates of the ANC leadership, which as indicated, was 
struggling, to define its policy direction.  Third Way thinking was an eclectic approach, which 
supported neoliberal market policies on the one hand, but also emphasized progressive ideals 
such as the importance of community, commitment to equality of opportunity, public-private 
partnerships and investment in human development (Surender & Lewis, 2004). For Harrison 
(2006:189), the emphasis of Third Way thinking on integration, also referred to as ‘joined-up 
government’, shaped not only the international planning arena, but contributed significantly to 
the emergence of integrated development planning in South Africa from the mid- to late-1990s. 
Together with the enhanced status of local government and the decentralization of development 
functions and responsibilities (Cameron, 2009), integrated development planning was adopted as 
the ‘new planning paradigm’ which would undo the planning iniquities wrought by apartheid, 
and would, for the first time, include a social and economic planning focus and ‘the lexicon of 
participation and democracy’ (Holland, 2006:23).  
 
Today, integrated development planning in South Africa can be considered an amalgam of 
international planning theory and praxis together with local inputs and influences. Harrison 
(2008:326), reflecting on the influence of Third Way Planning on South Africa’s IDP, makes the 
following statement:  
 
The attention given to participation, for example, has been counter-balanced by stronger 
systems of performance management, while the decentralist tendency of the Third Way has 
been implemented together with greater centralisation of policy making, financial control 
and monitoring. Also, despite its concern with community and participation there is a 
                                                          
1 The ‘third way’ was a policy approach first advocated by the UK Labour government under Blair. 
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strong technocratic streak to Third Way governance, driven by a pragmatic focus on 
‘getting things done’. All this is reflected in the IDP.  
 
4.2.1 Defining Integrated Development Planning 
 
A commonly cited definition of the process of integrated development planning is provided by 
the Intergovernmental Forum for Effective Planning and Development as:  
 
a participatory approach to integrate economic, sectoral, spatial, social, institutional, 
environmental and fiscal strategies in order to support the optimal allocation of scarce 
resources between sectors and geographical areas and across the population in a manner 
that provides sustainable growth, equity and the empowerment of the poor and the 
marginalised (DPLG, 2004:2). 
 
Such an integrated participatory approach acknowledges that development is a human process 
involving all sectors of a population. It emphasizes that people must be the ‘masters of their own 
destiny’ and as a development strategy discards the notion of planning ‘for’ the people, ‘but 
embraces the belief in development planning ‘with’ the people’. A participatory integrative 
planning model is a hybrid planning approach that advocates a fusion of both top-down and 
bottom up approaches and involves communities, government officials, the private sector, 
NGOs, CBOs and labour who participate in development initiatives as equal partners (Du 
Mhango, 1998:2). 
 
Integrated development planning is thus intended as a holistic, multi-sectorial and multi-
dimensional planning endeavour where different actors and stakeholders work cooperatively to 
prepare development strategies, for a particular locality, in a coordinated and cohesive manner 
(Foundation for Contemporary Research, 2006). Furthermore, integrated planning is meant to be 
a participatory and consultative process that draws together communities and other stakeholders 
such as business, labour, national and provincial government, parastatals and NGOs to decide on 
the future development of a specific municipality (Todes, Sithole & Williamson, 2007:5). 
National government has formulated a comprehensive legislative framework that informs the 
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preparation and implementation of Integrated Development Plans (IDP). In this process local 
government is legally compelled to consult and engage communities in a meaningful manner on 
the overall development of the municipal area (RSA, 2000).  
 
Integrated development planning is thus the key instrument through which local government is 
intended to support the creation of a national developmental state. This integrated planning 
approach has not only been described as the ‘cornerstone of developmental government in South 
Africa’, but it is also viewed as the mechanism through which to align and co-ordinate sectorial 
plans, strategic priorities and budgets and resources (GGLN, 2008:53). It is a planning 
framework which must be followed by all municipalities in their preparation of their five year 
strategic plans (Achmat, 2002), and according to Harrison (2008:321) it provides a mechanism to 
‘align budgeting and project implementation with strategic priorities, and to link across and 
coordinate the growing number of sectorial plans, programmes and projects that impact on the 
activities of municipal government’. 
  
The IDP is supposed to set out the developmental vision of a municipality and, as a strategic 
document, it is supposed to delineate its goals and objectives.  In that regard the Municipal 
Systems Act defines an IDP as ‘the principal strategic planning instrument which guides and 
informs all planning and development, and all decisions with regard to planning, management 
and development, in the municipality’ (RSA, 2000). As such, the IDP supersedes all other local 
council plans and is used to assist local councils to achieve their developmental mandate (Valeta 
& Walton, 2008). As it is prescribed in legislation that all stakeholders within a municipal area 
must be involved in the preparation of IDPs and in the prioritisation of development needs (RSA, 
2000), integrated development planning must involve ‘the entire municipality and the citizens in 
that municipality to find the most effective solutions to achieve sustainable development’.  
 
The lifespan of an IDP is linked to the five year term of office of local councillors. A new 
municipal council has the option of adopting the IDP of its predecessor, adopting the IDP of its 
predecessor with amendments or it may prepare a new plan (RSA, 2000).  As indicated, 
municipalities are also obliged to review their IDPs on an annual basis and, in particular, to 
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ensure that they reflect the changes that have been introduced by new municipal councils (FCR, 
2002). 
 
Before commencing with preparations for an integrated development plan, municipalities are 
required to formulate a ‘process plan’ that provides guidelines on the management of the IDP 
process, including the method to be followed in planning, drafting, adopting and reviewing an 
IDP (De Visser, 2005). Other requirements of the IDP process plan is that the document must 
specify the structures that will manage the planning process, the mechanisms that will enable the 
public to participate in the IDP process, the time schedule for the planning process, the 
delegation of responsibilities and the methods that will be used to monitor the planning process 
(DPLG, 2001).  
 
IDP methodology comprises five planning phases and an interactive and participatory process 
involving the involvement of all relevant stakeholders. The Department of Provincial and Local 
Government (now the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs) 
emphasizes that, in order to be meaningful, the process of preparing IDPs must be a consultative 
and strategic process, must comprise an integrated approach across conventional sectorial 
boundaries and must include an implementation-oriented planning methodology (DPLG, 
2001:7). The overall process is set out as five sequential but discreet phases, each with its own 
specified outputs, as follows (DPLG, 2001; Achmat, 2002):  
 
 Phase 1 (Analysis): This first phase provides an assessment of the existing level of 
development in a municipality through a consultative analysis of existing socio-economic 
conditions and trends in the locality. During this phase, problems and priority issues are 
identified. 
 
 Phase 2 (Strategies): The vision for the municipality and objectives for each priority 
issue identified in Phase 1 are developed. Strategic options and the choice of strategy for 
each issue are then established and development projects are then identified. 
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 Phase 3 (Projects): The prioritization of projects takes place together with the formation 
of project task teams. Indicators, project outputs and major activities are decided upon 
together with tentative costs and budget estimates.  
 
 Phase 4 (Integration): During this phase, the screening, adjusting and integrating of 
project proposals takes place and 5-year financial plans, capital investment programme 
and municipal action plans are prepared. Other requirements include the preparation of an 
integrated spatial development framework, LED programmes, a performance 
management system and a disaster management plan.  
 
 Phase 5 (Approval): During this stage the IDP is approved by the municipal council with 
the support of the municipal administration, municipal residents, the district council and 
other relevant role-players and stakeholders.  
 
4.2.2 Integrated Development Planning and Intergovernmental Relations  
 
Both the scholarly literature and policy documents emphasize that IDPs should be the product of 
South Africa’s intergovernmental planning system of co-operative governance. The process of 
integrated planning is therefore intended to include the coordinated action and involvement of 
the three spheres of government and the alignment and coordination of national, provincial and 
local government development programmes. The overall aim of such co-ordinated 
intergovernmental action is to ‘maximise development impact’ at municipal level (Gueli, 
Liebenberg & Van Huyssteen, 2007: 100). According to Patel and Powell (2008:352) the 
inclusion of IDPs in the intergovernmental planning system was intended ‘to ensure that national 
objectives are realised in municipalities’. However, despite this objective, they highlight the 
numerous challenges of intergovernmental planning in the IDP process and the lack of 
coordinated input from all three spheres.  
 
The key findings of the IDP Hearings Report conducted in 2005 by the Western Cape Province’s 
Department of Local Government and Housing include the need to develop a shared paradigm 
for sustainable development and to improve intergovernmental investment in localities by 
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identifying the common targets and outcomes. Another recommendation that emanated from the 
IDP Hearings was the need to strengthen the strategic development role of provinces and to 
utilize their ability to align, monitor and support development actions. It was stated that 
development was hampered by the ‘absence of credible provincial development strategy to 
contextualize the national development agenda and provide a framework to municipalities’ 
(Department of Local Government and Housing, 2005:4). Other problems relating 
intergovernmental cooperation included tensions between community needs and the long term 
strategies of national government, poor resource alignment, the lack of powers and functions 
required by municipalities to deliver local services and their reliance on the cooperation and 
commitment of national and provincial government (Patel & Powel, 2008:352-353).  
 
Commenting on the role of Provinces in developing IDPs, the Municipal Integrated 
Development Planning Manual (DPLG, Undated:11) states that: 
 
Provinces have a crucial role to play in ensuring that municipal IDPs contribute to the 
sustainable development of the province as a whole. In particular, the Premier's Office and 
the local government departments must support, guide and monitor the formulation and 
implementation of IDPs. They must facilitate the coordination and alignment of IDPs with 
the strategies and programmes of national and provincial organs of state. 
 
In defining the role of municipal planning within the system of co-operative government, Section 
24(1-4) of the Municipal Systems Act states that:  
 
 The planning undertaken by a municipality must be aligned with, and complement, the 
development plans and strategies of other affected municipalities and other organs of 
state so as to give effect to the principles of co-operative government contained in section 
41 of the Constitution. 
 Municipalities must participate in national and provincial development programmes as 
required in section 153(b) of the Constitution.  
 If municipalities are required to comply with planning requirements in terms of national 
or provincial legislation, the responsible organs of state must align the implementation of 
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that legislation with the provisions of this Chapter; and in such implementation (i) consult 
with the affected municipality; and (ii) take reasonable steps to assist the municipality to 
meet the time limit mentioned in Section 25 and the other requirements of this Chapter 
applicable to its integrated development plan. 
 An organ of state initiating national or provincial legislation requiring municipalities to 
comply with planning requirements, must consult with organised local government 
before the legislation is introduced in Parliament or a provincial legislature, or, in the 
case of subordinate legislation, before that legislation is enacted. 
 
Whilst the IDP should inform the allocation of local resources by the provincial and national 
sector departments, the local sphere must also consider national and provincial programmes 
when developing local and policies and strategies (DPLG, 2001). This is intended to ensure the 
alignment of policies, programmes and strategies of the different spheres of government.  
 
4.2.3 The purpose of Integrated Development Planning 
 
Integrated development planning is intended as a micro-level development planning strategy to 
be used by local government to transform and democratize grassroots development and as a 
mechanism to promote participatory democracy through the involvement of a range of role 
players. By design the IDP is intended to enable local government to be developmental in its 
duties and to ensure that it makes optimal use of resources in its pursuit of sustainable socio-
economic development, and the reduction of poverty and social inequality (DPLG, undated). 
 
The IDP, is thus the focal point of South Africa’s developmental local government system and it 
is the mechanism that through which municipalities are supposed to address social 
transformation and to play a distinctive developmental role (Frodin, 2009). As such, the IDP is 
not only a legislative imperative for local government, but a ‘binding strategic planning 
instrument’ (Achmat, 2002:5). Its critical development role, moreover, is acknowledged by the 
UNDP (2002:1) as ‘the principal planning instrument that guides and informs all planning and 
decision-making in municipalities throughout the country. The IDP embraces many of the 
characteristics of Local Agenda 21 (LA21) in terms of its underlying philosophy, principles and 
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processes and consequently represents a key vehicle for local government to fulfil its 
developmental role’. 
 
The Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG, undated: 9) provides a list of the 
intended benefits of integrated development planning to various stakeholders in the planning 
process. Some of these benefits are listed below:  
 
 Municipal Council: Provides accountable leadership and development direction; enables 
cooperative relationships with stakeholders and communities; enables access to 
development resources and external support; allows for the monitoring of the 
performance of municipal officials. 
 
 Councillors: Provides councillors with a mechanism for communicating with their 
constituencies; enables councillors to represent their constituencies effectively by making 
informed decisions; enables councillors to measure their own performance.  
 
 Municipal Officials: Guides business unit planning within the municipal administration; 
provides municipal officials with a mechanism to communicate with councillors; enables 
officials to contribute to the municipality's vision; permits officials to be part of the 
decision making process. 
 
 Communities and other stakeholders: Gives stakeholders an opportunity to inform the 
municipal council what their development needs are; gives them an opportunity to 
determine the municipality's development direction; provides a mechanism through 
which to communicate with their councillors and the governing body; provides a 
mechanism through which they can measure the performance of the councillors and the 
municipality as a whole. 
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4.2.5 Public participation in Integrated Development Planning 
 
Numerous sources emphasize the importance of public participation in the IDP process.  
Cameron (2001:104) highlights the participatory imperative of IDPs and its specific intent 
namely to ‘assess community needs, prioritise such needs, develop integrated frameworks and 
goals to meet these needs, formulate strategies to achieve the goals and implement programmes 
and projects’. In that respect, Section 3.3 of the White Paper (RSA, 1998b) states that ‘one of the 
strengths of integrated development planning is that it recognises the linkages between 
development, delivery and democracy. Building local democracy is a central role of local 
government, and municipalities should develop strategies and mechanisms (including, but not 
limited to, participative planning) to continuously engage with citizens, business and community 
groups’. In order to meet this objective Mosana (2005) observes, ‘a municipality must develop a 
culture of municipal governance that compliments representative government with a system of 
participatory governance’. He further emphasises that municipalities must not only provide an 
environment which fosters community participation, but which encourages and builds the 
capacity of councillors, community members and staff to enable meaningful participation 
through the allocation of the requisite resources.   
 
In 2000, the Department of Provincial and Local Government proposed the formation of an IDP 
Representative Forum to encourage and facilitate stakeholder and community participation in all 
stages of the IDP process. It was proposed that such a forum would consist of members of the 
executive committee of the Municipal Council and councillors, including district councillors, 
traditional leaders, ward committee representatives, heads of departments and senior officials 
from municipal and government departments (Losch, 2006).  
 
Ward committees and ward based planning are a critical element of the IDP process. This system 
is aligned to the national policy framework to ensure stakeholder mobilization and citizen 
participation in development initiatives. A ward committee is an area-based committee whose 
boundaries coincide with ward boundaries. The Municipal Structures Act (Act 117 of 1998) 
makes provision for the establishment of ward committees as a vehicle for encouraging 
community participation in municipal matters. Chapter 2 (19) of the Act requires a municipality 
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to consult with communities in the performance of its functions and in exercising its powers and 
this consultative process is institutionalized in Chapter 4 (RSA, 1998a). 
 
Ward committees are viewed as an essential component of good local governance. For the DPLG 
(2005b), ward committees represent the interface between local municipalities and communities. 
In a similar vein, Putu (2006:5) declares that ward committees ‘serve as a cord which articulates 
the new system of local government to the majority of the people, more especially to previously 
disadvantaged communities’. He outlines their role as actively participating in core municipal 
business such as integrated developmental planning, budgeting and the municipal performance 
management process. According to the National Policy Framework on Public Participation 
(RSA, 2005a), ward committees must be impartial, must act as independent advisory bodies and 
must function as forums for deliberative democracy. 
 
Considerable concern has been expressed both in the literature and in official documents about 
the effectiveness of ward committees. This is evident in the Ward Committee Resource Book 
(2005:6) which outlines the challenges to the effectiveness of the ‘Ward Participatory System’. 
These relate mainly to inexperience in committee procedures and participation in committee 
meetings, insufficient knowledge of budgets and financial statements and their roles and 
responsibilities as ward members. Other problems that have been raised surrounding ward 
committee representatives refer to poor communication and feedback of information to their 
communities. Piper and Von Lieres (2008) cite poor implementation and functioning of the ward 
committee system, political power struggles, party and partisan conflict over the composition and 
operation of ward committees, party and partisan conflict over the establishment of ward 
committees and party conflict over the implementation of ward committee policy. 
 
Several other measures have introduced the process of citizen participation including 
Community Based Planning (CBP) which is a participatory planning methodology used at ward 
level in order to enhance community engagement action and foster ownership of development 
initiatives. The CPB process aims to assist local government in responding to community needs, 
in improving the quality of plans and the quality of services delivered. It was envisaged that the 
CPB process would lead to improved agency plans, ward plans and IDPs (CBP Guide, 2005), 
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although there is little documented evidence to date to suggest that they had have strengthened 
participatory process in any significant way. The appointment of Community Development 
Workers (CDWs) in 2003 was a further initiative introduced to support ward committees in 
terms of IDPs, CBPs and ward plans. The function of CDWs includes providing information on 
government services and support structures, facilitating community based planning in local 
areas, facilitating implementation of community projects and providing technical support in the 
compilation of reports and the monitoring and evaluation of projects (DPLG, 2005b).  
 
4.2.6 Integrated Development Planning and Performance Management Systems  
 
The Performance Management System (PMS) is seen as the mechanism by which developmental 
local governments and stakeholders are able to measure progress towards specified goals and 
targets and to hold institutions and individuals accountable for their duties and use of resources 
(Davids, 2006). A comprehensive legislative and policy framework informs the system of 
performance measurement in South Africa, and this includes the Constitution, the Batho Pele 
White Paper (1998), the White Paper on Local Government (1998), the Local Government 
Municipal Structures Act (Act 117 of 1998), the Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000), the 
Municipal Planning and Performance Management Regulations (No 796 of 2001) and the Local 
Government Municipal Finance Management Act (Act 56 of 2003). The Batho Pele White Paper 
(Department of Public Service and Administration, 1997), in particular, laid the foundation for 
the adoption of a performance management system in local government. In order to improve the 
quality of the Public Sector and to adhere to its mantra of ‘People First’, emphasis was placed on 
consultation with citizens, the setting of service standards, equal access to services, courtesy and 
consideration, provision of information, openness and transparency and  redress and value for 
money (ibid). However, the two core policy documents are central to the institutionalization of 
performance management at the local level, namely the Municipal Systems Act (32 of 2000) and 
the Municipal Planning and Performance Regulations (796 of 2001). The preamble of the 
Municipal Systems Act (2000) emphasises the important role of participation in performance 
management noting that communities have an integral role to play in the affairs of municipalities 
‘and in particular in planning, service delivery and performance management’.  
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Chapter 6 of the Municipal Systems Act (2000) sets out the conditions for the establishment of a 
performance management system, including the criteria for target setting, monitoring and review. 
Section 38 of the Act requires each municipality to establish a PMS which is proportionate to its 
resources, circumstances and in line with the objectives, indicators and targets specified in its 
Integrated Development Plan. Section 41 further requires that a municipality set appropriate key 
performance indicators and measureable performance targets in order to be able to monitor and 
measure performance on an annual basis. At the same time Section 42 reiterates the importance 
of the active involvement of local communities, noting that ‘a municipality, through appropriate 
mechanisms, processes and procedures established in terms of Chapter 4, must involve the local 
community in the development, implementation and review of the municipality’s performance 
management system and, in particular, allow the community to participate in the setting of 
appropriate key performance indicators and performance targets in terms of integrated 
development planning for the municipality’. Taking into account administrative and financial 
capacity, Section 51 directs municipalities to facilitate a culture of public service and 
accountability amongst their staff and for them to be performance orientated and focussed on the 
developmental objects of local government. 
  
Section 7 (1) of the Municipal Planning and Performance Management Regulations (2001) 
provides the following definition of a municipality’s Performance Management System:  
 
a framework that describes and represents how the municipality’s cycle and processes of 
performance planning, monitoring, measurement, review, reporting and improvement will 
be conducted, organized and managed, including determining the roles of the different role 
players. 
 
Section 7 (2) of the Municipal Planning and Performance Management Regulations (RSA, 2001) 
requires further that the PMS of a municipality must demonstrate how it is to operate and be 
managed from the planning stage up to the stages of performance review and reporting. It must 
also clarify the roles and responsibilities of each role-player, including the local community, in 
the functioning of the system. It must further clarify the processes of implementing the system 
within the framework of the integrated development planning process, must determine the 
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frequency of reporting and the lines of accountability for performance, and must provide for the 
procedure by which the system is linked to the municipality’s integrated development planning 
processes. In addition, Section 9 sets out the requirements of key performance measures which 
include input indicators, output indicators and outcome indicators in respect of each development 
priority and objective. It also stipulates that a municipality must insure that communities are 
involved in the process of setting key performance indicators (ibid).  
 
The Local Government Municipal Finance Management Act, No. 56 of 2003 requires that a 
municipal council must prepare a service delivery and budget implementation plan (SDBIP) 
indicating service delivery targets and performance indicators for each quarter.  Section 53 of the 
MFMA requires that annual performance agreements for the municipal manager and all senior 
managers, as specified in Section 57(1)(6) of the Municipal Systems Act, must promote sound 
financial management and must be linked to the measurable performance objectives approved 
with the budget and to the service delivery and budget implementation plan. Sections 68 and 69 
of the Act set out the requirements in terms of budget preparation and implementation, whereas 
Sections 72 and 88 provide guidelines in terms of mid-year budget and performance assessment 
of service delivery.  
 
For Kambuwa and Wallis (2002) the adoption of Performance Management Systems (PMS) was 
propelled by the democratic imperatives of the South African developmental state, the need to 
institutionalise state accountability processes and to increase the chances of the IDP processes in 
achieving the desired results. Furthermore, the introduction of performance management systems 
was intended to strengthen both individual and institutional performance in the public sector. The 
performance monitoring system was also introduced to strengthen community oversight and to 
allow them to monitor and evaluate the performance of political office bearers and officials in 
their municipalities. Kambuwa and Wallis (2002) elaborated as follows:   
 
An overriding expectation was that the new PMS would be a tool that would empower 
communities to determine their needs and assess the performance of their municipalities. It 
would give credence to the idea of a bottom up approach – an idea of long standing in 
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community development ideology. If implemented, this would be a radical departure from 
previous policies and practice (Ibid:8).  
 
4.3 Concluding comments 
 
This chapter has looked at the role of local government in the broader project to establish a 
developmental state in South Africa. In what may be viewed as a top-down and bottom-up 
approach, the South African model of a democratic developmental state assigns considerable 
importance to a decentralised and people-centred form of government. Although, as was 
discussed, the idea of developmental local government first advanced in the 1998 White Paper 
on Developmental Local Government was largely descriptive, the concept has assumed a wider 
meaning and it is increasingly portrayed as a foundation stone of a national developmental state. 
This is because developmental local government is expected to be the frontline between the state 
and ordinary citizens and the vehicle for the delivery of basic services and the promotion of local 
economic development. In that respect, it was seen that a key instrument established to promote 
developmental local government is the process of integrated development planning. The IDP 
process is not only intended to ensure that planning at the level of the local state is integrated, 
both within a municipality as well with other spheres, but that it also embodies participatory 
principles and practices. 
 
The chapter which follows examines theoretical understandings of participation in the literature 
and its practice in South Africa. It points to the fact that whilst participatory democracy is seen to 
be self-evidently good, the practice of participatory development is fraught with many challenges 
and it frequently fails those whom it is intended to assist the most, the poor and marginalised.  
This chapter is also intended to provide a background to the analysis of participatory practices in 
the case study area of Delft.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
The preceding two chapters discussed understandings of both government officials and other 
political and social commentators of the essence of a democratic developmental state and its 
potential role in post-apartheid South Africa. This included a focus on the local state and 
what might constitute developmental local government. Here attention was focused on the 
need to advance citizen participation in decision making within the local state and on the use 
of integrated development planning as a means to that end. The chapter which follows 
provides an overview of theoretical debates on participation in the literature. It then proceeds 
to a discussion of the way in which participation is conceived in legislation and policy, as 
well as in practice, in South Africa today. 
  
Throughout the world, participation has become a key concept in the contemporary 
development lexicon and it is frequently used synonymously, and with much optimism and 
fervour, with deliberative democracy, good governance and citizenship. The  raison d’ etat 
for the practice of participation and public deliberation is seen to be its central role in 
legitimising government actions and strengthening political systems in developing countries.  
However, over the course of the past two decades, there has been mounting disillusionment 
with the nature and outcome of engagements between the local state and society. Some 
theorists are of the view that the very notion of participation is ambiguous, contested and 
value-laden, surrounded by much conceptual confusion and inadequate grounding in 
development theory (Mohan & Hickey, 2004). Both practitioners and theorists have 
highlighted its marginalising and divisive nature which is seen to be a consequence of its 
mechanistic use as a tool to validate pre-conceived policy initiatives via top-down procedures 
reminiscent of the developmental approaches of the 1960s. Despite this critique, however, the 
acceptance of public participation as a definitive solution to the challenges facing developing 
countries continues unabated. 
 
Within the bounds of this framework, this chapter seeks firstly to conceptualise participation 
within the context of the evolution of people-centred development approaches. Attention will 
then turn to locating participation and its institutionalisation within a more radical and 
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politicised participatory discourse, followed by an articulation of the dialectical relationship 
between popular agency and social structures and the exercise of human agency within the 
confines and constraints imposed by structures of the state. Thereafter, the focus will shift to 
an analysis of participation as a spatial practice and an investigation into the configurations 
and dynamics of power relations which infuse spaces of public engagement. Within the 
context of the foregoing analyses, the final section will explore the different levels of 
participation as a way of understanding current institutionalised practices and power 
dynamics. 
 
5.1 Evolution of people-centred development approaches and public participation 
 
During the late 1960s, disillusionment with orthodox development theories and their failure 
to address poverty and bring about transformation in less developed nations led to a 
systematic search for alternative conceptual analyses and a shift in focus from economic 
growth to the social dimensions of development. Between the 1970s and 1980s, participatory 
approaches were considered the sine qua non of development practice and development 
efforts increasingly promoted ‘people-centred development’, ‘state–society synergies’, 
‘participatory democracy’ ‘bottom-up planning’ and ‘grassroots development’ (Rahman, 
1993; World Bank, 1996; Hemson, 2007; Jennings, 2007). 
 
People-centred development discourse emphasised that people should be the architects of 
their own future (Burkey, 1993; Chambers, 1997), and focused on the role of social capital, 
capabilities, freedom and the ability of ordinary people to manage development themselves 
(Ul Haqhas, 1995; Sen, 1999, 2002; Nussbaum, 2000). Following this perspective, 
participatory development would enable the poor to influence, implement and control 
activities which are essential to their development through interaction with agencies, officials 
and technical consultants (Burkey (1993). A new participatory rhetoric based on ideas of self-
reliance, capacity building, equality and empowerment gained rapid currency during these 
decades and was used to constantly reinforce beliefs of what were seen to be the key 
advantages of a participating public. 
 
The rationale behind participatory approaches to development was that grassroots support 
provides valuable insight into local conditions, facilitates the implementation of the planning 
process and improves development outcomes (Gupta, Grandvoinnet & Romani, 2004). It was 
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seen to be associated with the actualising of human rights, the enabling of social justice and 
the building of social capital. Mainstream or ‘populist’ participatory approaches of the 1980s 
emphasised the value of tapping into local knowledge and enabling the beneficiaries of 
development interventions to participate in all stages of the process (Hickey & Mohan, 2004). 
During this decade it was generally believed that it was not possible to implement any 
meaningful type of development initiative without following participatory procedures. For 
many a participatory approach was viewed as the ‘magic bullet’ for addressing inequality and 
social change, leading Chambers (1977) to declare participation to be a ‘new paradigm’ of 
development. 
 
However, revisionist thinking in the 1990s led a ‘critical backlash’ against mainstream 
participatory practices (Hickey & Mohan, 2004). What were seen as palliative participatory 
approaches and an ‘appropriation of participatory discourse’, particularly by organisations 
such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, evinced strong criticism from a 
number of quarters (Cooke, 2004; Kesby, 2010). During this era, major international 
institutions were charged with depoliticising development, and by implication participation, 
through their narrow technicist focus on project effectiveness and cost reduction, which 
ignored such issues as structural inequality, asymmetrical power relations and social justice 
(Leal, 2010; Gaventa, 2006; Williams, 2004). Mohan and Hickey (2004:59) ascribe the 
depoliticising of participatory praxis to ‘an absence of a coherent theory of participation that 
seeks to explain and articulate the role of agency within development processes’ and the 
inability to ‘theorize the potential contribution of participation to a transformatory political 
process’. For these authors, participation needed to be aligned to the notion of citizenship, 
social justice and development as social change, rather than its use as a ‘technical fix’ for 
problems of poverty and inequality. Emerging participatory discourse during this period thus 
placed emphasis on what was considered the vital link between participation and 
transformation in existing economic, social and political structures and on the need for 
strategies that encompassed ‘organizational change’ (Hoff & Stiglitz, 2001). 
 
5.2 Understanding participation 
 
A review of the literature from different perspectives reveals the multi-dimensional nature 
and complexity of the concept of participation and its shifting role and focus over time. 
Moreover, the varied contexts of participation and the differing ideological underpinnings of 
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its advocates further complicate an understanding of the concept. Drawing on the ideas of 
Burkey (1993) and Oakley (1991), Penderis (1996:127) distinguishes between participation 
as a means to achieve the objectives of development programmes, as opposed to participation 
as an end ‘which lays emphasis on participation as a process which awakens levels of 
consciousness, constitutes self-transformation and develops and strengthens the capacity of 
beneficiary groups in development initiatives’. Following Nelson and Wright (1995:1), these 
two perspectives imply very different state–society power relations, with the first, focusing 
on efficiency and improved project outcomes, seen to be less empowering to citizens.  In 
support of this view, Rahnema (1992:117) points to the way in which participation is used by 
governments as a coercive tool to increase productivity and reduce costs. Although such 
practices ‘are commonly cloaked in the rhetoric of empowerment’, Cleaver (2001:27) 
maintains that in practice they provide limited opportunity for empowerment and 
transformation. 
 
Participation, according to some writers, should ideally be a transformation process and a 
proactive ‘learning by doing’ exercise and people-centred approach to development (Nelson 
& Wright, 1995; Oakley, 1991; Burkey, 1993). It is also seen to be essential in a democratic 
and accountable society that enables the exercise of agency and citizenship (Ayiar, 2010).  
Participation moves beyond representative democracy and its ideology is ‘driven by a belief 
in the importance of entrusting citizens with the responsibility to shape their own future’ 
(Jennings, 2007:1). The view of participation as ‘popular agency’ recognises the ‘existing 
capacities of people as active claims-making agents’ (Hickey & Mohan, 2004:3) and citizens 
are acknowledged as able participants in the development process. Scholars such as Yadav 
(1980) and Padarath (2006) inform us that the only viable approach to successful 
participatory planning entails a meaningful decision-making partnership between decision 
makers, planners, researchers and the community. This notion of participation not only 
enhances development practice and improves service delivery at the local level (Buccus, 
Hemson, Hicks & Piper, 2007) but also contributes to deepening the democratic process. 
 
At the simplest level, public participation refers to the engagement in the decision-making 
process that occurs between civil society stakeholders and various democratic structures and 
institutions of the state, particularly at the local level (Brodie, Cowling & Nissan, 2009). 
Similarly, for Rowe and Frewer (2004:512), public participation is viewed as ‘consulting and 
involving members of the public in the agenda-setting, decision-making and policy-forming 
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activities of organisations or institutions responsible for policy development’. However, it is 
becoming increasingly clear that engaging, consulting and involving local people rarely 
results in the anticipated goals of empowerment and transformation of the status quo, unless 
there is popular agency and true representation of the most marginalised sectors of society 
and in the context where there is equal control over the participatory process. According to all 
accounts this is a rare occurrence in the development arena. Thus, a more in-depth 
investigation of the political nature of participatory relations and the role of power within 
formal institutionalised spaces provides an important framework for analysing state-society 
relations in the context of a democratic developmental state. 
 
5.3 Politicising and institutionalising participation 
 
The linking of citizen participation to the claiming of basic rights has led to the growing 
politicisation of the concept (where it had previously been viewed as a technocratic tool). The 
expansion of the participatory agenda from a fairly narrow focus on beneficiaries as subjects, 
to a broader view on democratic governance has, in particular, succeeded in politicising 
participation through the promotion of a radical and transformatory understanding of 
citizenship.  According to Gaventa (2002), the embedding of participation within human 
rights principles serves to elevate the status of participants from mere beneficiaries of 
projects to the ‘legitimate claimants’ of development initiatives (Gaventa, 2002). The 
politicisation of participation has also led to its association with the idea of good governance. 
Features of good governance, as mentioned, include sound financial regulation, institutional 
reform, transparency and the expansion of human capital (Marangos, 2008; Rodrik, 2002), 
which incorporate factors such as participation, consensus orientation, equity, efficiency and 
accountability (Stiglitz, 1998).  The progressive incursion of rights-based public participation 
into the political arena has led to the institutionalisation of participatory systems and 
processes. It has also prompted a rethinking of the nature of state and civil society relations 
and has led to a call to refurbish participatory institutions. In that regard, Gaventa (2004a:25) 
asserts that a  ‘key challenge for the 21st century is the construction of new relationships 
between ordinary people and the institutions – especially those of government – which affect 
their lives’. However, he stresses that it is the nature of these new institutional arrangements 
and the power relationships that emerge within and around these spaces that will determine 
the level of inclusiveness of participatory democracy. In similar fashion Williams (2004:100) 
maintains that the institutionalisation of participation could potentially develop ‘a new 
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political imagery’ of empowerment by reshaping current practices and by advancing new 
ways of interacting in development processes. Within this context, supportive state officials 
can potentially ‘open up spaces of empowerment’ at the local level, build the political 
capacities of citizens and provide opportunities for political learning. This, in turn, will 
enable citizens to demand accountability and responsiveness to their expressed claims and, in 
so doing, to influence key decisions and thereby repoliticise participation (ibid). Such 
repoliticised, inclusive participation at the local level will enable citizens, as agents, to claim 
their rightful place as ‘makers and shapers’ of development initiatives, rather than ‘users’, 
‘choosers’ (Cornwall & Gaventa, 2000) and ‘passive consumers’ of predetermined 
interventions (Babu, 2010). 
 
5.4 Broadening the participatory agenda: Agency and citizenship  
 
A major limitation of participatory theory is the lack of consideration of the role and potential 
of agency (Mohan & Hickey, 2004) which is viewed as essential in order to move 
participation from a technical device, or ‘tyranny’, to participation as a vehicle of structural 
change and transformation (Cleaver, 2004). The work of theorists such as Bourdieu, Giddens 
and Archer add depth to an analysis of participation in terms of understanding the complex 
relationship between human agency and social structures. 
 
Bourdieu’s (1972, 1979) examination of the dynamics of power relations, the influence of 
external structures on social action and the role of social capital in producing and reproducing 
inequality provides an interesting analytical lens through which to view and understand the 
complex dynamics of state–society relations. The construction of social reality by agents, he 
asserts, is determined by their perceived position in social space and this hierarchical 
position, or ‘habitus’, is in turn shaped by the economic, social, cultural and symbolic capital 
or assets that they possess and the multiplicity of interactions in their personal life (ibid, 
1979). This hierarchical status, conferred on them by their perceived position, influences their 
ability to engage with authorities. Thus, the possession of different forms of capital 
determines the form of social reality that agents construct and it is this perceived form that 
enables the (re)production of durable forms of hegemonic relations (ibid, 1990).  
 
In his theory of structuration, Giddens (1984:131) discusses the ‘duality of structure’ which 
implies a dialectical relationship between actors and structures rather than a deterministic one 
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suggested by Marxist doctrine. This ‘duality’ refers to the repetition of social action which 
creates structures, while the structures enable interaction within the social system.  He 
explains the ‘duality of structure’ as follows: 
 
Human social activities, like some self-reproducing items in nature, are recursive. That 
is to say, they are not brought into being by social actors but continually recreated by 
them via the very means whereby they express themselves as actors. In and through 
their activities agents reproduce the conditions that make these activities possible 
(Giddens, 1984:2).   
 
Giddens’s (1984) notion of recursivity implies that structures both enable and constrain 
action which in turn produces and reproduces structures. Social reality is the result of ‘social 
practices ordered across space and time’ and social practices are continually repeated, or 
recursive, reproducing ‘the conditions that make these activities possible’ (1984:2).   Within 
the recursive ordering of social practices, the knowledge of actors plays a decisive role. This 
knowledge enables reflexivity of social practices as agents continually reflect, rationalise and 
monitor social and physical aspects of the specific context in which they find themselves, 
which in turn impacts on their action. Thus, continual inputs of knowledge enable ‘reflexive 
ordering and reordering of social relations’ which in turn impacts on actions and behaviour of 
individuals and groups (Giddens, 1990:16). 
 
However, the actions of agents imply that power as agency is a reflection of capability, not 
intentions and it is the exertion of power that creates an effect and impact (ibid, 1990). Thus 
for Giddens, knowledge, power and capability play a critical role in both the actions of agents 
and the structures that are created over space and time. While authoritative and allocative 
resources and sets of formulated rules are properties within such structures that enable actors 
to reproduce social systems, these properties also function as a mode of control (ibid, 1984). 
There is similarity in the work of Giddens and Bourdieu in terms of the understanding of the 
relations between structure and agency. Both theorists place an emphasis on the conscious 
intentions of social agents. Thus Bourdieu stresses the significance of the habitus of 
individual actors, which limits or enables interaction, while Giddens places emphasis on the 
reflexivity of actors which enables them to transform social reality through reflection and 
rationalisation. 
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Archer’s (1995) notion of analytical dualism draws on Giddens’s structuration theory and 
posits that, while structures and agency are interlinked and function interdependently, their 
initial form over time is constrained and recreated to produce new forms under changing 
cultural and historical conditions. This she refers to as morphogenetic sequencing, which 
enable’s one to analyse the internal micro-dynamics of structures of a particular period and 
investigate their inter-linkages over time. Her concept of central conflation views structure 
and agency as co-constitutive; structures are reproduced by the exercise of agency of actors, 
but their actions and choices are both constrained and enabled by existing structures. 
 
In line with Giddens, Cerny (1990:4) maintains that neither the structure nor the agent 
‘determines’ the other. While agreeing that they are ‘inextricably intertwined’ and choices 
and alternatives are constrained, he asserts that ‘the actual pattern of constraint (and 
opportunity), is itself in dynamic flux, filtering and transforming the choices and actions of 
agents in ways that can either reinforce or modify existing structures (or both at the same 
time) in complex ways’. Cerny draws attention to an additional dynamic, noting that actions 
are limited in such settings due to tension over accessing scarce resources, particular rules of 
the ‘game’ and uncertainties over the role of actors within the ‘games’ that are being played 
out.  Even within wider structures, ‘clusters’ of games emerge and opposing groups, with 
different stakes in the ‘game’, compete against each other, which could result in ‘dynamic 
tension’ between groups (ibid:6). In order to claim ‘radical’ citizenship which is their 
constitutional right, actors must therefore function within the confines and constraints defined 
by the political structures of the state. While agents can reinforce, modify and institutionalise 
structures by their choices, opportunities for change and transformation are limited and 
dependent on the political will, commitment and responsiveneness of the state to 
transformation. 
 
The actions and choices of citizens, furthermore, are shaped and influenced by broader 
transnational political structures and forces which not only constrain choice but reduce and 
limit the leverage and decision-making powers of civil society. As agency is embedded 
within participatory institutional structures (which, in turn, are sited within larger 
formations), decision making occurs within predetermined parameters which restrict and 
constrain options and preferences (Heller & Evans, 2010). Such constraints constitute control 
and domination and are a reflection of the different power hierarchies and the supremacy of 
the instituting agents over society.  Gaventa (2006:25), building on the work of Lukes, also 
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reflects on the broader global dimension and the vertical shifting of powers that impact on 
local participatory practices. In so doing he devised a three-dimensional model, the ‘power 
cube’, to analyse the types of participatory spaces that are created, the interplay of different 
types of power within such spaces, and the relationship between both spaces and levels of 
power within the global, national and local sphere. Although separate, all three dimensions 
are interrelated, implying that a change in circumstances on one dimension will impact on the 
others. Gaventa uses this model to consider the transformative possibilities within different 
participatory spaces in terms of their different manifestations of power and as a means to 
analyse participatory dynamics and devise strategies to strengthen praxis (ibid). 
 
5.5 Formulations of place and space 
 
Drawing on the work of such authors as Walmsley (1988), Hart (1986) and Krupat (1985), 
Penderis (1996:4) depicts the concept of place as conjuring up notions of ‘belonging, shared 
values and common concerns … imbued with strikingly different meaning and significance’ 
which confers both an identity on its occupants and ‘implies an integration of nature and 
culture’. Closely linked and within place, space exists as a three-dimensional bounded 
territory where ‘the various spatial dimensions articulate with one another and over time exert 
a powerful influence on place’ (ibid:5). 
 
Spaces are thus centres of meaning, expressions of intentions and aspirations constructed by 
human experience (Buttimer, 1979; Relph, 1976; Tuan, 1975), where groups and individuals 
interact either at the microspace personal level, mesospace neighbourhood level or 
macrospace city level (Penderis, 1996; Weightman, 1985). Conversely, exclusion from space 
alienates and undermines feelings of identity, belonging and self-worth, manifesting 
powerlessness, lack of control, vulnerability and emotional deprivation (Huttman, 1993; 
Knox, 1987; Ley, 1983; Marcussen, 1990). 
While a sense of place relates to prevailing personal and social arrangements, a specific 
locality is influenced by the wider economic and political structures of the broader region. 
Places are also mediums for social interaction, and different localities provide the 
infrastructure for social relationships and the context for the integration of people into 
collective groups with shared cultures. As such, while social space is a medium for social 
interaction and individuals and groups make their own ‘histories’, the environment of the 
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local milieu may be both enabling and constraining and people’s responses will vary as they 
draw on knowledge and resources in attempts to transform their realities. Politically defined 
space, in particular, can enable or constrain according to the nature and form of governance 
of the political superstructure or state apparatus (Peet, 1993; Thrift, 1983). 
The foregoing discussion sets the context for the following sections which will focus more 
specifically on the form, content and purpose of participatory spaces and the dynamics of 
power which imbue and surround such spaces. 
 
5.5.1 Participatory spaces 
 
Participation, as intimated above, takes place in a variety of spaces created for different 
reasons, by different stakeholder groups, with different terms of engagement and different 
sets of dynamics. While some institutional forms are transient events, others are more 
resilient and regularised. In the participatory political sphere, spaces are constructed by 
‘enablers’ and inhabited by ‘engagers’, to borrow Escobar’s (2011) terms, where enablers 
delineate and define the spaces according to predetermined specific goals and either summon 
or invite engagers to participate in deliberations in order to fulfill the requirements of 
participatory democracy. 
 
A profusion of literature on the construction of participatory spaces and a growing number of 
terms and catchphrases has been employed to describe these spaces, often reflecting the 
power struggles that frequently inhabit such spaces. Institutionalised spaces are depicted as 
‘closed’, ‘well-behaved’, ‘patronising’, ‘summoned’, ‘invited’ and ‘provided’, in contrast to 
popular spaces which are portrayed as ‘contested’, ‘claimed’, ‘captured’, ‘invented’, 
‘resisted’ and ‘conquered’  sites of interaction (see Aiyar, 2010; Miraftab, 2004; Escobar, 
2011; Gaventa 2004b; Cornwall, 2002a, 2002b).  In that respect, Gaventa (2004a:35) 
provides a continuum of different types of participatory spaces in terms of how they were 
created and in whose interests. He differentiates between three different types of spaces. 
Firstly, ‘closed’ spaces are the exclusive domain of a group of decision makers, operating 
‘behind closed doors’, and entry into these spaces is denied to outsiders. Secondly, ‘invited’ 
spaces are those shaped by state authorities or organisations in order to create a forum for 
citizens who are then requested to participate in development initiatives. Third on the 
continuum are ‘claimed’ spaces formed by the less powerful public and individuals, either to 
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challenge the more dominant or to raise common concerns that are not being adequately 
addressed by authoritative figures. Each of these spaces, he maintains, interact dynamically 
with each other, ‘constantly opening and closing through struggles for legitimacy and 
resistance, co-optation and confrontation’ (ibid). They are thus never static or void of social 
relations.  
 
Cornwall (2004b:76), in her discussion of participation as a spatial practice, highlights the 
situated, bounded nature of participatory spaces as potential permeable arenas for 
participatory opportunities. Such spaces, she asserts, could represent informal opportunities 
for local people to come together, or more complex multi-stakeholder gatherings comprising 
government, civil society, the private sector and donors, as follows: 
 
A space can be emptied or filled, permeable or sealed; it can be an opening, an 
invitation to speak or act. Spaces can also be clamped shut, voided of meaning, or 
depopulated as people turn their attention elsewhere (2004a:1). 
 
Examining participation as a spatial practice enables an analysis of power relations and the 
exercise of citizenship within arenas of public engagement (Cornwall, 2002a). Cornwall’s 
(2002c) categorisation of participatory spaces differentiates between institutional and non-
institutional spaces. Government-established participatory arenas, or ‘invited spaces’, 
although offering potential for state/civil society collaboration and the exercise of citizen 
voice, are frequently reduced to hierarchical sites of inequitable relations, which reproduce 
dependency and undermine the potential for meaningful participation and deliberation. Such 
spaces often reflect particular contexts and ‘histories of governance’ and ‘cultures of politics’ 
which shape relations and rules of engagement and limit opportunities for the enactment of 
citizenship (Cornwall, 2004a:2). New institutional spaces thus often reflect previous social 
relations and the power dynamics of earlier times, and consequently ‘simply creating a new 
institution is not enough to purge it of older associations’ (Cornwall, 2002a:3). ‘Popular’ 
spaces, on the other hand, are spaces of ‘radical possibility, (and) of resistance’ (2002b:78) 
where people congregate voluntarily as ‘expressions of public dissent’ (2004a:2) or to secure 
rights which are denied to them.  These are ‘organic’ public spaces created by ordinary ‘like-
minded’ people who come together to influence decision making and policy ‘from below’, or 
to take an ‘oppositional stance’, expose corruption, air grievances and hold institutions 
accountable (2002a:25). 
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Both Lefebvre and Foucault offer insights to understanding the production of space and the 
interplay of social relations within it. For Lefebvre (1991:14), there are different modes of 
space and, besides physical space, mental space and social space ‘involves, underpins and 
presupposes the other’. Hence, past experiences and social relations leave their footprint on 
new spaces, and thus animate new social relations and practices. As social products, spaces 
are never vacant or neutral, but function as a medium of ongoing production of social 
relations fashioned and reshaped differently by different sectors of society. Similarly, 
Foucault (1967) describes the production of space, not as a ‘homogeneous and empty space’, 
but as a site of clusters of social relations.  Like Lefebvre, he draws attention to the many 
types of spaces such as private space, public space, family space, social space and even useful 
space, which can be appropriated, delimited, formalised and contested. Foucault (1977) 
points out that some sites are inclusionary and penetrable, while others are exclusionary and 
entry is restricted through the ‘disciplining power’ of officials. Gaventa (2006), building on 
the theme of exclusionary spaces, notes that those who shape the spaces have power over the 
spaces, although this power shifts continuously and a powerful group in one space could have 
considerably less power in another space. 
 
Other scholars comment on the political motivations behind the construction of contemporary 
‘invited’ spaces. Many have evolved over time in tandem with government reforms and 
democratic decentralisation and have been created as a means to legitimise decision making, 
enhance efficiency and strengthen accountability by ‘inviting’ citizens to participate in 
government-induced deliberative processes (Ayiar, 2010). Although such sites have the 
potential to enhance state accountability, responsiveness and public scrutiny, and to improve 
the quality and intensity of state-society interactions, in reality these ‘invited’ structures as 
arenas for state and civil society interactions are frequently, following Gramsci (1971), places 
of hegemony and platforms for control and repression to preserve the status quo rather than 
an opportunity for citizenship and the exercise of agency. 
 
5.5.2 Contested participation: Issues of power 
 
Participatory ideology and its praxis was conceived as a radical mechanism for emancipation 
of the poor and marginalised and the  transformation of underlying socio-political structures, 
practices and power relations that reproduce inequality, injustice and social exclusion.  Such 
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ideology is embedded in Marxist political economy and Freirean philosophy, rationalised as 
the pursuit of social justice through radical transformation. During the 1960s and 1970s 
scholars such as Paulo Freire, Orlando Fals Borda and Mohammed Anisur Rahman 
advocated an emancipatory form of participation and the creation of a critical consciousness 
and fundamental change in power relationships. Such drastic, transformative participation 
would challenge oppressive structures that reproduced inequalities, marginalisation and 
‘dehumanising’ circumstances, and would, instead, produce ‘self-conscious people’ 
(Rahman, 1993:13) who would be ‘beings for themselves’ in their ‘struggle to be more fully 
human’ (Freire, 1970:29). While such freedom would enable ordinary people to determine 
their own destinies through a process of conscientisation, transformation of the status quo 
would ‘require a radical critique and reorientation of social theory and practice’ (Fals Borda, 
2001:27).  
 
Since the 1990s, participatory discourse has increasingly focused on the complexities of the 
surrounding power relations occurring within institutional spaces designed to function as 
arenas of interaction between state and civil society to enable the exercise of citizenship and 
the fostering of social justice (Cornwall & Gaventa, 2007). Scholars such as Harbers 
(2007:43) challenge the ‘democratising potential’ of participation and current practice that 
provides evidence of ‘undemocratic elements of deliberation’, while others highlight the 
continued practice of using participation as an element of coercion and control (White, 1996). 
Cleaver (2004) draws attention to the predominant practical and technical development 
discourse, concerned with efficiency, cost efficiency and enhancing the visibility of collective 
actions, noting that it is ‘commonly cloaked in the rhetoric of empowerment’. She advocates 
a far deeper consideration of radical empowerment discourse that calls for a more drastic 
‘transformation of structures of subordination’.   
 
A number of writers have emphasised the importance of a more in-depth understanding of the 
unequal power relations and contestations that occur within institutionalised participatory 
structures. Conceiving participatory sites as centres of resistance and contestation enables one 
to explore ‘the micropolitics of encounters’ within such spaces (Cornwall & Coelho, 
2007:11). In that regard, Hickey and Mohan (2004:238), attribute the failure to bring about 
transformation in these spaces to insufficient consideration of issues of power and politics 
and the need for ‘a conceptual relocation of participation within a radical politics of 
development … and radicalized understanding of citizenship’ as opposed to mainstream 
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participation which is largely voluntaristic in nature. Such an approach, however, would 
require ‘a more radical reconfiguration’ of state–society interactions and responsibilities 
(Cornwall, 2004a). Cleaver (2001:36) urges participation practitioners to question entrenched 
beliefs that participation is essentially ‘good’ and that its practice ensures success and issues 
of power and politics must be ‘avoided as divisive and obstructive’. 
 
In their analysis of the dynamics of power relations, Nelson and Wright (1995:7–14) identify 
three models of power which can be used to investigate different aspects of participation and 
empowerment. Their first model, referred to as ‘power to’, relates to the growth of human 
power through the transformation of knowledge and through everyday encounters which 
stimulate confidence and capacity. The second model, referred to as ‘power over’, relates to 
the participation of state and civil society actors in political decision making and their 
influence over development decisions and control of resources. The third model, ‘decentred’ 
power, which – contrary to the ‘power over’ model – views power as subjectless, interacting 
invisibly within and between discourse, institutions, actors and flows of events within the 
ambit of the state. 
 
Gaventa (2006:24), building on the analysis of Nelson and Wright (1995), adds two further 
dimensions of power. The first of these is power within, which he describes as the acquisition 
of self-confidence and awareness which enables agents to participate meaningfully. The 
second, power with, refers to the highest level of power which arises through collective action 
and as a consequence of the synergies created between participating bodies. Gaventa’s 
categorisation implies a progressive increase in power, from an initial stage of no power or 
control to a stage where citizens have equal power and control of decision making. 
 
Further analysis of the dimensions of power is provided by authors such as Chambers (2005), 
who describes the hierarchical power relations between ‘uppers’ and ‘lowers’, using the 
North–South analogy, whereby powerful ‘uppers’ control and determine the activities of 
powerless ‘lowers’. This distinction has particular relevance for deepening our understanding 
of state–society interactions at the local level, where power is institutionally centred and 
frequently used by authorities as a coercive measure. In that connection, Cooke and Kothari 
(2001:8) speak of ‘participatory decisions that reinforce the interest of the already powerful’.  
 
Notions of power in participatory discourse are frequently dichotomised into state–society 
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categorisations. In that regard, Lefebvre (1991) describes l’espace étatique as the space 
which is used by the state as a ‘political instrument’ or strategy of control:  
 
the space thus produced also serves as a tool of thought and of action … in addition to 
being a means of production is a means of control, and hence of domination, of power.  
Forces act within space as a result of actions of the state and within spaces the violence 
of power is answered by the violence of subversion and these seething forces … can 
never be totally quieted. Though defeated, they live on, and from time to time begin 
fighting ferociously to reassert themselves and transform themselves through struggle 
(Lefebvre, 1991:24).  
 
Brenner and Elden (2009:358), drawing on the work of Lefebvre, link space with territory 
and highlight the critical role of the state in the transformation of existing inherited political 
economic landscapes into new spaces: 
 
As the product, the child, of a space, the so-called national territory, the State turns 
back toward its own historical conditions and antecedents, and transforms them. 
Subsequently, the State engenders social relations in space; it reaches still further as it 
unfurls; it produces a support, its own space, which is itself complex.  
 
The resulting space for Lefebvre (1991) is ‘abstract space’, or homogeneous space, which he 
refers to as ‘politically instrumental’ space which is designed to be used as an instrument of 
repression for the purpose of sustaining the centralised power of the state. 
 
Foucault’s (1984) theorisation of relational power and its inextricable link to knowledge 
sheds additional light on our understanding of power dynamics within participatory spaces. 
Foucault, contrary to Marxist dogma, is of the view that power is not concentrated in the 
hands of any one group, but exists in all social relations. He asserts that: 
 
power is relations; power is not a thing … power is not an institution, and not a 
structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one 
attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society (Foucault, 1984:93). 
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5.6  Levels of participation 
 
Moving the practice of participation from a position of ‘tyranny’ to one of transformation and 
empowerment and a shift in focus from participation as a means, to participation as an end 
requires interrogation of the different levels of intensity and dimensions of participation. The 
work of scholars such as Arnstein (1969), Pretty (1995), White (1996) and the International 
Association for Public Participation (2007) have added to our understanding of the role of 
power and intensity levels of participation. 
 
Arnstein (1969) developed a typology of eight levels of participation, based on the type of 
participation, the level of participation and the extent of citizen control and power that each 
level confers on citizens. These different levels represent as a ‘ladder of participation’, 
ranging from non-participation at the bottom, to tokenism, and ultimately to citizen power at 
the top. The bottom two rungs of the ladder, comprising manipulation and therapy 
respectively, constitute non-participation and are the weakest forms of citizen engagement. 
The third, fourth and fifth rungs, representing informing, consultation and placation, are 
categorised as tokenistic. For Hilyard (2001:59), this category reflects ‘top-down planning’ as 
the involvement of local people merely ‘lend(s) credibility to decisions that have already 
been made’. Only rungs six, seven and eight, which involve partnership, delegated power and 
control, represent true participation whereby citizens have the power to negotiate and 
participate fully in the decision-making process. Arnstein (1995) used this typology to 
analyse the role of power and powerlessness in participatory systems. This included what she 
termed ‘road blocks’ facing participatory practices. On the part of the ‘power holders’ the 
‘road blocks’ include ‘racism, paternalism, and resistance to power redistribution’, while on 
the side of the powerless they include such inadequacies as a limited ‘socioeconomic 
infrastructure and knowledge-base, plus difficulties of organizing a representative and 
accountable citizens' group in the face of futility, alienation, and distrust’ (ibid:218). 
 
Pretty’s (1995:1252) classification also includes different levels of intensity ranging from the 
lowest to the highest levels of participation. Aligning Pretty’s (1995) classification to 
Arnstein’s (1969) typology of participation reveals similar trends. The first two levels – 
manipulation and passive participation – represent non-participation and are merely used as 
‘pretence’ as participants have no power over any decision making in any form. The third, 
fourth and fifth levels – consultation, participation for material benefits and functional 
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participation – fall into the category of tokenism as citizens are dependent on external 
initiators and participate to fulfill predetermined project objectives. Pretty’s (1995) final two 
levels – interactive participation and self-mobilisation – are the highest intensity levels of 
participation and represent citizen power where local people are involved in the joint analysis 
of problems, act independently to solve problems and take initiatives independently of 
outsiders. 
 
White’s (1996), typology of different forms, functions and interests of participation is 
illustrated in Table 5.1. Column one depicts the forms of participation which are arranged 
hierarchically moving from nominal participation, which confers the least amount of power 
on participants, as power is centred in the hands of the instigatory agent, to the transformative 
level, which confers the highest intensity of power on beneficiaries. White further 
distinguishes between the objectives of the implementing agency and the impact on 
participant beneficiaries respectively in columns two and three (ibid). 
 
Table 5.1: Form, function and interests in participation (Source: White, 1996:7) 
Form Top-Down Bottom-Up Function 
Nominal Legitimisation Inclusion Display 
Instrumental Efficiency Cost Means 
Representative Sustainability Leverage Voice 
Transformative Empowerment Empowerment Means/End 
 
This is an important distinction as it differentiates between the outcomes desired by the 
initiator of a particular project as the product on the one hand, and the outcomes conferred on 
the actors as a process of transformation and empowerment on the other. The fourth column 
sets out the function of participation. While the aims of nominal and instrumental 
participation are largely for display to legitimise actions and to achieve cost effectiveness of 
projects respectively, representative participation is far more meaningful in terms of enabling 
citizens with a ‘voice’ to influence their own development outcomes. The most sought after 
and highest level is transformative participation which occurs where citizens are equal 
partners in decision-making processes and are empowered through meaningful collaborative 
deliberations. 
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Finally, the International Association for Public Participation (IAP2) (2007) devised a 
framework of increasing levels of intensity ranging from informing, consulting, involving 
and collaborating to empowering. Within this structure, informing, consulting and involving 
represent little more than a cosmetic facade of participatory development and the actors stand 
to gain very little in terms of claiming power to affect any decision making. Collaborating 
and empowering on the other hand, signifies a far more equal participatory partnership where 
agents have more control of the process and play a far more proactive role in setting priorities 
and influencing the decision-making process. 
  
The above analysis of the different models of participation advanced by Arnstein (1969), 
Pretty (1995), White (19960 and IAP2 (2007) enables categorisation of the intensity levels of 
participation according to participation as a means and participation as an end. This 
categorisation is depicted in Table 5.2 below. 
 
Table 5.2:   Levels of participation as a means or an end (Source: Author, 2011) 
 Arnstein (1969) Pretty (1995) White (1996) IAP2 (2007) 
Participation 
as a Means 
Manipulation 
Therapy 
Informing 
Consultation 
Placation 
 
Manipulative participation 
Passive participation 
Participation by   
    consultation 
Participation for material  
    incentives 
Functional participation 
Nominal 
Instrumental 
 
Inform 
Consult 
Involve 
 
Participation 
as an End 
Partnership 
Delegated power 
Citizen control 
Interactive participation 
Self-mobilisation 
Representative 
Transformative 
Collaborate 
Empower 
 
For all typologies, the vast majority of intensity levels fall within the category of participation 
as a means, which infers that participation is used to involve local people in decision making 
for the purpose of credibility or as a palliative measure due to legislative requirements or to 
satisfy donors. A far smaller percentage of intensity levels falls in the category of 
participation as an end, which requires active participation, partnership, citizen control and 
empowerment and which results in transformation. This is in line with research findings 
which reveal that in the majority of cases participatory practices are used as technical 
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solutions, or for the purpose of legitimacy as a ‘pretence’ mechanism to comply with 
organisational requirements. The above framework may be used as an analytical device to 
reflect on the different mechanisms of participation in operation and to consider how they 
might be redesigned to enable transformation and empowerment. 
 
5.7 From subject to citizen: An explanatory framework 
 
In the light of the above, an explanatory framework has been devised that enables 
consideration of currently accepted methodologies and practices and an analysis of the 
intersection between forms of citizen engagement and contestations of power that pervade 
participatory spaces and restrict popular agency. In addition, it facilitates an analysis of how 
current institutionalised practices and participatory governance spaces need to be reshaped to 
enable empowered participation and synergistic state-society relations.  
 
 
Figure 5.1:  From subject to citizen (Source: Author, 2011) 
 
Figure 5.1 portrays the different levels of participation on a continuum, moving from 
manipulation, as the least empowering participatory form of engagement to self-mobilisation 
and empowerment as the most sought after form of interaction. These levels can then be 
separated into sub-categories according to non-participation, tokenism and citizen power, 
using Arnstein’s (1969) classification system. Within each sub-category, the different types 
of spaces reflect how they are created and the opportunities that such space offers participants 
in terms of influencing decisions and controlling the development process. Closely linked to 
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the nature of these participatory spaces is the interplay of power dynamic within each space. 
 
The first sub-category depicts non-participation which, due to the closed nature of the 
participatory space, reduces the actor to the position of ‘subject’ of participation. In this 
context, the mechanisms of manipulation, placation and the restriction of information exclude 
beneficiaries from participating in the process and deny them their rights as citizens. Power is 
in the hands of the powerful and is used to control, subvert and exclude the powerless from 
any form of participation or impact on the development process. 
 
The second sub-category represents tokenism. The site of participation has evolved to one of 
‘invited’ space where participatory mechanisms include consultation, involvement and 
information sharing as a top-down method to legitimate decisions. Such tokenism constitutes 
mere ‘window dressing’, co-option and ‘pretence’ of inclusion of the marginalised. 
Participation at this level represents ‘depoliticised’ development with no emphasis on 
fostering political learning, restructuring political networks or consideration of structural 
inequalities. Nominal power is transferred to local actors and limited opportunity is conferred 
on beneficiaries to exercise agency and influence the trajectory of the development process. 
While this is considered a higher level of intensity than non-participation, it amounts to little 
more than a cosmetic smokescreen to gain approval of pre-designed plans from passive 
beneficiaries, with the production of power remaining firmly in the hands of the 
implementing agency. 
 
In the final stage, which comprises self-mobilisation, transformation and empowerment, 
power is transferred to participants and this enables them to participate meaningfully as equal 
partners and to influence decisions that will impact on policy. These have become ‘inclusive’ 
spaces where citizens have claimed their rightful place in the participatory process and have 
the power, political knowledge and capability to define their collective priorities and 
influence development choices. The beneficiary, as powerless and passive subject of 
development, has achieved the status of empowered citizen which opens up new possibilities 
for transformational change. Following the model, it is only at this level that participation can 
achieve its stated purpose of transformation and emancipation aspired to by scholars such as 
Freire (1970), Rahman (1993) and Fals Borda (2001) more than four decades ago. 
 
For the purpose of this research and deriving insights from foregoing theoretical discussions, 
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it is accepted that participation ought to give substance to the ideal of participatory 
democracy. Such democracy is only achieved through collective engagement, meaningful 
deliberation and shared decision-making. Within this context, and informed by international 
experience, meaningful participation should therefore be situated within a radical 
understanding of development where participation is understood as an intensely dynamic 
political process comprising the exercise of power and control. In this understanding, 
participation should be a politically transformatory process as it is only through radical 
empowerment that the notion of citizenship is realised and structures of inequality and 
institutions of subordination can be challenged and transformed. Within such a framework 
participation is viewed as a democratic process, an instrument of socio-political change and a 
mechanism for attaining human rights and social justice. 
 
5.8 Public participation in South Africa 
 
The apartheid system of planning ‘for’ rather than ‘with’ the people and the location of 
decision-making in the hands of the white minority, completely excluded politically 
marginalised groups from any form of participatory decision-making. The authoritarian 
apartheid regime nurtured an elitist approach to development initiatives and decisions 
remained the exclusive domain of government officials and planning consultants (Penderis, 
1996; Sowman, 1994). Communities, in this context, were reduced to submissive recipients 
of development programs, rather than active participants and initiators of projects (Mathekga 
& Buccus, 2007). Williams (2006:200) concurs with these observations, remarking that prior 
to the democratic transition, government in South Africa ‘was highly centralised, deeply 
authoritarian and secretive, which ensured that fundamental public services were not 
accessible to black people’. This lack of opportunity for the majority of South Africans to 
participate and contribute to decision-making and policy implementation continues to impact 
on development in South Africa today. 
 
Despite South Africa’s democratic transition and a legal framework which has 
institutionalised participatory democracy, public involvement in development initiatives 
remains an objective largely unfulfilled. Certain scholars highlight the lack of connectivity 
and tensions between government’s commitment to public participation and its neoliberal 
capitalist growth agenda which thwarts transformation and bottom-up grassroots 
development (Biyela & Xaba, 2009; Binns & Nel, 2002).  Others, such as Von Lieres 
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(2007:70), maintain that ‘formal electoral democracy means little in practice’ and most 
opportunities for participation are limited to elections. She highlights the failure of the state 
to ‘facilitate new institutional spaces for poor citizens’. Tapscott (2007:84) agrees with these 
interpretations, informing us that: 
 
Despite the best intentions of legislators and policy makers … it is evident that the 
majority of municipalities have thus far failed to give effect to the principles of Batho 
Pele and participatory democracy. Indeed public frustration with what is perceived to 
be meaningless exercises in participation through ward committees, public meetings … 
and the like is steadily growing. 
 
Williams (2006:197) in turn asserts that participation has been reduced to ‘spectator politics’ 
with communities merely rubber stamping pre-designed planning programmes. In such 
contexts, Sisk (2001) argues, citizens will withdraw from participatory processes when they 
perceive themselves to be the objects of administrative manipulation. He notes that: 
 
Participatory approaches will founder if people believe that they are being used to 
legitimize decisions that have already been taken or that the results of their efforts will 
not matter in the long run. Citizens and civic groups will quickly recognize when a 
process is a mask for a top-down decision-implementation and when the views of 
participants are genuinely sought (2001:163). 
 
It is against this backdrop that the theory and praxis of participatory governance in South 
Africa is examined in order to assess the reasons for the state’s inability to recognise 
community voice and democratise development. The ensuing discussions will provide a 
platform for empirical investigation. 
 
5.8.1 Government’s commitment to public participation and participatory governance 
 
Since the establishment of a democratic state in 1994, and as a consequence of the country’s 
extensive history of political oppression, it is unsurprising that the in-coming government 
should align itself to the notion of people-centred development. Citizen involvement in 
political processes is integral to this process and participation is seen to be synonymous with 
democratic practices, accountable governance and the actualising of human rights through 
 
 
 
 
 128 
popular agency (PSC, 2008). This commitment to participatory democracy is not only 
enshrined in the South African Constitution but is also evident in a host of supporting 
legislation and policy documents. 
 
An examination of official government statements reveals that there is an increasing 
awareness in post-apartheid government and policy circles that the active involvement of 
citizens is fundamental to achieving the nation’s developmental state vision (The Presidency, 
2009, 2010, 2011, 2012; ANC, 2007b). It is broadly acknowledged that public participation 
not only ensures responsiveness and legitimacy of the state but is a mechanism to give effect 
to South Africa’s developmental state mandate at the local level to transform society and 
alleviate poverty through the initiation of socio-economic development projects and 
improved service delivery (Davids, 2005). 
 
Numerous sources highlight the government’s recognition of the importance of public 
engagement in local governance in line with global and regional views on the value of 
participation. Stanley Sangweni, former Chairperson of the Public Service Commission 
(PSC, 2008), draws attention to government’s commitment to the ideal of public participation 
by acknowledging that ‘public participation plays a critical role in deepening democracy and 
promoting good governance’. He affirms further that the involvement of citizens in matters of 
governance ‘ensures that their experiential and grounded perspectives inform government on 
their needs and how these needs can best be addressed’ (ibid:ii). However, Mafumadi 
(DPLG, 2004) cautions that although societal participation in local governance matters has 
been legislated, the actualisation of development will only be determined through the creation 
of meaningful participatory structures. 
 
The Draft National Policy for Public Participation (RSA, 2005a) outlines government's 
commitment to participation and sets out the basic assumptions underlying this concept in 
South Africa. The policy stipulates that participation must be ‘genuinely empowering’ and 
not reduced to tokenism and manipulation. Besides being a legislative requirement, the 
motivation underlying the fostering of public participation in South Africa includes the 
promotion of good governance and the recognition of the potential of participation to 
improve development outcomes and empower local people (Moodley, 2007). Public 
participation is thus seen as the conduit through which information about public needs is 
conveyed to policy makers at the local level, thereby promoting not only responsiveness and 
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accountability but also the facilitation of policy implementation and community 
empowerment (Masango, 2002). 
 
5.8.2 Legislative and policy framework for public participation in Local Government 
 
In order to promote democratic governance and equitable development, the post-1994 
government introduced a range of participatory structures, mechanisms and legislative 
mandates at all government levels. The most significant legislation and policy documents 
include the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, which embeds citizen participation 
in development planning and decision making as a fundamental human right, the White Paper 
on Local Government, the Municipal Structures Act and the Municipal Systems Act. While 
there is less reference to public participation at the national and provincial level, there are 
substantial legislative requirements at the local level to include citizens in decision-making 
processes. 
 
The Bill of Rights, contained in Chapter 2 of the Constitution (RSA, 1996), provides for a 
legislative framework imbedded within a culture of human rights which, besides political 
rights, includes socio-economic rights and requires the state to promote the exercise and 
realisation of such rights. In this regard, De Villiers (2001:36) notes that ‘any legislation 
aimed at advancing the rights of citizens contributes, directly or indirectly, to their 
empowerment as participating members of society … Thus, the promotion of public 
participation must be viewed within the much broader context of the transformation of the 
entire society’. 
 
Chapter 5 of the Constitution sets out the legislative requirements for public participation and 
Section 152 (1e) obliges local government ‘to encourage the involvement of communities and 
community organisations in the matters of local government’. This provision requires local 
authorities to create opportunities for communities to participate in local governance decision 
making. Furthermore, Section 195 (1e) stipulates that ‘people’s needs must be responded to, 
and the public must be encouraged to participate in policy making’.  At the provincial level, 
Section 118 (a) and (2) of the Constitution states that a provincial legislature must facilitate 
public involvement and that a provincial legislature may not exclude the public from a sitting 
of a committee unless it is justifiable to do so (RSA, 1996). Implied in these clauses is the 
fact that, beyond electoral participation, the right of citizens to participate in policy making 
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processes is constitutionally enshrined. 
 
The 1998 White Paper on Local Government (RSA, 1998b) outlines the pivotal role of 
municipalities in democratising society and fostering participation at the local level. Section 
1.3 of the White Paper specifies that municipalities must ‘seek to promote the participation of 
marginalised and excluded groups in community processes’ and ‘must adopt inclusive 
approaches to fostering community participation, including strategies aimed at removing 
obstacles to, and actively encouraging, the participation of marginalised groups in the local 
community’. Section 3.3 further proposes that municipalities ‘should develop mechanisms to 
ensure citizen participation in policy initiation and formulation, and the monitoring and 
evaluation of decision-making and implementation’. The mechanisms referred to in Section 
3.3 include the setting up of participatory platforms to enable stakeholder involvement in 
matters of local government. 
 
The Municipal Structures Act of 1998 and the Municipal Systems Act of 2000 impose legal 
obligations on municipalities to institutionalise participatory governance at the local level.  
Thus, Chapter 4, Section 44 (g) of the Local Government Municipal Structures Act stipulates 
that municipalities must provide an annual account of the ‘involvement of community 
organisations in the affairs of the municipality’, Section 44 (h), in turn, requires local 
government to give ‘due regard to public views and report on the effect of consultation on the 
decisions of the council’ (RSA, 1998a).  Part 4 of Chapter 4 of the Municipal Structures Act 
of 1998 outlines the requirements for the establishment of ward committees in Category A 
and Category B municipalities. The ward system committee is the vehicle used in 
metropolitan and local municipalities to involve community members in planning and 
decision making processes and thereby to entrench participatory democracy and to ensure 
accountable local government. The ward committee system will be discussed more fully in 
subsequent chapters. 
 
Section 16 (1) of the Municipal Systems Act of 2000 mandates a municipality to ‘develop a 
culture of municipal governance that complements formal representative government with a 
system of participatory governance, and must for this purpose encourage, and create 
conditions for, the local community to participate in the affairs of the municipality’ (RSA, 
2000). This directive refers to local government’s obligation to encourage community 
participation in such areas as performance management, budget preparation, strategic 
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decision making in the provision of municipal services and, particularly, in the preparation 
and implementation of Integrated Development Plans. Municipalities are further required to 
contribute to building the capacity of local communities to enable them to participate 
meaningfully in the affairs of the municipality. It also requires them to build the capacity of 
councillors and staff in order for them to be able to foster community participation. 
 
However, despite a wide range of statutes institutionalising participation and seemingly good 
intentions of government, overwhelming evidence in the literature indicates that the 
participatory processes in South Africa in reality amounts to little more than a façade of co-
optation and manipulation of people to obtain approval of pre-planned official decisions. 
These institutionalised ‘invited’ participatory spaces, created through government channels, 
offer inadequate opportunity for the exercise of agency from below and the inclusion of the 
voice of the majority of citizens (Sinwell, 2010; Williams, 2006, 2009; Tapscott, 2008). The 
mounting upsurge of protests throughout the country is an expression of the inadequacy and 
ineffectiveness of institutionalised participatory spaces and indicative of the lack of 
meaningful dialogue and participation of local people in government decision making 
(Coetzer & Terblanche, 2013). 
 
5.8.3 The impact of economic liberalisation on participatory governance 
While the ANC government has attempted to anchor its transition to democracy in 
participatory processes, a number of authors have questioned the compatibility of 
consultative participatory governance with the state’s commitment to orthodox economic 
liberalisation policy. Significantly, as far back as 2003, even the then president, Thabo 
Mbeki, acknowledged the inappropriateness of following a rigorous neoliberal strategy by 
stating that in order to transform the country and improve the quality of life of its citizens, 
South Africa could not allow itself to be held prisoner to ‘neo-liberal market ideology’ as this 
would ‘abandon the masses of our people to permanent poverty and underdevelopment’ 
(Bond, 2006:4). 
However, despite this rhetorical rejection of economic liberalisation, South Africa has 
continued to strongly support neoliberal ideology, which Mohamed (2010:156) attributes to 
the government’s desire to ‘maintain good credit ratings and to attract foreign investment’. 
Heller’s (2001:34) view of South Africa’s neoliberal support has important implications for 
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its developmental and redistributive efforts and he links the state’s inability to bring about 
transformation directly to its submission ‘to a neoliberal strategy of economic development 
and its attendant managerial vision of local government’.  Similarly, for Carmody (2002), the 
state’s neoliberal pursuit is incompatible with its promotion of social democracy and its 
developmental state strategy due to its dependence on international investors and global 
markets, as opposed to its national market and domestic social forces. 
Expanding on this position, Edigheji provides an insightful discussion of the contradictory 
dynamics of the South African government’s commitment to participatory governance and its 
support of neoliberalism and New Public Management (NPM) reforms. Firstly, Edigheji 
(2004) argues that, while the rationale behind the promotion of participatory governance is to 
lessen social exclusion and income inequalities along racial lines, its economic liberalisation 
policy is reducing and minimalising the social welfare role of the state and it is becoming 
more attentive to meeting the exigencies of the private sector. The outcome of the 
implementation of a neoliberal economic policy is inequitable growth favouring the 
privileged elite, the entrenchment of marginalisation and the undermining of ‘the state's 
capacity to realize its developmental objectives’ (ibid:4). Edigheji’s (2004:13) second 
contention is that the adoption of New Public Management (NPM) reforms promoting 
managerial efficiency has minimalised the role of the state and has transformed citizens into 
‘passive economic entities’ whose ability to pay determines their access to services, and this 
impacts adversely on government’s commitment to democratic governance and the building 
of a democratic developmental state (ibid). 
 
Extending this line of thought, scholars such as Lemke (2001) caution that an embracement 
of neoliberal governmentality represents a withdrawal of the responsibility of the state and ‘a 
new way of articulating its power’.  Lemke proposes that: 
 
The neo-liberal forms of government feature not only direct intervention by means of 
empowered and specialized state apparatuses, but also characteristically develop 
indirect techniques for leading and controlling individuals without at the same time 
being responsible for them. The strategy of rendering individual subjects ‘responsible’ 
… entails shifting the responsibility for social risks such as illness, unemployment, 
poverty, etc. and for life in society into the domain for which the individual is 
responsible and transforming it into a problem of ‘self-care’ (Lemke, 2001:201). 
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Similarly, Larner (2000) views neoliberalism as a policy framework and political agenda 
favouring the operation of markets, economic efficiency and  international competitiveness 
and governing citizens ‘from a distance’ rather than formulating policies to ensure full 
employment and an inclusive social welfare system. As social and spatial polarisation is a 
serious consequence of neoliberal reform, Larner (2000) recommends a policy shift from a 
minimalist non-interventionist state and calls for ‘the reintroduction of forms of state control 
that will attenuate the power of the market and prioritise the re-establishment of national 
control’ and ‘a return to the more protectionist stance associated with Keynesian welfarism’ 
(ibid:8). 
 
Khosa (2003:49), like Edigheji (2005), reflects on the government’s neoliberal economic 
policy and the accompanying adherence to NPM doctrine which is in conflict with South 
Africa’s developmental state objectives and impacts on society as follows: 
 
Government’s efforts have largely been devoted to streamlining management systems, 
cutting costs, and emphasizing administrative performance rather than mobilising 
participation, training ordinary citizens, and engaging in sustained consultative 
initiatives. Not only has the language of managerialism and cost-recovery displaced the 
language of participation and social justice; the ruling party is also arguably 
disengaged from vital organs of civil society. Second, due to its commitment to 
technocratic creep, the government has increasingly come to rely on private sector 
consultants. The ANC’s technocratic concern with getting institutions right has all but 
obviated efforts to build local democracy and mobilise participation. 
 
Lemke (2001), Larner (2000) and Khosa’s (2003) analyses enable one to understand more 
fully the repercussions of following a neoliberal policy agenda in South Africa and its 
adverse implications for the construction of a developmental state that is participatory and 
inclusive. For these authors, the overall outcome of economic liberalisation in South Africa 
and its support of NPM is a relegation of the role of citizens to ‘users’ of services and a 
shifting of responsibility of governance onto the general public, encouraging self-governance, 
rather than a more protectionist state-centred approach which focuses on diminishing social 
inequality and the economic redistribution of development. 
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5.8.4 Current public participation approaches 
 
Since the inauguration of the new democratic government in 1994, the approach to public 
participation in South Africa has evolved from the delivery of projects to a passive citizenry 
during the apartheid era to a ‘new democratic order’ which acknowledges the right of citizens 
to participate in creating their own future though the exercise of popular agency and voice 
(PSC, 2008). While the range of legislative requirements leaves ‘little doubt that a strong 
commitment to participatory governance exists’ (Marais, Everatt & Dube, 2007:10), Davids 
(2005) emphasises that this changing context raises a number of important questions that beg 
investigation. Such questions include an understanding of who is participating, what is the 
purpose of this participation for the different role players, what is the nature and depth of 
participation of the different stakeholders and what are the different types of participatory 
spaces that enable participation? Other questions that emerge include what are the power 
dynamics that are taking place within institutionalised and legislated participatory spaces and 
why are spaces such as ward committees and integrated development planning currently 
deemed dysfunctional and inadequate in nurturing citizenship and what alternatives might be 
devised to improve local governance and enhance participatory democracy? 
 
Heller (2001:138–139) stresses that in order to enable meaningful participation in South 
Africa, the preconditions for successful decentralisation of responsibilities to the local level 
must include a strong central state with the capacity to coordinate between the different levels 
of government. In order to ensure transparency, accountability and representivity, he advises 
‘more, not less regulation’ is required in order to avoid Mamdani’s label of ‘decentralised 
despotism’ and in order to enable inclusive participatory spaces which will lead to democratic 
deepening. Heller (2001:140) further maintains that democratic deepening and redistribution 
of power will only occur if decentralisation results in broadening the depth of participation 
through the inclusion of previously disadvantaged communities and in expanding the scope 
of participation in terms of bringing a wider range of socio-economic issues into the public 
domain and redistributing decision-making power to ordinary citizens. 
 
5.8.5 Spaces of participation 
 
In giving effect to the ideal of participatory democracy, different forms of participatory space 
have emerged in South Africa since the new democratic dispensation. Besides 
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institutionalised public space set up to enable local governments to include the voice of the 
marginalised, informal spaces are increasingly opening up as expressions of dissatisfaction. 
These also serve to challenge the inefficiency of institutionalised participatory platforms and 
the failure of the local state to respond to the voice of communities and to fulfil pledges of 
transformation (Miraftab, 2004; De Visser, 2009; Atkinson 2007). 
 
5.8.5.1 Institutionalised participatory spaces 
 
Official formal spaces are instituted by the state to facilitate the participation of citizens in 
decision making processes and to enable their inputs to influence policy outcomes. However, 
the nature of such participation is, to a large extent, determined by the structure of these 
participatory spaces, the methods of engagement used by officials and their capacity to enable 
meaningful participation. In that respect, Thompson (2008:97) rejects the accepted view that 
formal spaces ‘are characterised by rationalist, deliberative processes’ that enable meaningful 
participation of marginalised communities, as the public participation process is dependent on 
the dynamics of engagement. Following Cornwall and Coelho (2006), Thompson (2008) 
explains that, within the South African context, such formally instituted government spaces 
can be transformed into ‘sites of challenge’ or ‘conquered spaces’ by excluded communities, 
which is a reflection of the political contestation that increasingly characterises engagement 
in these formalised spaces instituted by the state.  Thompson (2008) raises important issues 
relating to the usefulness and legitimacy of ‘invited’ spaces and notes that the extent of 
participation in institutionalised spaces varies, depending on which groups participate, the 
nature of such participation and the reason behind their invitation to participate. Reflecting on 
research conducted in the Western Cape, she highlights the limited influence of 
disadvantaged communities on decision making, the use of participatory spaces as vehicles 
for legitimising actions of the state, the inability of officials to reach a compromise or provide 
alternative solutions and unequal representivity of invited interest groups (ibid). 
 
Research and policy discussion forums conducted by the Centre for Public Participation 
(CPP) and their research partner, the South African National NGO Coalition (SANGOCO), 
disclose that power relationships impact significantly on meaningful participation. Research 
conducted by Hicks (2006:3), for example, revealed that institutionalised participatory 
opportunities: 
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were typified by unequal power relationships between politicians and bureaucrats, 
government and civil society representatives, those with access to information and 
resources and those without, those belonging to organized structures and those not, 
those who are viewed as educated and those not, urban and rural residents, men and 
women, and people with different abilities ... these unequal power relationships play 
themselves out in the policy arena, resulting in some issues not making it onto the 
agenda, the exclusion of some stakeholders, the rendering invisible of others, and the 
exclusion of many from that critical juncture where decisions are made. 
 
Hicks (ibid:3) further notes that despite enabling legislation and the setting up of 
institutionalised participatory mechanisms, these are failing to enable meaningful 
participation and research has demonstrated that participatory mechanisms are ‘inadequate, 
inaccessible and disempowering, and (that) new approaches to community participation in 
planning and policy-making are required’. Steyn (undated) confirms Hick’s sentiments and 
underlines that the mere act of institutionalising formal spaces for public participation will 
not automatically translate into meaningful participation that is inclusive and transformative 
as this will depend on how these spaces are created, who is invited to participate in them, the 
nature of that participation and the type of power relations that animate such spaces. 
 
5.8.5.2 Popular invented participatory spaces 
 
A wealth of scholarship provides insight into the problems relating to invited spaces and top-
down methods used by municipal officials to facilitate dialogue and public input at the local 
level. According to Van Donk, dissatisfaction with the current ‘technicist and state-centric 
approaches to public participation’ and the simultaneous subversion of democratic 
participation has resulted in the emergence of alternative ‘invented’ arenas of participation as 
alternative avenues to express community voice (Van Donk, 2011:7). 
 
The reasons for the recurrence of ‘invented’ spaces of protest are multilayered. Ramjee and 
Donk (2011) ascribe the escalation of popular spaces to the unresponsiveness of the state to 
address the needs of particularly the poor and marginalised and its failure to provide reasons 
for its inability to address such needs. They further maintain that current official structures 
are inadequate in terms of enabling the expression of dissent and merely function to maintain 
the existing status quo. In these circumstances, ‘inventing new spaces to express their 
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dissatisfaction may be the only effective recourse that communities have to capture the 
attention of government’ (ibid:14). Williams (2008:33) refers to such spaces as ‘counter 
spaces’ or participatory spaces of resistance, which are claimed, restructured and transformed 
by citizens as an institutional challenge to formally constituted spaces of engagement and as a 
modality to overcome exclusion from meaningful decision making. Narsiah (2011:92) 
accuses the state of being ‘patronising and paternalistic’ due to its increasingly techno-
bureaucratic approach, noting that ‘what is patently clear is that democratic modes of 
accountability have quickly been subsumed by market governmentality’. He comments 
further that citizens are prevented from playing an active and empowered participatory role in 
governance and that the delivery of services is ‘controlled and managed by unelected, 
unresponsive and unaccountable bureaucrats, technocrats and administrators’ and that it is 
‘hardly unsurprising therefore that service delivery is very much a moribund backwater in 
South Africa’ (ibid:93). 
 
In terms of the interplay of power dynamics in participatory spaces, we are reminded by 
Cornwall (2002a) that invited spaces are never neutral and it is thus essential to ‘make sense 
of power relations that permeate and produce these and other spaces’ and to take into account 
that the boundaries between formalised and informal spaces fluctuate over time. Cornwall 
(2002a:20–21) clarifies further that the ‘boundaries between “invited” and “popular” spaces 
are mutable, rather than fixed; “popular spaces” can become institutionalised, with statutory 
backing, and “invited spaces” may become sites for the articulation of dissent, as well as for 
collaboration and compromise’. She highlights the potential for power struggles and 
marginalisation, which is particularly relevant to the South African context, as follows: 
 
Even though such spaces can provide the terrain at the margins from which 
marginalised people can organise … they can also work to deepen the exclusion of 
minorities, by representing the voice of the majority or occupying space by asserting 
the right to speak about and for ‘the people’. 
 
This situation is certainly prevalent in South Africa where local elites wrestle for power over 
popular participatory spaces and these power struggles are frequently politically motivated. In 
this regard, research conducted by Mathoho (2011:42) reveals that poor service delivery is 
clearly the main motivation of protestors and the thrust behind the emergence of ‘invented’ 
popular spaces, although he concedes that some protests are politically driven. Mathoho 
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(2011:42) also draws attention to another matter of concern, namely that many municipalities 
claim that certain service delivery functions are not the responsibility of the local sphere of 
government and that poor intergovernmental co-ordination between the different spheres of 
government can often be blamed for service delivery failures. However, he asserts that 
‘communities waiting for service delivery do not care which sphere of government delivers 
what. All that they are concerned about is seeing services delivered effectively in their areas’ 
(ibid). In similar vein, Tapscott (2008:9) maintains that the intensification of popular protests 
since 2009 is an attempt by communities to gain the attention of authorities. These protests, 
he states, have focused increasing attention on the inadequacy of institutionalised formal 
spaces and reflect disillusionment with the poor performance of local government and the 
‘rhetoric of participation and empowerment unaccompanied by any material gain’. 
 
5.8.6 Current participatory realities 
 
In terms of both legislation and policy all development interventions in South Africa are 
supported to entail some form of citizen participation. The notion of a participatory public 
has been advocated in government circles as a means to improve service delivery and to 
deepen democracy. However, a number of sources have noted that the operationalisation of 
public participation is fraught with difficulties (Robino, 2009; Noble, 2003; Moodley, 2006; 
Esau, 2007; Williams, 2007a, 2007b, 2008). Beyond those scholars who question the intrinsic 
value of participatory initiatives, there is a considerable empirically based literature on the 
problems which appear to hinder effective participation in planning initiatives. 
 
The lack of meaningful participation in South Africa is increasingly ascribed to the political 
system of proportional representation, to unequal power relations and to control over the 
formal participatory spaces by bureaucratic elites. The system of proportional representation, 
rather than a constituency-based system, impacts on the representivity of citizens in South 
Africa. Buccus and Hicks (2009:156) report that the proportional representation system: 
 
undermines the notion of citizen representation, with representatives allocated to 
constituency areas, which they must then service. This system is not sufficient to ensure 
that citizens’ needs and interests are incorporated in policy-making, with many arguing 
that elected representatives owe greater allegiance to the political parties who include 
them in party lists than to the electorate, who can only vote for parties and not 
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individuals. 
 
Likewise, for Williams (2006:98), the party-based system, rather than a constituency-based 
system, presents its own set of problems ‘as the consent for governance is not earned through 
rigorous policy debate of the merits and demerits of particular social programmes, but 
political acquiescence is manufactured through the skilful manipulation of think-tanks, self-
styled experts, opinion polls and media pundits’. Williams emphasises that this ‘limited form 
of democracy gives rise to an administered society rather than a democratic society’ (ibid). 
 
Other sources draw attention to the current use of ‘invited’ participatory spaces as political 
platforms from which to wield power and gain support for political party interests. A research 
report compiled by the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs 
(COGTA, 2009) to evaluate the state of local government attributes the lack of true 
participation at local government level to insufficient separation of powers between political 
parties and municipal councils, problems with the political administrative interface and 
interference by political parties. Similarly, Skenjana and Kimemia (2011:58) are of the view 
that political affiliation and the concomitant desires of political parties to assert their 
dominance thwart development efforts as ‘political affiliation and the desire to maintain 
control over ward committees take precedence over concerns of fair representation and the 
pursuit of the set developmental objectives’. They further maintain that party politics has 
resulted in excluding ‘sizable segments of the population from the invited spaces’ (ibid). 
 
The inability of authorities to entrench meaningful participatory practices and deepen 
democracy has been highlighted by a number of writers. Mathekga and Buccus (2007) assert 
that the new local government institutions, created with genuine intentions to bring about 
democracy and improve service delivery, have not lived up to expectations. In a similar vein, 
Osmani (2008:1) states that ‘examples of genuinely effective participation by all the relevant 
stakeholders, especially by the marginalised … are still more of an exception than the rule’. 
For Friedman (2006), formal participatory mechanisms are not enhancing participatory 
governance nor enabling the poor to influence government decisions as they are biased 
towards groups that have the capacity to organise.  Others, such as Narsiah (2011) and Fakir 
and Moloi (2011) emphasise the lack of leadership and political will of local officials and 
commitment to participatory governance as problematic areas that require attention, whereas 
scholars such as Hollands (2011) draw attention to the need to build the capacity of both local 
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government officials and community members to enable meaningful participation. While 
Cooke and Kothari (2001), in their discussion of the theory and practice of participation, even 
refer to participation as the ‘new tyranny’, others, such as Stiefel and Wolfe (1995), query the 
value of the participation slogan and ask whether its practice is ‘Utopia or necessity?’ 
 
Mantzaris and Ngcobo (2008:24–27) elaborate on the dangers of the participation process in 
South Africa. Together with scholars such as Williams (2006) and Friedman (2006), they 
warn of increasing ‘top-down’ approaches of municipalities and the use of communities as 
‘rubber stamps’ for decisions ‘already made’. They assert further that ‘such a process will 
constitute a decisive closing-down of a democratic “space” that could lead to an erosion of 
deep civil engagement’. Their empirical research, conducted in a number of case study areas 
in the Umzinyathi Municipality in KwaZulu-Natal, revealed limits to participation and 
highlighted problems such as staff shortages, scarce financial resources, lack of 
communication channels, lack of capacity, limited training of officials and the lack of inter-
departmental co-operation and synergy. Moodley (2006:4) lists other factors that militate 
against active participation such as numerous delays in the delivery of development projects, 
increased project costs and complex decisions relating to who should be involved given the 
complexities of local community dynamics. 
 
5.9 Concluding comments 
 
This chapter has examined the theoretical debates surrounding the notion of participatory 
development within the context of its applicability to democratic developmental state 
discourse. Attention then turned to an analysis of the discourse and current status of public 
participation in South Africa. It also examined the government’s stated commitment to 
creating a participatory governance system that is inclusive and democratic, outlined the 
dynamics of institutional and non-institutional spaces and highlighted current realities that are 
impacting on efforts to provide meaningful participatory opportunities for citizen 
engagement. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
OVERVIEW OF THE CITY OF CAPE TOWN AND DELFT 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
The chapter which follows provides a broad overview of the overarching system of municipal 
governance in the City of Cape Town as a precursor to succeeding discussion on the 
interaction between citizens and local government within the ambit of a democratic 
developmental state.  It also provides a summary of the demographic characteristics and 
settlement dynamics of the population of Delft and their perceptions of the challenges which 
they confront and the quality of life which they experience living in the area. These findings 
will serve as a background to the case study on the practicalities of implementing 
developmental local government in South Africa. 
 
6.1 Development Local Government in the City of Cape Town  
Cape Town is the oldest and largest urban area in South Africa and it is currently one of the 
fastest growing metropolitan complexes in the country. It is the seat of national parliament 
and the legislative capital of South Africa. Cape Town, together with the larger Western Cape 
province, is markedly dissimilar from other South African cities, both politically and socially, 
and has been described as one of the most unequal and ‘divided’ areas in the country (Cooke, 
1991; Pieterse, 2002). This is reflected in Cape Town’s residential settlement patterns, with 
low-density housing in well-resourced neighbourhoods predominately inhabited by whites, 
contrasted with high-density residential areas for blacks, coloureds and Asians in poorly 
resourced neighbourhoods and informal settlement areas.  
 
The evolution and transformation of local government in Cape Town in the post-apartheid era 
has followed a similar trajectory to other municipalities in South Africa and comprised three 
transition phases. During the pre-interim phase (1994–1996), the City of Cape Town was 
governed by 40 appointed local councils, comprising 50% statutory and 50% non-statutory 
councillors. In the interim phase (1996–2000), metropolitan Cape Town comprised six 
autonomous local authority areas, namely Cape Town/Central, Tygerberg, South Peninsula, 
Blaauwberg, Oostenberg and Helderberg with an umbrella administration set in place to 
oversee the metropolitan area. The final phase began after government elections in 2000, 
when these six local government structures amalgamated to form the City of Cape Town’s 
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Metropolitan Council (Pieterse, 2007:18).  
 
However, in terms of municipal elections, the City’s political landscape has been far more 
complex than in any other metropolitan area in South Africa. The 2000 elections were won 
by the Democratic Alliance (DA) comprising a coalition of the Democratic Party (DP) and 
the New National Party (NNP). Shortly thereafter in 2002, and as a result of floor-crossing 
legislation, which provided a limited window of time for politicians to change political 
parties without forfeiting their seats, the DA lost many of its councillors to the NNP and 
ANC. The ANC and the NNP then formed an alliance which enabled them to take control of 
the City of Cape Town from the DA (Isaac, 2008). In 2006, no party won an outright 
majority, with the DA gaining 41.9% of votes as the largest party, followed by the ANC with 
37.9% of votes (Politics Web, 2011). Currently, the DA is the majority party having won 
60.9% of the votes in the 2011 elections (Independent Electoral Commission, 2011a) making 
it the only metropolitan authority in the country which is not run by the ruling African 
National Congress (ANC). 
 
The City of Cape Town has opted for a Mayoral Executive system which assigns executive 
authority to the Mayor (IDP, 2012). The City is governed by a city council which comprises 
221 councillors and which is responsible for electing the Executive Mayor, Deputy Mayor 
and Speaker. The City Manager, appointed by City Council, is responsible for the 
administration of the City and the management of its 12 directorates (City of Cape Town, 
2013). 
 
For governance purposes, the city is divided into 111 electoral wards and one member of the 
council is elected from each ward. An additional 110 councillors are selected from 
proportional party lists, which together make up the total complement of 221 councillors 
(City of Cape Town, 2012c). The Office of the Speaker assumes overall responsibility for the 
administration of the sub-council and ward system and is accountable for managing all 
community development activities within the jurisdictional area of the council. The Executive 
Mayor is elected head of local government for a period of five years and in turn appoints an 
11-member Mayoral Committee which functions as a local cabinet. Other duties of the City 
council include the formation of the 24 metropolitan sub-councils (City of Cape Town, 
2012c). 
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Following the elections of 18 May 2011, the DA won 78 of the wards while the ANC won 33 
(Independent Electoral Commission, 2011a). Of the 110 councillors elected through the 
proportional representation system, the DA was awarded 57 seats and the ANC 40 seats. The 
African Christian Democratic Party and the Congress of the People were awarded 3 seats 
each, while the Africa Muslim Party, Aljama-ah, Cape Muslim Congress, National Party, Pan 
Africanist Congress, United Democratic Movement and Freedom Front Plus were awarded 
one seat each (Independent Electoral Commission, 2011b). As discussed in the previous 
chapter, among its most important tasks, the city council is responsible for developing and 
implementing an IDP, the development of infrastructure, the provision of services, the setting 
of rates and tariffs, the determination of service level agreements and the preparation of 
budgets. 
 
6.1.1 The Integrated Development Plan 
 
One of the first tasks of the incoming City of Cape Town council following its victory in the 
2011 municipal elections, thus, was to prepare an Integrated Development Plan setting out its 
developmental strategy for the period from 2012 to 2017. The implementation and 
monitoring of the IDP is the responsibility of the Integrated Development Planning and 
Organisational Performance Management (IDP&OPM) Department which falls under the 
auspices of the Compliance and Auxiliary Services Directorate. The IDP&OPM is also 
responsible for maintaining the municipality’s organisational performance management 
system (City of Cape Town, 2011). In accordance with the requirements of the Local 
Government Municipal Structures Act, the City’s IDP must reflect its ‘developmentally-
oriented planning’ (RSA, 2000: Section 23) and must set out a strategic vision for its long-
term development, paying particular attention to its most critical development and internal 
transformation needs (RSA, 2000: Section 26). 
 
The IDP, as indicated, is the practical mechanism through which the City of Cape Town aims 
to deliver the developmental mandate conferred on it by national government. Accordingly, 
the City’s IDP is informed by, and articulates with, a number of national and provincial 
policies relating to spatial development, transport, housing, social development, economic 
growth and environmental advancement. The IDP, in turn, informs a number of municipal 
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strategies and plans such the Cape Town Spatial Development Framework – which guides the 
spatial development of the municipal area and guides investment in infrastructure and social 
facilities – the Disaster Management Plan (DMP), the Social Development Plan (SDP), the 
Service Delivery and Budget Implementation Plan (SDBIP), the City’s Turnaround Strategy 
(TAS), the Economic Development Strategy (EDS), and the Integrated Transport Plan (ITP) 
amongst others. One of the most critical components of the IDP process is the linking of 
planning to the municipal budget and the allocation of specific funds to identified 
development projects (City of Cape Town, 2011; IDP, 2012). 
 
The preparation of the current IDP took nine months to complete and the final plan was 
approved by the council on 28 May 2012. The IDP is centred on five Strategic Focus Areas 
(SFA). These focus areas include a well-run city, a safe city, a caring city, an inclusive city 
and an opportunity city, all of which are intended to inform governance, plans and strategies 
within the metropolitan area for the designated five-year period. Furthermore, a number of 
objectives, deliverables and indicators are linked to each SFA and are assigned to relevant 
directorates within the city council. All current development programmes are located within 
the five strategic focus areas and a development matrix has been established to implement, 
monitor and evaluate the performance of a range of programmes in each focus area. 
 
The selection of the five strategic focus areas was derived from a public needs analysis 
process which included gathering information from three sources. Firstly, during 2011 and 
2012 the council used a Community Satisfaction Survey to target 3 000 respondents using 
stratified random sampling across the municipal area. Trained fieldworkers conducted face-
to-face interviews with residents in order to identify areas of priority need (IDP, 2012). The 
second source of information was gathered using the C3 Notification System which is a 
mechanism used by the City to obtain citizen complaints about municipal services. 
Information is received and logged through telephone calls and electronic messaging (sms) 
delivered to a central call centre. Complaints are then forwarded by call centre staff to the 
relevant line department which assumes responsibility for responding to the matter. The C3 
system is an on-going system of information gathering used by councillors, ward members 
and the general public to inform the City of service delivery problems (ibid). 
 
The third method used to source information for the compilation of the SFAs took the form of 
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a public engagement process, which is prescribed by legislation as part of the process of IDP 
preparation. This public engagement process took place between August and November 2011 
and included various strategies to target different neighbourhoods in the metropolitan area 
(IDP Review, 2013:31). It was reported that the participation process included nine mayoral 
meetings in selected neighbourhoods, six sub-council meetings, one meeting with the City’s 
strategic partners and a meeting with internal council staff. Although it was noted that the 
public was encouraged to attend sub-council meetings and engage in discussions relating to 
the IDP, public meetings only took place in six of the 24 sub-council areas. The City of Cape 
Town, nevertheless, has repeatedly claimed that its public participation process was very 
inclusive: 
 
The extensive public participation process, involving the use of information 
inserts in a range of media, including newspapers, and the innovative use of 
social media, meant that more than a million citizens were reached in the public 
engagement process leading up to the formulation of this IDP. A total of 2 780 
members of the public attended the various public meetings, including the 
meeting with the City’s strategic partners. Altogether 6 500 “Have your say” 
forms were received as at the end of 2011(IDP Review, 2013:33).  
 
It is the responsibility of the Public Participation Unit to develop and implement all public 
participation strategies for the City’s directorates and departments. The IDP public 
participation process is monitored by the Public Participation Working Committee which was 
established to play an oversight role and assess the extent to which the City’s public 
participation strategies comply with legislation. The unit also provides logistical support and 
training to stakeholders on methods to be used in engagement with the public (Viti, 
14/05/2013).  
 
6.1.2 The sub-council system 
 
In order to give substance to the ethos of participatory democracy and the new developmental 
orientation of local government, legislation requires that the City must introduce a number of 
institutional reforms to enable citizen participation in local decision making, thereby enabling 
them to play a role in identifying and influencing development initiatives in line with 
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recognised local needs and priorities. Accordingly, following the 2006 elections, the City of 
Cape Town made provision for the establishment of participatory mechanisms at the sub-
council and ward committee levels. These mechanisms represent the institutionalised 
‘participatory spaces’ prescribed by policy to facilitate the engagement of community 
members and community-based organisations, in the formulation of the IDP and in other 
decision making processes. 
 
In accordance with the requirements of the Municipal Structures Act (RSA, 1998a), the City 
has been demarcated into 24 wall-to-wall sub-councils comprising varying numbers of 
geographically clustered wards. These sub-councils are decentralised government structures 
which serve as the interface between the council, ward committees and civil society. Each 
sub-council comprises between ten and twelve councillors representing the wards within its 
jurisdiction, together with additional councillors appointed through the proportional 
representation system. 
 
A municipal staff member is elected as sub-council manager for each of the 24 sub-councils, 
and is given responsibility for compiling the annual budget, coordinating operations and 
implementing projects within the sub-council’s area of jurisdiction. It is also the 
responsibility of the sub-council manager to arrange sub-council meetings, to act as the 
official liaison officer between the sub-council governance structure and the council and to 
work closely with ward councillors and ward committees located within its boundaries. The 
chairperson of the sub-council is elected by majority vote and is assigned responsibility for 
convening sub-council meetings which are held on a monthly basis. 
 
Sub-councils are tasked with overseeing all development within their respective sub-council 
areas and with carrying out functions designated by the City Council. These include 
responsibility for monitoring service delivery, supervising the spending of ward allocations, 
encouraging residents to participate in decisions relating to the IDP and budget, and making 
recommendations to council with regard to the development needs and priorities of their 
areas (City of Cape Town, 2011). Sub-council meetings are open to the public and are 
advertised in the media as well as on the city council’s website, where the agenda and 
minutes of meetings can be downloaded. 
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6.1.3 The ward committee system  
 
Ward committees are participatory platforms which serve as the mechanism for channelling 
information from the community to the city council either through ward councillors or sub-
councils (Putu, 2006). In accordance with the requirements of Section 17 of the Municipal 
Systems Act and Section 72 of the Municipal Structures Act, the City was given the option of 
determining the type of ward committee system within its area of jurisdiction. These may 
consist of either sector-based or geographically based ward committees and the municipality 
opted for the former of these two systems (City of Cape Town, 2012c). 
 
Each sub-council area comprises between three and six wards with committees of up to ten 
members drawn from different sectors representing registered organisations which are active 
within the ward (City of Cape Town, 2012c). The ten sectors include civic-based 
organisations, faith-based organisations, safety and security organisations, environmental 
groups, early education, youth organisations, arts and culture, sport, the business community 
and designated vulnerable groups such as the aged and disabled. As each of these ten sectors 
is typically made up of a number of organisations, one representative is elected to represent 
the sector on the ward committee. Legislation further requires that the composition of ward 
committees must be reflective of the different sectors that are active in each ward. The Office 
of the Speaker is charged with the responsibility for the overall oversight of ward 
committees. 
 
A ward councillor, who is elected by voters in municipal elections, is the designated 
chairperson of the ward committee and receives support from the proportional representation 
(PR) councillor who is assigned to the ward. Wards form the interface between the sub-
council and city council, on the one hand, and between community organisations and their 
members on the other hand. However, a ward committee has no designated power and can 
only function as an advisory body and a link between communities and the municipality.  
 
In terms of the Local Government Municipal Structures Act (RSA, 1998a), the overall 
objective of the ward committee system ‘is to enhance participatory democracy in local 
government’. As such it is envisaged that ward committees should participate meaningfully 
in the IDP process and in other matters of governance within the City of Cape Town.  The 
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configuration of local representative structures is depicted in Figure 6.1 below. 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Ward committee reporting structure  
 
In their role as sector representatives, ward committee members are obliged to liaise with 
the organisations in their sector on a regular basis. The ward committee members are 
further required to inform the ward councillor of the needs and priorities expressed by the 
sector organisations. In turn, the ward councillor must make recommendations to the sub-
council, portfolio committees or relevant line departments at the City of Cape Town. Once 
the specific matter has been finalised and a decision has been relayed back to the ward 
committee by the ward councillor, ward committee members must inform their sector.1 
Ward committee members receive a small allowance for the expenses incurred in carrying 
out their duties and this amounts, on average, to about R500 per month.  
 
                                                 
1 Information sourced from interviews with officials and councillors, through attendance at sub-council and 
ward meetings and from the City of Cape Town website at www.capetown.gov.za/.   
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Despite the fact that the City has in place a number of mechanisms to promote citizen 
participation, fieldwork conducted in the course of this case study revealed that the ward 
committee system is the only formalised platform through which community members can 
voice their needs and concerns.  It is, thus, the only institutional structure used by the City 
to enable public participation and to give meaning to the notion of a participatory 
democracy as envisioned in developmental state rhetoric. However, as shall be seen in 
chapters which follow, ward committees have generally failed to promote effective citizen 
participation and, still less, to improve public access to services. 
 
6.2 Overview and contextualisation of Delft on the Cape Flats 
The case study area of Delft is a high-density urban community located approximately 25 
kilometres from Cape Town’s Central Business District (see Figure 6.2 below). It is bounded 
by the Cape Town International Airport to the west, the N2 National Road to the south, the 
R300 freeway and Blue Downs to the east and the Stellenbosch Arterial Road and Belhar to 
the north.  Delft incorporates seven suburbs, namely Delft South, Voorbrug, Leiden, 
Eindhoven, Roosendal, The Hague and Symphony Way. Apart from some open spaces within 
the currently developed area, most of its future expansion can only occur along its western 
boundary.  
 
Delft owes its origin to attempts by apartheid authorities to address the serious housing 
shortages facing communities living on the Cape Flats and to accommodate the rapid influx 
of people into the south-eastern corridor of Cape Town (Cook, 1991). The development of 
Delft, together with Blue Downs, was initiated in 1987 as a project of the then Coloured 
House of Representatives to provide housing for the coloured community who were residing 
in the wider region. Like many other communities on the Cape Flats, the township was 
established as a ‘model’ housing project as part of the apartheid regime’s system of separate 
development (Millstein, 2010; Oldfield, 2000, 2004). However, today there is a far greater 
integration of population groups within Delft as a result of the N2 Gateway Project, a joint 
initiative of national, provincial and local government, which commenced in 2005 in Langa, 
to replace informal dwellings with formal housing (Jordhus-Lier, 2011). Following this 
initiative, large numbers of households from Langa were forced to relocate to Delft and this 
has increased the number of African residents in the area. Their relocation severely damaged 
social networks and resulted in a loss of jobs and earnings due to the increased distance from 
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places of employment (Mnguni, 2011). 
 
Figure 6.2 Location of Delft within the City of Cape Town2 
6.3 The physical and infrastructural environment 
Delft’s contemporary urban form has evolved over time, reflecting the overlap of apartheid 
segregationist policies prior to 1994 and post-apartheid integrated planning philosophy under 
the country’s new democratic dispensation. While older sections in the northern residential 
area of Roosendal directly reflect apartheid planning architecture, newer sections in the south 
and western sectors are the result of post-apartheid urban development efforts. Paradoxically, 
it is the newer sections of Delft, established in the post-apartheid period, that represent the 
most deprived, disadvantaged and poorly resourced areas. 
                                                 
2 Retrieved from the City of Cape Town website at http://www.google.co.za 
Delft 
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6.3.1 Housing characteristics 
 
Poor-quality housing and bleak surrounding environments are among the most noticeable 
expressions of poverty and inequality on the Cape Flats. Although housing quality varies 
within Delft, many residents have no access to formal government-subsidised housing and 
are forced to live in informal structures, backyard shacks and temporary relocation areas. As 
is common elsewhere on the Cape Flats, poor housing quality is a feature of the area. 
Dwellings are often constructed on shallow foundations and, as a consequence of sandy soil, 
this leads to subsidence and cracks in foundations and walls (Penderis, 2003). 
 
The residential neighbourhoods of Delft have developed over time and are reflective of the 
settlement philosophy of housing officials of different eras. There are currently four types of 
housing structure in the area and the first of these comprises solid brick structures ranging 
from around 30m2 to 55m2 in size. These include detached, semi-attached or row housing 
units which are government subsidised. To qualify for subsidised government housing, 
families must have a combined monthly income of less than R3 500 per month. The older 
parts of Delft, comprising the four neighbourhoods of Voorbrug, Roosendal, The Hague and 
Eindhoven, have the largest houses with between three and four rooms. 
 
The second type of housing includes structures built in the three temporary relocation areas 
established as part of the N2 Gateway relocation programme. In these temporary settlement 
areas housing units have been laid out in close, barrack-like grid patterns to facilitate service 
delivery. Living conditions are sub-standard and some of the houses are as small as 18m2 and 
yet accommodate up to eight family members. Discussions with the sub-council manager 
reveal that although these areas are designated ‘temporary’, there is little chance that 
households living in them will be provided with formal housing in the near future due to 
extent of the housing shortage in Delft and the long waiting lists. 
 
The third form of housing includes backyard structures which are built within the grounds of 
formal houses. These structures are extremely common in Delft and are most prevalent in the 
older neighbourhoods. In many cases, unemployed home owners build backyard structures 
for themselves and then rent out their government subsidised homes to earn an income. The 
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fourth category of housing comprises informal structures which are found interspersed 
throughout the residential neighbourhoods of southern Delft. These informal structures are 
similar to others found elsewhere in South Africa and are typically built with corrugated iron 
sheets and low-grade wooden planks scavenged from demolition sites and garbage dumps.  
The interiors of these informal shelters are insulated with cardboard and paper. 
 
Research conducted over time has revealed the centrality of housing to general well-being 
across cultures and social groups throughout the world (Boutros Ghali, 1993; Kothari, 2004; 
Gabriel, Mattey & Wascher, 2001) and demonstrates that there is a positive correlation 
between satisfaction with housing and quality of life (Lee & Park, 2010).  Thus, in order to 
gain some insight into the perceived quality of life of residents in the case study area, 
respondents were asked to indicate their level of satisfaction with their housing conditions in 
Delft as illustrated in Figure 6.3 below. 
 
 
Figure 6.3 Housing satisfaction 
 
Considering the number of respondents either renting accommodation or living in backyard 
structures and informal shacks, it is perhaps not surprising that 36% of respondents are either 
not very satisfied or very unsatisfied with their existing housing situations. Among the 
reasons why residents are dissatisfied with their housing conditions, the most commonly cited 
relate to the impermanent nature of the building materials used in temporary relocation areas, 
the small size of the government-subsidised structures and a lack of protection from the 
elements as a result of poor building materials. Some respondents drew attention to the 
temperature extremes that occurred within the structures as a result of poor insulation and 
complained that this frequently led to the increased incidence of illness, particularly among 
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infants and the elderly. Some respondents noted that their houses leaked during the winter 
months, while others complained that they lived in a shack and not a formal house. 
 
Reflective of the different types of accommodation available in the area, the majority of 
survey respondents (65%) indicated they are either fairly satisfied or very satisfied with the 
conditions of their home. These findings are confirmed to a large extent by survey responses 
illustrated in Figure 6.4 below which signify that a large proportion of respondents (56%) 
would not consider moving away from Delft to a surrounding area on the Cape Flats. 
However, a significant number of respondents indicated that they would give the idea of 
moving some consideration (20%) with others indicating strong consideration (23%). 
 
 
Figure 6.4  Desire to move from Delft 
 
6.3.2 Service provision and community facilities 
 
The provision of basic services and facilities in disadvantaged neighbourhoods has the 
potential to considerably improve general living standards and the quality of life of poor 
communities. It is for this reason that the government has repeatedly stated its commitment to 
extending basic services to communities in order to address poverty and inequality 
(Presidency of South Africa, 2011, 2012, 2013). This commitment is further articulated as 
part of government’s intention to build a democratic and transformative developmental state 
(National Planning Commission, 2011). In pursuit of this national policy goal, numerous 
documents produced by the City of Cape Town refer to the council’s commitment to address 
inherited public service disparities and to extend the provision of basic amenities and 
facilities to historically disadvantaged areas (City of Cape Town, 2010, 2012c).  It is in this 
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context that the residents of Delft were asked to comment on their level of satisfaction with 
the services provided by the City. 
 
The survey results reveal that Delft residents are generally satisfied with the level of basic 
services in their neighbourhoods. The overwhelming majority (97.9%) have access to 
electricity in their homes and most households use a prepaid meter system using units 
purchased from a variety of outlets in the area. As the cost of electricity is high, many 
households also make use of paraffin and wood fires for cooking and paraffin and candles for 
lighting. A smaller, but still significant, proportion of respondents (74%) reported that they 
had a water point inside their yard, while 26% had access to a water point outside the yard. In 
temporary relocation areas and informal settlements, both standpipes and sanitation and 
ablution facilities are positioned in communal areas outside the yards and these are shared by 
a large number of households. Discussions with residents living in these areas indicate that 
this poses a range of problems as the ablution facilities are unhygienic, the toilets are often 
blocked, there is no privacy and during the winter months the communal areas are often 
flooded as a result of the high water table on the Cape Flats. For these residents, the poor 
quality of services has the potential to translate into serious health risks, particularly in winter 
as the seepage of sewage from blocked toilets flows into the groundwater system and collects 
in pools of water around their dwellings. 
 
6.3.3 Local facilities and amenities 
 
Delft is generally well supported with public facilities and, besides sixteen primary schools, 
five secondary schools and one technical high school, there are also a number of adult 
learning centres and crèches run by various organisations in the area. There are numerous 
sports complexes which provide rugby, soccer and netball fields, together with a public 
swimming pool. Other facilities include civic centres, public libraries and health centres. The 
Delft Community Health Centre is managed by the Provincial Health Department and the 
Delft South Clinic is administered by the City’s Department of Health. Quarterly Progress 
Reports (DOH, 2013) provided by City of Cape Town health officials indicate that 
tuberculosis is the most serious illness in the area and each year they treat around 1 500 
patients. More than half of all multi-drug-resistant tuberculosis cases identified in the City of 
Cape Town occur in Delft. 
 
 
 
 
  
155 
 
The Hague Community Centre houses the sub-council offices and is also used for sub-council 
meetings, workshops and community meetings. There is also a range of sector organisations 
that are active in Delft and these will be discussed in the subsequent chapter. Community 
organisations include the Delft Development Forum, Delft Community Policing Forum and 
Delft Poverty Development Alleviation Forum amongst others. 
 
6.4 The socio-cultural environment 
  
According to the 2011 Census3, of the 74 340 people living in Delft, 51% were coloured and 
46% were African, with the remainder made up of other racial groups and foreigners. The 
survey data provides information on the demography of Delft and reveals that there is virtual 
parity in the gender ratio with 51% of respondents being women and 49% men. The survey 
also revealed that Delft has a relatively youthful population (the average age of respondents 
was 28 years) and 73% of residents are younger than 40 years of age. 
 
This age profile is reflective of the fact that many of the residents of Delft are young people 
who have settled in the area because they are not able to find accommodation elsewhere. This 
pattern is similar to trends elsewhere in the province (DOGIS, 2013) and further underlines 
the challenges faced in providing employment opportunities for this generation of urban 
dwellers. As a likely consequence of the youthful make-up of the population, the survey 
results reveal that more than a third of households have no dependents under the age of 18 
years. However, almost half of the sample indicated that their households had one or two 
dependents and a further 14% indicated that they between three and six dependents living 
with them. 
 
Data from the 2011 census revealed low levels of education for African and Coloured people 
living on the Cape Flats and these broad trends are mirrored in Delft where only 33% of 
residents had completed secondary schooling, 52.2% had had some secondary schooling and 
9.2% indicated that they had only completed primary schooling. These results pose a 
                                                 
3 The City of Cape Town’s Department of Geographical Information Systems has provided demographic profiles 
for all wards within the City of Cape Town using Census 2011 data. Demographic data is accessed from 
www.capetown.gov.za/en/stats/Pages/Census2011.aspx 
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challenge to economic advancement when it is borne in mind that a well-educated and skilled 
workforce was a major contributor to the success of the Asian developmental states (Abe, 
2006; Woo-Cumings, 1999). This shortcoming has been recognised by a number of scholars 
and politicians who have highlighted the critical need to improve the quality of education, 
(referred to by Akogee, 2010, as a ‘dysfunctional system’), and to provide the training and 
the requisite skills required by a state which aspires to be developmental and transformative 
(Butler, 2010; Edigheji, 2010; Manuel, 2013).  
 
6.5  The economic environment  
 
The section which follows documents the socio-economic status of the population of Delft as 
reflected in the survey data. 
 
6.5.1 Income structure 
 
Analysis of the household income of Delft residents reveals that, as a consequence of 
unemployment or low earning power, the overwhelming majority of the population are poor. 
In that respect, 41% of all respondents reported that they received no income, while 85% of 
households who were receiving an income indicated that they earned less than R4 000 per 
month. Only 27.4% of respondents indicated that they were currently employed, 40.1% 
indicated that they were unemployed with a further 21.9% revealing that they had never had a 
job. Based on this data, 70% of the sampled population is unemployed. Furthermore, of the 
27.4% of residents who currently have jobs, only 50.5% indicated that they are currently 
employed on a full-time basis. Under these circumstances, it is perhaps to be expected that 
the majority of the households depend on income derived from other means such as transfers 
from family members living elsewhere, child-care grants (17.6%), old-age pensions (4.2%) 
and disability grants (2.9%). 
 
Discussions with residents revealed that poverty in Delft is multi-dimensional and includes 
income poverty, asset poverty and capability poverty; residents not only receive too low an 
income to pay for essential household expenditures but they have too few assets and 
capabilities to initiate some form of informal economic activity. The following statements by 
residents interviewed in this study are reflective of the all-embracing nature of poverty (once 
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referred to as a poverty trap) which can lead to disempowerment and despair: 
 
I cannot even afford to look for work – I do not have the money for the transport (40-
year-old African father of three). 
 
If I am lucky to get casual domestic work in Kuils River, they pay me R70. Transport 
costs R15 and I have to pay R20 for day care for my child.  Then I only have R35 in my 
pocket (35-year-old single mother). 
 
While there are a variety of formal economic businesses in Delft such as supermarkets, retail 
stores, petrol stations and building supply outlets, the size of the informal sector is far larger 
than the formal sector. Informal activities are highly visible alongside the Main Road, which 
is a major through route that separates Delft into a western and eastern zone, and on street 
corners within the different residential neighbourhoods. The most prevalent informal 
activities include fruit and vegetable stalls, barbers, hairdressers, car parts stalls and clothing 
stalls. Other types of informal activity commonly found in the area are spaza shops, which 
are micro-enterprises that sell basic household necessities and groceries, as well as tuck shops 
which are home-based shops attached to the residence. A small range of basic foodstuffs such 
as cigarettes, bread, milk and tinned foods are sold from these enterprises. Some of the spaza 
shops sell alcohol illicitly and provide jukeboxes and arcade video games to attract 
customers. Many of the spaza and tuck shop owners use either casual labour from within the 
neighbourhood or family members to run the shops on a daily basis.  
 
6.5.2 Household assets 
 
In terms of household assets, the vast majority of respondents reported that they owned a 
radio (96.1%), a television (96.8%) and a mobile phone (94.8%). This is aligned to findings 
in other disadvantaged areas on the Cape Flats (Thompson, Nleya & Africa, 2011b, 2011c).  
Discussions with residents and observation during qualitative fieldwork in the survey area 
reveal that leisure activities tend to be home-centred and focus on listening to the radio, 
watching television and socialising with friends and family. While financial constraints limit 
the ability of households to own a wide range of assets, both the radio and television are 
viewed as almost essential possessions for purposes of leisure. 
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6.5.3 General living conditions and quality of life  
 
Quality of life refers to the general well-being of individuals although it varies according to 
culture, values and belief systems. An assessment of the attributes of quality of life includes 
not just the physical aspects of an individual’s living conditions but also those of the broader 
surrounding neighbourhood environment. Scholars such as Evans, Kantrowitz and 
Heshelman (2002) and Samman (2007) maintain that aspects such as health, education, 
housing, employment and participation in decision making are key determinants of an 
individual’s perceptions of the quality of his or her life. Other factors which can be used to 
assess quality of life, and which contribute to both physical and psychological well-being, 
include feelings of safety and security, which if absent can produce high levels of anxiety and 
vulnerability amongst members of a community. High-density living and a lack of personal 
space are additional factors that can impact negatively on one’s feelings of well-being and  
quality of life. 
 
Sterile public places and environmental degradation are common features of formal housing 
areas in Delft, while conditions in the informal and relocation areas are considerably worse.  
Many of the public places interspersed between housing developments are bleak and 
unappealing with sandy, barren surfaces. Open spaces surrounding houses are also frequently 
used as dumping grounds for household waste and other materials. In April 2003 a three-
year-old girl died after playing with toxic waste that was dumped on the corner of Symphony 
Way and Silversands Road. It was reported in the Cape Argus (2013) that a total of fifteen 
children and three policemen, who responded to calls for assistance at the time, were also 
admitted to hospital after inhaling the fumes of the toxic chemicals which had been illegally 
dumped at the site. According to residents, when rubbish is dumped it poses an additional 
health hazard in that it attracts flies and rodents, and during the summer the smell of rotting 
household waste is almost unbearable. 
 
An issue of major concern to the residents of Delft is the high incidence of crime and gang-
related violence. The highly visible security gates attached to the front entrances of houses 
along most of the main transport routes throughout the area bear testimony to the fear of theft 
and of intruders in general.  Data released by the Department of Community Safety (Western 
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Cape Government, 2012) reveals that Delft has the sixth highest incidence of murder in the 
Western Cape Province and, according to provincial police reports, gang-related violence in 
the area is the highest on the Cape Flats. The most serious crimes reported are assault with 
intent to do bodily harm, robbery, sexual offences, common assault and domestic violence. 
The most common injuries sustained by victims are those caused by gunshot wounds 
(26.2%), stabbings (49.0%), and trauma caused by blunt objects (17.2%). 
 
Most of the respondents in the survey felt safe within their own homes, but were fearful about 
crime in their different neighbourhoods. A sizeable 40% of respondents indicated they always 
feared crime in their immediate neighbourhoods, while an additional 21% indicated they had 
been fearful of crime many times. Only 26% of the sample indicated that they had never 
feared crime in their area. It appears further that most of the respondents fear crime when 
travelling. Although the majority of respondents (83%) reported that they had not been a 
victim of crime within the preceding 12 months, it is significant that nearly one in five (17%) 
had suffered from some form of criminal activity during this period. Women, children and the 
elderly appear to be at particular risk and discussions with some female residents indicated 
that they rarely allowed their children to be out of doors after dusk, unless they were 
accompanied by an adult.  Respondents were further asked to indicate how they were treated 
by the police when reporting crimes and 77.4% reported that they had not been treated fairly. 
Furthermore, even if their case had finally been served in court two thirds (65%) were not at 
all satisfied with the outcome. 
 
The perceived increase in criminal activity is presented in Figure 6.5 below. Respondents 
were requested to respond to questions relating to whether they had perceived an increase in 
criminal activity in Delft in the last 12 months and 66% of the sample stated that they felt 
there was much more crime now than in the previous year, with a further 13% indicating 
there was more crime. Only 11% stated that crime levels were about the same and a mere 8% 
said there was less or much less. According to residents the most common social and criminal 
problems were, in order of severity, drugs and alcohol abuse, followed by robbery and house 
breaking and gang activities. The vast majority of respondents (66%) believed that both drug 
usage and gang activity had increased significantly in the preceding 12-month period. 
Respondents also reported that police action frequently led to violent conflicts. This view has 
been confirmed by media reports which suggest that the Delft police have on a number of 
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occasions used excessive force in their actions against residents, using rubber bullets to 
control conflict situations and enforcing illegal curfews on residents living in the 
Blikkiesdorp Temporary Relocation Area (Slamdien, 2011). 
 
Figure 6.5 Increase in criminal activity 
  
Respondents’ perceptions about the increase in criminal activity were confirmed in 
discussions with the local police force and community police forum members. The need for 
greater safety and security within Delft and the need to address criminal activity is such a 
prominent public concern that it has frequently appeared on the agendas of sub-council 
meetings and members of the local police force have been invited to present strategies on 
how the problem might be addressed. 
 
Over and above their concerns about the high incidence of crime, respondents were asked to 
rate their views on the overall living conditions in Delft on a continuum from very bad to 
very good, as reflected in Figure 6.6 below. 
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Figure 6.6 Current living conditions 
 
While almost half the sample (48.1%) were indifferent, noting that conditions were neither 
good nor bad, 33.9% indicated that they were either bad or very bad. Only 17.8% of the 
sample reported that their living conditions were either good or very good. Interviews with 
some of the residents indicated that they attributed bad living conditions to the high incidence 
of drugs and gangs and the lack of employment opportunities, while for others having good 
friends and neighbours in the community contributed to their view of good or very good 
current living conditions. 
 
6.6 Concluding comments 
 
This chapter has looked at the system of local governance which prevails in the City of Cape 
Town and, in particular, at the structures which have been put in place to support public 
participation in decision-making processes which affect the welfare of poor communities. It 
found that, formalistically at least, there is a relatively comprehensive system in place to 
support citizen engagement in the local state, whether through the process of preparing an 
IDP or through the channels established at ward level. The efficacy of these channels will be 
examined in the chapters which follow. 
 
The chapter has also provided a broad overview of the socio-economic characteristics of 
Delft which, in this investigation, serves as a case study for an examination of the 
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effectiveness of efforts to establish a developmental local government as part of the broader 
mission to construct a democratic development state. In this context, the picture of Delft 
which emerges is one of a dislocated and poor community living in a built environment 
which is far from optimal. Educational levels are low, poverty and unemployment are 
endemic, alcoholism and drug abuse are widespread and the area suffers from some of the 
highest levels of crime on the Cape Flats, an area which is itself renowned for gang activity 
and violence. 
 
The chapter which follows will consider the manner in which the City of Cape Town has set 
about implementing the model of developmental local government. This will focus, in 
particular, on the mechanisms set in place to advance public participation and will investigate 
the extent to which they are perceived, by different stakeholders, to fulfil their intended 
objectives. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
PARTICIPATORY DYNAMICS AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES OF 
RESIDENTS 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
As discussed in a previous chapter, one of the key features of a democratic developmental 
state is the extent to which it is able to establish mechanisms which will support citizen 
participation in policy formulation and in decision making processes which directly impact 
on their welfare. In pursuit of this goal, South Africa’s democratic reform strategies have 
included the concept of developmental local government which is intended to drive a 
development agenda and to support the national government’s vision of a developmental 
state. The mechanisms used by local government to promote public participation and identify 
local development needs, as previously indicated, include the Integrated Development Plan 
(IDP) and the institutionalised sub-council and ward participatory systems.  
 
The analysis of the case study area of Delft, which follows in this chapter and the next, aims 
to assess the achievements of the City of Cape Town in implementing the model of 
developmental local government.  The first part of the chapter focuses on the structure and 
functions of the sub-council and ward committee systems in Delft. Attention then shifts to an 
examination of the public perceptions of the effectiveness of the IDP and the participatory 
mechanisms that have been set up by the municipality to enable citizen participation in 
decision-making processes. The final section provides an account of the broader political 
perceptions of residents in the case study area.   
 
7.1 The political environment and governance system 
 
The Cape Town metropolitan government, as mentioned in the previous chapter, comprises 
24 sub-councils, which are political subdivisions which function as local councils within their 
areas of jurisdiction. Delft falls within the bounds of Sub-council 5 and includes Ward 13, 
Ward 20 and Ward 1061. A study of political party dynamics in Delft show that since 2006 
there have been shifts of power within the sub-council between the ANC and DA. Ward 20 
                                                 
1 Information relating to the sub-council and ward system operating in Delft is derived from the City of Cape 
Town website (www.capetown.gov.za). 
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and Ward 13 had been ANC strongholds in 2006, but during the 2011 municipal elections 
they suffered defeat to the DA in both wards. On the other hand, the ANC won the municipal 
elections in Ward 106 which was established as a new ward in 2011.  
 
7.1.1 Sub-council 5 
 
Sub-council 5 incorporates the suburbs of Delft, Bishop Lavis, Bontheuwel, Valhalla Park, 
Montana and Charlesville. Most of the residents within this sub-council typically live in 
government subsidised housing, have low incomes and live in in poorly resourced residential 
neighbourhoods (DOGIS, 2013). Sub-council 5 includes Wards 13, 20, 24, 31, 50, and 106 
and is comprised of six ward councillors and five proportional representative councillors. 
Five ward councillors are members of the DA and one councillor is a member of the ANC, 
whilst four proportional representative councillors are members of the DA and one is a 
member of the ANC.   
 
Of the six wards located within the boundaries of Sub-council 5, three are located entirely 
within Delft, while the other three are situated within the suburbs of Bonteheuwel, Bishop 
Lavis, Valhalla Park, Montana and Charlesville, some distance away. Sub-council 5 has two 
offices, one in Bonteheuwel and one in Delft and meetings are held alternatively at the 
different office complexes. Sub-council meetings are held in the third week of each month 
and members of the public and other stakeholders are invited to attend these meetings. The 
agenda and minutes of previous meetings are available on the sub-council’s website prior to 
the meeting. Provincial and local government officials, the representatives of community 
organisations and members of the public are invited to address the sub-council at its monthly 
meetings with the proviso that they announce their intention to do so 48 hours prior to the 
event. Although this system ostensibly affords citizens the opportunity to participate in the 
deliberations of the sub-council on a regular basis, the fact that every second meeting is held 
in Bonteheuwel precludes this possibility as few if any of the residents of Delft could afford 
to travel there for that specific purpose.  
 
Although service delivery and local economic development are portrayed as key 
responsibilities of a developmental local government, the actual amounts which are made 
available for dispersal at sub-council level are extremely limited and their potential to impact 
infrastructural and socio-economic development in an area is minimal. Thus, in the 2012/13 
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financial year Sub-council 5 was allocated R4.2 million by the City for ward projects to be 
initiated within the area. Of this amount, each of the six wards was allocated R700 000.00 for 
development projects (this will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter). Ward 
councillors are responsible for the monitoring of ward allocations and development initiatives 
to ensure that the budget is spent in accordance with the business plan that was submitted as a 
precondition for the receipt of funding. Additional funding of R1 million from the Mayor’s 
Redress Fund and R254 000 from the Bulk Fund from the Speaker’s Office was received for 
additional development initiatives (Rau, 17/04/2013). These additional funds are generally 
used to provide services to the poorer wards. Sub-council 5 thus received a total amount of 
around R5.5 million for the 2012/2013 financial year for the development of projects 
identified within its six wards.   
 
7.1.2 The ward system   
 
Delft’s ward boundaries are illustrated in Figure 7.1. Ward 13, in the north-eastern area of 
Delft, includes the neighbourhoods of Roosendal, parts of Leiden and The Hague.  
 
 
Figure 7.1 Delft ward boundaries 
 
The population of Ward 13 has increased by 155.5% since 2001 and housed a total 
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population of 45 755 residents in 2011, whereas the number of households at 10 520 has 
shown an increase of 179.6% since 20012. Within this ward, the coloured population group 
(72%) comprises the majority. A majority of households (60%) have a monthly income of R3 
200 or less and 88% of households report living in formal dwellings. With regard to 
educational achievement, 24% of residents aged 20 and older have completed Grade 12 or 
higher. 
 
Ward 20 is situated in the south-western sector and includes parts of Delft North, Delft South, 
Eindhoven and sections of Leiden and Voorbrug. The population of Ward 20 has increased 
by 52.7% since 2001and in 2011 comprised 41 762 persons, whilst the number of households 
has increased by 71.9% since 2001. The coloured population comprises 58% of residents and 
Africans comprises 39%. A total of 66% of households have a monthly income of R3 200 or 
less and 88% of households live in formal dwellings. Only 26% of residents have achieved 
Grade 12 or higher qualifications.   
 
Ward 106 is by far the poorest of all the wards and has the least facilities. It includes the Cape 
Town International Airport area on its western boundary, together with the western parts of 
Delft North, Delft South, Delft Leiden and The Hague. In 2011 it had a population 48 995 
which represents an increase of 315% over the total in 2001. The number of households has 
likewise shown a dramatic increase of 388.7% rising from 3 796 in 2001 to 14 753 in 2011. 
The African population (65%) constitute the majority of ward residents. The majority of 
residents (76%) live in formal dwellings and 76% of households earn a monthly income of 
R3 200 or less. Only 29% of residents have achieved Grade 12 qualifications or higher. This 
is the ward most likely to expand in the future due to a large expanse of open land in its 
western half, adjacent to the Cape Town International Airport. Although census data reveals a 
high proportion of formal house ownership, the picture is distorted by the fact that three 
temporary relocation areas are located within this ward and are included in the census as 
formal dwellings, despite their informal nature (DOGIS, 2013).  
  
                                                 
2 Demographic and socio-economic data for Ward 13, 20 and 106 is based on 2011 census data supplied by 
Statistics SA and reworked by the Strategic Development Information and GIS department of the City of 
Cape Town (DOGIS, 2013).  
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7.2 Integrated Development Planning  
 
In the context of previous discussion, the Integrated Development Plan is the instrument 
intended to enable the City of Cape Town to fulfil its developmental mandate and to that 
extent it represents an over-arching development strategy for the metropolitan area. The City 
Manager, Achmat Ebrahim, explains that the IDP “represents an integrated approach to all 
the activities of local government in consultation with residents and stakeholders; its focus is 
on development in the broader sense (economy, infrastructure and people), and it is a 
structured plan that informs budget priorities, decision making and the allocation of 
resources” (IDP, 2012:7). 
 
In order to function effectively as developmental local governments, all municipalities are 
mandated to address poverty and inequality within their area of jurisdiction through the 
process of integrated development planning.  Accordingly, as previously noted, the City uses 
a three-pronged process to develop and monitor its IDP. Key to the success of this process is 
the extent to which citizens are engaged in the identification of their most pressing needs and 
the extent to which they are able to make meaningful input into the formulation of an IDP. In 
order to assess the extent to which they were engaged in the most recent integrated planning 
process, the residents of Delft were asked to comment on their knowledge of the IDP and the 
extent to which they had provided input into the formulation of the current plan.  Their 
responses are recorded in Figure 7.2 below. 
 
 
Figure 7.2 Knowledge of and input into Integrated Development Planning 
 
Figure 7.2 reveals that the vast majority of Delft respondents (98.9%) indicated that they had 
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never heard of the City’s IDP whilst 99.5% reported that they had never been asked to give 
input to the preparation of an Integrated Development Plan. These figures not only 
correspond with patterns for the municipality as a whole3, but they reveal that despite a 
highly publicised public participation strategy, the overwhelming majority of residents of 
Delft, and other historically disadvantaged areas, are effectively excluded from a processes 
which is intended to be the centre piece of participatory local governance. 
 
Discussions with a senior official4 from the IDP Unit of the City of Cape Town (Male 
Official, Cape Town: 22/05/2013) confirms that these trends are common around the country 
and that, on average, no more than 5% of the national population is aware of integrated 
developmental planning or the participatory process which is supposed to underpin it. This 
appears to defeat one of the key objectives of the IDP process, namely that it should be as 
inclusive as possible. Research conducted by Marais, Everatt and Dube (2007) in Gauteng 
revealed similar trends. Their investigation highlighted a number of reasons for the lack of 
knowledge of IDPs and low public input rates which included the poor publicising of 
meetings, cost and difficulty of travelling to meeting venues, language barriers, inconvenient 
meeting times and poorly facilitated meetings (ibid). These, as shall be seen, are problems 
common to Delft. 
 
Interviews with City officials, sub-council chairpersons and sub-council managers within the 
metropolitan area revealed that although public participation in the design of the IDP is 
prescribed by statute, this is not the case in practice and in reality the process is very much a 
top-down exercise where ordinary citizens have very little input. The data recorded above 
suggest that, despite the City’s attempts to engage with the public in the drawing up of an 
IDP, the systems and practices adopted are ineffective and generally benefit only those who 
                                                 
3 Of those interviewed in the City’s 2011 Customer Satisfaction Survey, across the municipality 91% had never 
heard of the IDP (City of Cape Town, (2011) Community Satisfaction Survey, Project Robben, TNS Research 
Services., p.57. 
4 During interviews, respondents frequently requested that their anonymity be protected, either due to the 
sensitivity of the topic or due to their position being threatened if it was known that they had made a 
particular statement. Thus, in accordance with these requests, certain statements are recorded by only 
providing the gender, place and date of the interview and indicating whether the respondent is an official, 
councillor or ward committee member.   
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are relatively well educated and who can provide a motivated, well-structured development 
proposal for their particular ward. Thus, although integrated development planning was 
introduced in South Africa as a method of fostering public participation (Harrison, 2006; 
Theron, 2005) and as a means to address the needs of all South Africans (Oranje et al, 2000), 
in the context of Delft this objective is clearly not being achieved. 
 
7.3 Institutionalised participatory spaces  
 
In order to comply with legislative requirements and to give expression to the notion of 
developmental local government, the City of Cape Town has established several structures to 
promote citizen participation in local decision making. These mechanisms include the 
aforementioned sub-councils, ward committees and sector organisations. In the section which 
follows both the establishment and responsibilities of ward committees in the case study area 
will be discussed based on information provided by officials from the City of Cape Town and 
the sub-council chairperson of Sub-council 5. Thereafter, survey data will be presented on the 
perceptions held by Delft residents on the effectiveness of the participatory systems which 
have been set in place. 
 
7.3.1 Ward councillors and ward committees 
 
Ward committees, as indicated, serve as the frontline structure through which the City gives 
effect to the idea of participatory governance and fulfils its obligations in terms of the 
Municipal Structures Act (RSA, 1998b). As indicated, the City has elected to use a system of 
sector representative (to be discussed in more detail in Section 7.3.2. below), rather than a 
geographically based system of representation. Ward committees, as discussed, are chaired 
by ward councillors elected by the residents during local government elections. Once elected, 
ward councillors are mandated to represent their constituency at sub-council meetings. The 
city council further designates a proportional representative councillor to assist the ward 
councillor to carry out his or her duties. 
 
Discussions with councillors and attendance at ward committee meetings in the case study 
area reveal the procedure of communicating the needs of residents to council.  This process is 
depicted in Figure 7.3.  At level one, the community voices their development priorities, 
concerns and needs to their sector organisation.  
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Figure 7.3  Participatory hierarchy 
 
The chairpersons or representatives of the ten sector organisations (more will be said of these 
below) that are active in the ward are elected as members of the ward committee. At level 
two, members of the ward committee highlight the concerns and development priorities of 
their respective sectors at the ward committee meetings which are held every second month. 
The ward councillor, who is the ward committee chairperson, is then responsible for tabling 
these matters at the sub-council meeting at level three. Following a decision at sub-council, 
either the ward councillor or sub-council chairperson must forward the matter to council. 
Once a council decision has been made, the response is then relayed back to sub-council 
through the sub-council chairperson and is then communicated back to the ward committee 
through the ward councillor who serves on the sub-council. Ward committee members 
representing their sectors are informed of the decision at the ward meetings and then must 
relay decisions back to their organisations.  
 
The functions and responsibilities of ward councillors and ward committee members are set 
out in the City of Cape Town’s website. Further information available to councillors is 
provided by the Department of Provincial and Local Government (Ward Committee 
Resource Book, 2005) which explains the philosophy behind the notion of participatory 
democracy and the role and function of ward committees. Furthermore, according to the 
chairperson of Sub-council 5, shortly after the 2011 election, all councillors in the City of 
Cape Town attended training and capacity building workshops to enable them to fulfil their 
roles as councillors effectively (Rau, 23/10/2012). 
 
Interviews with the sub-council chairperson (Rau, 23/10/2012) and sub-council manager 
(Julies, 23/10/2013) revealed that they clearly understood the role of the sub-council and 
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ward system and that these structures had been established to encourage residents to become 
involved in decision making in the City and to participate in the preparation of IDPs and 
annual budgets. Interviews with councillors revealed that they also understood that that they 
had a further responsibility to monitor service delivery within their wards and to deal with 
service delivery requests, complaints and enquiries. Other duties which they identified were 
the need to make recommendations to the City council on development priorities and matters 
that impact negatively on their ward (Female Councillor, Delft: 16/04/2013; Male Councillor, 
Delft: 15/04/2013). 
 
When asked to comment on their understanding of the role of ward councillors, residents 
stated that they believed a ward councillor should be transparent and accountable when 
carrying out his or her designated duties and should serve as the link between the community 
and the municipal council. The importance of this role is underscored by the fact that a 
significant majority (62%) of residents in the case study area were of the view that local 
government was responsible for solving most or all the problems within a sub-council area, 
while only a small minority stated that some functions were the domain of provincial and 
national government. This implies that whether or not a developmental local government has 
the resources and the capacity to provide necessary services and stimulate local economic 
development and job creation, local residents are likely to hold them accountable for these 
activities. 
 
As a means to assess the confidence which the residents of Delft have in institutionalised 
participatory structures, respondents were asked to rate their level of trust in their sub-council 
and in ward committees. Their responses are illustrated in Figure 7.4 below and reveal that 
just over half (52%) of respondents interviewed stated that they had little or very little trust in 
the sub-council, compared to 44% who stated that they had some or a lot of trust. In the case 
of ward committees, trust levels were somewhat higher with 52% of respondents reporting 
that they trusted these structures somewhat or a lot whilst 39% stated that they trusted them a 
little or not all. A small percentage of respondents indicated that they did not have enough 
knowledge of their sub-council and ward committee to comment which, in itself, is indicative 
of the extent to which the objectives of these participatory structures have been 
communicated to the local population. 
. 
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Figure 7.4 Trust in local government structures 
 
This overall lack of trust in formalised participatory spaces appears to affirm the views of 
Arnstein (1969) who drew attention to the ‘roadblocks’ that are faced by citizens in their 
attempts to participate in formal structures and their alienation from and distrust of the 
‘powerholders’ as a result of their powerlessness. Similar views are presented by Huttman 
(1993) and Marcussen (1990) who assert that feelings of alienation and distrust result from 
exclusion from space and this is manifested as a lack of control and emotional deprivation. 
 
Respondents were further requested to consider their levels of trust in other key institutions 
operating in the area (see Table 7.1) and their responses are of interest. The community 
policing forum was the most accepted of these with 50% of respondents recording that they 
trusted these structures somewhat or a lot. This can be ascribed to the visible presence of the 
community police forum in Delft and its response to problems raised by residents (such as the 
current concern with increased drug activity in the area). The local police service was the 
next most trusted institution with 47% of residents indicating they trusted the police 
somewhat or a lot. In contrast, 51% of respondents reported that they did not trust the mayor 
of Cape Town at all. This response could be attributed to the party political preferences of 
respondents (since 2006 all mayors have been members of the DA), but more likely (in that 
two of the three wards are DA controlled), it is reflective of the mayor’s perceived 
indifference to the needs of the poor in areas such as Delft. 
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Table 7.1 Trust in key institutions in governance 
  Not at all A little Somewhat A lot Don’t know 
Mayor of Cape Town 51% 9% 12% 21% 7% 
Local Police 31% 16% 19% 28% 6% 
Community Policing 
Forum 26% 17% 24% 24% 8% 
 
Respondents were also asked their opinions (represented in Table 7.2 below) on the extent to 
which their ward councillors facilitate citizen participation in decision making processes in 
the wards which they represent. These related to the extent to which they allowed citizens to 
participate, the manner in which they announced council programmes, and the manner in 
which they managed citizens’ complaints. 
 
Table 7.2 Perceptions of ward councillors in enabling participation, announcing 
council programmes and managing complaints 
  
Very 
badly 
Fairly 
badly 
Fairly 
well 
Very 
well 
Don’t 
Know 
Allowing citizens to participate 26% 20% 27% 11% 16% 
Announcing council programmes 30% 16% 27% 11% 17% 
Managing complaints  30% 17% 26% 10% 17% 
 
Only 11% of respondents reported that their ward councillor was facilitating citizen 
participation very well, compared to 46% who stated that this responsibility was being carried 
out fairly badly or very badly. Identical responses were recorded in respect to the way in 
which councillors succeeded in announcing council programmes to their constituents, with 
46% of respondents reporting that this function was performed fairly badly or badly. This 
latter finding is of significance in that it implies that ward councillors are failing in their duty 
to act as the channel of communication between residents and the sub-council and other 
municipal structures. It also raises questions about the accountability of ward councillors who 
frequently appear to be unreceptive to the interests of their constituents. This is evident in the 
survey results which reveal that 47% of those interviewed felt that ward councillors managed 
public complaints either fairly badly or very badly, in contrast to just 10% who felt they were 
performing this function very well. Overall, it is significant that no more than 38% of 
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respondents were fairly satisfied or well satisfied with the ward councillor’s performance in 
any of these three areas of citizen engagement.   
 
In a context where it is understood that participation should form an integral part of the 
process of democratic transformation and citizen empowerment (Nelson & Wright, 1995; 
Buccus, Hemson, Hicks & Piper, 2007; Jennings, 2007; Harbers, 2007), the responses of 
residents suggest that councillors in the case study area are failing to fulfil their legislative 
mandate. It is also indicative of the fact that in failing to promote meaningful citizen 
participation, councillors are also failing to advance one of the core elements of 
developmental local government. Furthermore, by failing to communicate council 
programmes and to facilitate citizen participation, the councillors are effectively excluding 
residents and preventing them from exercising agency, which, Cleaver (2004) reminds us, is 
essential in moving participation from a position of ‘tyranny’ to one of transformation. As the 
exercise of agency is one of the key features of a democratic developmental state, according 
to authors such as Gumede (2009), White (2006) and Leftwich (2000), the failure to actively 
involve citizens as partners is tantamount to a rejection of the model of democratic local 
government (Evans, 2010; Edigheji, 2010; National Planning Commission, 2011, 2012). 
 
Citizens’ perceptions of the level of commitment shown by their political representatives are 
also evident in the amount of time which they believe councillors spend in their wards. When 
asked to comment on how much time they believed the ward councillor spent in their ward or 
was visible to residents, 39% noted that he/she was never in the ward, and only 11.5% 
reported weekly attendance in the ward. Almost 21% of the respondents indicated they did 
not know. On the other hand, when asked how much time they felt a ward councillor should 
spend visiting the community, a significant 40% of respondents stated ‘all of the time’. A 
further 40% of respondents indicated that the councillor should visit the community at least 
weekly, with 13% noting that he/she should visit at least once a month. Considering that ward 
councillors receive a salary of around R34 000 per month and that they are appointed 
specifically to represent community interests at sub-council level, residents might justifiably 
expect that the majority of their time would be spent in their communities or in dealing with 
community matters. Whilst the exact proportion of time spent by councillors’ in their wards 
is unknown, their perceived absence appears to have done much to undermine popular trust in 
their role and in their ability to advance participatory processes. As other studies have found 
(Narsiah, 2011; Fakir & Moloi, 2011) this may be due to a lack of leadership, of political will 
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and of a serious commitment to participatory governance on the part of local office bearers. It 
might also be due to the competence levels of councillors which, as the survey results 
suggest, appear not to be of the required standard. 
 
Table 7.3 presents the extent to which respondents believe the ward councillors have the 
competence to perform their basic tasks and the experience to manage public service 
programmes. The findings reveal that a very small percentage of respondents were of the 
opinion that their ward councillor was competent in either category (7% and 8% 
respectively).  While just over a third of respondents (35%) perceived their ward councillor to 
have some competencies, only 7% felt that they were totally competent. In contrast, 46% 
believed ward councillors to be not very competent or not competent at all. Similar 
perceptions were recorded with respect to the councillors’ experience in managing public 
programmes with 47% stating that they were either not very competent or not at all 
competent. These findings are similar to those of surveys conducted in parts of Kwa-Zulu 
Natal by Mantzaris and Ngcobo (2008) which they attribute largely to the lack of capacity 
and training of political office bearers. Yusuf’s (2004) research on Buffalo City Municipality 
and Stellenbosch Municipality revealed a similar lack of capacity.     
 
Table 7.3 Perceptions of ward councillors in terms of ability to perform tasks and 
experience in managing public service programmes 
  
Not at all 
competent 
Not very 
competent 
Somewhat 
competent 
Totally 
competent 
Don’t 
know 
Ability to perform tasks 27% 19% 35% 7% 12% 
Experience in managing 
public programmes 28% 19% 33% 8% 12% 
  
Citizen concerns about the competence of their ward councillors are aggravated by what they 
perceive to be the indifference of their political representatives and the fact that they do not 
appear to care much about the people they are supposed to serve. These perceptions are 
recorded in Table 7.4 below. 
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Table 7.4 Perceptions of ward councillors in terms of caring, honesty and fairness 
  
Not at all 
caring 
Not very 
caring 
Somewhat 
caring 
Totally 
caring 
Don’t 
know 
Extent they care about the 
community 
31% 23% 26% 7% 13% 
 
Not at all 
honest 
Not very 
honest 
Somewhat 
honest 
Totally 
honest 
Don’t 
know 
Honesty in handling public 
funds 
31% 23% 26% 5% 15% 
 
Not at all 
fair 
Not very 
fair 
Somewhat 
fair 
Totally 
fair 
Don’t 
know 
Fairness in allocating 
services 
30% 20% 30% 7% 13% 
Fairness in allocating 
employment opportunities 
32% 20% 28% 6% 13% 
 
The survey results reveal that 54% of respondents felt that ward councillors were either not 
very caring or cared nothing at all about the communities they were serving, with just 33% 
believing they were somewhat caring or totally caring. Linked to popular concerns about the 
disinterest of their local political representatives was a widespread conviction that they are 
also inherently dishonest. Thus, 54% of respondents stated that they believed ward 
councillors to be either not very honest or not all honest in handling public funds. In contrast, 
just 5% of those interviewed believed ward councillors to be totally honest. This distrust of 
the integrity of councillors was also revealed in the extent to which respondents believed they 
displayed fairness in the allocation of services. Here 50% of the sample believed that ward 
councillors were either not very fair or not fair at all in the way in which they allocated 
services in the community, whilst just 7% felt they were totally fair. Respondents also felt 
that councillors were unfair in the way in which they allocated the employment opportunities 
which they had at their disposal. Thus, 52% stated that they were either not very fair or not all 
fair, and just 6% believed that they totally fair. 
 
Although these findings present a damning condemnation of ward councillors, it is important 
to note that they are based on perceptions which may or may not be based on fact. Thus, for 
example, in the case of employment allocation, interviews with the chairperson of the sub-
council and the sub-council manager (Rau, 23/10/2012; Julies, 23/10/2012) revealed that 
although residents were of the view that ward councillors have responsibility for this activity, 
this was not always the case. Despite the fact that the employment of locals was frequently 
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raised as an issue in housing projects in the area, the chairperson and manager of the sub-
council noted that housing is largely a provincial government competence and provincial 
officials determine the criteria for the allocation of jobs and these include the use of unskilled 
local residents. The sub-council manager explained that in cases where the municipality is 
responsible for housing developmental programmes, he is mandated to assist in the 
identification and appointment of local unemployed labour. The ward councillor, he 
maintains, is not involved in the appointment of unemployed workers, although many 
residents believe this to be the case. Whether or not ward councillors are involved in the 
unfair allocation of employment opportunities, residents’ perceptions reflect the fact that the 
responsibilities of councillors have been poorly communicated to them. They are reflective of 
the general distrust which they maintain towards what are intended to be key role players in 
the building of a democratic developmental local government. 
 
This distrust is further evident in the extent to which residents feel that key institutions in 
Delft were biased in favour of one particular group. In general, the responses revealed fairly 
similar patterns in the extent to which respondents felt that the police, the community police 
forum, ward committees, street committees, SANCO and the sub-council favoured one group 
in the dealings with the community. Table 7.4 below reveals that the majority of respondents 
(ranging from 62% to 72%) were of the opinion that all of these institutions looked after the 
interests of all residents. However, it is noteworthy that greatest number of respondents 
(27%) felt that the sub-council office was biased towards one group, considerable less than 
the 15% who felt that ward committees, street committees and SANCO looked after the 
interests of one group only.  Whilst the opinions of respondents may be unsubstantiated they 
are, once again, indicative of the poor communication channels that exist between citizens 
and participatory structures and the fact that some residents feel that they are being unfairly 
treated. 
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Figure 7.5 Community interests 
 
Despite the negative perception of ward councillors held by residents, it is evident that their 
views do not affect their participation in public meetings to the same extent. Thus, Table 7.5 
reveals that 52% of all respondents reported that they often attended a meeting organised by 
the ward committee (only marginally less than the 54% who stated that they often attended a 
street committee meeting). Significantly, only 20% stated that they had never attended a 
meeting organised by the ward committee (marginally less than the 21% who stated they had 
never attended a street committee meeting). Attendance at school governing body meetings 
was ranked the highest and attracted 62% of respondents who indicated attending such 
meetings often. 
 
Table 7.5 Attendance at meetings 
  Never 
Once or 
twice Often 
Don’t 
know 
Attendance at meetings organised 
by ward committee 20% 24% 52% 3% 
Attendance at meetings organised 
by street committee 21% 21% 54% 3% 
Attendance at meetings organised 
by school governing body 15% 22% 62% 1% 
 
Respondents who stated that they had never participated in meetings, put forward a number 
of reasons for their non-attendance (see Table 7.6 below). In that regard, the primary reason 
for non-attendance cited by respondents was the fact that they had no knowledge of these 
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meetings (responses ranged 34% to 42%). A smaller but still significant proportion of 
respondents stated that they lacked the time to attend meetings (responses ranged from 17% 
to 21%). 
 
Table 7.6 Main reasons for non-attendance at meetings  
  
Ward Committee 
N=69 
Street 
Committee 
N=67 
School Governing 
Body 
N=52 
I do not have information 
about the meetings 36% 34% 42 % 
I do not have time to 
attend meetings 17% 21% 19% 
It will make no difference 
as nothing will change 15% 15% 17% 
 
The perception of some respondents that their attendance would serve no purpose as ‘nothing 
would change’ (15% to 17% of those who attended no meetings) can, in part, be explained by 
the work of Bourdieu (1979, 1989) and Giddens (1984, 1990) with respect to the complex 
relationship between human agency and social structures and the micro-politics that impact 
on state–society relations. These theorists draw attention to such issues as the perceived 
hierarchical status of actors. For Bourdieu this is determined by their knowledge and 
capabilities, whilst for Giddens the ability to transform social reality is dependent on 
knowledge, reflection and rationalisation. For many residents in the case study area, the 
historical legacy of non-participation, overall low levels of education and limited knowledge 
of municipal processes such as the IDP, is likely to play a role in limiting their exercise of 
agency. Other factors limiting their engagement could include the controlling and 
exclusionary attitude of officials, which not only limits the ability of residents to participate 
but also shapes their opinions on whether participation is likely to yield any gains. 
 
7.3.2 Sector organisations 
 
As previously indicated, ward committees in Delft consist of the ward councillor and ten 
members selected from different organisations which are active within the ward and wider 
area. These organisations are further categorised into ten different sectors in accordance with 
the objectives of the organisation (see Table 7.7). 
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Table 7.7 Sector organisations 
Civic-based Organisations 
• Ratepayers Associations 
• Civic Organisations 
• Street Committees 
Youth 
• Constituted Organisations 
• City-wide Organisations 
• National Organisations 
Faith-based Organisations 
• Churches/Mosques/Temple 
Organisations in area 
Arts and Culture 
• Fine, Performing and Visual Arts 
Safety and Security Organisations 
• Neighbourhood Watches 
• Community Police Forums 
Sports 
• All registered sporting codes in area 
• Excludes Provincial/National bodies 
Environment 
• Natural and Built Environment with 
a focus on a particular issue in area 
• Environmental Organisations with 
focus in area 
Designated Vulnerable Groups 
• Community Initiatives addressing the 
vulnerable, aged, gender or disabled 
• Organisations servicing the Health 
sector 
Education 
• Early Childhood Development 
Centres 
• Excludes Secondary and High 
Schools which participate through 
the Junior City Council 
Business 
• Community-based Associations 
focussed on the formal and informal 
sectors 
• Market gardeners and small-scale 
agriculture 
 
The composition of the ward committee must be reflective of all the sectors and organisations 
must be registered on the sub-council data base in order to qualify as a sector organisation. 
Although each sector generally comprises a variety of similar organisations within its cluster, 
only one representative is selected from each sector to serve as a ward committee member. 
The sector representative is responsible for liaising with all the organisations within the 
sector and for raising sector concerns and development needs at ward committee meetings. 
 
Discussions with a senior official from the City of Cape Town (Male Official, Cape Town: 
17/05/2013) and councillors (Male Councillor, Delft: 23/05/2013; Male Councillor, Delft: 
20/06/2013; Female Councillor, Delft: 20/06/2013) from the case study area reveal that the 
system of sector representation is problematic. Firstly, many sector organisations draw their 
membership from different wards in the sub-council area and as a result the chairperson of a 
sector organisation may be a resident in a different ward from the one in which he or she is 
serving as a ward committee member. Problems arise when these ward committee members 
are required to communicate council or sub-council responses back to their members who 
may be residing in a different ward or who may be unable to attend certain meetings. This 
presents particular difficulties in sub-council areas comprised of five to six wards. 
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The three wards in Delft comprise a diverse cross-section of population groups with a range 
of socio-economic and demographic characteristics. In this context, some councillors 
contended that the effectiveness of the ward committee system depends, to a large degree, on 
the chairpersons or representatives of the sector organisation and their interest in engaging 
with their members and in encouraging residents to become involved in development 
initiatives in the area (Male Councillor, Bonteheuwel: 22/05/2013; Female Councillor, Delft 
19/06/2013). Councillors were consequently of the general opinion that the election of ward 
committee members on a geographic basis would lead to a more effective system of engaging 
with ward residents. This, they maintain, is because members would be only be elected if  
they were known to the community, had already achieved a track record of service to the 
community, and had displayed initiative and enthusiasm in their dealings with people (Sub-
council Meeting, Bonteheuwel: 22/05/2013). 
 
Besides the registered sector organisations, there are various other organisations or forums 
which Delft residents can join. However, despite the fact that a significant number of 
respondents reported having attended meetings on a fairly regular basis, when asked to 
indicate their involvement in organisations within the community, in terms either of 
participation as a member or of performing a leadership role in the organisation, 99% of 
respondents noted that they were not involved at all. Furthermore, only 1% indicated that 
they were members of a community policing forum, a street committee, a school governing 
body or another type of association or community group. A far larger percentage of 
respondents indicated belonging to a religious group, with 39% stating that they performed a 
leadership or official role in the organisation, and 19% indicated they were members. An 
additional 3% stated that although they were not members, they attended meetings or 
gatherings. The remaining 39% stated that they were not involved in religious organisations 
in any way.  
 
As ward committees comprises representatives from sector organisations, it is only through 
membership of these organisations that ordinary citizens can become ward representatives. 
Furthermore, as the ward committee is the only formalised structure through which local 
residents can participate in and influence decision-making processes, the finding suggests that 
the development needs of most people are not being heard.  The findings also suggest that the 
system of sector representation operating in the City of Cape Town (which differs from the 
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system of geographic representation in place in many other local government areas across the 
country), is responsible for excluding a large number of residents who are not members of 
community organisations. In that respect, following Gaventa’s (2004) continuum of the way 
in which participatory spaces are established and in whose interests, the formally invited 
participatory spaces in Delft may be considered effectively ‘closed’ to those residents who 
are not affiliated to an organisation,   
 
Exclusion from institutionalised spaces, as discussed above, has important ramifications for 
residents. As authors such as Walmsley (1988), Buttimer (1979), Tuan (1975) and 
Weightman (1985) have pointed out, space confers identity on its occupants and it serves a 
centre for the expression of aspirations, as a means for enabling the interaction of individuals 
and groups and the exercise of voice (Cornwall, 2002c). At the same time, theorists such as 
Ley (1983) and Knox (1987) assert that exclusion from such spaces leads to alienation and 
inflicts feelings of powerlessness, vulnerability and low self-worth. In such circumstances, 
according to Rahman (1993), there is a need for emancipatory forms of participation which 
can challenge the structures responsible for marginalising and ‘dehumanizing’ ordinary 
citizens. 
 
7.4 Popular participatory spaces 
 
Since 1994, many communities throughout South Africa have established representative 
residents’ organisations which are affiliated to the South African National Civic Association 
(SANCO). Previous research and interviews with SANCO members (Penderis, 1996, 2003) 
reveals that these civic structures are in essence grassroots organisations that focus particular 
attention on poor living conditions in disadvantaged areas, and negotiate on behalf of the 
community for better service delivery and other developmental needs. In terms of power 
hierarchy and the chain of command, street committees represent second-tier structures 
within SANCO which are established to assist in maintaining order and in addressing 
problems in the community.  
 
Interviews with one of the ward councillors (Female Councillor, Delft: 22/06/2013) reveal 
that a fairly sophisticated street committee system has been established within the case study 
area and this augments the institutionalised ward committee system, and provides further 
‘voice’ to residents. Although street committees are informal community structures, their 
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influence in townships across the Cape Flats is significant particularly with regard to the 
resolution of local disputes and the provision of social support. 
 
Wards in Delft are divided into different street blocks which are represented by a street 
committee and residents residing within a particular block can bring matters of concern to 
these structures.  The ward councillor maintained that she and other councillors organise 
regular meetings with street committee chairpersons to discuss problems in specific 
neighbourhoods in their respective wards.  Street committee chairpersons can also forward 
matters of concern directly to sub-council meetings. The issues raised mostly relate to 
problems with services in the area, but more serious matters concerning housing, crime, 
vulnerability and so forth are also dealt with by street committees. Street committees are thus, 
in practical terms, the participatory structures closest to the people where matters of 
immediate concern can be raised. More serious problems are raised at ward meetings or 
during one-on-one meetings with the ward councillor whose responsibility it then is to table 
the problem at sub-council meetings. 
 
Respondents were asked to rate their level of trust in street committees and in SANCO and 
their perceptions are reflected in Table 7.6 below. A total of 52% of respondents indicated 
that they trusted the street committee somewhat or a lot.  
 
 
Figure 7.6 Trust in Street Committees and SANCO 
 
A similar response was recorded with regard to SANCO with 50% stating that they trust the 
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organisation somewhat or a lot. Although these levels of trust are roughly the same as those 
for ward committees (52%) a distinction arises in the case of the sub-council which less 
people trust somewhat or a lot (44%) and the highest number trust not at all (33% compared 
to 21% and 22% for street committees and SANCO respectively). In the case of the sub-
council, it is evident that the residents of Delft have more trust in non-institutionalised 
platforms than the formal structures established through legislation.  
 
When asked whether they had ever taken part in protests, which Gaventa (2006a) and 
Cornwall (2002a, 2004b) describe as non-institutional participatory spaces or ‘invented 
spaces’, only 1% of respondents indicated that they had participated in such activities in the 
preceding twelve months. However, these responses do not appear to be an accurate 
reflection of reality in that protest action in Delft appears to be increasing both in number and 
in intensity, largely as a result of dissatisfaction with service delivery and the quality of 
housing. Although statistics on the number of protests that have taken place are not available, 
media reports5 and interviews with senior officials in Delft (Rau, 22/05/2013; Julies, 
22/05/2013) appear to corroborate the view that protest action in the area is growing.   
 
Scholars such as Aiyar (2010), Escobar (2011), Gaventa (2004a, 2004b) and Cornwall 
(2002a, 2002b), as indicated, maintain that protests typically take place as a consequence of 
the closed and/or patronised nature of institutionalised spaces and that they are frequently the 
only avenues open to residents to challenge oppression and coercion and to raise concerns 
ignored by authority figures. The escalating protests in Delft can be understood in this 
context and it can be argued that residents have had to resort to ‘claiming’ spaces of 
resistance in order to air their grievances and to have their voices heard. 
 
7.5 Political opinions and perceptions  
 
Whilst a lack knowledge of the workings of the structures established to promote citizen 
participation appears to have a been a limiting factor for citizen engagement in Delft, it is 
evident that the community is generally well informed about current affairs and about broader 
issues of governance. In response to the question of how often they had access to the news 
                                                 
5 This is evident in such press articles as ‘Protesting Delft residents block road with tyres’ (The Sowetan, 2012), 
‘Delft residents picket’ (The Voice of the Cape, 2012) and ‘City seeks interdicts against Delft leaders’ (Cape 
Times, 2013). 
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(Table 7.8 below), 68% of respondents reported listening to the news on the radio on a daily 
basis, while 74% stated that they listened to the news on television on a daily basis. Due to 
the associated cost, only 29% of respondents reported reading newspapers on a daily basis, 
whilst very few had access to news on the internet.  
 
Table 7.8 Interest in current affairs 
  Never 
Less than 
once a month 
A few 
times a 
month 
A few 
times per 
week 
Every 
day 
Frequency of news from 
Radio 11 % 1% 5% 15% 68% 
Frequency of news from 
Television 6% 1% 3% 16% 74% 
Frequency of news from 
Newspapers 40% 12% 8% 11% 29% 
Frequency of news from the 
internet 86% 1% 3% 5% 5% 
 
In response to the question whether they should hold the political leadership to account, the 
overwhelming majority of respondents (98%) stated that they agreed or strongly agreed that 
citizens should be more active in questioning leaders. There was also a strong assertion (93% 
agreeing or strongly agreeing) on the right of opposition parties to examine and criticise 
government actions, and an equally strong conviction (96% agreeing or strongly agreeing) on 
the need for news media to investigate corruption in government.  
 
Table 7.9  Matters of governance  
  
Strongly 
agree Agree 
Strongly 
agree Disagree 
Don’t 
know 
Citizens should be more active in 
questioning leaders 70% 28% 2% 0.2% 0.2% 
Opposition parties should 
examine and criticise government 
actions 67% 26% 6% 0.2% 0.6% 
The news media should 
investigate corruption in 
government 71% 25% 3% 0.2% 1.1% 
 
It is evident that citizens of Delft consider themselves to be free under the new democratic 
dispensation. As illustrated in Table 7.10, the overwhelming majority of those interviewed 
(94.9%) considered themselves completely free to vote for anyone of their choice, to join any 
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organisation of their choice (96%) and to say what they think (95.7%). 
 
Table 7.10   Perception of freedoms 
  
Not at all 
free 
Not very 
free 
Somewhat 
free 
Completely 
free 
Don’t 
know 
Freedom to choose who to 
vote for 1.1% 1.5% 2.6% 94.9% 0% 
Freedom to join any 
organisation 0.2% 1.7% 1.7% 96% 0.40% 
Freedom to say what you 
think 0.2% 1.1% 2.6% 95.7% 0.40% 
 
While these responses indicate that progress has been made in the country’s transition from a 
racial autocracy to democracy, it also evident that ordinary people expect considerably more 
from the democratic system than freedom of expression and political association.  Thus, 
when asked whether they were satisfied with South Africa as a democracy, two thirds of 
respondents (66%) stated that they were either not very satisfied or not satisfied at all. Only 
26% stated that they were fairly satisfied with the democracy and a very small minority (8%) 
asserted that they were very satisfied with the current dispensation. 
 
 
Figure 7.11 Satisfaction with South Africa as a democracy 
 
While there is often a tendency to presume that disadvantaged citizens are politically 
uninformed, the survey results discussed above indicate that the residents of Delft are both 
politically knowledgeable and aware of their rights as citizens, including their right to 
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participate in systems of local governance. From this it may be inferred that their criticism of 
local participatory structures and of the poor performance of ward councillors are well 
informed.  The results also indicate that the low level of citizen participation in the 
preparation of IDPs is not due to local apathy but is due rather to poor communication by the 
City on the planning process and perfunctory attempts to consult local residents. It also points 
to an essentially top-down approach to planning which pays lip-service to community 
participation and is the antithesis of the developmental rhetoric so evident in government 
policy documents. It is evident that citizen participation is further hampered by the poor 
design of ward committees and the system of sector representation which effectively excludes 
those who are not involved with local organisations.  
 
7.6 Concluding comments 
 
This chapter has examined the formal structures which have been established to promote 
citizen participation in Delft. The findings of the research indicate that the ‘invited spaces’ 
for participation created by the municipality are failing to engage the community as intended 
and the population have turned to their own ‘created spaces’, in the form of street 
committees, to address their concerns. It is also evident that the shortcomings of the 
participatory system have fuelled distrust in both local institutions (sub-councils and ward 
committees) and local politicians. The survey data also suggests that, from the perspective of 
poor citizens, the City is failing in its attempts to establish a developmental local government. 
This relates to its ability to promote citizen participation, to provide services of an acceptable 
standard, and to build a more equitable society. In this context, frustrated citizens are 
increasingly turning to protest action as the most effective way in which to exercise voice and 
to attract the attention of the authority. 
 
Where this chapter has focused on the perceptions of the residents of Delft, the chapter which 
follows will focus on the views of officials from the City of Cape Town, councillors and 
ward committee members in the case study area in order to gain an understanding of their 
perceptions of the meaning of developmental local government and the extent to which they 
believe the City is succeeding in fulfilling its developmental mandate. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
POLITICAL AND OFFICIAL PERSPECTIVES OF INTEGRATED 
DEVELOPMENT PLANNING AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION  
_____________________________________________________________________  
The previous chapter looked at the structures and processes in place to promote participatory 
development in Delft. Based on survey data it analysed the perceptions which residents of the 
area hold on the effectiveness of the system of participatory governance and the extent to 
which they believed they were being given a meaningful say in local affairs which affect their 
welfare. This chapter looks at the challenges of establishing participatory systems from the 
perspective of local government administrators and political office bearers. In so doing, it 
focuses on the extent to which the process of integrated development planning, a corner stone 
of developmental local government, is seen to advance participatory development and general 
improvement of the welfare of poor communities. It also critically examines the institutions 
established to give effect to on-going citizen participation in the affairs of the local state, 
namely the sub-councils and ward committees. 
 
The views and perceptions of a variety of municipal officials, ward councillors and ward 
committee members in the case study area were canvassed in an attempt to understand the 
process through which the City of Cape Town is attempting to advance the ideal of 
democratic developmental government. In order to give structure to the evidence generated 
through several different sources including interviews, focus group discussions and personal 
observation, information is categorised into three broad themes relating to intergovernmental 
relations and the integration of governance efforts, the integrated development planning 
process and the sub-council and the ward committee participatory system. 
 
8.1 Intergovernmental relations and integration of governance efforts 
 
Besides the importance of inter-governmental cooperation and a ‘seamless web of services 
that cuts across jurisdictional boundaries’ (Layman, 2003:24), one of the key requirements of 
building a democratic developmental state in South Africa, as discussed, is the need to 
coordinate and integrate the activities of the national, provincial and local spheres of 
government. This pre-condition applies no less to the establishment of developmental local 
government. In that respect, while cooperation refers to the clear division of powers and 
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responsibilities, the integration of development interventions denotes the alignment of 
policies, strategies and planning of the three different spheres in order to deliver the 
developmental vision of national government at the local level. In this context, continued 
engagement and consultation between the three spheres, the coordination of development 
programmes and the streamlining of efforts and resources is seen to be essential in building a 
state that is both developmental and transformative. This is acknowledged in the Preamble to 
the Intergovernmental Relations Framework (Act No. 13, 2005b:2) which states that:   
 
… one of the most pervasive challenges facing our country as a developmental state is 
the need for government to redress poverty, underdevelopment, marginalisation of 
people and communities and other legacies of apartheid and discrimination … this 
challenge is best addressed through a concerted effort by government in all spheres to 
work together and to integrate as far as possible their actions in the provision of 
services, the alleviation of poverty and the development of our people and our country. 
 
The rationale behind the creation of a system of cooperative governance in South Africa is 
the notion of a ‘whole’ government which delivers resources and development to its citizens 
at the local level in a synchronised manner (RSA, 1998b). It is thus necessary for the 
activities of the three spheres to focus on the development of municipalities through 
combined and synergised plans and actions. This, however, is not an easy task taking into 
consideration the numerous structures operating within each sphere and the number of 
engagements that are required both within and between spheres. Pieterse (2007:13) outlines 
the challenges involved in aligning inter-sphere activity as follows: 
 
The tendency … to have IDPs reflect the entirety of government’s efforts in a particular 
municipal territory is in part driven by the policy imperative to see a tight alignment 
between the NSDP, Provincial Growth and Development Strategies (PGDS) and IDPs. 
However, this alignment is more difficult to realise in practice than commonly 
suggested in formal policy prescripts. The reality is that these three categories of policy 
are actually very different to one another.   
 
Reuben Baaitjies, Director of Intergovernmental Relations at SALGA, agrees that 
cooperative governance is an extremely daunting task and states that ‘for too long, there has 
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been little or no development planning within the other spheres, which means that when local 
government plans, there is no, or precious little, engagement by the other spheres to align 
their programmes with the priorities identified at the local level’ (Baaitjies, 2009:12). This 
perspective was confirmed during interviews with ward councillors and officials1 from line 
departments at the City of Cape Town who maintained that one of the structural barriers 
impacting on the delivery of a transformative developmental state is the overlapping of 
functions of the different spheres and the lack of synergised planning with national and 
provincial structures (Male Official, Cape Town: 13/06/2012; Ward Councillor, Delft: 
06/09/2012; Male Official, Cape Town: 02/05/2013). According to Councillor Van Wyk, 
from Sub-council 5, a lack of coordination between local government and the other two 
spheres of government directly impacts on the needs of local communities: 
 
In terms of the Development State vision, there is a disconnect between National, 
Provincial and Local Government. They start with a blank canvas, but the disconnect is 
between the needs of the people and higher body decisions. What the people’s real 
needs are is not understood and the diversity in wards is not understood. Emotional 
forces and the political landscape play a major role. If one goes into the community we 
can see what the real needs of people are. We cannot predetermine this. We must really 
listen to the people, not the other way around. We are not doing this at grassroots level. 
If we do not deal with this, things will just get worse. We talk about freedom, but look 
at our informal settlements – still the same people are living there (Van Wyk, 
24/09/2013). 
 
Other councillors presented a similar view of the delivery of a developmental state. A 
proportional representative councillor claimed that ‘if we want to achieve national goals at 
the local level and give substance to the idea of a developmental state, we need to combine 
development plans and support each other. Not work in isolation at different levels which is 
what often happens’ (Ntoko, 23/05/2013). Ward councillor Gympies agreed that the notion of 
a development state was not based on current development needs and asserted that 
                                                          
1 During interviews, respondents frequently requested that their anonymity be protected, either due to the 
sensitivity of the topic or due to their position being threatened if it was known that they had made a particular 
statement. Thus, in accordance with these requests, certain statements are recorded by only providing the 
gender, place and date of the interview and indicating whether the respondent is an official, councillor or ward 
committee member.  
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government is out of touch with the reality of circumstances faced in communities. She 
commented that ‘there is definitely a disconnect in the thinking of the developmental state. 
There is lack of alignment somewhere between the greater needs of national government and 
the immediate needs of communities. Our people want satisfaction of their immediate needs, 
such as jobs, housing and safety which are serious problems in most communities’ (Gympies, 
23/05/2013). During a focus group discussion, ward committee members were asked their 
views on whether the government is succeeding in its efforts to deliver the goals of a 
developmental state in the context of Delft. One ward committee member noted that ‘I do not 
want to lie. I do not know about the developmental state. But what I do know is that there is 
no development here on the ground. What the government says is contrary to what is the 
practicality’ (Male Ward Committee Member, Delft: 20/10/2012).    
 
A lack of co-operation is evident in the interface between administrators from different 
echelons of government and between these officials and local politicians. Observation of sub-
council meetings revealed latent tensions between municipal and provincial officials on the 
one hand and councillors on the other. Councillors blamed municipal and provincial officials 
for poorly coordinated planning and budgeting, failure to provide development plans to sub-
council, failure to indicate the on-going status of ward projects and failure to timeously 
release the funding required to implement projects in the sub-council area. One ward 
councillor was of the view that the poor coordination of effort leads to ‘duplication and 
infective utilisation of scarce resources. We often work in silos which impacts on our ability 
to perform optimally. Our community people then lose trust in us and follow the route of “toi 
toing” (protesting) and destroying property’ (Male Councillor, Delft: 19/06/2013). Agreeing 
with this viewpoint, another councillor added that the lack of response from municipal 
officials when requested to provide information on development plans was very frustrating, 
as this impacted on attempts to monitor the provision of services in their ward (Male 
Councillor, Delft, 19/06/2013). 
 
A lack of harmonisation between provincial and local government spheres in the planning 
and delivery of public housing was reported to be a major source of frustration of City 
officials and office bearers alike. The lack of a shared and coordinated vision and the 
duplication of efforts by local and provincial government that this leads to is described by Mr 
Martin Julies, the sub-council manager, as follows: 
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There is no single data base and no coordination of beneficiary lists. As Delft is such a fast 
growing area new people are creating their own leaders and own lists and pleading their more 
dire circumstances in order to be given priority. Some projects are City projects and others 
Provincial projects which results in a very complex and difficult situation (Julies, 23/10/2012).  
 
His concerns were confirmed during a telephonic interview with a provincial housing official, 
who claimed no knowledge of municipal housing projects in Delft and suggested that the 
researcher forward all enquiries in this regard to the City of Cape Town’s Human Settlements 
Department (Female Official, Cape Town: 07/11/2012). However, an official from the 
national Housing Development Agency (HDA), the entity responsible for the acquisition of 
land and the project management of housing services, disagreed that there was duplication 
and lack of collaboration. The Housing Development Agency is established under the 
Housing Development Agency Act (No. 23 of 2008) and operates as a national public entity 
with its executive authority vested in the minister responsible for housing. One of its key 
responsibilities is to ensure that there is intergovernmental collaboration and alignment of 
housing development services (HDA, 2013). While requesting anonymity due to the 
sensitivity of the topic, she commented as follows: 
  
Housing is a very emotional issue and there are many problems surrounding it. We (the 
HDA) are a parastatal and play a facilitative role. There is only one housing list, as 
there is an allocation committee for housing and representatives from the National, 
Provincial and Local Government Human Settlement Departments are members of the 
same committee. The role of the housing allocation committee is to reach consensus on 
the allocation of housing and budgeting and the process is coordinated by this 
committee (Female Official, HAD, Cape Town: 16/07/2013).  
 
Another serious concern raised by officials in Delft is the slow pace of delivery of housing 
and the confusion engendered in the community as to which sphere of government might be 
held responsible. The sub-council manager noted that ‘community members do often not 
understand the difference and vent their anger on their ward councillor and committee 
members when they presume the City is running the project when in fact it is a provincial 
project’ (Julies, 23/10/ 2012). He added that this was a particularly problematic issue in Ward 
106, ‘which is a very poor ward in terms of facilities, and community residents continually 
take out their frustrations on the ward councillor, although this is a provincial responsibility’ 
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(Julies, 23/10/2013). The chairperson of a neighbouring sub-council agreed with this view 
stating that ‘I am quite strict about not taking responsibility if the problem is not a local 
government issue. I will assist and take it to the responsible Provincial Department to follow 
up, but I won’t deal with it’ (Male Sub-council Chairperson, Cape Town: 20/09/2013). In 
attempting to address this lack of understanding, in a number of sub-council meetings 
observed, the chairperson urged councillors to use ward committees and sector organisations 
as a channel of communication to explain the division of powers and respective functions and 
responsibilities of the different spheres to residents, (Rau, 22/05/2013, 19/06/2013; 
23/08/2013). 
 
Although the provision of housing is a designated responsibility of provincial government, 
the City of Cape Town has received housing accreditation from national government which 
enables it to play a more proactive role in the delivery of housing (Pollack, 2011).  Dr Martin 
van der Merwe, the IDP Manager of the City of Cape Town, noted that ‘as an accredited 
housing authority, responsibilities of the provincial housing authority are devolved to the 
local level in order to facilitate more effective housing delivery’ (Van der Merwe, 
02/05/2013). 
 
Another example of the lack of inter-sphere coordination and the failure to align national, 
provincial and local government programmes is to be found in the delivery of local health 
services. According to councillors in the case study area, this lack of alignment has resulted 
in serious duplication of effort and the wastage of scarce resources.  A specific example that 
was discussed at length during a sub-council meeting related to the implementation of a 
national health programme in Delft and the lack of communication and alignment with the 
programmes of the City’s Health Directorate (Sub-Council Meeting, Delft: 19/06/2013). At 
national level, the Department of Health launched a nation-wide polio and measles 
immunisation campaign in April and June 2013 which was to be rolled out through all public 
health facilities at the local level. According to staff from the City Health Directorate, the 
national health campaign was not properly aligned to local government health programmes 
and accordingly City health officials were unable to inform ward councillors in Delft 
timeously of the implementation of the campaign. Confirming the challenge which this posed 
a councillor stressed that the lack of communication and collaboration impacted on the ability 
of local officials to provide an integrated service delivery system and it also meant that ward 
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councillors were unable to inform their constituents as they themselves were not aware of the 
campaign (Male Councillor, Delft: 19/06/2013). A failure to coordinate inter-governmental 
activity, according to another councillor, angered residents who then turned on their own 
councillors. “(T)hese complaints” she commented, “are understandable as immunisation is an 
essential service that should be communicated to the public’ (Female Councillor, Delft: 
19/06/2013). 
 
A further concern raised by officials relates to weak intra-governmental coordination within 
the municipality itself with regard to the planning and implementation of projects. This 
concern further extended to the lack of coordination within departments and this was stated to 
be a factor which constrains officials in fulfilling their duties (Male Official, Cape Town: 
16/08/2012). In some cases poor coordination is attributed to a lack of capacity on the part of 
municipal officials, whilst in others it is attributed to continually changing responsibilities 
assigned to line departments2 and the reallocation of duties, all of which impact on the 
delivery of development programmes (Sub-council Meeting, Bonteheuwel: 20/02/2013; Sub-
council Minutes, 22/05/2013; Sub-council Meeting, Delft: 19/06/2013). 
 
At the intra-sphere level, the lack of communication between the City of Cape Town’s line 
departments and the sub-council regarding service provision became a standard issue on the 
monthly sub-council agenda. One example in this regard, and a matter repeatedly raised at 
sub-council meetings, was the upgrading and maintenance of parks in the sub-council area 
(Sub-council Meeting, Bonteheuwel: 22/05/2013; Sub-council Minutes, Delft: 19/06/2013). 
A specific issue under discussion during one meeting was that the City Parks Department, 
which is responsible for the maintenance of the parks in the City of Cape Town, repeatedly 
failed to communicate progress and to provide documentation relating to its upgrade 
development plan to the sub-council (Sub-council Meeting, Delft: 19/06/2013). An additional 
problem highlighted at the meeting was the delay in implementing service delivery 
maintenance programmes in the sub-council area, despite budget approval. The issue related 
to the on-going debate between the Department of Roads and Storm Water and the City Parks 
Department as to which department is responsible for services such as the maintenance of 
sidewalks (Sub-council Meeting, Delft: 19/06/2013). Once again, councillors felt that the lack 
                                                          
2 The City of Cape Town has undergone a series of organisational restructuring exercises in the past few years. 
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of alignment of duties impacted on their ability to perform their duties and they believed that 
this lead to justifiable dissatisfaction and complaints on the part of the residents in areas 
which were affected by the lack of maintenance. 
 
Other problems cited during interviews and at sub-council meetings as impacting on 
development in the case study area included substandard service from some municipal 
officials and line departments, unspent funds and the lack of timeous provision of business 
plans and action programmes from the various line departments (Male Ward Councillor, 
Bonteheuwel: 20/05/2013; Sub-council Meeting, Bonteheuwel: 23/08/2013; Sub-council 
Meeting, Delft: 19/06/2013). According to a proportional representation councillor, line 
departments were failing to forward IDP plans to the sub-council which was ‘thus kept in the 
dark’ on the extent to which they were meeting their objectives and set targets (Female 
Councillor, Delft: 17/04/2013). Another matter of concern which was raised at sub-council 
meetings, and which was confirmed in interviews with City officials, related to the 
realignment of directorates which involved the redirection of some of their functions to a 
different or new directorate. This resulted in staff changes with new officials taking over 
responsibility for projects in a particular directorate and with consequent delays or inaction 
(Sub-council Meeting, Delft: 19/06/2013; Sub-council Minutes, 23/08/2013). In this regard 
the realignment of the Department of Social Development and Early Childhood Development 
was stated to have impacted on the implementation of ward projects due to the repositioning 
of responsible line department staff and the appointment of a new project manager. 
Councillor Esau remarked that this impacted on the delivery of ward projects in the sub-
council area and contributed to the under-spending of earmarked funding (Esau, 19/06/2013). 
 
From the above it is evident that weak coordination of both intra- and inter-governmental 
activity together with poorly synchronised strategies is inhibiting the goals of developmental 
local government. Weak integration of effort across spheres of government is also 
aggravating resource scarcity at the local level.  
 
8.2 Integrated Development Planning 
 
A range of official documents and media reports assert that, in compliance with statutory 
requirements, there is a comprehensive system of public participation in place to support the 
formulation and implementation of the City’s IDP (City of Cape Town, 2012a, 2012b; IDP, 
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2011a, 2012).  In the Mayor’s Foreword to the current IDP, Alderman Patricia de Lille 
pronounces that ‘we are proud that this IDP has reached over one million people in an 
extensive public participation process. This is proof that the IDP is a plan that belongs to all 
the people of Cape Town; a plan in which they all have a say’ (IDP, 2012:6). Despite these 
claims, empirical evidence (both qualitative and quantitative) indicates that in practice the 
municipality’s IDP process is, to a large degree, a top-down process designed at mayoral 
level and presented to stakeholders for rubberstamping and approval. In particular, it would 
appear as if the Mayor of Cape Town herself plays an important role in the design of the IDP 
as evident in the following statement from a senior City official: 
 
The IDP is the Mayor’s Plan and it is a very important process for her. The mayor is at 
the forefront of the drafting of the IDP document and the shaping of the plan. She goes 
to meetings and listens to people and respondents and their problems and concerns.  
She very much owns the plan which gives it credibility. She also pushes the 
organisation very hard to reach its goals (Male Official, Cape Town: 09/05/2013).  
 
Regarding participation of civil society in the preparation of the IDP, it was acknowledged by 
an IDP official that ‘we are not even close to achieving what the spirit of legislation requires. 
We have initiated a number of participatory activities, but we only manage to access a 
miniscule number of the population’ (Male Official, Cape Town: 02/05/2013). Supporting 
this view a councillor from Delft added that ‘the IDP in its present form is a flawed and 
defective process. If we want to give substance to the government’s vision of a 
developmental state in South Africa, we will have to seriously rethink our existing system of 
local government as the implementing arm of government’ (Male Councillor, Delft: 
23/05/2013). In addition to these sentiments, interviews with a cross-section of officials, 
councillors and ward committee members highlighted a number of recurring themes relating 
to the IDP which they believe impact negatively on the ability of local government to deliver 
a democratic and developmental state. These themes are discussed in the section below. 
 
8.2.1 The Integrated Development Planning process 
 
A discussion with an official from the City of Cape Town’s Public Participation Unit 
revealed that there are both internal and external role-players who provide input into the 
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planning of the IDP. Internal role-players comprise entities within the City Council, namely 
members of the Mayoral Committee (MAYCO), Portfolio Committees, the Executive 
Management Team, the different Directorates and Departments, Sub-councils, Ward 
Committees and other municipal bodies. External role-players include community members, 
community-based organisations, non-governmental organisations, national and provincial 
government, neighbouring municipalities and higher learning institutions (Male Official, 
Cape Town: 16/5/2013).   
 
The Director of the IDP Office, Dr Martin van der Merwe, explained that the IDP process 
takes place at three levels with varying degrees of input from the different stakeholders. He 
explained that the first planning level comprises the corporate planning level, which is the 
responsibility of the Executive Mayor who designs the overall IDP framework on the basis of 
input received from the public through various channels including meetings and surveys. The 
draft IDP is then submitted by the mayor to the IDP Unit, together with a political mandate 
and the parameters within which the IDP must be formulated. The second level comprises a 
technical legislative level which allows limited flexibility in terms of planning options due to 
stringent national legislative requirements and strict oversight with regard to the 
implementation of the IDP and the achievements of set targets. Minimal public input or 
political influence occurs at this level and, according to Van der Merwe, ‘legislation is very 
restrictive in terms of what we can or cannot do’. The third level takes place at community 
level through the sub-council and ward system. However, input at this level is once again 
very limited and is restricted to concerns such as the fencing of parks and the building of 
speed humps. The Director of the IDP Office further maintains that the primary concerns of 
communities revolve around the three issues of employment, safety and housing and ‘these 
can be raised through other channels such as mayoral imbizos, walkabouts and “have your 
say” campaigns’ (Van der Merwe, 02/5/2013). This would seem to imply that the IDP 
process itself is not intended to address the major concerns of local communities and focuses 
instead on relatively minor issues of service delivery such as the installation of speed bumps. 
 
As noted in Chapter 6, the City of Cape Town’s IDP has been developed around five 
Strategic Focus Areas (SFA), namely the Opportunity City (SFA1), Safe City (SFA2), Caring 
City (SFA3), Inclusive City (SFA4) and the Well-Run City (SFA5) and aligned to the annual 
budget. A total of 24 corporate objectives are set for the SFAs and for each objective a 
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number of measurable and quantifiable key performance indicators and corporate targets are 
specified. Subsequently, each objective is further divided into a number of different 
programmes which consist of smaller projects to be initiated in different localities across the 
City of Cape Town’s metropolitan area. Lead directorates and line departments are then given 
responsibility for managing the different programmes and projects that fall within their area 
of specialisation. 
 
Selected officials from various line departments, who are responsible for the implementation 
of the different IDP programmes within the sub-council area, are mandated to provide a 
detailed written report and verbal presentation to sub-council members on a quarterly basis. 
This has proved to be a very significant practice as in this way local government officials are 
held accountable for reaching set targets. Councillors are also given the opportunity to 
discuss the status of projects in their area with implementing officials from the different line 
departments. This system of reporting further provides councillors with additional 
information on such matters as the alignment of departmental strategies with those of their 
provincial and national development counterparts, and this allows them the opportunity to 
request reports from other spheres of government when programmes are not aligned. In this 
way, theoretically at least, councillors have an opportunity to exercise some oversight over 
the activities taking place in their wards. In that regard, it was evident that both the sub-
council chairperson and sub-council manager availed themselves of the opportunity to follow 
up concerns raised at sub-council meetings with line departments, portfolio committees and 
Mayco when required to do so, even if the outcome of their intervention was minimal (Sub-
council Meeting, Bonteheuwel: 22/05/2013; Sub-council Activity Day, Bonteheuwel: 
23/05/2013; Sub-council Meeting, Delft: 19/06/2013; Ward Committee Meeting, Delft: 
17/07/2013). 
 
8.2.2 Public participation in Integrated Development Planning 
 
The Director of the IDP Office acknowledged that ‘although there is an honest and sincere 
desire to involve communities’ it is not so easy in practice ‘as the IDP process is extremely 
complex and requires input from a number of diverse quarters’ (Van der Merwe, 
02/05/2013). One of the officials from the City of Cape Town’s Public Participation Unit 
elaborated on this, noting that one of the many challenges that officials in his unit face when 
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developing participatory mechanisms, is the diversity of communities in terms of language 
and literacy levels. In response to the question of how illiterate residents are included, he 
explained that the policy is to use media such as local radio stations to advertise initiatives 
that are undertaken in the area and to conduct one-on-one ‘door-to-door’ interviews in the 
language of the residents being canvassed. However, he conceded that this approach was not 
followed in the formulation of the IDP, but was used in other initiatives such as the naming of 
streets which could form part of ward allocation projects run by line-departments. He 
acknowledged that an important mechanism to enable participation at the grassroots level is 
the sub-council and ward committee system, although he believed that they are often not 
performing as intended in facilitating participation (Male Official, Cape Town: 16/05/2013). 
 
Although a media statement released by the Executive Mayor of the City of Cape Town and 
advertised on the council website (De Lille, 2013) proclaims that IDP public engagement 
meetings were held in all 24 sub-council areas to gather the views of the public, interviews 
with the Mr Julies, the sub-council manager and Ms Rau, the sub-council chairperson, 
revealed that as many of the sub-councils cover extensive geographical areas, in practice, few 
ordinary residents are given the opportunity to participate in IDP deliberations (Rau, 
23/10/2012; Julies, 23/10/2012). This was confirmed during a focus group discussion held 
with ward committee members and during discussions with ward councillors in Delft. One of 
the ward committee members confirmed that an IDP public meeting had ‘never been held in 
Delft since the local government elections in 2011’ and that the Delft community had not 
been invited to give input in any form into the City’s current IDP (Male Ward Committee 
Member, Delft: 23/10/2012). In that regard a ward councillor admitted that current local 
government structures do not facilitate a bottom-up community-driven process (Female 
Councillor, Delft: 22/05/2013), whilst a proportional representation councillor maintained 
that ‘public participation is a dream. It’s just not possible. Community people do not 
understand the IDP and in any case they are more concerned about getting jobs and putting 
food on the table’ (Female Councillor, Bonteheuwel: 17/04/2013). This conviction that poor 
citizens have no intrinsic interest in participatory processes is further evident in the following 
statement by an official in the IDP Office: 
 
For the majority, they are really worried about bread and butter issues and not the 
IDP. The lack of awareness of the IDP overall in the country is very worrying – current 
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statistics indicate that only 5% of South Africans are aware of the IDP. We accept that 
the overall knowledge of the IDP within the City of Cape Town is very small. Although 
we want people to engage with plans of the city, for many they are just not interested – 
only when it comes to matters of service delivery which actually affects them. Even 
though we want people to engage with plans of the City, many do not engage as it does 
not concern them (Male Official, Cape Town: 09/05/2013). 
  
A chairperson from an adjoining sub-council acknowledged that the participatory process 
throughout the City’s municipal area is defective as a result of it being ‘council driven, not 
community driven and not emanating from the wishes of the people on the ground as required 
by legislation’. He explained that ideally the process should start at grassroots at ward 
committee level and ‘input should be coming in from every area in terms of what the people 
want in their ward. You have got the building blocks in terms of the 111 wards that are giving 
input’, he maintained. ‘These inputs must then be put to the 24 sub-councils who look at it 
and give input from the sub-council point of view’ as  some of the things in the IDP are not 
ward based, ‘they are bigger than ward based’. He noted that additional input such as that 
relating to infrastructural requirements (for example, the sewerage system maintenance) 
would need to be provided by the different line departments as this information would not be 
known to ward committees and councillors. He also indicated that political input would have 
to be given by Mayco members, although he conceded that:  
 
This is what should be done, but it isn’t. I don’t disagree that this is not a participatory process 
- but no-one will do anything about it. You have actually got the line departments dictating in 
my opinion, because you get presented with a budget which the line departments draw up. And 
surely that must be in line with the IDP? (Male Subcouncil Chairperson, Cape Town: 
18/07/2013).  
 
One of the official reasons for the lack of public participation was stated to be the weakness 
of civil society and its failure to engage in participatory processes. According to a City of 
Cape Town official: 
  
If you don’t have organised civil society, if they just have to tick the blocks, then they 
just tick the blocks. To me it’s much more beneficial that they (the public) just tick the 
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block. We are dealing with civil society. They are not readily available. Every year 
before the IDP meeting then they must just tick the block.  What do they do for the rest 
of the year? The whole process is flawed (Female Official, Cape Town, 18/07/2013).  
 
A similar observation was made by a ward councillor who was of the view that the lack of 
‘voice’ in the process of participatory decision making in the IDP stems from the fact that 
‘community people are not well organised’ and they need ‘to also start taking responsibility 
for their development needs’ (Female Councillor, Bonteheuwel: 23/05/2013).  
 
Irrespective of the validity of these claims, and a tendency to blame the victims, the lack of 
meaningful participation in the IDP process was a recurring theme by officials, councillors, 
ward committee members and sector representatives. Furthermore the absence of effective 
institutionalised structures for participation is likely to be a contributing factor to the 
recurrent community protests that take place in Delft on a monthly and sometimes weekly 
basis highlighting the dissatisfaction of community residents with their living conditions and 
the use of protests as a last resort to have their voice heard and to exercise agency. These 
protests also suggest that the frustration displayed by communities is, in part, due to the fact 
that the promise (endlessly repeated in policy documents and by political leaders) that their 
expressed needs and opinions will be taken into consideration is seldom if ever fulfilled. 
 
Using the insights provided by respondents in the foregoing section, it appears that the lack of 
participation can be attributed to three major flaws in the current IDP process. Firstly, the 
methods of gathering input from the public are only reaching a very small sector of the 
population and are thus failing to not identify the tangible development needs of 
disadvantaged communities. Secondly, and linked to the first constraint, the current use of 
public input appears to be based predominantly on the views of the more literate and 
advantaged sectors of the society and this serves to further exclude the poor and 
marginalised. Finally, the participatory mechanisms to elicit community input, namely sub-
councils and ward committees, are inadequate structures for the promotion of citizen 
participation. It is thus unsurprising that the vision of a developmental state that is intended to 
deepen democracy and decrease inequality, poverty and unemployment is not being reflected 
in any significant way in the case study area. 
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8.2.3 Alignment of local, provincial and national development plans 
 
While the overall vision of a developmental state in South Africa remains a strategic focus of 
national government, as expressed in the NDP, the actualisation of this vision, as indicated, is 
intended to commence at local government level through the mechanism of Integrated 
Development Planning. In this context it was deemed necessary to determine how the City 
aligns its IDP to the NDP in order to assess how national objectives of developmental local 
government, and ultimately the goals of a developmental state, are given effect at community 
level. It is evident that, formalistically at least, the IDP is supposed to be fully aligned with 
the NPD and other national and provincial planning strategies. As the Director of the IDP 
Office explains:  
 
Many of the other policy documents flow from the IDP – and are included as 
annexures. Planning the IDP is a total iterative process and it is carefully aligned to 
the NDP. Although some documents take a longer term view, all development in a 
municipal area must be aligned. Sometimes the long view is different to problems that 
we face today. For example a ten year plan may focus on certain issues and problems, 
but we might find that in a particular area a problem such as safety and security 
becomes an issue. Then one will need to adapt to that, but unfortunately that adaption 
takes time. One can compare this adaption to trying to change the direction of an 
elephant charging at full speed - how does one do this – the answer is slowly (Van der 
Merwe, 02/05/2013). 
 
This approach is evident in an internal departmental spread sheet which sets out how NDP 
objectives are aligned with those in the City’s IDP. For the purpose of this research only a 
selection of objectives, actions and deliverables have been extracted from this document and 
these are illustrated in Table 10.1 below. Each of the three NDP objectives listed in the table 
are drawn from Chapter 13 of the NDP which aims to create ‘a state that is capable of playing 
a developmental and transformative role’. 
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Table 8.1 Alignment of the National Development Plan and Integrated 
Development Plan 
 
NDP Objective  NDP Action IDP Objective IDP deliverable 
A state that is 
capable of playing 
a developmental 
and transformative 
role 
No action directly impacting 
on local government found 
in the IDP 
Objective 3.1 
Providing access to 
social service for 
those who need it 
 
Programme 3.1 (a) 
Number of targeted and 
development programmes 
 
A state that is 
capable of playing 
a developmental 
and transformative 
role 
No action directly impacting 
on local government found 
in the IDP 
Objective 3.2 
Ensure increased 
access to innovative 
human settlements 
for those who need 
it 
Programme 3.2 (a) 
Use property and land to leverage 
social issues 
Provide beneficiaries with secure 
freehold title 
Relations between 
national, provincial 
and local 
government are 
improved through a 
more proactive 
approach to 
managing the 
intergovernmental 
system 
Use differentiation to ensure 
a better fit between the 
capacity and responsibilities 
of provinces and 
municipalities. Take a 
proactive approach to 
resolving coordination 
problems and a more long-
term approach to building 
capacity 
Objective 3.2 
Ensure increased 
access to innovative 
human settlements 
for those who need 
it 
Programme 3.2(c) 
Partner with Province in education 
and school sites through a review 
process which has been initiated 
between the City and the Provincial 
Department of Education in which 
all vacant educational assets are 
being assessed in terms of whether 
they should be released to other 
forms of development.   
 
 
For each NDP objective an accompanying action has been listed and this is aligned to an IDP 
objective with specified targets. Since interpretation of the objectives and targets needed to 
support the NPP is at the sole discretion of the City (in other words, they are not agreed to in 
consultation with provincial and national government) it cannot be said that the process of 
planning is an integrated one. The City, in practice, determines which aspects of the NDP it 
wishes to pursue in its IDP and in which way. 
 
The NDP objective of creating a state that is capable of playing a developmental and 
transformative role, is aligned to IDP Objective 3.1 entitled providing access to social 
services for those who need it, together with IDP Objective 3.2 entitled to ensure increased 
access to innovative human settlements for those who need it. The deliverable in both cases 
finds expression in the Strategic Focus Area 3 of the IDP (one of the five SFAs of the City’s 
IDP), namely a Caring City. As the exact number and nature of IDP deliverables is not 
provided in the spread sheet, an analysis was conducted of the City’s 2012/2013 Five Year 
Corporate Scorecard as this sets out the specific targets of each IDP deliverable as reflected 
in the Service Delivery and Budget Implementation Plan (SDBIP, 2013). For IDP Objective 
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3.1, the Corporate Scorecard lists the implementation of seven social development 
programmes and 25 recreation hubs as targets. Bearing in mind that there are 111 wards in 24 
sub-council areas, and 14 sub-councils are either situated completely within the Cape Flats or 
include townships on the Cape Flats (City of Cape Town Sub-council Map, 2013), these 
targets appear to be decidedly inadequate in terms of addressing the needs of poor and 
disadvantaged. 
 
With respect to IDP Objective 3.2, which specifies the number of public housing units to be 
delivered annually, the Corporate Scorecard sets a target of providing only 12 281  units for 
the entire metropolitan area. Given the vast number of informal settlements, backyard shelters 
and temporary relocation areas currently within the City’s boundaries and the dire need for 
housing, repeatedly expressed by City officials and councillors in Delft and elsewhere, it is 
evident the delivery of such a limited number of housing units will have very little impact in 
providing accommodation for marginalised households and in improving their quality of life. 
To place this in perspective, besides a vast number of backyard shacks, there are currently 
377 informal settlements within the boundaries of the city (Van der Merwe, 02/05/2013) and 
an estimated housing backlog of 350 000 units (City of Cape Town, 2013). Considering the 
fact that only 3 802 subsidised housing units and 60 rental units were provided for poor 
families during the 2011/2012 financial year (City of Cape Town, 2012c) and considering the 
continuous in-migration into the City, the slow delivery rate does not bode well for the 
elimination of housing shortages in the municipality in the foreseeable future. 
 
In that regard, according to officials, councillors and ward committee members interviewed, 
conditions in Delft appear to be deteriorating with respect to the provision of formal 
accommodation and other services as migrants continue to stream into the area. This is borne 
out, as indicated, by the growing number of housing protests in the locality. Illustrative of the 
scale of the problem, during a ward committee meeting attended by the researcher a resident 
asked when her family would be given a house as they had been on the waiting list for ten 
years.  The sub-council manager informed her that she would still have to wait a very long 
time as those currently being assigned housing were residents who had been on the waiting 
list for 25 years (Julies, 17/07/2013). Amongst those in most dire need of formal housing are 
the residents of the Blikkiesdorp temporary relocation area which was considered by a ward 
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committee member as to be no better than a slum. He described the conditions in the area as 
follows: 
 
This is worse than during apartheid. These people live in these one-room tin sheds like 
cattle. They are treated like prisoners by the police. It’s an insult to one’s dignity. 
Don’t talk about democracy – where’s the democracy here? You tell me (Male Ward 
Committee Member, Delft: 19/06/2013).   
 
The NDP objective of improving of intergovernmental relations is presented as 
corresponding well with Objective 3.2 of the IDP, which refers to the need to increase access 
to human settlements. Somewhat incongruously, the IDP deliverable in this instance is stated 
as the need to liaise with the Provincial Education Department to review educational and 
school sites that could be used for other forms of development. Although this deliverable 
could potentially increase access to human settlement opportunities, there is no guarantee that 
it would increase the housing stock per se and increase access to accommodation by the poor.  
Although housing has been identified, by officials, councillors and residents alike, as one of 
the most critical issues facing the municipality, the growing backlog in housing provision 
suggests that relatively little headway is being made in addressing the problem. However, 
despite the fact that the delivery of housing is a concurrent responsibility of all three spheres 
of government there is little in the City’s IDP of how inter-governmental coordination might 
be improved and better alignment of policy and planning objectives achieved. In that respect, 
the planning alignment which is evident in the IDP appears to be little more than an exercise 
in legislative compliance with little consideration given to the dynamics of how this might 
come about in practice. 
 
One of the major constraints to more effective intergovernmental co-operation and the 
alignment and delivery of national objectives appears to be fact that provincial and local 
government officials in the Western Cape, for the most part, demonstrate a very limited 
understanding of the concept of a developmental state. It follows that if a basic understanding 
of national government’s vision of a developmental state is either lacking or limited at 
provincial and local government level, the strategies to implement such visions will 
accordingly be inadequate due to divergent views and the absence of a common purpose. The 
lack of a ‘common developmental grammar’, which according to Johnson (1995) is a 
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prerequisite of a successful developmental state, will undoubtedly detract from efforts to 
implement such a state at the local level. In that respect, not only is the term ‘developmental 
state’ not included in the City of Cape Town’s IDP, but the majority of officials interviewed 
have either ‘not heard of the term’ or stated that it is not used in their departments or in 
official documentation. This was reflected by the comments of a senior official who stated 
rather self-consciously that ‘I must be honest, but I have not heard of a developmental state in 
the work I do in this department or at any meetings with other departments. Even when I 
attend mayoral meetings this term is not used’ (Male Official, Cape Town: 20/05/2013). 
Likewise, in the Provincial IDP Assessment Annual Report of 2012/2013, prepared by the 
Western Cape Government’s Department of Local Government (WCGDLG, 2013), no 
mention is made of a developmental state. On the other hand, as has been seen, at national 
level the term is used far more frequently and can be discerned in a range of documents and 
most notably in the recently launched National Development Plan. 
 
8.2.4 Challenges 
 
There are a number of challenges that appear to impact on the ability of the City of Cape 
Town to develop and implement an IDP that reflects local needs and improves the quality of 
life of disadvantaged communities in particular. The most pressing challenges relate to the 
complexity of the IDP process, its scheduling after local government elections and the size of 
wards and methods of gathering input from residents; each of these is discussed below. 
 
8.2.4.1 The complexity of the Integrated Development Planning process 
 
Notwithstanding a media statement published on the City of Cape Town’s website referring 
to the City’s IDP as ‘a clear, concise and reader-friendly’ document, in reality the technical 
language is seen as a problem in a number of quarters. Ms Rose Rau, Sub-council 5 
Chairperson, points out that the technical language used in the IDP is beyond the 
understanding of the majority of residents throughout the City of Cape Town (Rau, 
17/04/2013). Dr Martin van der Merwe, IDP Manager, agrees, noting that ‘although the IDP 
is the primary strategy of council in terms of the development needs of the City, for most 
community people the notion of an IDP is a mystical concept’ (Van der Merwe, 02/05/2013). 
At sub-council level, many councillors report that the highly technical format of the IDP and 
 
 
 
 
  
207 
use of difficult concepts and terminology is not only confusing but also intimidating. This 
complaint is understandable as many councillors have limited technical expertise. One 
councillor stated that even IDP report-back meetings were difficult to understand due to their 
technical nature, and she recommended that ‘the IDP shouldn’t be such a highfalutin’ thing’ 
(Female Councillor, Bonteheuwel: 23/09/2012). In a context where officials and local 
political office bearers struggle to comprehend the technical content of the IDP, it stands to 
reason that the ordinary people will experience even more difficulties and will thus not be in 
a position to make any positive contribution even if presented with the opportunity to do so. 
 
The lack of understanding of terms and concepts used in the IDP and its implementation 
process was further emphasised during a sub-council meeting and subsequent interviews with 
councillors. At the meetings an exchange took place between an IDP official and a ward 
councillor who requested information from the official on the way in which ward projects 
were aligned to the IDP. The reaction from the official was that she would forward the IDP to 
sub-council so that councillors could ‘see how the objectives of the IDP are reached’. In 
reality, ward projects are not linked to the IDP as they are projects that are identified in 
specific wards after the IDP has been finalised and specific funds for this purpose are 
channelled from council to wards through sub-council. Both the request for information and 
the response suggest that neither the IDP representative official nor ward councillor fully 
understood the concept or the functioning of the IDP. This lack of knowledge was further 
demonstrated when a number of councillors requested training sessions on the IDP in order to 
better equip themselves to give meaningful input when requested to do so. These findings 
provide further insight as to the reasons why community members fail to participate in IDP 
discussions. In a context where the councillors have a limited understanding of the process it 
is unlikely that meaningful IDP discussions will take place at ward committee level, let alone 
at sector level, which is the only level where grassroots participation can take place and 
development needs can be expressed. 
 
8.2.4.2 The scheduling of the Integrated Development Plan 
 
Another recurring challenge highlighted by respondents relates to the timing of the IDP after 
the municipal elections and the urgency with which a municipality has to compile the final 
plan. The Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs stipulates that local 
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governments must prepare their IDP within a time frame of nine months. The manager of 
Sub-council 5 explained the challenges in this regard as follows: 
 
The problem with the IDP is the need to decide quickly on its content and there is not 
enough time given to the process after elections. This is why only sub-councils give 
inputs, not wards as it takes time to establish both sub-councils and wards after 
elections. Sub-councils must be established first and only then wards. These are the 
structural problems that we face in terms of involving community residents (Julies, 
20/09/2012). 
 
He conceded that although it is desirable for both councillors and ward committee members 
to provide input into the IDP as a means both to identify local needs and to comply with 
legislative requirements, in practice this is not possible due to a number of constraints. One 
such constraint is the lengthy process of establishing ward committees (as vehicle for public 
participation) after the elections. Thereafter ward committee members have to arrange public 
meetings with their sectors which, in large geographical areas such as Delft, are difficult to 
set up and attendance is often poor. Mr Julies further emphasised the need for ward 
committee members to receive training as ‘they are the extra hands and feet of local 
government and need to feel competent in what they do as they have an important role to 
play’ (Julies, 20/09/2012. This need was confirmed by one of the committee members at a 
ward meeting when he requested that more training be given to committee members ‘to 
enable them to play their role more effectively’ (Male Ward Committee Member, Delft: 
17/07/2013). 
 
An additional problem relating to the timing of the IDP is the requirement of preparing an 
IDP which is linked to the five-year term of office of councillors (DPLG, 2004). After 
government elections, as indicated, each local authority has just nine months in which to 
develop their IDP and this, according to an official from the IDP Office, is a ‘massively 
complex and demanding task’ which requires input from so many levels and is ‘an enormous 
responsibility’ in terms of planning for development in an area (Van der Merwe, 02/05/2013). 
This is a recurring challenge as at the end of every five-year cycle, new government elections 
result in the selection of new councillors and officials and the need arises once again to 
provide training and to formulate a new IDP. 
 
 
 
 
  
209 
 
8.2.4.3  The size and diversity of wards  
 
Another challenge relates to the large size and diversity of many wards and the methods used 
to gather information within them. In that regard, the Director of the IDP Office maintains 
that ‘the mere size of the city and some of the wards present an enormous number of very 
complex challenges’ (Van der Merwe, 02/05/2013). In similar vein, a councillor observed 
that the demarcation of boundaries of sub-councils and wards ‘often makes things very 
difficult as these divisions result in different impacts’ (Male Councillor, Bonteheuwel: 
23/05/2012). For another councillor, some of the wards are so large and accommodate such a 
diversity of neighbourhoods that it is almost impossible to attend to the development needs of 
the different groups, ‘let alone feed these needs into the IDP’ (Male Councillor, 
Bonteheuwel: 23/05/2012). 
 
Besides the size of wards, the way in which information is required to feed into the IDP 
presents its own set of difficulties. Commenting on this, a neighbouring sub-council 
chairperson asserted that: 
 
As we have such diverse communities, there is no one size that fits all. On the one hand 
you are going to insult the rocket scientist, but on the other hand if you are requesting 
information from someone who has never been asked for input in the past and you give 
it in a way that is indecipherable you are not going to get a response. The biggest 
problem with the IDP is that the way they are requesting information is inadequate – if 
you look at the IDP inputs for example, people are saying for instance that they don’t 
have enough street lights – what do you do with that information – you cannot do 
anything unless you phone the person and ask them where are the street lights 
inadequate. We don’t have the capacity to do that (Sub-council Chairperson, Cape 
Town: 22/09/2012). 
 
He explained that besides the need for careful formulation of questions used to collect input, 
there was an urgent need to provide feedback to residents: 
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Another problem with the current IDP process and gathering input is there is no 
feedback. The person says I would like this for example. The next year the same thing 
happens. That person never gets feedback. I understand the logistics that you cannot go 
back and give feedback to 4 000 people. But you know what – if you can’t afford the 
service then don’t start the service (Sub-council Chairperson, Cape Town: 
22/09/2012). 
 
The shortcomings outlined above point to the complexity of eliciting information on the 
needs and aspirations of very diverse segments of the population of Cape Town. However, it 
does also point to the inadequacy of the participatory systems which have been established 
and the fact that many of the practices introduced by the City to encourage citizen input are 
carried out in a very perfunctory manner. 
 
8.3 The sub-council and ward committee system 
 
The sub-council and ward committee system in the City of Cape Town, as discussed, has 
been established in order to give expression to the notion of developmental local government. 
As noted in preceding chapters, sub-councils are responsible for a range of service delivery 
functions and tasks and they are held responsible for addressing development challenges at 
the local level. The ward committee system is designed to provide citizens the opportunity to 
guide decision making and to influence policy through their representative organisations. 
 
8.3.1 The sub-council system 
 
In an interview the chairperson of Sub-council 5 was asked to provide her views on the 
structure and functioning of the sub-council and its role in delivering ‘developmental local 
government’ to communities. She explained that ‘the sub-council chairperson and sub-
council manager are the face of the sub-council’ and, together with wards, ‘sub-councils are 
tools that bring local government closer to the people and encourage participation’. However, 
she emphasised that this is by no means an easy task and the facilitation of public 
participation ‘is very challenging and a huge amount of energy is necessary to make it 
happen’ (Rau, 20/10/2012).  
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It is of interest to note that in the context of Delft party politics was not seen as a constraint to 
the effective functioning of the sub-council The majority of councillors interviewed felt that 
party affiliations were not a problem and that there is a ‘good relationship between the 
different political parties’ in the sub-council and that they worked well together ‘on the 
whole’ (Male Councillor, Delft: 20/02/2013; Female Councillor Delft: 24/02/2013). This was 
confirmed through observation of sub-council meetings and activity days (Sub-council 
Meeting, Delft: 17/04/2013; Sub-council Meeting, Bonteheuwel: 22/05/2013, Sub-council 
Activity Day, Bonteheuwel: 23/05/2013). 
 
Nevertheless, local politics do inevitably have an influence on local affairs. In that respect 
there appears to be an inherent tension in the roles assigned to ward councillors and 
councillors appointed on a proportional basis. In that connection one councillor noted though 
that ‘there is not always a good match when appointing proportional representative 
councillors as they are sometimes from opposing political parties and this can create many 
problems in a ward’. In response to the question of whether party politics play a role in the 
sub-council area, the response was ‘yes there is sometimes abuse as councillors can use their 
political influence to appoint ward committee members and are then in a position of power to 
persuade them to support [their] recommendations, but this is not always the case’ (Female 
Councillor, Delft: 27/09/2012). This viewpoint was confirmed by other councillors who 
indicated that party politics was a discernible dynamic within Delft and played a role in 
determining the structure of ward committees. This impacted on the functioning of the ward 
committee as members would then make development decisions that were politically 
motivated and not necessarily in the interest of the broad majority (Sub-council Meeting, 
Bonteheuwel: 23/05/2013). 
 
The terms of reference of sub-councils, set out in the City of Cape Town’s Council 
Overview, asserts their duties as being ‘to make recommendations to Council on any matter 
affecting its area of jurisdiction; to exercise any power, duty or function delegated to it by 
Council in respect of its area of responsibility; and to exercise any power, duty or function 
conferred upon it in terms of the Sub-council Bylaw’ (City of Cape Town, 2012c:12). 
However, the administration and management of such a large and diverse sub-council is by 
all accounts ‘a massively daunting responsibility’, to use the phrase of a senior municipal 
official. Challenges include the wide range of stakeholders from different line departments 
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who are required by to provide input into the delivery of services and development initiatives 
and the low socio-economic status of its residents and their lack of basic needs. The sub-
council chairperson, Ms Rau, commented that ‘if you think of the physical size of the sub-
council, it will often appear as if we as councillors are not doing our work. But you must keep 
in mind that besides our other duties we are controlling 96 ward projects and these are often 
delayed due to the line departments not doing their work’ (Rau, 17/07/2013). 
 
It is evident that the work of the sub-council is further hampered by the manner in which 
wards have been demarcated. In this delimitation the sub-council has been divided in two by 
a large tract of land which accommodates the Cape Town International Airport and adjacent 
industrial sites. This section of land divides the sub-council into two halves and physically 
separates two sets of three wards. As a consequence, one of the sub-councils three wards is 
situated mainly in Bonteheuwel, on one side of the airport, while the others are in Delft. The 
division, not unexpectedly, impacts on the administration of the sub-council and results in the 
duplication of certain functions.  
 
A further demarcation challenge relates to the establishment of a new ward in Delft following 
the 2013 elections. Prior to these elections Delft had comprised two wards, namely Delft 
North and Delft South. After the elections Ward 106 was included extending along the entire 
western boundary of Delft North and Delft South.  While the new ward was established to 
accommodate the rapidly growing population of Delft (Female Councillor, Bonteheuwel: 
22/05/2013), there have been complaints that the new political structure lacks basic facilities 
and services. According to a councillor ‘the redrawing of ward boundaries has given some 
wards hardly any infrastructure. When wards are drawn they only see voting numbers but not 
facilities’ (Male Councillor, Delft: 19/06/2013). This is evident in Ward 106 which has few 
facilities, poor services and substandard residential structures which are mainly situated in 
temporary relocation sites. A further problem highlighted by municipal officials and 
councillors (Male Official, Cape Town: 02/05/2013; Male Councillor, Delft: 20/06/2013; 
Female Councillor, Delft: 20/06/2013), is the fact that Ward 106 has become the location of 
choice for migrants moving into the metropolitan area and it is the second-fastest growing 
ward in the City of Cape Town with an in-migration rate of 315%3 per annum. In the context 
                                                          
3 This data is based on 2011 figures supplied by Statistics SA and reworked by the Department of Geographical 
Information Systems at the City of Cape Town (DOGIS, 2013).  
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of an existing housing shortage, this rapid growth has become a major concern for both 
officials and councillors alike. 
 
As previously indicated, sub-council offices are located in both Bonteheuwel and Delft and 
meetings are held alternatively at the two sites to enable councillors and the public equal 
access. Meetings are held monthly and are advertised on the sub-council website and the 
forthcoming agenda and minutes can be viewed and downloaded by the public and other 
interested parties prior to meetings. The sub-council manager and administrative personnel 
are responsible for convening the meeting and attendance is compulsory for all councillors 
and representatives of the City of Cape Town line departments such as the Departments of 
Sport and Recreation, Health, Traffic Services, Solid Waste, City Parks, Law Enforcement, 
Spatial Planning and Urban Design, Human Settlements and Finance. 
 
Sub-council meetings are well structured and the chairperson adheres strictly to recognised 
meeting procedures. At the commencement of meetings members are presented with detailed 
documentation including the minutes of previous meetings and line department reports. On a 
quarterly basis, line department representatives present their departmental activity reports 
which provide information on the current status of development projects in the sub-council. 
Matters typically addressed relate to applications for land use departures, law enforcement 
problems, service delivery and maintenance issues, traffic services and the C3 notification 
system. While the public is invited to sub-council meetings, they are not permitted to 
participate in deliberations. If residents wish to bring a particular matter to the attention of 
sub-council, they first need to inform their sector organisation by forwarding a written 
statement explaining the problem. This is then tabled at the sector meeting and conveyed to 
the ward committee through the sector representative in his or her role as ward committee 
member. The ward councillor then decides how to proceed with the matter either by raising it 
at sub-council or attending to it through consultation with one of the relevant city council 
departments. 
 
The functioning and effectiveness of the ward committee system was not only a recurring 
theme amongst councillors and officials but it was also a topic that triggered some emotional 
responses from councillors.  The diverse range of concerns raised about the ward committee 
system related to flawed selection procedures, the poor representation of groups, the limited 
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power of ward committees to influence decision making, and the lack of capacity of 
committee members to serve as the interface between sub-council and the community. 
Problems associated with the use of sector organisations as vehicles for community 
representation were referred to in the previous chapter, and it is evident that this system leads 
to the capture of participatory processes by a small local elite. Thus, according to one 
councillor: 
 
In my ward, all the same people are members of the different sector organisations. All 
they do is change their names around and then they serve together on the ward 
committee. I have been working in this ward for 40 years – I know these people and we 
must take them to task. They are also the ones who are always protesting in the ward 
(Female Councillor, Bonteheuwel: 19/06/2013). 
 
A further limitation of the system of sector representation raised by the sub-council 
chairperson relates to the administrative burden of continually ensuring that sector 
organisations are registered and listed on the City of Cape Town’s database. For members to 
be eligible to serve on ward committees their organisations need to be officially registered. 
She noted that recent communication between the sub-council and council revealed that of 
the 400 organisations currently operating in Delft only 190 were compliant with regard to 
registration on the council’s database. Thus, of the 44 ward committee members currently 
active in the sub-council, only 22 members satisfied the required legislative criteria (Rau, 
19/06/2013). 
 
A further concern raised by officials and councillors is the youthfulness of some ward 
committee members and their ability and commitment to perform fulfil their obligations. 
Commenting on this the sub-council manager maintained that ‘he could be a very young 
person of 20 and subsequently his organisation decides to replace him for example. Also he 
must be a responsible person as he has to communicate problems of his organisation to the 
ward committee and once it has been forwarded through the system and decisions are made, 
he must then feed decisions back to his sector’ (Julies, 19/06/2013). Some members, he 
asserted, failed to fulfil these responsibilities. 
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In the context of these concerns, some councillors viewed the ward committee system to be 
as a superfluous and ineffective structure as evident in the following comments: 
 
It is my belief that there is not really a role for the ward committee. I know as ward 
councillor what the problems are in the ward. Perhaps when there is a diverse ward, 
then there is a role for a ward committee but, where you have a single community there 
is not really a role for a ward committee if the ward councillor is doing a proper job 
(Female Councillor, Delft: 20/09/2012). 
 
First of all you’ll find that the ward committee members are not participating 
effectively. According to me, the system is not working. There is a need to monitor what 
they do so that they start working to serve the people. They only participate when they 
come to get their salary (Male Councillor, Delft: 23/05/2013). 
 
The ward committee is a waste of time and money. If you have a good ward councillor 
why do you need a ward committee? We know our area and know what the problems 
are, so why would we need a committee to tell us this? (Female Councillor, Delft: 
28/09/2012). 
 
However, other councillors challenged these sentiments, commenting that ‘we must 
remember that ward committee members are not councillors and are not supposed to do the 
job of councillors. It is our responsibility to work closely with them and to guide them in their 
work’ (Female Councillor, Bonteheuwel: 19/06/2013). Another respondent agreed that some 
ward committees were working well together, but conceded that there is a need to focus on 
those wards where the committee system was not functioning (Male Councillor, 
Bonteheuwel: 21/06/2013). One repeated problem raised related to the failure of ward 
committee members to attend meetings and/or their failure to send letters of apology prior to 
meetings. This resulted in their ultimate replacement and a lengthy process of new elections 
to fill the vacancies in that they had ‘failed to take their Code of Conduct seriously enough’ 
(Sub-council Chairperson’s Report, 20/04/2013). 
 
Although the need to encourage participation and to enable local citizens to participate in 
decision making was frequently stressed by the more experienced councillors, many do not 
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appear to understand the true meaning of the concept and fail to accord it the necessary 
seriousness. 
 
For the most part, councillors appear to view the C3 system as the most appropriate vehicle 
for citizen participation as it permits them to report service delivery problems to a focal point 
in the City’s administration.  This perception is based on comments made by councillors and 
ward chairpersons to the effect that the C3 system ‘is the mechanism that allows people to 
participate’ (Sub-council Minutes, 22/05/2013). In reality, this system only enables a reactive 
response to an identified municipal service fault and it does not represent a democratic 
process that facilitates the engagement of citizens in decision making based on identified 
needs and priorities. 
 
Generally speaking, the evidence generated suggests that the current participatory approach 
used by most councillors in the case study area neither encourages participatory governance, 
nor is it representative of what Cornwall (2002b; 2004a) refers to as an ‘invited’ space for 
corroborative decision making between the state and civil society.  This is partly attributed to 
a lack of understanding of the concept of participation, but it can also be ascribed to the 
inability and/or lack of capacity to use participatory methods to engage and deliberate with 
the community. This aspect will be discussed further in the following section. 
 
8.3.2 The ward committee system 
 
The ward committee system, as indicated, is intended to serve as a conduit for 
communication between the local authority and society and to that extent it has an important 
role to play in building a developmental local government which works with ‘citizens and 
groups within the community to find sustainable ways to meet their social, economic and 
material needs and improve the quality of their lives’ (RSA, 1998b: Section B (1)). 
 
The ward committee system operates in terms of the municipality’s Rules for the 
Establishment and Election of Ward Committees (City of Cape Town, 2011b). In terms of 
these rules, once a ward councillor has determined the composition of the ward committee 
and the sub-council has endorsed his or her proposal, the recommendation is forwarded to the 
council for final approval. Sub-council minutes indicate that the scheduling of ward meetings 
 
 
 
 
  
217 
is determined by sub-council (Sub-council Minutes, 23/08/2013). However, the majority of 
ward committees in the case study area do not have a full complement of members, implying 
that there are sectors in the community (and by implication individuals) which remain 
unrepresented (Ward Committee Meeting Minutes, Delft: 10/04/2013; Ward Committee 
Meeting Minutes, 18/04/2013; Ward Committee Meeting Minutes, Bonteheuwel: 15/04/2013; 
Ward Committee Meeting, Bonteheuwel: 10/04/2013). Further difficulties relate to poor 
attendance and the fact meetings are often inquorate. In such cases ward meetings are 
postponed and rescheduled. Observation of ward committee meetings and an examination of 
the minutes of meeting reveal that absenteeism is a recurring problem, not only on the part of 
ward committee members but also on the part of ward chairpersons and proportional 
representative councillors. Under such circumstances, ward committee members have been 
requested to chair meetings (Ward Committee Meeting Minutes, 18/04/2013). Considering 
that ward meetings only take place once every two months, repeated absenteeism impacts on 
the optimal functioning of the committee. 
 
The sub-council chairperson observed that ‘a healthy ward committee is a reflection of a 
good councillor’. However, she noted that one of the major constraints to effective ward 
committees is the fact that members are not appointed on a full-time basis as theirs is ‘an 
impossible job to do part time as Delft is such an overcrowded area with so many problems’. 
A further challenge is the need to provide training and capacity building for both ward 
chairpersons and ward committee members: 
 
Building capacity is essential. This has been a huge shortcoming, but the City identified 
this need and sorted out training.  When ward committees are inaugurated they have to 
get training – this is a process that all wards have to go through throughout South 
Africa so that all ward members are on the same page and understand what their role 
is. This is the same for all officials and councillors at national and provincial level 
(Rau, 17/07/2013). 
 
The first training and capacity-building opportunities presented to current Delft ward 
committee members took place in March 2013. The aim of the training was to provide 
members with an understanding of their responsibilities as ward representatives, of the 
protocols which they need to follow, and of the need to encourage participation by their 
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fellow residents. The training is reported to have been a success and the sub-council 
chairperson claimed that ‘I can now confidently say that ward committee members have a 
good grasp of their roles and responsibilities and are passionate about making a contribution 
in their wards’ (Rau, 17/04/2013). This view was affirmed by a ward committee member who 
stated that ‘the training was really good – it took the form of different role-playing activities 
and made us understand our duties as ward committee members much better’ (Male Ward 
Committee Member, Delft: 18/04/2013). However, this was the only capacity building 
offered to ward committee members and it was stated that there was a need for further 
training. 
 
Ward committee members also expressed the need for a much closer working relationship 
with their ward councillors. Calling for more frequent engagement with councillors than the 
bi-monthly ward committee meeting, one member stated: 
 
I am finding my role as ward committee member quite challenging. I respect my 
councillor but I need more interaction with her – not only once every two months at the 
ward committee meeting. This is not just for myself, but for all our ward committee 
members. The morale is down because there is no interaction and we want to be more 
involved. It is important for us to work with the ward councillor and that she can reflect 
on our views and see that we want to work (Male Ward Committee Member, Delft: 
17/07/2013). 
 
Supporting this view, another member stated that ‘we are new to this so we need to interact 
more and meet on our own with our ward councillor before the ward committee meeting so 
that we can discuss issues that we want to raise’ (Male Ward Committee Member, Delft: 
17/07/2013). In this instance, the ward committee chairperson agreed with the proposal and 
resolved that she meet with the committee informally in each alternate month (Female 
Councillor, Delft: 17/07/2013). 
 
A dynamic that was clearly evident during ward meetings and interviews with both 
councillors and committee members is the unequal power relations that exist between the 
sub-council and ward committees. As one councillor’s conceded: 
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The ward committee does not have much power – and its impact is very dependent on 
the ward councillor who might not represent all in the ward. Although there are some 
ward councillors who work very hard and really try to make a difference, others do just 
the absolute minimum (Female Councillor, Bonteheuwel: 20/09/2012).  
 
This statement aside, on many occasions it was observed that some councillors exhibited a 
rather domineering attitude towards ward committee members. This was evident in the 
manner in which they assumed a dominant role in the selection of development initiatives and 
in general decision making in their wards. Some councillors would, in an authoritarian 
manner, frequently overrule suggestions made by committee members. This is reflective of 
the limited confidence which some councillors hold in the ability of ward committee 
members to play a meaningful role. This was evident in the disparaging remarks made about 
ward committee members at some sub-council meetings and the paternalistic manner in 
which they were sometimes addressed by councillors. 
 
A lack of meaningful engagement with formal council structures was raised on a number of 
occasions by ward committee members, particularly with reference to the process of ward 
project allocations (Male Ward Committee Member, Delft: 23/09/2012; Male Ward 
Committee Member, Delft: 18/04/2013; Male Ward Committee Member, Delft: 19/06/2013). 
The allocation of ward projects4 is a system which enables communities to identify and 
prioritise development needs through their sector and ward committees. As the majority of 
people are excluded from formal IDP processes, for the reasons previously mentioned, the 
ward allocation process one of the few meaningful opportunities for residents to influence 
development decisions. The process of identifying projects was described by a councillor as 
follows: ‘Wards must submit a ward plan. A ward plan is like a wish list of the different 
items that are needed within a ward’. It was important, she maintained, for ward committee 
members to prioritise their development requests, although she conceded that ‘it is often very 
difficult to know where to start as there is such a need, but ward committees must prioritise 
and decide how to use their allocation on development priorities’ (Female Councillor, Delft: 
21/09/2012). 
                                                          
4 Apart from development projects identified in the City of Cape Town’s Integrated Development Plan, the City 
provides each of the 24 subcouncils a specific additional allocation for the purpose of enabling ward committees 
to identify development projects according to the needs expressed in the wards. 
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When this viewpoint was presented to ward committee members during a focus group 
discussion, they strongly disagreed, maintaining that public participation practices in Delft 
were virtually non-existent and decision making was decidedly top-down. In most cases, it 
was stated, decisions were predetermined by the councillor. According to one ward 
committee member ‘ward councillors have all the power and they decide what development 
is needed here – it is not a democratic process at all and very frustrating’ (Female Ward 
Committee Member, Delft: 14/06/2013). Another ward member confirmed this opinion as 
well as the lack of opportunities for participation in the identification and allocation of ward 
projects: 
 
The ward councillor does not allow us to make decisions on how to spend ward 
allocations. Of the R700 000 allocated to our ward, we (the ward committee) were only 
given an amount of R20 000 and were told to come up with a project. It’s the same for 
all the ward councillors – they make the decisions and then come and tell us what to do 
(Male Ward Committee Member, Delft: 14/06/2013). 
 
The top-down nature of deliberations described by respondents above and the limited 
opportunity which exists to engage in and direct decision making was further confirmed 
during a discussion with a councillor. In response to the question on how ward committees 
identify and prioritise development projects in their wards, he stated that: 
  
We get all the ward committee members together in one room. Each ward committee 
member must then write on a piece of paper what their requests are for their ward 
projects. Then we (sub-council) type out all the requests. If the request is not part of 
local government’s mandate, we delete the request. We then take the requests to council 
or to the respective line departments for approval. Sometimes the line departments are 
not interested and the request is struck off the list. We need to keep record of this 
though, so that we can take this decision back to the ward committee who can inform 
the sectors. The City of Cape Town officials actually decide and it is up to the line 
department at the end of the day to decide. But then the request has to fall within the 
R700 000 that is allocated to each ward for their projects (Male Councillor, Delft: 
17/07/2013). 
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The gatekeeping role performed by various municipal line departments surfaced as a further 
dynamic of power relations in the case study area.  It was reported that in order to have ward 
projects approved, councillors would sometimes have to resort to ‘lobbying’ officials for the 
approval of projects. This issue also emerged during discussions with senior City of Cape 
Town officials where it became evident that line departments play a very significant role in 
determining the selection of development initiatives (Male Official, Cape Town: 20/09/2013). 
The power struggles that ensue not only detract from the effective and democratic 
functioning of the ward committee system but they also impact on the ability of sub-councils 
to initiate development projects in their area of jurisdiction. These findings support Gaventa’s 
(2004b:157) contention that those who shape the spaces have power over the spaces of 
participation. 
 
However, a number of councillors felt that the ward committee system had an important role 
to play and they emphasised the need to nurture and support ward members to enable them to 
fulfil their mandate. As a long-serving member of the sub-council remarked:   
 
As our main focus as ward councillors is to promote grassroots democracy we must 
pay full attention to public participation. There is often lack of communication from our 
side to the community and we must communicate our role. The only way I can get 
results is through public participation and reaching the people. But they must also take 
responsibility, mobilise and initiate projects which is what I encourage them to do 
(Abrahams, 22/05/2013). 
 
Ward committee members were asked to explain how wards function in Delft and to indicate 
their roles and responsibilities as members of the ward committee. They responded that their 
role was to advise the councillor on matters in the ward, to assist in monitoring service 
delivery, particularly the C3 notification system, and to assist in understanding and 
identifying the needs of the community. They stated that their role was only advisory and 
they had no formal powers and that ‘all decisions are made at council and sub-council 
meetings and are implemented here’ and that sub-council decisions ‘are told to us at ward 
meetings’ (Focus Group Discussion, Delft: 23/10/2012). When asked to evaluate how 
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effective councillors were in fulfilling their mandates, a ward committee member provided 
the following insight: 
 
One of the councillors, he did nothing. But if you are not doing the good thing you will 
not last. We had a very bad one who did nothing for the people, but this one was always 
protected by the officials even if he did nothing. It is different now. Now there is a new 
councillor who is doing the right thing’ (Male Ward Committee Member, Delft: 
17/05/2013). 
 
The responsibilities of ward committee members were further communicated to them by the 
ward chairperson at ward committee meetings. They were advised to assist ward councillors 
in identifying problems such as drain blockages, unpaved sidewalks, broken street lighting 
and so forth and were encouraged to either forward the location of the problem to the sub-
council or submit it to the ward councillor who would then send in a combined report to the 
relevant line department (Focus Group Discussion, Delft: 23/10/2012). 
 
Besides the shortcomings of the system of sector representation already discussed, the 
procedure of relaying information to community members under the pretext of ‘participation’ 
would appear to be structurally flawed in that ordinary citizens are given very limited 
opportunity to participate in community matters in terms in an on-going basis. According to 
both councillors and ward committee members, the current participatory process starts at 
community level when residents identify needs through their sector organisations. Thereafter, 
the sector representative (who frequently represents more than one organisation in his or her 
sector), is supposed to relay the information to the ward committee during one of the six ward 
meetings that are held each year (Rau, 17/07/2013; Ward Committee Meeting, Delft: 
17/07/2013; Focus Group Discussion, Delft: 23/10/2012). In reality, as discussed above, ward 
committees meet less frequently. It is subsequently the responsibility of the ward councillor 
to take the matter further, either by tabling it on the agenda of a sub-council meeting or by 
relaying the request to one of the City’s line departments. This represents the institutionalised 
mechanism that has been established to ensure that communities are consulted.  
 
According to the sub-council chairperson, the Council Speaker plays an important role in 
ensuring that the required reporting protocols are adhered to, and that, following ward 
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meetings, ward committee members have to meet with their sectors and provide the 
Speaker’s Office with the agenda of the meeting, the minutes of the meeting and the 
attendance register (Sub-council Meeting, Delft: 19/06/2013; Ward Committee Meeting, 
Delft 17/07/2013). The sub-council assists with the organisation of sector meetings by 
advertising their time and by providing the venue. Sub-councils must additionally submit 
quarterly reports to the Office of the Speaker on the activities of wards and sectors (Sub-
council Chairperson’s Report, 19/06/013). In this way the Office of the Speaker is able to 
ensure that sub-councils, ward committees and sectors follow the prescribed procedures as 
stipulated by legislation. However, the formalistic dimensions of this process aside, it does 
not, for the reasons discussed, ensure meaningful citizen engagement and nor does it 
represent a shift in power relations as they exercise little influence over decision making in 
their neighbourhoods. Furthermore, when it is taken into consideration how few of the 
residents of Delft are represented by a sector organisation it becomes clear that the prospects 
for participating in issues which affect  the daily lives of ordinary citizens are limited and, for 
most, non-existent. 
 
In addition to the legislated sub-council and ward committee and sector feedback meetings, 
other mechanisms used to encourage public participation in council matters include general 
public meetings, ward councillors’ quarterly feedback meetings and housing steering 
committee meetings. The dates of these meetings are advertised on the sub-council website. 
The chairperson of the sub-council noted that the ward councillors’ meeting is a new addition 
and is used to communicate progress on development projects to community members. These 
meetings are held in each of the wards in the sub-council area in order to ‘give the 
community the opportunity to hear from their ward councillor about the progress that has 
been made on the ward business plan and serves as a forum for residents to engage with the 
ward councillor on community affairs’ (Rau, 22/05/2013). However, these additional 
participatory opportunities offer limited platforms for engagement and are for the most part 
focused on information feedback sessions by councillors who represent the dominant voices 
in the community.    
 
8.4 Concluding comments    
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Drawing on the collective evidence presented above, it can be inferred that the lack of 
development in the case study area can be attributed to a variety of different factors, one of 
which includes the failure to advance an effective system of participatory governance. 
However, it is also certain that a range of other factors such as a lack of funding for 
development initiatives and poor intra- and inter-governmental coordination in the integrated 
planning process combined with a rapid growth in the population have all served to hamper 
development intervention. Although a lack of funding (and particular funding to house the 
influx of new residents) is not an issue easily resolved at local government level, where 
revenue-generating opportunities are restricted by legislation, a failure to promote an 
effective system of citizen participation is less explicable. 
 
This chapter has shown that, despite the existence of the necessary legislative framework to 
promote inter-governmental coordination, the integration of planning processes between the 
three spheres of government is weak. This manifests itself in poor communication between 
national and provincial and local government in the implementation of national policies but is 
also evident in the limited alignment of planning processes. In what should be a central 
characteristic of a development state, the chapter has revealed that the formulation of an IDP 
in the City of Cape Town is only loosely based on the National Development Plan and that it 
is left to the municipality itself to decide on which aspects of the NDP it should focus. While 
official discourse has suggested that the South African developmental state will be 
constructed in a top-down and bottom-up fashion, it is evident that the two processes remain 
largely distinct and far from integrated. 
 
The IDP process, as indicated, is intended to be the key instrument through which 
municipalities engage with their citizens in the formulation of strategic plans for each 
council’s five-year term of office. However, evidence from the City of Cape Town’s own 
reports, which together will empirical evidence generated in Delft, suggests that, in what is 
supposed to be an inclusive process, the overwhelming majority of its citizens are excluded 
from participating in the formulation of the IDP. While this might be attributed, in part, to the 
complexity of involving a highly diverse citizenry, it is also evident from the case study of 
Delft that participatory processes are implemented in a top-down and perfunctory manner. 
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This is never more apparent in the system of sub-councils and ward committees which are 
intended to be the frontline interface between citizens and the local state. The evidence from 
Delft suggests that the design of the ward committee system, based as it is on sector 
representation, serves to effectively exclude the majority of residents. Furthermore, the 
discretionary powers and resources available to sub-councils are so limited that any decisions 
which they can make are unlikely to improve conditions for residents in any substantive way. 
In this context, it is perhaps not surprising that many local councillors have little interest in 
participatory processes and merely go through the motions of consulting their constituents. 
Thus, while legislative compliance is ensured, there is little serious attempt to elicit the views 
of ordinary people and to incorporate them into policy. To that extent the participatory 
practices documented in the case study area are reminiscent of the technicist approach 
adopted in the 1980s by major funding institutions such as the World Bank, which focused on 
project effectiveness and the reduction of project costs (Cooke, 2004; Mohan & Hickey, 
2004). This is a far cry from the transformative goals spelt out in so many national policy 
documents which stress that citizen participation will lead to the empowerment and 
upliftment of the poor and to the deepening of democracy. It is also provides little evidence 
that progress is being made in the establishment of developmental local government. 
  
The concluding chapter which follows will revisit the research propositions advanced in the 
opening chapter and will reflect on the extent to which the South African government is 
succeeding in its quest to build a system of developmental local government in the country. 
In particular it will examine the defining characteristics of developmental government 
outlined in policy and legislation and, in particular its emphasis on citizen participation, and 
will discuss the degree to which it has achieved its objectives. Finally, it will also reflect on 
the extent to which developmental government, such as it is, is contributing to the building of 
a national developmental state. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
This thesis set out to critically examine the South African government’s attempts to construct 
a developmental state and, as part of this process, to establish a system of developmental 
local government. In this it drew inspiration from the achievements of East Asian 
developmental states and their policy of state-led macroeconomic planning. However, despite 
the demonstrated economic success of these countries it is evident that the East Asian model 
of a developmental state was, in many respects, sui generis in that it came about in a 
particular historical, geo-political and socio-cultural context that may not easily be replicable 
elsewhere in the world. It is also apparent that the methods adopted by these states were often 
authoritarian and they operated counter to the accepted norms of modern democracies. This 
realisation prompted debate on whether a democratically oriented model of a developmental 
state is possible and, if so, what its determining features might be (Heller, 1999; White, 1988; 
Rodrik, 2004; Leftwich, 1995; Mkandawire, 2001). Further discussion revolved around the 
question of whether it was possible to build developmental states in Africa, given the 
extensive political, economic and administrative challenges faced on the continent. The 
experiences of Botswana and Mauritius, however, suggest that it is indeed possible provided 
national policies are advanced in a consistent and concerted way over a sustained period. 
 
For much of the past two decades the ruling party and government in South Africa have 
stated their intention to establish a developmental state in an array of official statements and 
policy documents (Presidency of South Africa, 2009, 2010; ANC, 2005, 2007a, 2007b, 
2009). The approach to this project, as discussed, has been inconsistent although it has gained 
momentum and the idea of a developmental state now forms part of the way in which the 
state portrays itself. Nevertheless, since it first entered official discourse the concept has 
never been clearly articulated in policy or in legislation and it is consequently understood in 
different ways in the public domain. Furthermore, in portraying itself as a developmental 
state South Africa differs from other states which have assumed this mantle only after they 
achieved a significant degree of economic success. In that respect a number of scholars have 
pointed out that the litmus test for a state aspiring to be known for its developmental 
attributes is not the intensity of its rhetoric, but rather its visible development outcomes. It 
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was against this criterion that the South African developmental state was assessed in this 
investigation. 
 
9.1 Focus of the research 
In the context of successful developmental state experiences elsewhere, the core thrust of this 
thesis has been to investigate the extent to which the South Africa government is 
accomplishing its vision of implementing a developmental state at the local level through the 
vehicle of integrated development planning. The research, as stated in chapter one, was 
premised on three key propositions, the first of which was that South Africa is struggling to 
construct a democratic developmental state due to the fact that concept has been poorly 
defined and articulated in policy and legislation. Linked to this was the premise that there is 
an inherent contradiction between the neo-liberal model of the state currently in operation 
and ambitions to create a strong interventionist developmental state. The second proposition 
was that the bottom-up notion of developmental local government is limiting prospects for 
the growth of a strong national developmental state. The third proposition was that despite 
the fact that developmental local government is intended to entail a strong component of 
citizen participation, in practice the integrated development planning process (which is key to 
the participatory process), is carried out in a top-down, pre-determined fashion which inhibits 
effective community participation. 
 
Due to its proximity to the population, local government has been portrayed, in both policy 
and legislation, as the foundation of a democratic developmental state in South Africa and the 
space where development outcomes are to be realised. In this context, a key dimension of a 
democratic developmental state is the need, prescribed in legislation, to engage citizens in 
governance processes and to promote a form of co-determination in policy formulation and 
planning. At the local level the process of integrated development planning is seen to be the 
key vehicle through which participatory democracy, and by implication participatory 
development, will be advanced. The system of participatory development is further supported 
through the mechanism of sub-councils and ward committees which are intended to serve as 
the interface between citizens and the local state.  These participatory structures were 
examined in some depth in the township of Delft in order to assess the extent to which they 
supported the participation of residents and led to improvement in their livelihoods. 
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9.2 Theoretical reflections 
In order to frame the analysis of South Africa’s attempts to construct a developmental state 
through the vehicle of developmental local government this research began with a review of 
theoretical understandings of the factors which gave rise to the East Asian developmental 
states in what here is described as the 20th century developmental model. Thereafter 
discussion focused on what has now loosely been described as the 21st century model of the 
developmental state which has been extensively influenced by the wave of democratisation 
which swept much of the developing world in the latter decades of the twentieth century. 
These two models, in different ways, have informed thinking about the establishment of a 
developmental state in South Africa.  
 
For this purpose of this discussion, the analytical framework illustrated in Figure 9.1 has been 
designed to enable reflection on developmental state theory and to review major scholarly 
contributions on the topic.  
 
Figure 9.1 Theoretical and analytical framework of Developmental States  
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9.2.1 20th Century Developmental States 
 
Theoretical analysis of the 20th Century development states, and the successes of the macro-
economic planning systems adopted by South East Asian nations, was used as a starting point 
to inform this research. In that regard, a number of scholars highlight the importance of the 
policy measures designed by capable political elites and the significance of rational and 
deliberate planning (Johnson, 1999; Pempel, 1999; Beeson, 2003; Evans, 1995). The 
discourse of political-economists positioned the developmental state on a spectrum 
somewhere between a free-market capitalist system and a centrally planned socialist system 
(Woo-Cumings, 1991), whilst other theorists stressed their interventionist nature in directing 
economic development towards specific socio-economic goals (Johnson, 1982; Robinson & 
White, 1998). Despite contestation in the literature on the distinguishing features of East 
Asian developmental states, there is some consensus on three broad thematic influences, 
namely those relating to the ideology of developmental states, the context in which they were 
established, and their structural characteristics.  
 
Whilst a large volume of literature describes the ideology/structure nexus of developmental 
states, few examine its ideological content in any great depth. Before the turn of the 20th 
century, the developmentalist ideology underpinning the Asian developmental state focused 
almost exclusively on economic growth (Murakami, 1992; Castells, 1992; Edighei, 2007) and 
scant attention was paid to social development goals and the enhancement of citizen welfare. 
This was clearly a secondary concern for Asian states at the time. The primary task of such 
states, in the words of Johnson (1982:306) was to ‘be a developmental state - and only then a 
regulatory state, a welfare state, an equality state, or whatever other kind of functional state a 
society may wish to adopt’.  However, both Mkandawire (2001) and Taylor (2001) point out 
that Asian developmental states were not without ideological foundations and nationalism 
was to play an important role in encouraging the population to sacrifice for the ‘greater 
good’.  What is presumed, but not articulated to any great extent in the Asian developmental 
state literature, is that the net result of its economic growth and industrial expansion would be 
a general increase in living standards, which, in turn, would provide political legitimacy, 
promote the growth of national cohesion, national autonomy and liberation from outside 
controls. In other words, the national consensus necessary to drive the development process 
was contingent on demonstrated improvement in the livelihoods of the population and this 
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gained momentum as the benefits of economic growth began to spread to all sectors of 
society. 
 
Many scholars, as indicated, emphasise the critical role that contextual factors played in 
economic successes of East Asian developmental states and stress that attempts to replicate 
the model will not easily be achieved (Johnson, 1999; Schaller, 1997; Mathews, 2006; 
Pempel, 1999). This is because a series of geo-political factors, contingent on the Cold War, 
led to the provision of considerable amounts of aid to those East Asian states which were 
perceived to be the frontline in the struggle against communist expansion. Conditions within 
these states were also instrumental in determining the economic course which was followed. 
Thus, a limited resource base led to an emphasis on trade, whilst low opportunity costs, 
labour intensive activities, a passive workforce and low wages were further key factors which 
facilitated the expansion of the economy (Bagchi, 2000; Onis, 1991; Broham, 1996). Whilst 
some authors believe culture and the Confucian doctrine were important contributors to the 
success of East Asian developmental states, others contest the extent of their influence. What 
is not in dispute, however, is that East Asia’s integration into the global economy, as a result 
of assistance from the United States, provided access to foreign markets and direct foreign 
investment which accelerated economic growth. It is also evident that the geographical 
location and strategic positioning of East Asian nations opened up opportunities for intra-
regional economic cooperation which was mutually beneficial to these states (Woo-
Cummings, 1999). 
 
From a structural perspective it is clear that these states shared a number of common 
characteristics which enabled them to sustain rapid economic growth and bring about social 
transformation (Mkandawire, 2001; UNCTAD, 2007; Evans, 1995). These included strong 
state-led planning, the existence of a powerful and insulated meritocratic bureaucracy and a 
competent civil service, state administrative capacity and strategic leadership. Other features 
included relative autonomy from social forces, a strong state business alliance, 
authoritarianism and a weak and subordinated civil society (Leftwich, 2002; Edigheij, 2005). 
Export oriented economic policies, investment in research and development, technological 
transfers and the protection of infant industries were further contributing factors to the 
economic successes of these states and their performance legitimised state efforts and 
approaches (Johnson, 1982).  
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9.2.2 21st Century Developmental States 
 
21st Century development thinking influenced understanding of the functioning of democratic 
developmental states and their role in bringing about socio-economic transformation. Whilst 
earlier explanations of development fixed on the notion of capital accumulation and the 
supposed ‘trickle down’ effect, new thinking suggest that to be relevant, developmental states 
should focus on organisational change (Hoff and Stiglitz 2001:389) which is characterised by 
participatory people-driven transformation and strong state/society ties (Leftwich, 2000; 
Edigheji, 2010; Fritz & Rochas Menocal, 2007). These shifts in development thinking were 
prompted by the seeming unsustainability of 20th century developmental states and they 
emphasised the critical importance of good governance, relevant institutions and the building 
and expansion of capacities (Rodrik 1999, Evans, 2010; Alkire, 2002). Thus, a number of 
writers stressed that attempts to produce a successful 21st century developmental state would 
require a strong capable state with a common developmental vision, a high calibre 
bureaucracy, a growth oriented leadership, democratic enabling institutions and a skilled staff 
(Meyns & Musamba, 2010; Sangweni, & Mxakata-Diseko, 2008). The new thinking required 
a shift of mindset from a narrow focus on the need for synergies between the state and 
capitalist elites and the insulation of the state from public pressures groups, to a more 
inclusive ‘bottom up’ set of ties with civil society (Edigheiji, 2010; Evans, 2010).  
 
It is far easier to discern the ideological underpinnings of 21st century democratic 
developmental states, and they are thus of great use in evaluating South Africa’s attempt to 
build a state that is developmental in orientation. Here, the literature is far more expansive on 
the developmental intentions of these states which typically include social welfare, 
transformation, equality, freedom and expansion of opportunity. Key debates draw attention 
to the democratic nature of new developmental states, the types of institutions that must be 
built to deliver developmental outcomes with an explicit focus on addressing poverty and the 
redistribution of the fruits of development (Routley, 2012; Leftwich 2008; Musamba & 
Heyns, 2010). The importance of public deliberation, the fostering of equitable, inclusive 
development and an insistence on social justice are new themes which have emerged in 21st 
century developmental state literature (Gumede, 2009; Deen, 2011). For such states 
developmental outcomes will include a reduction of poverty and inequality, an increase in 
employment, wider access to essential services, improvements in general living conditions 
and quality of life, and broader social inclusion (Fritz & Menocal, 2007; Edighei, 2010).  
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9.2.3 Developmental states and participatory theory  
 
A key component of a democratic developmental state is the participation of civil society in 
decision-making processes. This feature distinguishes it from the authoritarian states of South 
East Asia. One of the key themes in democratic developmental state discourse and people-
centred development is the role of agency in decision-making processes. This has been 
underlined by scholars such as Mohan and Hickey (2004), Cleaver (2004), Jennings (2007) 
and Padarath (2006) who emphasized the value of active citizenship in terms of empowering 
a nation and transforming society. However, despite the South African government’s 
repeated commitment to a participatory and inclusive developmental state in South Africa, as 
argued by Marais et al (2007) and evident in policy documents, research findings in the case 
study area reveals a top-down state-society relationship where the state apparatus, following 
Gramsci (2003), is coercive, rather than enabling and empowering in its engagement with 
community representatives and residents.  
 
The insights of Bourdieu (1979) relating to how agents construct social reality in accordance 
with their perceived hierarchical position or ‘habitus’ (which is linked to the assets they 
possess), assisted in enabling a more in-depth understanding of the survey responses in the 
case study area of Delft and the implications of these findings. Bourdieu (1979) holds the 
view that the lower socio-economic status of certain groups impacts negatively on their 
relationship with authority figures due to feelings of inferiority and intimidation.  Similarly, 
survey responses revealed that a large number of residents in the case study area are of the 
opinion that going to meetings set up by local authorities to discuss development issues 
would be a waste of time. They stated that past experience has proven that their opinions 
would not be deemed important by the authorities and that councillors would not be 
interested in their point of view even if they attended meetings. The vast majority of residents 
living in the case study area are low income earners with poor educational qualifications and 
are, in certain cases, intimidated by councillors and the technical language used by officials.  
 
These survey findings also bring to mind certain aspects of Giddens’s (1984) theory of 
structuration which draws attention to the complex dialectical relationship between official 
structures and popular agency and the danger of continually reproducing existing structures 
through the actions of agents. Like Lefebvre (1991), who maintains that knowledge serves 
power, Giddens (1984) supports Bourdieu’s contention that the knowledge and capabilities of 
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the different actors play a significant role in the recreation of social practices and 
reproduction of structures as they reflect and rationalise their particular context. This insight 
can also be applied to the South African context. Despite intentions to create meaningful 
participatory systems in South Africa and to enable grassroots residents to exercise popular 
agency and to participate in development decisions through Integrated Development Planning 
and institutionalised participatory structures such as the ward committee system, research 
findings highlight the reproduction of patronising practices of the past and the persistence of 
manipulative social practices that require community input as a formality to legitimise state 
decisions. These findings further support conclusions drawn by authors such as Hicks (2006), 
Skenjana and Kimemia (2022), Mantzaris and Ngcobo (2008) and Friedman (2006) who in 
research elsewhere in South Africa found unequal power relations at the local level, 
unresponsive bureaucrats and the exclusion of community members from formal 
participatory mechanisms.   
 
Giddens’s (1984) contention that the transformation of society requires reflexivity, which in 
turn is determined by insight and knowledge, highlights the need for both training and 
capacity building of all actors in the participatory process, including officials councillors, 
community representatives and grassroots residents. Both councillors and ward committee 
members in Delft indicated a need and desire for capacity building (during interviews and at 
sub-council and ward committee meetings) as this would enable them to play a more 
meaningful role in fulfilling their respective mandates. This lack of capacity is not only a 
problem within the case study area, but it is also, according to Hollands (2011) and Sangweni 
and Mxakata-Diseko (2008), sorely lacking in other areas and within different levels of 
government in South Africa.  
 
Both personal observation, attendance at meetings and discussions with officials, councillors 
and ward representatives revealed the existence of different layers of power dynamics within 
the political structures. Local government officials clearly held the most power in terms of 
decision-making and in many respects took on a gatekeeping role with regard to enabling 
development interventions in Delft. Whilst councillors were dependent on the decision-
making powers of the local authority and support for their requests, they in turn controlled 
development decisions and inputs from ward committee members, who were representing the 
broader community. Such power imbalances are clearly impacting on the establishment of a 
transformative developmental local state as the needs and priorities of local residents are 
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clearly not being incorporated in decision-making. These findings are in line with the work of 
Foucault (1967; 1977) who elaborates on the different types of spaces of social interaction 
and the operation of power within such spaces, which can be both exclusionary and 
‘disciplining’ in the hands of authorities. Likewise, Escobar (2011) and Gaventa (2006) assert 
that those who shape the spaces, which in the case study area is the responsibility of local 
government, have the power over it and typically fashion it according to their own 
predetermined objectives. The findings of this research support the assertions of these authors 
and although such institutionalised participatory platforms have the potential to promote 
more meaningful state-society relations and to enable the exercise of agency, officials and 
councillors use these sites as platforms to enforce pre-determined development plans and to 
gain the passive acquiescence of community representatives.  
 
It is further important to heed the work of scholars such as Freire (1972), Fals Borda (2001), 
Cleaver (2001), Hickey and Mohan (2004) and Cornwall and Coelho (2007) who elaborate 
on the implications of oppressive participatory structures and their impact on development 
intentions. Rather than enabling the creation of a critical consciousness, empowerment and 
the attainment of social justice, the ultimate aims of public participation, the top down 
practices of developmental local government within the case study area is marginalising and 
disempowering residents and reproducing the inequalities which have characterised South 
African society for many generations. Whilst Lefebvre (1991:51) reminds us that space is not 
a void but is a ‘politically instrumental’ tool used ‘by all kinds of authorities’ as a means of 
control and domination, Cooke and Kothari (2001) are of the view that the increasing number 
of manipulative forms of participation merely serves to reproduce decisions of the ‘already 
powerful’. Despite a repeated commitment to participatory discourse in official policy 
statements (Presidency of South Africa, 2009, 2010, 2011) and its framing in legislation such 
as the Local Government White Paper (RSA, 1998b), Municipal Structures Act (RSA, 2000) 
and Draft National Framework for Public Participation (RSA, 2005a), the overall findings of 
this research show little evidence of meaningful participation.  
 
In general terms, current participatory practices in the case study area can be defined as local 
authority officials paying lip service to the notion of participation and using institutionalised 
participatory mechanisms as a smokescreen to satisfy the need for compliance with 
legislative requirements. It is evident that this practice is also prevalent in other communities 
throughout South Africa according to authors such as Buccus, Hemson, Hicks and Piper 
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(2007), Williams (2006), Tapscott (2008) and Thompson (2008).  It is therefore unsurprising 
that Delft residents, due to their dissatisfaction with the official ‘invited’ spaces of 
participation established by government, have resorted to ‘inventing’ their own spaces of 
participation which take the form of protests. Williams (2008:3) refers to these platforms as 
spaces of resistance or ‘counter spaces’, while for Ramjee and Van Donk (2011) and 
Mathoho (2011) protests represent the only vehicle that grassroots residents have to express 
their dissent if the formal spaces are not enabling meaningful engagement. These protests are 
escalating in the case study area and can be interpreted as a reflection of the frustrations of 
residents living in temporary and makeshift structures with poor access to basic services and 
lacking decent quality of housing.  
 
9.2.4 The South African Developmental State  
 
There is a wide body of literature which discusses what might be the components of a 
developmental state in South Africa (Van Dijk & Croucamp, 2007; Gelb, 2006; Fine, 2007, 
2008; Randall, 2007; Poon, 2009; Thomas, 2008; Makgetla, 2008; Southhall, 2006; Nzwei & 
Kuye, 2007; Levin, 2008). One such theme focussed on the need to incorporate such 
democratic principles as citizen participation, social inclusion and state/society synergies into 
a South African model of the developmental state (White, 2006, Edighei, 2010; Erwin, 2008), 
Others underline the critical importance of economic growth as a necessary precondition for 
funding developmental interventions and addressing poverty and inequality (Ashman, Fine & 
Newman, 2010:26; Misra-Dexter & February, 2010; Bhorat & Van der Westhuizen, 2010). 
Two opposing views have led to a robust debate. One, voiced mainly by government 
officials, alludes to the ‘current existence’ of a South African developmental state (ANC, 
2009; ANC, 2007b, The Presidency, 2009b), despite any supporting empirical evidence to 
support this claim, whilst an opposing view advanced by academics and political 
commentators refute the existence of a South African developmental state due to its inability 
to produce developmental and transformative outcomes (White, 2006; Gelb, 2006; Weiss, 
2010; Netshitenzhe, 2011; Fine, 2007, Maphunye, 2009; Kenny, 2010). A further theme 
focuses on the need to include good governance, on the importance of building appropriate 
institutions, and on the need to enhance capacity as a means to bring about developmental 
outcomes (Mokaba, 2001; Evans, 2010; Gelb, 2010; Habisso, 2010). 
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From an ideological perspective, it is evident that the ANC-led government is cognisant of 
the importance of the need to foster a developmentalist approach which embraces 
participatory democracy, the transformation of society and a human oriented development 
agenda (Edighei, 2010; Gumede, 2011). However, unlike the context in which the East Asian 
developmental states achieved their growth (Bagchi, 2000; Leftwich, 2008; Woo-Cumings, 
1999; Johnson, 1999), the South African context presents a very different challenge due to the 
historical legacy of discrimination, high poverty levels and inequality, low levels of literacy, 
comparatively weak regional integration and a culturally diverse and heterogeneous 
population. In that respect, writers such as Fakir (2007) are critical of the government’s 
failure to take into account these contextual factors and stress that its failure to do so 
undermines developmental efforts. With regard to the structural characteristics of the South 
African state, a number of writers have pointed to a weak bureaucracy, inefficiency and a 
lack of skills, weak alliances with the public sector, poor leadership, corruption and the 
government’s pursuit of neoliberal economic policy as detrimental to efforts to construct a 
state that is developmental, pro-poor and transformative (Fine, 2008; Butler, 2010; 
Maphunye, 2009; Mokaba, 2001; Mantzaris & Ngcobo, 2008). Furthermore, it is argued, 
despite the government’s developmental state discourse, political rhetoric has not been 
translated into any meaningful efforts to transform the structural features of the state such that 
it is able to deliver a developmental mandate.    
 
9.3 Summary findings of the research 
The foregoing review of the literature provided a theoretical framework with which to assess 
the manner in which the South African government has set about constructing a 
developmental state, and in particular the construction of a system of developmental local 
government, and with what effect.  Discussion in the section which follows focuses on the 
findings from the case of Delft and it reflects on the manner in which a number of factors, 
cumulatively, are serving to constrain the establishment of developmental local government 
in Cape Town. These challenges, which operate at both the macro and micro levels, are 
summarised in Figure 2 and discussed in greater detail below. The summary findings of the 
research indicate that contrary to government claims that it is a developmental state, the data 
suggests that in its current form it is decidedly non-developmental. This is because measured 
against the objectives of transformation, redistribution and an expressed commitment to 
participatory democracy, very little progress has been made. 
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Figure 9.2: Factors impacting on efforts to build a South African Developmental State 
 
9.3.1 Macro-level influences 
Both empirical findings in the case study and official documents point to a number of macro-
level influences which are preventing transformation to a developmental state in South 
Africa. These include slow economic growth and diversification, a weak bureaucracy and 
civil service, and poor intergovernmental collaboration and coordination.  
 
Slow economic growth and diversification: Although South Africa’s aspiration to emulate 
the Asian development model through strong state intervention would seem an appropriate 
strategy to grow the economy and widen inclusion, a paradox has been the government’s 
unrelenting pursuit of a neoliberal economic policy framework which has not a brought about 
the desired level of growth. Despite its stated pro-poor orientation, the ANC government’s 
embrace of unfettered free market principles is in effect enriching a small elite, whilst the 
majority of citizens are becoming more impoverished. This is confirmed by current economic 
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data released by Statistics South Africa (2013a) which shows trends of sluggish economic 
growth and increasing unemployment, which does not bode well for efforts to decrease 
poverty and inequality. Low labour participation rates are attributed to the persistently low 
GDP growth rate of 3.2%, between 1993 and 2013, and this impacts predominantly on 
previously disadvantaged black and coloured population groups (Statistics South Africa, 
2013b). Survey results in the case study area and in the wider Cape Town metropolitan area 
reflect these national trends with employment cited as the most critical need of residents. 
During a seminar session presented by Minister Trevor Manual on the National Development 
Plan and future prospects for South African, he emphasised that a growth rate of at least 5.7% 
would be required for sustainable development and the creation of decent employment in 
South Africa (Manuel, 27.08.2013). 
 
Weak state bureaucracy and public service sector: Both the literature and case study 
findings reveal that the poor performance of the local state is due to indecisive leadership, the 
lack of strategic vision, a poorly trained bureaucracy, an unskilled public, and the lack of 
political will to bring about transformation. An uncoordinated and weak central government 
system, poor sequencing of interventions and non-aligned strategies and budgeting remain 
serious constraints which, as evident in this research, are factors acknowledged by senior 
government officials. Despite the government’s recognition of the need to restructure the 
economy and to deliver visible developmental outcomes, there appears to be little serious 
intent to devise policy instruments to support this process or to build the capacity necessary 
to bring about change in the institutional infrastructure.    
 
The impact which the limited skills, capacity and commitment of local politicians and public 
officials has on the delivery of a development state in South Africa was a recurring theme 
which surfaced during interviews in the case study area. These skills relate to analytical 
abilities, visionary skills that enable long-term strategising, intellectual and technical skills 
required for appropriate policy formulation and organisational skills required to build an 
effective and efficient public sector. One of the problems relating to the delivery of national 
development plans identified by Minister Trevor Manuel was the capacity of local 
government officials to deliver at community level.  
 
Poor intergovernmental collaboration and co-ordination: Observation at official local 
government meetings, information generated through interviews and analysis of such 
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government documents as media statements, internal memoranda and in-house 
documentation points to poor inter- and intra- governmental collaboration and co-ordination. 
Furthermore, within the case study area the lack of sound intergovernmental and intra-
government relations, together with the ‘silo mentality’ of line departments in service 
delivery, is frustrating development interventions and resulting in the duplication of efforts, 
the wastage of scarce resources and a lack of accountability on the part of officials.  
 
The lack of development in the case study area and broader region is attributed to the serious 
disconnect between national, provincial and local level planning. In this regard, the National 
Development Plan which sets out the long term developmental state vision for South Africa 
has not incorporated local level development priorities due to a failure to collaborate with the 
local sphere. Local level needs are thus not reflected in the National Development Plan of 
government. There is further minimal alignment between the developmental plans of the 
different spheres of government. Thus, whilst national government defines the long term 
development vision of South Africa, little account is taken of provincial and local planning 
which is where this vision must be translated into reality. Within the case study area, in-house 
documents of the City of Cape Town reveal that the municipality independently formulates 
its Integrated Development Plan and thereafter, as an exercise in compliance, attempts to 
superficially align certain interventions with objectives of the National Development Plan. 
 
A further problem that was identified was that the developmental state model has never been 
enunciated clearly and means different things to different groups of people. Despite the fact 
that the notion of a South African developmental state is referred to in a succession of 
national policy documents such as the Medium Term Strategic Framework (The Presidency, 
2009a), New Growth Path (The Presidency, 2010) and the National Development Plan (The 
Presidency, 2009b) amongst others, there is a clear lack of conceptual understanding of the 
underpinnings of such a state. Furthermore, besides the 1998 Local Government White Paper 
which delineates the ‘developmental’ role of the local state, the concept has never been 
officially defined in formal policy documents. Furthermore, empirical evidence reveals that 
while senior national government officials frequently allude to a South African 
developmental state in strategic policy documents, there is scant reference to the term at 
provincial level and no reference whatsoever in the City of Cape Town’s Integrated 
Development Plan which is intended as the strategic instrument to deliver development 
outcomes. Moreover, officials from a variety of local government departments in the City of 
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Cape Town and councillors in the case study area concur that developmental state discourse 
does not form any part of local government deliberations. Unsurprisingly the majority of 
local government officials and councillors interviewed could not even define the term as it 
clearly did not form part of their day to day lexicon. This lack of a common understanding of 
the concept of a developmental state at different levels of the governing hierarchy represents 
a major impediment to the establishment of such a state in South Africa.  
 
9.3.2 Micro-level influences 
 
There are a number of micro-level challenges which emerged during empirical fieldwork in 
the case study area. These challenges can be broadly categorised according to three themes 
including ineffective participatory structures, the poor capacity of role-players, and top-down 
decision-making and restrictive legislation.  
 
Poor capacity of role-players: Numerous interviews with office bearers, local officials and 
residents revealed a lack of capacity to be a source of concern in the case study area. This 
impacted on various levels of government. Despite the fact that more senior officials and 
councillors have the requisite skills and experience, many more recent appointments do not 
have the necessary education, skills and experience to meet the requirements of their 
positions and mandate. Together with certain line department officials, the majority of 
councillors do not understand the process and ethos underpinning Integrated Development 
Planning. As a consequence officials in the case study area do not follow the prescribed 
participatory processes in terms of the identifying the community’s most pressing 
development needs.  
 
Both senior officials and councillors agreed that training and capacity building for councillors 
is essential in order to enable them to perform their duties. One such area is the training of 
ward councillors in terms of their responsibilities as ward chairpersons. Ward committee 
members also highlighted their lack of experience in their role as ward committee members 
reporting that training and capacity building is vital in enabling them to perform their 
responsibilities effectively. Since the local government elections in 2011, ward committee 
members in the case study area have only been give one capacity building exercise which 
took the form of role playing.  Furthermore, councillors have limited understanding of the 
true meaning of participation and consequently its practice is largely reduced to levels 
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described by authors such as Arnstein (1969) and Pretty (1995) as tokenism, placation and 
manipulation. A limited number of councillors in the case study area have an in-depth 
understanding of the concept of participation and thus lack the capacity to facilitate 
meaningful participation within the institutionalised setting. 
 
Ineffective participatory structures: Rather than ‘getting prices right’ which has been the 
mantra of the IMF, World Bank and the neoliberal economic policy prescriptions of the 
Washington Consensus, it is now widely believed that it is the strength of institutions and the 
nature of governance that shapes the development path of nations. Unfortunately, although 
the South African government has stated its commitment to building a state that is 
developmental, it has not made much headway in ensuring the effectiveness of its institutions 
at the local level in terms of enabling a participatory democracy and providing a meaningful 
platform for state/society interaction and collaboration. 
  
Despite the formal establishment of local government participatory structures in compliance 
with legislative requirements, research findings point to their use by politicians and officials 
to present predetermined development plans. Attendance at meetings and interview data 
gathered from politicians, officials and community residents reveal that the mechanisms set 
up in the name of participatory democracy, are merely used as a platform to present the 
illusion of enabling consultation and meaningful engagement in accordance with required 
legislation. Moreover, despite claims that ward committee structures enable engagement of 
community representatives and the exercise of agency, the dynamics observed in the case 
study area are far more reminiscent of Cornwall (2002a, 2002c), Gaventa (2004) and Ayiar’s 
(2010) depiction of such ‘invited spaces’, where hierarchical power relations are controlled 
by those who shape the spaces. Current practices highlight illustrate how different levels of 
power are being exercised by different role players. At ward committee level, the ward 
councillor is in a position of control and determines the development needs of his/her 
respective ward. These development needs are subsequently tabled at sub-council, where it is 
decided whether development requests are taken to council for approval or rejected. At 
council level, officials from line departments have the power to approve or turn down 
requests and councillors have to lobby for support of development proposals.   
 
As such, identified dynamics in Delft are far removed from those advocated by Marxist 
theorists, and supported by scholars such as Freire (1970) Fals Borda (2001) and Rahman 
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(1993), who envisaged in participation a process of emancipation, empowerment, 
conscientisation and the fostering of social justice. The nature of power relations within these 
participatory spaces and other levels of government not only impacts on the delivery of 
development to the case study area of Delft, but additionally impacts on the effective 
functioning of such spaces.  This is in line with Gaventa’s (2004) discussion of levels of 
power and his assertion that those who create the spaces frequently have power over the 
spaces.  
 
Top-down decision-making: In line with Cooke and Kothari’s (2001) observation of 
‘participation as tyranny’, which describes the way in which authorities use the notion of 
participation as a technicist ploy to maintain the status quo or enforce the views of the 
implementing institution, most of the state/society interaction in the case study area is 
reduced to coercive measures and manipulative tactics frequently in the name of 
participation. The drafting of the City of Cape Town IDP is a case in point, despite legislative 
requirements that call for community participation and input. Current power is in the hands of 
the Mayoral Executive, concurring with Smith’s (2007:12) assertions that mayoral executive 
committees tend ‘to be overly centralised bases of power, non-transparent and unaccountable 
to the broader council, and the community as a whole’.  
 
Officials, councillors and residents broadly agreed that the Integrated Development Plan was 
not based on democratic participation. Councillors, sector representative and community 
residents were not presented with any opportunity to provide input regarding specific 
community needs and the only public contribution was gathered from community satisfaction 
surveys targeting the more literate sectors of society. Other decision-making relating to the 
allocation of ward projects in the case study area was also top-down with sub-council 
members determining the overall development needs of the community.  
 
Another broad summary finding of this research points to legislative restrictions which, 
contrary to their stated intention, are hampering efforts to implement a developmental state at 
the local level. This is particularly observable in terms of efforts to design and construct a 
representative Integrated Development Plan and to enable the process to be inclusive and 
participatory. Interviews with senior officials revealed that compliance with legislative 
requirements which prescribe that the IDP must be completed within nine months after local 
government elections is an extremely difficult task. This relates not only to the complex 
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nature of the plan, which involves identification of diverse development needs in the 
metropolitan area, but particularly to enabling meaningful input from the public.   
 
Legislation surrounding the establishment of participatory mechanisms to enable inclusive 
governance and people-centred development is contradictory in respect to the role and 
responsibilities assigned to ward committees. On the one hand ward committees are intended 
to serve as the primary mechanism for community members to identify their collective 
development needs and to participate in the IDP and matters related to service delivery. On 
the other hand ward committees are only designated as ‘advisory’ bodies and are allocated no 
power whatsoever to influence final decision-making. This advisory role of ward committees 
enables some councillors in the case study area to dictate their own development preferences 
regardless of the input of ward committee members.  
 
Whilst compliance with legislative deadlines not only excludes meaningful public 
participation in terms of providing input into the IDP, it further prevents ward committees 
from playing any role in IDP decision-making. The establishment of ward committees in the 
case study area is a lengthy process as it requires public meetings with different organisations 
and sectors in the case study area and the selection of sector representatives to serve on ward 
committees. The subsequent selection of ward committee members and the formation of ward 
committees is only finalised after the submission of the City of Cape Town’s Integrated 
Development Plan to council. This precludes any attempt to participate in strategic decision-
making regarding development priorities in the case study area.             
 
9.4 Policy implications and recommendations 
Clear designation of the specific roles and responsibilities of different spheres of government 
will be required in order to strengthen existing efforts to build a developmental state. Existing 
developmental state discourse and strategic plans focusing on the government’s intent to 
build an interventionist state that is capable of bringing about socio-economic transformation 
and of deepening democracy is focussed almost exclusively on the role and function of 
national government and says little or nothing about the roles of provincial and local 
government which represent the implementation arm of the state. Despite the fact that the 
Constitution assigns responsibility to the central government to support lower spheres of 
government, there needs to be far more clarity on the specific roles assigned to the provincial 
 
 
 
 
244 
 
and local spheres with regard to the manner in which the implementation of strategies, 
programmes and projects should be aligned to national developmental goals. This can be 
achieved through the setting of clear development indicators and the enunciation of 
measurable targets and outcomes in accordance with the allocated core functions of 
provincial and local government.  
 
Enhancing capabilities and building capacity must be a key policy objective of government 
and a fundamental ingredient in efforts to construct and implement a developmental state. 
Capacity strengthening will be required at different government levels and across the 
spectrum of state role players and actors in the development process to equip state 
bureaucrats and civil servants to perform their required role in the development process. 
Focus should be placed on capacitating officials by enhancing the required technical, 
analytical, organisational, communication and administrative skills. The building of a 
knowledge economy, investing in mathematics and science training and enhancing the 
general level of education at all levels of society is a further pre-requisite for the 
establishment of a successful developmental state.   
 
Intergovernmental relations and coordination of efforts both across and within spheres should 
be prioritised as a policy objective in order to address the current overlapping of roles and 
responsibilities which has resulted in duplication of effort. As the contribution of provincial 
and local government is critical in terms of implementation of government’s developmental 
state vision, efforts need to be synergised and coordinated to a far greater degree than at 
present. To that extent, the provincial government’s Development and Growth Strategic Plans 
and local government’s Integrated Development Plans must reflect national government’s 
developmental state vision and must be aligned accordingly. The responsibilities of different 
spheres and departments within spheres must be clearly specified, strategies clearly 
articulated and mechanisms must be put in place to monitor achievements and outcomes.  
 
Although a number of policy documents such as the New Growth Path, National 
Development Plan, Industrial Policy Action Plan and Medium Term Strategic Framework 
(2009 – 2014) refer to the notion of a South African developmental state, the concept has 
never been formally defined and articulated in any policy document. Thus, if government is 
serious in its intent to construct a state that is developmental, it should firstly outline the 
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meaning of such a state within the South African context and provide clarity on its 
philosophical underpinnings. This will help to remove current confusion surrounding the term 
and furthermore will enable leadership and officials to build collective understanding and 
support a common vision.  
 
As fiscal constraints impact on efforts to implement a state that is developmental, it is 
axiomatic that sustained economic growth is a fundamental requirement and will be 
necessary to fund socio-economic development and to increase employment. By all accounts, 
the current structure of the South African economy and its unrelenting focus on the Mineral 
Energy Complex is continuing to prevent broad and inclusive economic growth. It is thus 
recommended that the government focuses its attention on a pro-poor development path in a 
more strategic and concerted manner in order to address the serious challenges of 
unemployment and socio-economic inequality facing the country. Other policy choices that 
the political leadership must consider includes diversifying the industrial base and building 
the manufacturing sector, focussing on sectors that encourage more labour intensive 
activities, encouraging export led growth and building the necessary infrastructural 
environment that facilitates poverty alleviation and economic inclusion. Furthermore, in its 
efforts to build a developmental state the South African leadership must not only focus 
attention on building sound public private partnerships to assist in driving the development 
agenda forward, but must also forge strong partnerships with labour and civil society in order 
to identify national priorities and gain support for long term development goals that are in the 
interest of all sectors of society.  
 
As the deepening of democracy is one of the stated goals of a South African developmental 
state, the building of functional participatory mechanisms at the local level is essential in 
enabling civil society to participate in decision-making and influence policy decisions from 
below. The current system of using ward committees through sector representation is failing 
to achieve broader goals of inclusive decision-making as the majority of residents do not 
belong to organisations and are thus falling through the net. A system of geographical 
representation with democratically appointed representatives will ensure that the process is 
more representative and inclusive.  
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9.5 Contribution and significance of the research 
This research has made a number of contributions to knowledge in the field of developmental 
state theory and practice. Whilst the broader topic focused on the construction of 
developmental states which is well represented in the literature, there is a considerable dearth 
of research which focuses on the implementation of developmental states at the local level. 
Furthermore, notwithstanding the existence of a number of important scholarly contributions 
documenting South Africa’s efforts in constructing a state that is developmental and 
transformative at the macro-level, no such attempt has explored the micro-dynamics at play 
within communities or analysed their impacts on the delivery efforts of a metropolitan local 
government.  
 
Furthermore, the investigation identified a noticeable gap in the research on developmental 
states in that the majority of contributions refer to centrally controlled states and research 
efforts have accordingly focussed on the national level. Very little research has focussed on 
sub-national and community level with regard to examining the institutional architecture and 
the different types of local level strategies that are used to deliver development outcomes.  
 
An additional contribution of this research is that a number of matters of significance to the 
political leadership and policy makers have emerged from the analysis and can be used to 
inform government decision-making in a number of sectors. Whilst it must be acknowledged 
that the findings of this investigation make no claim to be representative of conditions in 
other regions in South Africa, there are certain broad trends that emerged that need to be 
considered by government in their efforts to construct a state that has the capacity to be 
transformative and to enable the democratic participation of its people.  
 
9.6 Concluding comments 
Whilst the South African political leadership has frequently claimed the title of a 
developmental state, their development performance has clearly not matched their 
development intentions. Pedestrian economic growth has prevented South African political 
leaders from making any meaningful inroads into addressing poverty, unemployment and 
inequality and the current participatory mechanisms put in place to enable an empowered 
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citizenry and deepen democracy have not achieved the desired outcomes. State capacity, a 
defining feature and essential ingredient of a successful developmental state, is sorely lacking 
both between and within the different spheres of government.   
 
However, this should not detract from South Africa’s commitment to construct a 
developmental state and become more proactive and developmental in its orientation in terms 
of promoting sustained growth, deepening democracy and prioritising the development needs 
of its disadvantaged and marginalised citizens. Despite its many critics and an abundance of 
theorizing as to why South Africa cannot yet claim to be a developmental state, there is a 
wealth of scholarship which is of the opinion that the route of strong state intervention still 
remains the only path to follow. South Africa faces enormous challenges as a result of its 
historical legacy of discrimination and the perpetuation of its inherited patterns of inequality. 
In that context, considering the daunting challenges facing the country, it would not seem 
responsible for the leadership to expose the nation to the vagaries of the market when redress 
of past injustice remains a priority. As the state clearly plays a central role in determining the 
development success of a nation and in producing development outcomes relevant to its 
particular context, it is recommended that South Africa follow the route of an interventionist 
developmental state and purposively fashions policy to suit its unique development needs.  
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ACCEDE CITIZENSHIP SURVEY 2011 
 
RESPONDENT NUMBER [Office Use Only]  
 
 
Interviewer NAME 
 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE CAPTURED BY 
 
 
 
Area            
Sub-section of area  
 
Good day.  My name is ____________.  I am part of a team from The African Centre on Citizenship and Democracy (ACCEDE) which is 
part of the University of the Western Cape. We are doing a study of citizen participation and we would like to discuss these issues with 
a member of your household. We would like to choose an adult from your household.  Would you help us pick one? 
 
Every person in the area has an equal chance of being included in this study.  All information will be kept confidential. Your household 
has been chosen by chance.  Note:  The person must give his or her informed consent by answering positively.  If participation is refused, walk 
away from the household.  Use the day code to substitute the household. If consent  is secured, proceed as follows 
 
Respondent Selection Procedure 
Interviewer:  Within the household, it is your job is to select a random (this means any) individual.  This individual becomes the interview 
respondent.  In addition, you are responsible for alternating interviews between men and women.  Circle the correct code number below. 
 
  Male Female 
Previous interview was with a: 1                                        2                               
This interview must be with a: 1      2                           
                                    
Please tell me the names of all males/females [select correct gender] who presently live in this household.  I only want the names of 
males/females [select correct gender]  who are citizens of South Africa and who are 18 years and older.  
If this interview must be with a female, list only women’s names.  If this interview is with a male, list only men’s names.  List all eligible household 
members of this gender who are 18 years or older, even those not presently at home but who will return to the house at any time that day.  
Include only citizens of South Africa.   
                                    
Women's Names 
 
Men's Names 
 
1  1  
2  2  
3  3  
4  4  
5  5  
6  6  
7  7  
8  8  
9  9  
10  10  
                                    
Take out your deck of numbered cards.  Present them face-down so that the numbers cannot be seen.  Ask the person who is selecting 
respondents to pick any card, by saying: 
Please choose a card. The person who corresponds to the number chosen will be the person interviewed. 
[Interviewer:  REMEMBER to circle the code number of the person selected on the table above] 
                                    
The person I need to speak to is [insert name] _______________________________.  Is this person presently at home? 
 
If yes: May I please interview this person now? 
If no: Will this person return here at any time today?  
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If no: Thank you very much.  I will select another household.  Substitute with the next household to the right and repeat the 
respondent selection procedure.  (NOTE:  YOU CAN ONLY SUBSTITUTE HOUSEHOLDS NOT INDIVIDUALS.) 
If yes: Please tell this person that I will return for an interview at [insert convenient time].   If this respondent is not present when 
you call back, replace this household with the next household to the right. 
                                    
If the selected respondent is not the same person that you first met, repeat Introduction: 
                                    
Good day.  My name is ____________.  I am part of a team from The African Centre on Citizenship and Democracy (ACCEDE) which is 
part of the University of the Western Cape. We are doing a study citizen participation and we would like to discuss these issues with a 
member of you. Your answers will be confidential.  They will be put together with 900 other people we are talking to, to get an overall 
picture.  It will be impossible to pick you out from what you say, so please feel free to tell us what you think. This interview will take 
about 45 minutes. There is no penalty for refusing to participate.  Do you wish to proceed?  [Proceed with interview only if answer is 
positive]. 
                              Circle code number 
How many calls were made to the household where the interview actually took place? 1 2 
                        Day Month Year 
Date of interview [Interviewer: Enter day, month, and year]       
 Hour Minute 
Time interview started  [Interviewer:  Enter hour and minute]     
 
NOTES ABOUT THE INTERVIEW: 
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BEGIN INTERVIEW 
 
Let me start by asking you a few questions about your interest in political matters and your views on democracy.  
 
1. How interested are you in public affairs?  [Interviewer: Prompt if necessary: You know, in politics and government?]                      
[Read out options.]  
Very interested Somewhat interested Not very interested Not at all interested Don’t know [DNR] 
4 3 2 1 99 
 
2. How often do you get news from:  [Read out options] HAND RESPONDENT SHOW CARD 
  Every day A few times a week 
A few times a 
month 
Less than once 
a month Never 
Don't know 
[DNR] 
A. Radio 5 4 3 2 1 99 
B. Television 5 4 3 2 1 99 
C. Newspapers 5 4 3 2 1 99 
D The Internet 5 4 3 2 1 99 
 
3. When you get together with your friends or family, would you say you discuss political matters: [Read out options.]  
Frequently Occasionally Never Don’t know [DNR] 
3 2 1 99 
 
 
4. For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you agree or disagree.  PROBE FOR STRENGTH OF OPINION. 
  Strongly Agree Agree Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Don’t know 
[DNR] 
A. Citizens should be more active in questioning leaders                                                                                                                                                                                                        1 2 3 4 99
B Opposition parties should examine and criticize government policies and actions 1 2 3 4 99 
C The news media should investigate corruption in government 1 2 3 4 99 
D It makes you proud to be a South African. 1 2 3 4 99 
E The courts should have the right to make decisions that people always abide by 1 2 3 4 99 
F Sometimes it might be better to ignore the law rather than wait for legal solutions 1 2 3 4 99 
G People like me do not have any influence over what the government does 1 2 3 4 99 
H Politicians do not care much about what people like me think 1 2 3 4 99 
 
 
5. Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in South Africa?  Are you: [Read out options]. 
Very satisfied Fairly satisfied Not very satisfied Not at all satisfied South Africa is not a democracy 
[Do not read] Don’t know [DNR] 
5 4 3 2 1 99 
 
 
6. Thinking about freedom in South Africa, 
  Not at all free 
Not very 
free Somewhat free 
Completely 
free 
Don’t know 
[DNR] 
A How free are you to choose who to vote for without feeling pressured? 1 2 3 4 99 
B How free are you, to join an organisation you want? 1 2 3 4 99 
C How free do you feel to say what you think? 1 2 3 4 99 
  
 
Let’s turn to economic and living conditions as well as your experience with crime.  
 
7. How would you describe: [Read out response options] 
  Very good Good 
Neither good 
nor bad Bad Very Bad Don't know [DNR] 
A. The present economic condition of South Africa?  5  4  3  2 1  99 
B. Your own present living conditions?  5  4  3  2 1  99 
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8.  Much Worse Worse Same Better 
Much 
Better 
Don’t know 
[DNR] 
A. How do you rate your living conditions compared to those of other South 
Africans? 1 2 3 4 5 99 
B Looking back, how do you rate your living conditions compared to twelve 
months ago?   1 2 3 4 5 99 
C Is your life today better, about the same or worse than it was under apartheid?  1 2 3 4 5 99 
D Looking ahead, do you expect your living conditions in twelve months time to 
be better or worse?   1 2 3 4 5 99 
 
 
9. Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family gone without the following:  [Read out options] 
  Never Just once or twice Several times Many times Always Don't Know [DNR] 
A. Enough food to eat? 5 4 3 2 1 99 
B. Enough clean water for home use? 5 4 3 2 1 99 
C. Medicines or medical treatment? 5 4 3 2 1 99 
D. Enough fuel to cook your food? 5 4 3 2 1 99 
 
 
10. How much do you depend on: [Read out options] 
  Not at All A Little A Lot Don't Know [DNR] 
A. Earning a wage or a salary? 1 2 3 99         
B. Buying and selling goods as a trader? 1 2 3 99         
C. Doing work in return for food or shelter? 1 2 3 99         
D. Employing other people to work for you? 1 2 3 99         
E. Participating in a community savings group?  1 2 3 99         
F. Borrowing money from friends or family? 1 2 3 99         
G. Borrowing money from a bank? 1 2 3 99         
H. Receiving money from family members working elsewhere in the country? 1 2 3 99 
I. Receiving money from family members working in other countries? 1 2 3 99 
 
 
11. How often do you?  [Read out options] 
  Never Some of the  time Almost all the time Don’t know [DNR] 
A Borrow things from people living close to you 1 2 4 99 
B Lend things to people living close to you 1 2 4 99 
C Visit people living close to you 1 2 4 99 
 
12. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements [Interviewer: Probe for strength of opinion] 
  Strongly 
Agree Agree Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Don’t know/ Haven’t 
heard enough [DNR] 
A It is better to have low prices for basic goods even if it forces 
some local businesses to close. 1 
2 3 4 99 
B It is better to have low price goods sold in this area/neighbourhood, it doesn’t matter who sells the goods.  1 
2 3 4 99 
 
Now I am going to ask some questions about crime and safety in your community.  
 
13. What, if anything, makes you feel unsafe in your area/ neighbourhood?  
DO NOT PROMPT.  RECORD ALL MENTIONED.   
 
WRITE IN_____________________________________________________________(1st response) 
 
 
WRITE IN_____________________________________________________________(2ndt response) 
 
 
WRITE IN_____________________________________________________________(3rd response) 
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 1st response 2nd response 3rd response 
The area is too dark at night and there are insufficient lights 1 1 1 
Theft from cars is common    
Houses are often broken into 2 2 2 
Rape takes place often 3 3 3 
Murder takes place often 4 4 4 
Hijackings occur often 5 5 5 
There are violent gangs in the area 6 6 6 
There are drug dealers in the area 7 7 7 
Cars are driven at high speed or carelessly in the area 8 8 8 
Alcohol and drug abuse are high 9 9 9 
I don’t trust my neighbours and other people in my community 10 10 10 
There is not enough patrolling of the area by government or community police    
I feel safe in my area 0   
No further reply  996 996 
Don’t know 999   
Other (1st response), Specify_____________________________________________ 
Post 
Code 
     
Other (2nd response), Specify_____________________________________________ Post Code      
Other (3rd response), Specify_____________________________________________ Post Code      
 
14.  Mostly Positive 
Mostly 
Negative   
Don’t know 
[DNR] 
A. In certain communities people have said that gangs make a positive contribution.  If there are gangs 
in your area/neighbourhood, do you feel that they have a mostly positive or mostly negative effect in 
your area/neighbourhood? 
1 2 99 
B What about taxi drivers? Do you think taxi-drivers have a mostly positive or mostly negative effect in 
your area/neighbourhood? 1 2 99 
 
15. Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you:  [Read out options] 
  Never Just once or twice 
Several 
times Many times Always 
Don’t know/ 
 [DNR] 
A. Feared crime in your own home? 5 4 3 2 1 99 
B. Feared crime in your area/neighbourhood? 5 4 3 2 1 99 
C. Feared crime while travelling? 5 4 3 2 1 99 
 
16.  Yes No Don’t know [DNR] 
A. Have you or a member of your household been a victim of crime in the past 12 months? IF NO, MOVE TO Q18. 
1 2 99 
  Yes No NA 
B. Was there a charge laid with the police? 1 2 97 
C. [IF CHARGE LAID] Did the case go to court? 1 2 97 
 
17.  Not at All A Little Completely NA Don't Know [DNR] 
A. Overall, how fairly were you treated by the police? 1 2 3 97 99         
B. How satisfied were you with the overall result of the case? 1 2 3 97 99         
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18.  
  Much more More 
About 
the same Less Much Less 
Don’t know/ 
Haven’t heard [DNR] 
A. Compared to 12 months ago, how much crime is there in your area/neighbourhood at the present time? 1 2 3 4 5 99 
B. Compared with 12 months ago, how much drug activity do you think there is in your area/neighbourhood these days? 1 2 3 4 5 99 
C Compared with 12 months ago, how much gang activity do you think there is in your area/neighbourhood these days? 1 2 3 4 5 99 
 
 Yes No Don’t know [DNR] 
19. Has there been violent conflict in this area/neighbourhood over the past 12 months? IF 
NO, MOVE TO Q 22. 
1 2 99 
 
20. Over what sort of problems do violent conflicts arise in this community/neighbourhood? DO NOT PROMPT.  RECORD 
VERBATIM.   
 
WRITE IN___________________________________________________________________________________________(1st response) 
 
WRITE IN___________________________________________________________________________________________(2ndt response) 
 
WRITE IN___________________________________________________________________________________________(3rd response) 
 
 1st response 2nd response 3rd response 
Gang-related 1 1 1 
Drug-related 2 2 2 
Alcohol-related 3 3 3 
Taxi-related 4 4 4 
Shebeen-related 5 5 5 
Xenophobia-related 6 6 6 
Opening of spaza shops/other businesses 7 7 7 
When people in the area try to solve crimes or deal with criminals 8 8 8 
Police corruption 9 9 9 
Protest-related 10 10 10 
No violent conflict 997   
No further reply  996 996 
Don’t know 999   
Other (1st response), Specify Post Code      
Other (2nd response), Specify Post Code      
Other (3rd response), Specify Post Code      
 
21. To whom would you turn for help to resolve a violent conflict in this area/neighbourhood? [DO NOT PROMPT.  RECORD ALL 
MENTIONED.   
WRITE IN_____________________________________________________________(1st response) 
 
 
WRITE IN_____________________________________________________________(2ndt response) 
 
 
WRITE IN_____________________________________________________________(3rd response) 
 1st answer 2nd answer 3rd answer 
No-one  0   
The people involved in the conflict 1 1 1 
The Police 2 2 2 
Family/friends/neighbors 3 3 3 
Traditional chiefs/elders/mediators 4 4 4 
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Courts 5 5 5 
A religious organization or leader 6 6 6 
A non-governmental organization (including community-based) 7 7 7 
A vigilante group 8 8 8 
Conflicts cannot be resolved 990   
No reply/No further reply 996 996 996 
Don't know [Do not read] 999   
Other (1st response) [Specify]: ________________________________________ 
Post 
code      
Other (2nd response) [Specify]: ________________________________________ 
Post 
code      
Other (3rd response) [Specify]: ________________________________________ 
Post 
code      
 
Now I would like to ask you some questions about political leaders and structures and the way they deal with problems facing South Africa 
 
22. In your opinion, what are the most important problems facing this country that government should address?  [Do not read 
options.  Code from responses. Accept up to three answers.  If respondent offers more than three options, ask “Which three of these 
are the most important?”; if respondent offers one or two answers, ask “Anything else?”] 
DO NOT PROMPT.  RECORD VERBATIM.   
 
WRITE IN___________________________________________________________________________________________(1st response) 
 
WRITE IN___________________________________________________________________________________________(2ndt response) 
 
WRITE IN___________________________________________________________________________________________(3rd response) 
 
 1st response 2nd response 3rd response 
Economics    
Management of the economy 1 1 1 
Wages, incomes and salaries 2 2 2 
Unemployment 3 3 3 
Poverty/destitution 4 4 4 
Food / Agriculture    
Food shortage 5 5 5 
Drought 6 6 6 
Land 7 7 7 
Infrastructure    
Public Transport 8 8 8 
Infrastructure / roads 9 9 9 
Government Services    
Education 10 10 10 
Housing 11 11 11 
Electricity 12 12 12 
Water supply 13 13 13 
Orphans/street children/homeless children 14 14 14 
Services (other) 15 15 15 
Health    
Health 16 16 16 
AIDS 17 17 17 
Sickness / Disease 18 18 18 
Governance    
Crime and Security 19 19 19 
Corruption 20 20 20 
Political violence 21 21 21 
Discrimination/ inequality 22 22 22 
Gender issues/women’s rights 23 23 23 
Nothing/ no problems 0   
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No further reply  996 996 
Don’t know 999   
Other (1st response), 
Specify_____________________________________________ 
Post 
Code 
     
Other (2nd response), 
Specify_____________________________________________ 
Post 
Code      
Other (3rd response), 
Specify_____________________________________________ 
Post 
Code      
 
 
23. In the last question you said that [READ IN MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM]________________is the most important problem 
facing South Africa. How well or badly would you say the ANC has handled that issue over the past year? [Probe for strength 
of opinion] 
Very badly Badly Fairly Well Very Well Don’t know [DNR] 
4 3 2 1 99 
 
24. Could any other political party have done a better job than the government handling this issue?  
No  1 
Yes 2 
Don’t know [Do not read] 99 
 
 
*IMPORTANT NOTE: IF RESPONDENT SAYS NO OR DON’T KNOW, MOVE TO Q26 
 
25. [IF Yes]  Which political party?  
 
 
 
Democratic Alliance (DA) 1 
Congress of the People (COPE) 2 
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) 3 
United Democratic Movement (UDM) 4 
OTHER: 
Write Name: ________________________________________________________________________  
Not applicable 97 
Don’t know [Do not read] 99 
 
 
26. How well or badly would you say the current NATIONAL government is handling the following matters, or haven’t you heard 
enough to say? [Interviewer: Probe for strength of opinion] 
 Very Badly Fairly Badly Fairly Well Very Well DK / Haven’t heard enough  
A Creating jobs 1 2 3 4 99 
B Narrowing gaps between rich and poor 1 2 3 4 99 
C Reducing crime 1 2 3 4 99 
D Improving basic health services 1 2 3 4 99 
E Addressing educational needs 1 2 3 4 99 
F Delivering household water 1 2 3 4 99 
G Fighting corruption in government 1 2 3 4 99 
H Combating HIV/AIDS 1 2 3 4 99 
 
 
27. What are the most important problems facing your area/neighbourhood at the present time?  DO NOT PROMPT.   
1st response 
    
2nd response 
    
3rd response 
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28. In the last question you indicated that [READ IN MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM]________________is the most important 
problem facing your area/neighbourhood. How well or badly would you say your municipality has handled that issue over 
the past year? [Probe for strength of opinion] 
Very badly Badly Fairly Well Very Well Don’t know [DNR] 
4 3 2 1 99 
 
29. How much of the problems in your area/neighbourhood do you think your municipality can solve?  [Read out options] 
All of them 5 
Most of them 4 
Some of them 3 
Very few of them 2 
None of them 1 
Don’t know [Do not read] 99 
 
30. When there are problems in how local government is run in your area/neighbourhood, how much can an ordinary person do 
to improve the situation?   [Read out options.]  
Nothing A small amount Some A great deal  Don’t know [DNR] 
1 2 3 4 99 
 
31.  Do you think that _______________ (READ IN) looks after the interests of all in your community or after the interests of one 
group only, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say? 
 All Only one group Not Applicable 
Do not know enough 
about them 
A. The ANC 1 2  99 
B. The DA 1 2  99 
C The COPE 1 2  99 
D Your municipal office 1 2  99 
E. The Police 1 2  99 
F The Community Policing Forum in your community/neighbourhood. 1 2 97 99 
G The Ward Committee in your community/neighbourhood. 1 2 97 99 
H The Street Committee in your community/neighbourhood. 1 2 97 99 
I The South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO) 1 2 97 99 
 
32. Do you know the name of: 
  Don’t Know Know But Can’t Remember  
Incorrect 
Guess Correct Name 
A. Your Ward Councilor  99 1 2 3 
B. Your Member of 
Parliament  99 1 2 3 
 
33. How well or badly would you say your ward councilor is handling the following matters, or haven’t you heard enough to say? 
[Interviewer: Probe for strength of opinion] 
 Very 
Badly Fairly Badly 
Fairly 
Well 
Very 
Well 
DK / Haven’t heard 
enough [DNR] 
A. Allowing citizens like yourself to participate? 1 2 3 4 99 
B Making council’s programmes known to ordinary people? 1 2 3 4 99 
C Providing effective ways to handle complaints about councillors or 
officials? 1 2 3 4 99 
 
34. Please rate the group of councilors serving on your local government council according to the following:  
  Not at all competent 
Not very 
competent 
Somewhat 
competent 
Totally  
competent  
Don’t know 
[DNR] 
A.  Their ability to perform their tasks? 1 2 3 4 99 
B.  Their experience in managing public service programmes? 1 2 3 4 99 
  Not at all caring 
Not very 
caring 
Somewhat 
caring 
Totally  
caring  
Don’t know 
[DNR] 
C.  The extent they care about the community? 1 2 3 4 99 
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  Not at all honest 
Not very 
honest  
Somewhat 
honest  
Totally  
honest   
Don’t know 
[DNR] 
D Their honesty in handling public funds? 1 2 3 4 99 
  Not at all fair 
Not very 
fair 
Somewhat 
fair  Totally  fair   
Don’t know 
[DNR] 
E Their fairness in allocating services?  1 2 3 4 99 
F Their fairness in allocating employment opportunities? 1 2 3 4 99 
 
35.   
Almost all 
of the 
time 
At least 
weekly 
At least 
once a 
month 
At least 
once a 
year 
Never / It 
is not 
necessary 
Don’t 
know 
[DNR] 
A.  How much time should your local councilor spend in this area to visit the community and its citizens?  [Read out options] 1 2 3 4 5 99 
B.  How much time does your local councilor spend in this area?   1 2 3 4 5 99 
 
36.  Have Never Have done this once  
Have done this a few  
times 
Have done 
this often  
Don’t know 
[DNR] 
Do you ever get together with others and to make your ward councilor 
listen to your concerns about matters of importance to the community? 1 2 3 4  
 
37. How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say?  [Read out options] 
  Not at all Just a little bit Somewhat A lot Don’t know/ Haven’t heard  
A. President Jacob Zuma  1 2 3 4 99 
B. National Parliament 1 2 3 4 99 
C Premier Helen Zille 1 2 3 4 99 
D. Mayor Dan Plato  1 2 3 4 99 
E. Your Local Municipal Council 1 2 3 4 99 
F The Police in your area 1 2 3 4 99 
G Courts of law 1 2 3 4 99 
H Community Policing Forums 1 2 3 4 99 
I Ward Committees 1 2 3 4 99 
J Street Committees 1 2 3 4 99 
K SANCO 1 2 3 4 99 
L School Governing Boards 1 2 3 4 99 
 
 Yes No 
38. Have you ever heard an Integrated Development Plan (IDP)? IF NO, MOVE TO Q41 1 2 
39. Have you ever been asked to give input into the IDP for your area? 1 2 
 
40.  No Difference 
Minor 
Difference 
Major 
Difference 
Don’t know 
[DNR] 
A.  How much difference has the IDP made to the improvement of your area? 1 2 3 99 
 
Now let’s talk about services in your area. 
 
41.  Very 
satisfied 
Fairly 
Satisfied 
Not very 
Satisfied 
Not at all 
Satisfied 
Don’t know 
[DNR] 
 Overall, how satisfied are you with the delivery of services in your area?   1 2 3 4 99 
 
*IMPORTANT NOTE: IF RESPONDENT SAYS VERY SATISFIED OR SATISFIED, MOVE TO Q43 
 
42. IF DISSATISFIED: What makes you feel dissatisfied? DO NOT PROMPT.   
 
1st response    
2nd response    
3rd response    
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43. What do you do when you need help with getting a service from government?  
 
1st response    
2nd response    
3rd response    
 
44. Have you encountered any of these problems with your local public schools during the past 12 months? [Read out options.] IF 
NO EXPERIENCE IN A, MOVE TO  Q45  
  No experience with public schools in past twelve months Yes No Don’t know [DNR] 
A. Lack of textbooks or other supplies 97 1 2 99 
B Poor teaching 97 1 2 99 
C. Absent teachers 97 1 2 99 
D. Poor conditions of school 97 1 2 99 
 
*IMPORTANT NOTE: IF RESPONDENT SAYS NO, MOVE TO Q46 
 
45. Have any of your children left school before finishing grade 12 and if yes what did they do immediately after 
leaving?  WRITE IN THE RESPONSE: 
 
 
Not Applicable: Don’t have children 97 
 Not Applicable: No child has left school early  1 
Started working  2 
Started their own business 3 
Attended another school 4 
Attended an educational institution 5 
Nothing in particular (no further education or employment) 6 
Other, please specify 
 
 
Don’t know 99 
 
46. Have you encountered any of these problems with your local public clinic or hospital during the past 12 months? [Read out 
options.] IF NO EXPERIENCE IN A, MOVE TO  Q47 
  No experience with clinics in past twelve months Never 
Once or 
Twice 
A Few  
Times Often  
Don’t know 
[DNR] 
A Lack of medicines or other supplies 97 1 2 3 4 99 
B Lack of attention or respect from staff 97 1 2 3 4 99 
C Absent doctors 97 1 2 3 4 99 
D Long waiting time 97 1 2 3 4 99 
E Dirty facilities 97 1 2 3 4 99 
 
47.  
  Of lower quality than most other areas 
Of the same quality 
as most other areas 
Of higher quality than 
most other areas 
Don’t know 
[DNR] 
A. Do you think clinics and services in your area are: 1 2 3 99 
B. Do you think schools in your area are: 1 2 3 99 
C Do you think houses in your area are: 1 2 3 99 
 
Now I would like to ask you some questions about some of the community organizations in your area. 
 
48.  Yes No 
A Have you ever heard of the organisation called Violence Prevention Through Urban Upgrading (VPUU)?    1 2 
B Have you ever heard of the Khayelitsha Development Forum (KDF)?    1 2 
 
 *IMPORTANT NOTE:  ASK ONLY IF RESPONDENT HAS HEARD OF VPUU. 
 
Very 
effective Effective Ineffective 
Very 
ineffective 
Don’t know 
[DNR] 
49. How effective do you think VPUU is in reducing violence in your 
area/neighbourhood? 1 2 3 4 99 
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50.  *IMPORTANT NOTE:  ASK ONLY IF RESPONDENT HAS HEARD 
OF KDF. 
Strongly 
support Support Oppose 
Strongly 
opposed  
Don’t 
know 
 
A.  How do you feel about the Khayelitsha Development Forum?  Do you support this organization or have you not heard enough about them to say? 1 2 3 4 99 
B.  Think about the people who are important to you.  Generally, do you think most of them would support or oppose KDF? 1 2 3 4 99 
 
51.  Very effective Effective Ineffective 
Very 
ineffective 
Don’t know 
[DNR] 
A.  How effective do you think KDF is in helping people to get services?  PROBE THE EXTENT OF EFFECTIVENESS. 1 2 3 4 99 
B.  How effective do you think KDF is in encouraging development in your area/neighbourhood? 1 2 3 4 99 
C.  How effective do you think KDF is in promoting employment opportunities in your area/neighbourhood? 1 2 3 4 99 
 
52.  Do you think that the Khayelitsha Development Forum looks after the interests of all in your community or after the interests 
of one group only, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say?  
All Only one group Do not know enough about them Had not heard of them 
1 2 3 4 
 
 Yes No 
53. Do you think KDF favours any particular political party? 1 2 
 
*IMPORTANT NOTE: IF RESPONDENT SAYS NO, MOVE TO Q55 
 
54. [IF Yes]  Which political party?    
Democratic Alliance (DA) 1 
Congress of the People (COPE) 2 
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) 3 
United Democratic Movement (UDM) 4 
OTHER: 
Write Name: ________________________________________________________________________  
Not applicable 97 
Don’t know [Do not read] 99 
 
Now I am going to ask you some questions about the activities you take part in, your contact with political leaders and your role in the 
community. 
 
55. We find that some people are not able to vote or decide to not vote.  How about you?  How likely are you to vote in the 2011 local 
elections? 
Very certain to vote Likely to vote Likely not to vote Very certain not to vote Don’t know [Do not read] 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
*IMPORTANT NOTE: IF RESPONDENT SAYS VERY CERTAIN OR LIKELY TO VOTE, MOVE TO Q57. 
 
56. [If respondent answered that they will not vote, ask] Can you tell me why you will not vote? DO NOT PROMPT.  
 
WRITE IN VERBATIM RESPONSE:___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
I am not registered to vote 1 Political all make the same promises 7 
I don’t have time to vote  2 I am not interested in political matters 8 
I am too ill to vote 3 Other reason 9 
I don’t know which party to vote for 4 Not  applicable – will vote 97 
It is not worthwhile to vote 5 Refused to say 98 
Voting makes no difference 6 Don’t Know [DNR] 99 
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57. On a scale of 1 to 10 with 1 being very difficult and 10 being very easy, how easy or difficult is it for an ordinary person to have their 
voice heard between elections  
Very difficult  Very easy Don’t know [DNR] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 99 
 
58. Do you feel close to any particular political party? 
No (does NOT feel close to ANY party) 1 
Yes (feels close to a party) 2 
Refused to answer 98 
Does not know [Do not read] 99 
 
*IMPORTANT NOTE: IF RESPONDENT SAYS NO, REFUSES TO ANSWER OR DOES NOT KNOW, MOVE TO Q60. 
 
59. [if Yes]  Which party is that?  
African National Congress (ANC) 1 
Democratic Alliance (DA) 2 
Congress of the People (COPE) 3 
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) 4 
United Democratic Movement (UDM) 5 
 
OTHER: 
Write Name: _____________________________________________ 
POST CODE 
Not applicable 97 
Refused to answer 98 
Don’t know [Do not read] 99 
 1 
 
 
60. I am going to read out a list of groups that people join or attend.  For each one, could you tell me whether you are a 
leader/official, a member, attend meetings even though you are not a member or are not involved in the group at all? 
  Leader or Official  Member 
Not a Member, but 
attend meetings. 
Not involved at 
all. 
Don't Know 
[DNR] 
A. A religious group (e.g., church, mosque) 4 3 2 1 99         
B Political Party 4 3 2 1 99        
C. A Community Policing Forum 4 3 2 1 99         
D. A Street Committee 4 3 2 1 99         
E. A School Governing Body 4 3 2 1 99         
F Some other association or community group 4 3 2 1 99         
G 
Any other type of organization? 
 
Write in: ___________________________ 
4 3 2 1 99         
 
 
61. [If respondent belongs to more than one organization]   Of the organizations to which you belong, which one is the most important to 
you and what is its name?  Which is the next most important and what is its name?  And which one is the next most important? 
A.   [Write in Name of Group] 
1st Most Important 
 
__________________  
[Write in Name of Group] 
2nd Most Important 
 
__________________  
[Write in Name of Group] 
3rd Most Important 
 
________________  
 
 
62.  No, 
never 
Yes, Once 
or twice 
Yes, 
often. 
Don’t know 
[DNR] 
A. Have ever attended a meeting organized by your Ward Committee? 1 2 3 99 
B Have ever attended a meeting organized by your Street Committee? 1 2 3 99 
C. Have ever attended a meeting organized by your School Governing Body? 1 2 3 99 
 
*IMPORTANT NOTE: IF RESPONDENT SAYS YES, MOVE TO Q64 
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63. IF NO, WHY HAVE YOU NOT ATTENDED?  WRITE IN 
THE RESPONSE: 
 
A 
Ward Committee 
B 
Street Committee 
C 
School Governing 
Body 
 Not applicable: has attended a meeting  97 97 97 
I don’t have transport 1 1 1 
I don’t have any information about the meetings are held 2 2 2 
I don’t have the time 3 3 3 
It will make no difference, nothing will change 4 4 4 
They will not listen to my opinion 5 5 5 
 Have not thought about it 6 6 6 
Other, please specify 
 
   
Don’t know 99 99 99 
 
 Yes No Don’t know 
64. Have you taken part in a protest or demonstration in the last twelve months? 1 2 99 
 
*IMPORTANT NOTE: IF RESPONDENT SAYS NO, MOVE TO Q70 
65.  
 VERBATIM RESPONSE Don’t Know POST CODE 
A. What kind of protest was it? (march, rally, etc)   99  
B. Who organized the protest?   99  
C. What was the main issue being protested 
against?  99  
D What was your main reason for taking part in it? 
(Did you support the cause or organization?)    
 
 Yes No Don’t know 
66. Were the goals of the protest achieved? 1 2 99 
67. Did the protest become violent? 1 2 99 
68. (IF YES) Do you feel it was necessary for the protest to become violent to achieve the 
goals of the protest? 
1 2 99 
 
69.  
 VERBATIM RESPONSE Don’t Know POST CODE 
A. (IF YES) How did the protest 
become violent?  99  
 
Now I am going to ask you some questions about group relations in your area/neighbourhood. 
 
70. People have different group identities and South Africans describe themselves in different ways.  Besides being South 
African, do you feel you belong to any other group? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Don’t know [DO NOT READ] 99 
 
***IMPORTANT NOTE:  IF RESPONDENT SAYS NO, MOVE TO Q75 
 
71. If yes, which other group do you belong? 
 
 
   
 
72. Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a South African and being a ________[R’s GROUP].  Which of these two 
groups do you feel most strongly attached to, or are they equally important?  
South African  1 
______________________________________ [R's  Group] 2 
Equally important 3 
Not applicable/Does not feel close to any group 97 
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Don’t know 99 
 
***IMPORTANT NOTE:  IF RESPONDENT SAYS SOUTH AFRICAN OR EQUALLY IMPORTANT, MOVE TO Q75 
 
73.  
  Much less Less Same More 
Much 
More 
Not 
applicable 
Don’t know 
[DNR] 
A. Does ______________[READ IN R’s group] people have 
less, the same, or more influence in politics than other 
groups in this community? 
1 2 3 4        5 97 99         
  Much worse  Worse Same Better 
Much 
Better 
Not 
applicable 
Don’t know 
[DNR] 
B Are ______________[READ IN R’s group] people treated 
worse, the same as, or better by members of other groups? 1 2 3 4        5 97 99         
C Are ______________[READ IN R’s group]economic 
conditions worse, the same as, or better than other groups 
in this community? 
1 2 3 4        5 97 99        
 
74. In general, do you feel that people in government are less interested, or more interested in what ______________[READ IN R’s 
group] think compared to other groups, or is it about the same?  PROBE FOR STRENGTH OF OPINION 
Much less interested Less interested About the same More interested Much more interested Don’t know [DNR] 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
 
75. Are there any groups living in this community who you think should not be living here? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Don’t know [DO NOT READ] 99 
 
*IMPORTANT NOTE: IF RESPONDENT SAYS NO OR DON’T KNOW, MOVE TO Q77 
 
76. IF YES:  Which groups?  MULTIPLE MENTIONS POSSIBLE.  ACCEPT UP TO THREE RESPONSES.   
1st response 
    
2nd response 
    
3rd response 
    
 
77.  
 
Less 
than a 
year 
1-2 
years 
2-3 
years 
3-5 
years 
5-10 
years 
More 
than 10 
years 
Since 
birth 
Don’t Know 
[DNR] 
A.  For how long have you lived in this area? 1 2 3 4        5 6 8 99 
B. For how long have your neighbours lived in this area? 1 2 3 4        5 6 8 99 
C.  For how long have most other people lived in this area? 1 2 3 4        5 6 8 99 
 
78. Before coming to live here, where did you stay?  
79. Where were you born? 
 PRIOR RESIDENCE WHERE BORN 
Western Cape other 1 1 
Gauteng 2 2 
Eastern Cape 3 3 
KwaZulu/Natal 4 4 
Mpumalanga 5 5 
North West Province 6 6 
Northern Cape 7 7 
Northern Province 8 8 
Free State 9 9 
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Born here/Always lived here 10 10 
 
80. Would you consider leaving this community to go and live somewhere else in the future?  Would you give it:  READ OUT - SINGLE 
MENTION. 
Strong consideration 1 
Some consideration 2 
Would not consider it 3 
Don’t know [DO NOT READ]  99 
 
81. How much do you trust each of the following?  [Read out options] 
  Not at all Just a little bit Somewhat A lot Don’t know [DNR] 
A. People living close to you 1 2 3 4 99 
B. Your relatives 1 2 3 4 99 
D South Africans in general 1 2 3 4 99 
 
Finally, let me record a few facts about yourself.                                                                                                                                    
 
 
 
82. How old were you at your last birthday? 
[Interviewer: Enter three digit number. Don't Know = 999]       
 
  No Yes Don’t know 
83. Are you the head of the household? 0 1 99 
 
84. In your household, how many children are there under the age of 18? 
[Interviewer: Enter two digit number. Don't Know = 99]      
 
85. What is your home language?  
 
 English 1  Afrikaans 2 
Xhosa 3 Other [Specify]: _______________________ Post code 
    
 
86. What is the highest level of education you have completed?  [Code from answer.  Do not read options] 
No formal 
schooling 
Informal 
schooling only 
(including 
Koranic 
schooling) 
Some 
primary 
schooling 
Primary 
school 
completed 
Some secondary 
school / high 
school 
Secondary 
school 
completed / high 
school 
Post-secondary 
qualifications, other than 
university e.g. diploma from 
technikon or college 
University 
degree 
completed 
Post-
graduate 
Don’t 
know [Do 
not read] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
87. What is your religion, if any?                                                                                                                                                  
None 0 
Islam 1 
Catholic 2 
Protestant (Mainstream) 3 
Protestant (Evangelical/ Pentecostal) 4 
African Independent Church 5 
Zionist Christian Church 6 
Traditional religion 7 
Hindu 8 
Agnostic (Do not know if there is a God) 9 
Atheist (Do not believe in a God) 10 
Other [Specify]: ______________________________________________________________ Post code    
Don’t know 999 
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 Inside house Inside yard Outside yard Dont Know [DNR] 
88. Where is your main water source? 1 2 3 99 
 
89. Which of the following best describes the housing situation of this household? 
Own the House/flat  1 
Rent the house/flat 2 
Rent a dwelling in the backyard 3 
Informal dwelling  in informal settlement 4 
Other [Specify]: __________________________________________________________ Post code     
 
90. IF RESPONDENT IS THE OWNER, how did you obtain your house? 
Purchased it. 1 
From the government but had to pay a subsidy  2 
From the government and was not required to pay a subsidy 3 
 
91.  Very satisfied Satisfied Dissatisfied Highly dissatisfied 
 Overall, how satisfied are you with your house?   1 2 3 4 
 
*IMPORTANT NOTE: IF RESPONDENT SAYS VERY SATISFIED OR SATISFIED MOVE TO Q106 
 
92. IF DISSATISFIED: What makes you feel dissatisfied?  
DO NOT PROMPT.  MULTIPLE MENTIONS POSSIBLE.  ACCEPT UP TO THREE RESPONSES.   
1st response 
    
2nd response 
    
3rd response 
    
 
*IMPORTANT NOTE: ASK Q104 AND Q105 IF THE RESPONDENT IS NOT THE OWNER. 
 
 Yes No Dont Know [DNR] 
93. IF THE RESPONDENT IS NOT THE OWNER, are you on a waiting list?  1 2 99 
    
94. (IF YES). How long have you been on the waiting list? Dont Know [DNR] 
  99 
 
 
95. Which of these things do you personally own? 
  No (Don’t own) Yes (Do Own) Don’t know [DNR] 
A Radio 1 2 99 
B Television 1 2 99 
C Mobile Phone 1 2 99 
D A Computer 1 2 99 
C Bicycle 1 2 99 
D Motorcycle 1 2 99 
E Motor Vehicle / Car 1 2 99 
 
96. How often do you travel 10km or more from where you live right now?   
Never Less than once a month A few times a month A few times week  Everyday Don’t know [DNR] 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
 
 Train Bus Taxi Lift Private 
transport 
Don’t 
know 
97. What type of transport do you normally use? 1 2 3 4 5 99 
 
  No Yes 
98. Do you have a job that pays cash income? 1 2 
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99. (IF YES) Is it full time or part time? 1 2 
100. Are you presently looking for a job (even if you are presently working)? 1 2 
 
101. What additional sources of income does your household have? 
Other household members also work  1 
Old-age pension 2 
Child care grant 3 
Foster care grant 4 
Disability grant 5 
Borde & lodging 6 
Rental Income 7 
Assistance from relatives not living in the house 8 
 
OTHER: SPECIFY 
 
 
Don’t know [Do not read] 99 
 
102. How much do spend on public transport per month? 
Do not use public 
transport. 
Less than R50 
per month R51-R100 
R101-
R200 R201-R300 
R300-
R399 
R400-
R699 
R700-
R999 
R1000-
R1999 
R2000 or 
more 
Don’t know 
[DNR] 
97 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 5 
 
103. What is your the total income?  HAND RESPONDENT CARD 
No regular 
income 
R1-
R999 
R1000- 
R1999 
R2000- 
R3999 
R4000-
R5999 
R6000-
R7999 
R8000-
R9999 
R10 000-
R19 999 
R20 000- 
R29 999 
R30 000 – 
R50 000 R50 000+ Refused 
Don’t 
know 
[DNR] 
97 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 98 99 
 
104. What is your present occupation or last occupation (if unemployed)? 
 
WRITE IN_____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Never had a job. 1 
Currently unemployed 2 
Pensioner 3 
Student 4 
Housewife/Works in the house 4 
NB  REMEMBER TO  COMPLETE NEXT SECTION!  
ALL SUBSEQUENT QUESTIONS SHOULD BE ANSWERED BY THE INTERVIEWER AFTER THE INTERVIEW IS 
CONCLUDED 
105. Respondent Gender 
Male 1 
Female 2 
 
106. Respondent’s race  
Black  1 
White  2 
Coloured 3 
Indian 4 
Could not tell 99 
 
 Yes No Dont Know [DNR] 
107. Does the respondent have electricity in the house?  1 2 99 
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108. (IF YES). Is it through a meter or a wire? Meter Wire Dont Know [DNR] 
 1 2 99 
 
109. Do you think the respondent is well informed about politics?  
Well informed 1 
Somewhat informed 2 
Not very informed 3 
Not informed at all 4 
Do not know [Do not read] 9 
 
110. Which of the following best describes the main dwelling unit that this household occupies? 
House (brick structure) 1 
Flat in block of flats 2 
House/flat back yard 3 
Informal dwelling in backyard 4 
Informal dwelling  in informal settlement 5 
Other [Specify]: __________________________________________________________ Post code     
 
111. Was the roof made of: ONE CODE ONLY  
Metal, tin, zinc 1 
Tiles 2 
Thatch 3 
Plastic sheets 4 
Asbestos 5 
Multiple materials 6 
Could not see / could not tell 7 
 
  No one Spouse only Children Only 
A few 
others 
Small 
crowd 
112. Were there any other people immediately present who might be listening during the 
interview?   1 2 3 4 5 
 
113. What proportion of the questions do you feel the respondent had difficulty answering?                                                        
All 4 
Most 3 
Some 2 
Few 1 
None 0 
 
114. What was the respondent’s attitude toward you during the interview? 
 A. Was he or she  1 Friendly 
2 
In between 
3               
Hostile          
 B. Was he or she 1 Interested 
2 
In between 
3                
Bored           
 C. Was he or she 1 Cooperative 
2 
In between 
3               
Uncooperative 
 D. Was he or she 1 Patient 
2 
In between 
3                 
      Impatient 
 E. Was he or she 1 At ease 
2 
In between 
3                 
    Suspicious 
 F. Was he or she 1 Honest 
2 
In between 
3                 
     Misleading 
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115.  
Yes No 
A.  Did your presence in the area arouse interest from neighbors? 1 2 
B.  Did your presence in the area arouse suspicion from neighbors? 1 2 
C.  Did your presence in the area arouse fear from neighbors? 1 2 
D.  Were you approached by community and/or political party representatives? 1 2 
E.  Did you feel threatened during the interview? 1 2 
F.  Were you physically threatened during the interview? 1 2 
 
 
 
SIGNATURE PAGE 
116. INTERVIEWER:  Do you have any other comments on the interview?  For example, did anything else significant happen during the 
interview? 
No 1 
Yes: [Explain] ______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
       
   
2 
 
INTERVIEWER: I hereby certify that this interview was conducted in accordance with instructions received during training.   
All responses recorded here are those of the respondent who was chosen by the appropriate selection method. 
 
 
         INTERVIEWER SIGNATURE: ___________________________________________________________________________ 
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ANNEXURE 2 
FOCUS GROUP SCHEDULE 
FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION HELD WITH WARD COMMITTEE MEMBERS ON 
23/10/2012 IN DELFT 
 
1) How was your ward committee constituted?  
 
2) Do you understand the roles and responsibilities of a ward committee?  Provide some examples of the 
tasks that you are expected to perform on a daily basis.   
 
3) Have you received training in respect of how ward committees are supposed to function? Is this 
training adequate in terms of performing your role as ward committee member and the mandate you 
are given by sub-council?  
 
4) Are you familiar with the City of Cape Town legislation regulating establishment of ward committees in 
respect of: 
• The code of conduct for members of ward committees approved by council: 28 September 2011 
– C82/09/11. 
• Rules for the election and establishment of ward committees. 
• Rules for the operation of ward committees in the Metropolitan Area for the City of Cape Town. 
 
5) Is the sub-council effective in terms of their mandated roles and responsibilities in the community?  
 
6) Are ward committee members encouraged to attend sub-council meetings? 
 
7) As ward chairperson does the ward council assist ward committee members in enabling the ward 
committee to function optimally? Please elaborate on your answer.  
 
8) Would you consider the ward committee system as an effective mechanism in terms of representing 
the broader community and being able to influence decision-making? 
 
9) Would you consider the system of sector organisations as an effective mechanism in terms of 
representing the broader community on the ward committee? 
 
10) What is your understanding of the term participation? Are community members encouraged to 
participate in activities in the ward and sub-council? What is the nature of this participation?  
 
 
11) What is your understanding of the IDP process?  
 
12) Has your ward committee been invited to attend IDP meetings in the community? What is the nature 
of participation   
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13) Is your ward committee enabled to make a meaningful input into the City’s IDP during meetings in 
terms of expressing the priority and needs raised by ward committee members?    
 
14) Are inputs made by ward committee members in IDP consultation meetings reflected in the final IDP? 
 
15) Is your ward committee enabled to provide a meaningful input in terms of identifying other 
development initiatives in the area? 
 
16) Does your ward committee encourage community members to attend IDP and other meetings in the 
community and participate actively in deliberations?  If yes, how do you encourage community 
members to attend and what is the nature/level of their participation?  If not, what is the 
reason/obstacle preventing participation in community meetings?  
 
17) Could you make some suggestions that would enable more active participation in the IDP and other 
activities in the community?  
 
18) How do the sub-council and council respond to community service delivery needs as expressed by 
community members? 
 
19) What are the daily problems that you confront when performing your responsibilities as ward 
committee member in the community? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
319 
 
ANNEXURE 2 
FOCUS GROUP SCHEDULE 
FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION HELD WITH WARD COMMITTEE MEMBERS ON 
23/10/2012 IN DELFT 
 
1) How was your ward committee constituted?  
 
2) Do you understand the roles and responsibilities of a ward committee?  Provide some 
examples of the tasks that you are expected to perform on a daily basis.   
 
3) Have you received training in respect of how ward committees are supposed to 
function? Is this training adequate in terms of performing your role as ward committee 
member and the mandate you are given by sub-council?  
 
4) Are you familiar with the City of Cape Town legislation regulating establishment of ward 
committees in respect of: 
• The code of conduct for members of ward committees approved by council: 28 
September 2011 – C82/09/11. 
• Rules for the election and establishment of ward committees. 
• Rules for the operation of ward committees in the Metropolitan Area for the City 
of Cape Town. 
 
5) Is the sub-council effective in terms of their mandated roles and responsibilities in the 
community?  
 
6) Are ward committee members encouraged to attend sub-council meetings? 
 
7) As ward chairperson does the ward council assist ward committee members in enabling 
the ward committee to function optimally? Please elaborate on your answer.  
 
8) Would you consider the ward committee system as an effective mechanism in terms of 
representing the broader community and being able to influence decision-making? 
 
9) Would you consider the system of sector organisations as an effective mechanism in 
terms of representing the broader community on the ward committee? 
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10) What is your understanding of the term participation? Are community members 
encouraged to participate in activities in the ward and sub-council? What is the nature 
of this participation?  
 
11) What is your understanding of the IDP process?  
 
12) Has your ward committee been invited to attend IDP meetings in the community? What 
is the nature of participation   
 
13) Is your ward committee enabled to make a meaningful input into the City’s IDP during 
meetings in terms of expressing the priority and needs raised by ward committee 
members?    
 
14) Are inputs made by ward committee members in IDP consultation meetings reflected in 
the final IDP? 
 
15) Is your ward committee enabled to provide a meaningful input in terms of identifying 
other development initiatives in the area? 
 
16) Does your ward committee encourage community members to attend IDP and other 
meetings in the community and participate actively in deliberations?  If yes, how do you 
encourage community members to attend and what is the nature/level of their 
participation?  If not, what is the reason/obstacle preventing participation in 
community meetings?  
 
17) Could you make some suggestions that would enable more active participation in the 
IDP and other activities in the community?  
 
18) How do the sub-council and council respond to community service delivery needs as 
expressed by community members? 
 
19) What are the daily problems that you confront when performing your responsibilities as 
ward committee member in the community? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
